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I. The Proposed Amendment Arises Out of the Same Conduct as the 
Original Petition. 
First, the claims of Jane Doe No. 3 and Jane Doe No. 4 arise out of the same operative 
facts as the original plaintiffs. In particular, both Jane Doe No. 3 and Jane Doe No. 4 challenge 
the same secret agreement — i.e., the NPA that the Government executed with Epstein and then 
concealed from the victims. This is made clear by the proposed amendment itself, in which all 
four victims simply allege the same general facts. 
2. The Government Is Not Unduly Prejudiced by the Amendment. 
Second, allowing the addition of two plaintiffs from the originally alleged victim class 
will not unduly prejudice the Government. Various district courts define prejudice with regards 
to relation back in terms of lost evidence due to the passage of time or inadequate time for 
discovery. See Oslo I. Milwaukee Cnty.. 2007 WL 3228118. at *2 (E.D. Wis. 2007) (no 
evidence of prejudice; additional plaintiffs allowed). In fact, some jurisdictions require the 
opposing party to bear the burden of proving prejudice. See. e.g., Padilla'. Sears. Roebuck & 
Co., 2012 WL 5505071, at *I (N.D. Cal. 2012). In other jurisdictions, a defendant fails to prove 
prejudice unless it provides substantiated proof of harm. See Green'. Wolf Corp., 50 F.R.D. 220, 
224 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). These cases proceed from the premise that the concept of relation back 
would be undermined if defendants were allowed to bar plaintiffs from joining a case simply by 
proffering an unsupported protest of prejudice. Id. 
Here, the Government advances such an unsupported claim of prejudice. 
The 
Government seems to be treating this case as no-holds-barred, adversary litigation. In its effort 
to keep the new victims out of this case, the Government remarkably appears to have forgotten 
its statutory obligations to protect the victims. Congress has directed that federal prosecutors 
"shall make their best efforts to see that crime victims are . . . accorded the rights described in 
15 
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Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 311 Entered on FLSD Docket 02/06/2015 Page 16 of 21 
[the CVRA]." 18 U.S.C. § 377I(c)(1). In order for the Government to show "prejudice," it must 
demonstrate "[d]amage or detriment to one's legal rights or claims." Blacks's Law Dictionary 
1218 (8th ed. 2004). Because the Government has a legal obligation to make its "best efforts" to 
protect the CVRA rights of victims, it does not suffer any undue prejudice from the addition of 
two new victims seeking to protect their rights — rights that the Government must also protect. 
Turning to the specifics of the Government's position, the only argument that the 
Government advances with respect to Jane Doe No. 3 is that her CVRA claim is "specious." DE 
290 at 12. This is, of course. an argument not about prejudice to the Government but rather 
about the merits of Jane Doe No. 3's claims. But in considering a motion for joinder, the Court 
must assume as true all relevant factual allegations made by the party seeking to join. See Lewis 
World Boxing Council, 914 F. Supp. 1121, 1123 (D.N.J. 1996). Here, Jane Doe No. 3 has 
alleged — both in her initial affidavit and in her supplemental affidavit filed along with this 
pleading — that the Government did not properly confer with her or otherwise afford her rights 
under the CVRA. See. e.g., DE 291-I at 13 (alleging failure to confer on the NPA); Jane Doe 
No. 3 Aff. at 5 ("I was never offered a chance to meaningfully confer with the prosecutor for the 
Government, and 1 was never notified of any hearing that could affect me or my rights as a crime 
victim to ever bring charges"). And the proposed amendment would allege that the Government 
did not extend to her the rights promised in the CVRA. See Exhibit I at 1-2. 
In contending that it will ultimately be able to prevail on such issues, the Government 
claims that Jane Doe No. 3 told "agents of the Government" not to bother her about the Epstein 
investigation. DE 290 at 12. The facts surrounding this alleged exchange are highly disputed. 
To begin with, it appears that the agent did not write any report surrounding this contact, see DE 
304-1 at 1-3 (general affidavit that does not reference any specific dates) — a possible deviation 
16 
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Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 311 Entered on FLSD Docket 02/06/2015 Page 17 of 21 
from standard procedure that raises questions about what exactly happened. More important. 
Jane Doe No. 3 strongly disputes that this brief contact was proper notification of her rights. As 
she explains at length in her affidavit, she had grave doubts about whether a person calling her 
out of the blue over the telephone and asking her about sex with Epstein was truly a law 
enforcement investigator. See Jane Doe No. 3 Aft'. at 4-5. The fact that Epstein and his lawyer 
called her immediately after this contact only added to her suspicion. Id. at 5. 
In such circumstances, it is hard to see how a brief telephone call from an FBI agent 
complies with the CVRA's command that crime victims be reasonably "notified" of their CVRA 
rights, 18 U.S.C. § 3771 (c)(1), as well as actually afforded their rights — such as the right to 
confer with the prosecutor. Nor would it have been inconsistent with respect for the victims' 
"dignity and privacy," 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(8), for the Government to have followed its standard 
procedure of sending written notification of rights to Jane Doe No. 3.6 To be sure, federal 
prosecutors have "prosecutorial discretion" about which criminal charges to ultimately file. See 
18 U.S.C. § 377I(dX6). But that discretion is not a license for the Government to simply decide 
not to provide proper notification to a victim of serious federal crimes — particularly when that 
victim was clearly afraid of a dangerous criminal and hiding to escape his wrath. At the very 
least, the Government can simply deny Jane Doe No. 3 an opportunity to join this case through 
mere allegation that it complied with the CVRA. The Court should allow an amendment now 
and make a final determination on CVRA compliance based on an appropriate record? 
6 Much later on September 3, 2008. the Government sent notification to Jane Doe No. 3. 
at her address in 
, of a possible civil remedy to be pursued. DE 290-I. But it never sent 
its standard victim notification letter to Jane Doe No. 3 — in contrast to what it did earlier for 
other victims. 
7 The Court will have to make such determination even if it denies the motion to amend. 
Jane Doe No. I and Jane Doe No. 2 have already stated that they will call Jane Doe No. 3 as a 
witness at any trial to prove part of a common plan and scheme to deprive the victims of their 
17 
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Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 311 Entered on FLSD Docket 02/06/2015 Page 18 of 21 
The Government will likewise not be prejudiced if Jane Doe No. 4 is added into the case. 
The initial petition alleged that the Government had no made adequate efforts to notify "victims" 
about the non-prosecution agreement. Jane Doe No. 4 was in the victim class. The Government 
churlishly contends that adding her into this case would require "a separate trial over whether or 
not Jane Doe #4 is a 'victim' who would have been entitled to any rights." DE 290 at 10. Of 
course, the Government never denies that Jane Doe No. 4 is a victim in this case, presumably 
because it now possesses ample evidence that Epstein sexually abused her. Undersigned legal 
counsel has already provided ample information to the Government supporting this fact. The 
Government has an obligation to use its "best efforts" to protect the rights of victims. Simply 
demanding a "trial" when it knows what the real facts are is inconsistent with that obligation. 
The Government also makes other arguments about the merits of Jane Doe No. 4's claims, but 
those can be handled in due course in this litigation. 
3. The Government Is On Notice About Claims from Other Victims. 
The third and final requirement of the Eleventh Circuit's relation back test is adequate 
notice in the original complaint of the potential to add new plaintiffs. The Eleventh Circuit has 
said "the critical issue [regarding relation back] is whether the original complaint gave notice to 
the defendant of the claim now being asserted." Bloom'. Alvereze, 498 F. App'x 867, 883 (I 1th 
Cir. 2012). In Bloom, the Eleventh Circuit found that the motion to amend to add Mrs. Bloom to 
Mr. Bloom's claim did not satisfy the relation back test because Mrs. Bloom was only mentioned 
in the original pleading vaguely in one instance as Mr. Bloom's wife. Id. In contrast, as 
recounted in the Factual Background section above, the original petition and reply in this case 
clearly alleged that many victims — including Jane Doe No. 3 and Jane Doe No. 4 — were banned 
rights. See DE 291 at 25-26 (citing Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)). 
18 
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Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 311 Entered on FLSD Docket 02/06/2015 Page 19 of 21 
by the Government. For example, the petition alleged "[o]n information and belief, roughly the 
same crimes were committed [by Epstein] against several other young females. These victims. 
too, are in danger of losing their right to confer under the CVRA." DE I at 7 n.2 (emphasis 
added). And the reply supporting the petition asked the Court to "hold that [Jane Doe No. 
and 
the other victims in this case had the right to confer with the Government before it reached its 
non-prosecution agreement." DE 9 at 8 (emphasis added). The reply went on to explain relief 
sought, specifically that "[t]he Court should therefore declare the proposed non-prosecution 
agreement an illegal one, since it was reached in violation of the CVRA, and order the 
Government to confer with Petitioner and the other victims in this matter before reaching any 
disposition in this case." Id. at 2 (emphasis added). Building on all these allegations, at the first 
hearing in this case, the Court allowed an additional victim — Jane Doe No. 2 — to join the action. 
See DE 115 (tr. July I 1, 2008) at 14. The current motion for an amended pleading simply builds 
on that elaboration, naming two additional victims who were in the victim class alleged at the 
outset of this case. The courts have readily allowed relation back in such circumstances. See, 
e.g., Paskulyl. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 1210, 1211 (7th Cir. 1981) (where "the original 
complaint alleged that defendant engaged in practices that discriminated against women because 
of their sex; the defendant was thereby on notice that it might be required to defend its 
employment practices from charges of class-based discrimination"). 
Clearly the proposed amendment asserts a claim "that arouse out of the conduct. 
transaction or occurrence set out — or attempted to be set out — in the original pleading." Fed. R. 
Civ. P. I 5(c)(1)(8). The adding of new "parties after the applicable statute of limitations may 
have run is not significant when the change is merely formal and in no way alters the known 
19 
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Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 311 Entered on FLSD Docket 02/06/2015 Page 20 of 21 
facts and issues on which the action is based." Slarenl. Am. Nat. Bank & Trust Co. qf Chicago, 
529 F.2d 1257, 1263 (7th Cir. 1976). The Court should accordingly allow an amended pleading. 
CONCLUSION 
Jane Doe No. I and Jane Doe No. 2 should be allowed to amend their initial petition. 
pursuant to Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to conform to the evidence in this 
case and to add Jane Doe No. 3 and Jane Doe No. 4 as petitioners. A proposed first amended 
petition is attached to this pleading. 
DATED: February 6. 2015 
Respectfully Submitted, 
/s/ Bradley J. Edwards 
Bradley J. Edwards 
FARMER, JAFFE. WEISSING, 
P.L.
DWARDS. FIST0S & LEHRMAN, 
and
Paul G. Cassell 
Pro Hoc Vice 
S.J. Quinney College of Law at the 
University of Utah 
Attorneys for Jane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2 
• This daytime business address is provided for identification and correspondence 
purposes only and is not intended to imply institutional endorsement by the University of Utah 
20 
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Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 311 Entered on FLSD Docket 02/06/2015 Page 21 of 21 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that the foregoing document was served on February 6, 2015, on the following 
using the Court's CM/ECF system: 
Elm 
500 S. Australian Ave., Suite 400 
West Palm Beach. FL 33401 
Attorneys for the Government 
/s/ Bradley J. Edwards 
21 
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EXHIBIT 1 
EFTA00188636

Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 311-1 Entered on FLSD Docket 02/06/2015 Page 2 of 6 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA 
CASE NO. 9:08-cv-80736-KAM 
JANE DOE NO. I and JANE DOE NO. 2, 
Petitioners, 
vs. 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
Respondent. 
VICTIMS FIRST AMENDED PETITION FOR ENFORCEMENT 
OF THE CRIME VICTIMS' RIGHTS ACT 
COME NOW Jane Doe No. I and Jane Doe 2, to file this first amended petition 
for enforcement of rights under the Crime Victims' Rights Act (CVRA), 18 U.S.C. § 
3771. 
I. Petitioners Jane Doe No. I. Jane Doe No. 2, Jane Doe, No. 3, and Jane Doe 
No. 4 (hereinafter collectively referred to as "the petitioners"), now adults, were as minor 
girls the victims of federal sex crimes committed by Jeffrey Epstein (hereinafter 
"Defendant") and by other co-conspirators between about 1998 and 2006. These crimes 
included sex trafficking of children (in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1591), use of a means of 
interstate commerce entice a minor to commit prostitution (in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 
2422), travel with intent to engage in illicit sexual conduct (in violation of 18 U.S.0 § 
2423), wire fraud (in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343), and conspiracy to commit such 
crimes (in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371). The Defendant and others committed these 
crimes within the jurisdiction of the Southern District of Florida in Palm Beach County, 
1 
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Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 311-1 Entered on FLSD Docket 02/06/2015 Page 3 of 6 
Florida, as well as in other jurisdictions inside and outside the United States. The 
Defendant and his co-conspirators committed similar crimes against dozens of other 
victims. 
2. Upon information and belief, in and around 2005 to 2007. the Defendant and 
others were the subject of a federal criminal investigation conducted by the United States 
Attorney's Office for the Southern District of Florida (hereafter "the U.S. Attorney's 
Office") for crimes committed against the petitioners and other similarly situated victims. 
In around September 2007, the Defendant and the U.S. Attorney's Office entered a non-
prosecution agreement ("NPA"), under which the Defendant and other potential co-
conspirators would not be prosecuted for their federal crimes against petitioners and other 
similarly-situated victims, in exchange for the Defendant's guilty plea to two state 
offenses, including solicitation of a minor for prostitution. On June 30, 2008. in the 
Circuit Court for Palm Beach, the Defendant entered his guilty plea to the State offenses 
and, pursuant to the previous agreement, was sentenced to 18 months in jail. 
3. Upon information and belief, around and after September 2007, the Defendant 
and the U.S. Attorney's Office conspired together to make the NPA confidential and 
thereafter conceal its existence from the petitioners and other similarly situated victims 
for as long as possible. This conspiracy was designed to prevent the outcry that would 
have resulted from awareness by the petitioners, other victims, and members of the public 
that a wealthy, politically-connected defendant was receiving only a short county jail 
sentence for hundreds of federal sex crimes committed against minor girls. Among the 
means used by the conspiracy to conceal the existence of the non-prosecution agreement 
were false statements directed by the Office that the case was "still under investigation" 
2 
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Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 311-1 Entered on FLSD Docket 02/06/2015 Page 4 of 6 
and the Office was considering whether to file charges. when in fact the Office had 
already entered into the NPA. 
4. Under the Crime Victims Rights Act (CVRA), 18 U.S.C. § 3771, when the 
investigation had focused on the Defendant — and at all times thereafter — the petitioners 
and other similarly-situated crime victims had the rights (among others) to notice of their 
rights under the CVRA, to reasonably confer with the prosecutors, to notice of court 
hearings involving them, and to be treated with fairness. 
5. By cooperating together to conceal the NPA's existence until after it has 
become fully effective — and by taking other improper steps to prevent the investigation 
and prosecution of the Defendant and his co-conspirators — the U.S. Attorney's Office 
and the Defendant denied and continues to deny petitioners and other similarly-situated 
victims their rights (among others) to reasonably confer with prosecutors about the NPA 
and other aspects of the case, to notice that the June 30, 2008, hearing related to crimes 
committed against them, to restitution, and to be treated with fairness. 
WHEREFORE. the petitioners respectfully request this Court grant them 
appropriate remedies to fully enforce their rights, including (I) a declaration that the NPA 
is illegal and was entered into in violation of their rights, (2) a declaration that if after 
consultation with the victims the U.S. Attorney's Office determines that prosecution of 
Epstein and of others is appropriate then prosecution is permitted, (3) a declaration that 
the Office shall reasonably confer with the petitioners and other similarly-situated victims 
about whether to prosecute Epstein and his co-conspirators, (4) a release of all 
information surrounding the circumstances of the Office's initial decision not to pursue 
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Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 311-1 Entered on FLSD Docket 02/06/2015 Page 5 of 6 
criminal prosecution, and (5) all other appropriate remedies that the Court deems just and 
proper. 
The petitioners request appropriate discovery and an evidentiary hearing to prove 
their allegations and secure the relief requested above. 
DATED: February 6 2015 
Respectfully Submitted, 
/s/ Bradley J. Edwards 
Bradley J. Edwards 
FARMER, JAFFE. WEISSING, 
EDWARDS. 
FISTOS 
& 
LEHRMAN. P.L. 
and 
Paul G. Cassell 
Pro Hat Vice 
S.J. Quinney College of Law at the 
University of Utah.
Attorneys for Victims 
• This daytime business address is provided for identification and correspondence purposes only 
and is not intended to imply institutional endorsement by the University of Utah 
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Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 311-1 Entered on FLSD Docket 02/06/2015 Page 6 of 6 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that the foregoing document was served on February 6, 2015, on the 
following using the Court's CM/ECF system: 
IMM 
500 S. Australian Ave., Suite 400 
West Palm Beach. FL 33401 
Attorneys for the Government 
/s/ Bradley J. Edwards 
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA 
Case No. 9:08-cv-80736-1(AM 
JANE DOE #1 and JANE DOE #2 
I 
UNITED STATES 
JANE DOE NO. 3 AND JANE DOE NO. 4'S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION 
PURSUANT TO RULE 21 FOR JOINDER IN ACTION 
COME NOW Jane Doe No. 3 and Jane Doe No. 4 (also referred to as "the new victims"). 
by and through undersigned counsel, to file this reply in support of their motion pursuant to 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 21 to join this action (DE 280). on the condition that they not re-
litigate any issues already litigated by Jane Doe No. I and Jane Doe No. 2 (also referred to as 
"the current victims"). The Government's response (DE 290) fails to contest the new victims' 
specific argument that good cause exists for allowing them to join. Instead, the Government 
raises technical arguments about allegedly applicable statutes of limitations found in the CVRA 
or in 28 U.S.C. § 240I(a). But the CVRA does not contain the time limit that the Government 
reads into the Act. And § 2401(a) does not bar the action here. The Court should accordingly 
allow joinder of the new victims.' 
I. 
THE GOVERNMENT HAS NOT CONTESTED THE VICTIMS' POSITION 
THAT GOOD CAUSE EXISTS FOR ALLOWING THEM TO JOIN THIS 
ACTION UNDER RULE 21. 
To be clear, this motion is brought on behalf of all four victims — Jane Does No. 1, 2.3 
and 4. As indicated throughout their pleadings, the victims do not seek to duplicate effort but 
rather (represented through the same legal counsel) to pursue a single. consolidated approach. 
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Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 310 Entered on FLSD Docket 02/06/2015 Page 2 of 20 
In their motion for joinder, the new victims advanced several specific reasons why 
joinder was appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 21, including the facts that their participation 
would prove a consistent pattern of failing to notify victims. reinforce the relevancy of several 
document production requests currently pending before the Court. and elucidate the interface 
between the Government and the victims. DE 280 at 8-10. In a later pleading (responding to 
arguments from putative intervenor Alan Dershowitz), the new victims also advanced eight 
specific reasons why their allegations related specifically to current issues in the case, including 
issues of motive, the scope of any remedy that might be awarded, and the crime/fraud exception 
to the attorney-client privilege. DE 291 at 17-26. 
Tellingly, the Government does not directly contest any of these assertions. Instead, the 
Government raises several technical objections as to why joinder is not possible. The victims 
respond to each and every objection in the pages that follow. But to the extent the question 
before the Court is one calling for an exercise of discretion, the Court should act against a 
backdrop of uncontested reasons demonstrating that joinder of the new victims would be useful. 
II. 
THE CVRA DOES NOT CONTAIN A TIME LIMIT APPLICABLE TO THIS 
ENFORCMENT ACTION. 
Rather than contest the reasons for allowing two new crime victims to join this CVRA 
action, the Government attempts to manufacture a time limit out of the CVRA itself. The 
Government contends that the new victims' motion for joinder is "barred" by 18 U.S.C. § 
3771 (d)(5). which provides: 
A victim may make a motion to re-open a plea or sentence only if—
(A) the victim has asserted the right to be heard before or during the 
proceeding at issue and such right was denied; 
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(B) the victim petitions the court of appeals for a writ of mandamus within 
14 days; and 
(C) in the case of a plea, the accused has not pled to the highest offense 
charged. 
This paragraph does not affect the victim's right to restitution as provided in title 
18, United States Code. 
The Government's argument fails for the simple reason that the time limit applies only to a 
motion to "re-open a plea or sentence." The victims are seeking (among other things) rescission 
of an illegal non-prosecution agreement. not reopening of a "plea or sentence" — two different 
things. The Court has previously ruled to this effect, specifically discussing § 3771(d)(5). The 
Court held that lapthough this particular statutory enforcement provision expressly refers to the 
re-opening of a 'plea' or 'sentence' — events falling in the post-charge stage of criminal 
proceedings — the court concludes that the statute is properly interpreted impliedly to authorize a 
're-opening' or setting aside of pre-charge prosecutorial agreements made in derogations of the 
government's CRA conferral obligations as well." See DE 189 at 8. 
Moreover, on the facts of this case, the Government's construction leads to an absurd 
result. As the Court is aware, the Government arranged for Epstein to execute his NPA on about 
September 24, 2007 — in secret. At that time, the victims could not "assert(] the right to be heard 
before or during the proceeding," 18 U.S.C. § 3771(d)(5) (emphasis added), because no 
"proceeding" was held and the Government concealed what it was doing from the victims. And, 
of course, the victims could not have then filed for mandamus appellate review "within 14 days" 
because the Government did not reveal the NPA until almost a year later, and only then after 
being compelled to do so. Section 3771(d)(5) should not be construed to demand the impossible 
of crime victims. 
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Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 310 Entered on FLSD Docket 02/06/2015 Page 4 of 20 
The CVRA's legislative history makes clear Congress did not intend for courts to 
construe § 3771(d)(5) in the perverse fashion advocated by the Government. Senator Kyl, one of 
the two co-sponsors of the Act, explained that "[t]his provision [§ 3771(d)(5)] is not intended to 
prevent courts from vacating decisions in non-trial proceedings, such as proceedings involving 
release, delay, plea, or sentencing, in which victims' rights were not protected, and ordering 
those proceedings to be redone." ISO CONG. REC. 22954 (Oct. 9, 2004) (statement of Sen. Kyl) 
(emphasis added). Ele went on to emphasize that "[i]t is important for victims' rights to be 
asserted and protected throughout the criminal justice process. and for courts to have the 
authority to redo proceedings such as release, delay, pleas, and sentencings, where victims' 
rights are abridged." 151.2
The Government also half-heartedly refers to various time limits in 18 U.S.C. § 
3771(d)(3). See DE 290 at 3. But the only time limits applicable to the victims in that provision 
concern appellate relief after a district court has denied relief. Of course, proceedings before this 
Court are still continuing — no denial of relief has occurred to trigger any obligation by the 
victims.3 Simply put, nothing in the CVRA contains any limit that bars Jane Doe No. 3 and Jane 
2 
 
Section 377I(d)(5) also does not bar ail of the new victims' claims. By its plain terms. 
the provision is inapplicable to a request for restitution. The current victims have sought 
restitution, among other forms of relief, see DE 127 at 15, and the new victims seek to simply 
join in that claim. 
3 The Government also argues that victims' counsel did not request "forthwith" action at 
the July I I, 2008, hearing in this case. DE 290 at 2 (citing DE IS (tr. July I I, 2008) at 25-27). 
Of course, at that time the action had been pending for just four days. The Government had not 
provided the NM to victims' counsel, and victims' counsel was only learning about broad 
outlines of the agreement during the hearing. See DE 15 (tr. July I I, 2008) at 24 (court notes 
that victims' counsel "learned today ... that the agreement was signed ... in October"). In such 
circumstances, victims' counsel's decision to seek release of the NPA's text instead of 
precipitously committing his clients to invalidating an agreement he had not even read yet was 
4 
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• Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 310 Entered on FLSD Docket 02/06/2015 Page 5 of 20 
Doe No. 4's motion for joinder in this case. And reading any such limitation into the Act would 
clearly contravene the obvious congressional purpose of giving victims the "right to participate 
in the system." 150 CONG. REC. S4263 (Apr. 22, 2004) (statement of Sen. Feinstein), 
III. 
THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOUND IN 28 U.S.C. § 2401(A) DOES NOT 
APPLY TO THIS CVRA ENFORCEMENT ACTION. 
The Government next resorts to a civil statute of limitation as a barrier to the new victims 
protecting their rights. This effort, too, is unavailing. 
A. A CVRA Enforcement Action is not a "Civil Action" Against the United States. 
The Government contends that the six-year statute of limitations contained in 28 U.S.C. § 
2401(a) bars the new victims' entry into this case. The statute covers "civil actions," providing: 
[E]very civil action commenced against the United States shall be barred unless 
the complaint is filed within six years after the ri ht f action first accrues. The 
action of any person under legal disability or 
at the time the claim 
accrues may be commenced within three years after the disability ceases. 
This provision does not apply to this CVRA enforcement proceeding because it is not a "civil 
action" against the Government. To be sure, this Court has determined that convenience dictates 
that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "govern the general course of this proceeding." See 
DE 257 at 3. But that procedural determination does not alter the substance of this case. Indeed. 
the Government itself takes the position that this CVRA enforcement action is not a civil action, 
but rather is an "ancillary criminal proceeding()." DE 290 at 2.4 The victims' all agree. Given 
entirely reasonable. Indeed, any other course would have been foolhardy. 
4 The Government's concession readily distinguishes Center for Biological Diversity v. 
Hamilton, 453 F.3d 1331 (11th Cir. 2006), which is clearly not an "ancillary criminal 
proceeding," but rather a civil enforcement action of the Endangered Species Act. 
5 
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Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 310 Entered on FLSD Docket 02/06/2015 Page 6 of 20 
the agreement of both sides that this case is a "criminal" proceeding. it is hard to understand how 
there can even be any argument that § 240 I fai's limitation for "civil actions" is applicable. 
Confirming this conclusion is the standard definition of a "civil action," which is 
commonly defined as "a noncriminal litigation." Black's Law Dictionary 34 (9th ed. 2009) 
(emphasis added). Indeed, as the case law interpreting § 240 I (a) makes clear, the phrase "'civil 
action' as used in § 2401(a) is a term of art judicially and statutorily defined as one 'commenced 
by filing a complaint with (a) court.'" Oppenheon I. Campbell, 571 F.2d 660, 663 (D.C. Cir. 
1978) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 3). In this case, the victims never filed a "complaint." Instead. 
they filed a "Petition for Enforcement of Crime Victim's Rights Act," DE 1 — as language in the 
CVRA itself suggests was the proper procedure. See 18 U.S.C. § 3771(dX3) (providing that 
crime victims' rights "shall be asserted in the district court" and referring to a "motion" to 
protect rights). 
The federal courts — including the Eleventh Circuit — have been unwilling to stretch the 
meaning of the phrase "civil action" so far as to cover proceedings ancillary to a criminal case. 
See, e.g.. In re Grand July Proceedings. 832 F.2d 554, 557 (11th Cir. 1987) ("Just in terms of 
the plain meaning of words, it seems self-evident that an order denying a motion to quash a 
subpoena issued by a grand jury investigating possible criminal violations is not part of a 'civil 
action.'"); Blair-Bey I. Quick, 151 F.3d 1036, 1039 (D.C. Cir.) (D.C. Cir. 1998) ("the courts 
have uniformly concluded that habeas corpus proceedings — and their cousins, section 2255 
proceedings — are not 'civil actions"); United States'. Soueiti, 154 F.3d 1018, 1019 (9th Cir.) 
(finding deportation proceeding conducted as part of a criminal sentencing not a "civil action" 
because "one definition that is always correct is that civil actions are those that are not 
6 
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