EFTA00095067

mark omitted) (quoting Edwards v. Mazzuca, No 00 Civ. 2290 (12.1S), 2007 WL 2994449, at *5 
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 15, 2007)). Indeed, "[b]ecause minors often are not capable of remembering the 
exact dates when the alleged acts occurred, `fairly large time windows in the context of 
child abuse prosecutions are not in conflict with constitutional notice requirements.'" Young, 2008 
WL 4178190, at *2 (quoting Valentine v. Konteh, 395 F.3d 626, 632 (6th Cir. 2005)). The same 
is true here. The minor victims in this case cannot reasonably be expected to recall the exact dates 
when particular instances of abuse took place during their adolescence. This is especially so for 
Minor Victim-1, who experienced numerous instances of abuse over multiple years of her youth. 
Providing the approximate ranges of dates during which the offenses took place fully satisfies the 
requirements of an adequately pled charging instrument. The defendant cites no authority to the 
contrary, and her motion to dismiss should accordingly be denied. 
Third, the Indictment lists in clear detail the allegations relevant to each element of every 
criminal statute for which she is charged. Beyond simply "parroting the language of a federal 
criminal statute," Resendiz-Ponce, 549 U.S. at 108, the Indictment provides extensive detail 
regarding how the defendant is alleged to have committed the crimes charged in Counts One 
through Four. See Indictment ¶¶ 1-11. Indeed, "by providing Defendant with a narrative of the 
manner in which Defendant is alleged to have committed the charged offenses, the Indictment 
provides Defendant with more detail than is strictly necessary" under the governing law. United 
States v. Kozel, 19 Cr. 460 (KMW), 2020 WL 4751498, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 2020). 
Although the defendant complains that some of the terms used in the speaking portions of 
the Indictment are somehow vague, she cites no authority to suggest that her difficulty 
comprehending basic language in portions of a charging instrument that do not speak to the 
155 
EFTA00095247

elements of the offense requires dismissal.56 Counts One and Three, charging the defendant with 
violations of 18 U.S.0 § 371, "clearly contain[] the elements of the offense charged, fairly inform[] 
[her] of the charge[s] against [her], and enable[] [her] to plead an acquittal or conviction in bar of 
future prosecution for the same offense." United States v. Bunn, 154 F. App'x 227, 229 (2d Cir. 
2005). Counts Two and Four, charging violations of 18 U.S.0 §2422 and § 2243, respectively, 
similarly contain the elements of those offenses, and adequately inform the defendant of the 
charges against her. The Indictment also cites the relevant state criminal statute under which the 
defendant is charged constituting "sexual activity" within the language of both § 2422 and § 2243, 
specifically, violations of New York Penal Law § 130.55. Indictment In 11(b), 13, 17(b), 19. The 
defendant cites no authority for her suggestion that by providing additional detail regarding how 
the defendant committed the charged crimes, the Government is somehow required to provide 
even more specificity beyond the basic elements of the crimes charged. Absent any such authority, 
and where there is no suggestion that the Indictment fails to allege the essential elements of each 
crime charged, there is no basis to dismiss any of the counts in the Indictment. 
56 The defendant claims that the acts listed throughout the Indictment do not constitute illegal 
behavior. In this vein, the defendant makes specific reference to "grooming" as conduct that is 
not illegal. (Def. Mot. 12 at 4). This assertion contradicts the prevailing legal understanding of 
grooming. The Second Circuit has for many years found grooming behavior to be a means to 
"persuade, induce, or entice" minors to engage in illegal sexual activity. See, e.g., United States 
v. Thompson, 896 F.3d 155, 173 (2d Cir. 2018) ("Our precedent, however, supports applying a 
broad definition of enticement in this context: that definition would reasonably include 
Thompson's grooming of the minor victims to act as he desired with regard to many matters over 
the months before he made the video."); United States v. Dorvee, 616 F.3d 174, 180 (2d Cir. 2010) 
("We do not believe that the district court was clearly erroneous in finding, as a matter of fact, that 
these images were sent as part of a grooming process to persuade the agent to engage in the type 
of sexual conduct depicted in the images." (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); United 
States v. Brand, 467 F.3d 179, 203 (2d Cir. 2006) ("Brand's sexual advances and grooming 
behavior provide additional evidence in support of the jury's finding that Brand attempted to entice 
a minor."). In any event, it is for the jury to decide whether the evidence at trial establishes the 
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. 
156 
EFTA00095248

For the foregoing reasons, the defendant's sufficiency challenges to the Indictment fail as 
a matter of law, and her motion to dismiss Counts One through Four should be denied. 
VIII. There Is No Basis to Strike Any Portion of the Indictment 
The defendant moves to strike any reference to Minor Victim-3 from the Indictment, 
claiming that—contrary to the plain terms of the Indictment—the events involving Minor Victim-
3 are unrelated to the conspiracies charged in Counts One and Three and that some of that the 
allegations regarding Minor Victim-3 are unduly prejudicial. (Def. Mot. 6). The motion is 
baseless. First, as the Indictment itself makes clear, the defendant's and Epstein's interactions 
with Minor Victim-3 were part of a broader scheme and agreement to entice and transport minor 
victims with intent to commit illegal sex acts. Even if Minor Victim-3 was not ultimately 
transported as a minor, the core of a conspiracy is an agreement to engage in criminal conduct; 
there is no legal requirement that the agreed upon crime be completed. Although Minor Victim-
3's experiences cannot alone form the basis of a timely substantive charge, both charged 
conspiracies include timely overt acts, and it is well established that a charged conspiracy can 
encompass otherwise time-barred acts so long as at least one overt act in furtherance of the 
conspiracy is timely. Second, the description of Minor Victim-3's experiences in the Indictment 
is no more inflammatory or prejudicial than those regarding Minor Victim-1 and Minor Victim-2. 
Finally, even if evidence regarding Minor Victim-3 were not admissible as direct evidence of the 
charged conspiracies—which it is—that evidence will be admissible under Federal Rule of 
Evidence 404(b) to prove the defendant's knowledge, intent, and modus operandi. Accordingly, 
the motion to strike references to Minor Victim-3 as surplusage should be denied. 
A. 
Relevant Facts 
As alleged in the Indictment, Minor Victim-3 was one of the minor girls whom the 
defendant groomed to engage in sexual activity with Jeffrey Epstein. Minor Victim-3 was born in 
157 
EFTA00095249

At trial, the Government expects that Minor Victim-3 will testify, in substance 
and in part, that when she was 
, she met the defendant. After meeting Minor Victim-
3, the defendant befriended Minor Victim-3 by, among other things, discussing Minor Victim-3's 
life and family with Minor Victim-3. As a result, the defendant came to know Minor Victim-3's 
age. ithadheetwkohako desc 
Mino 
Epstein. At some Oniar 
Min 
11 17 years old, toig-deferiare 
w
defendant introduced Minor a3 
to Epstein. During that first visit, the de lelencouraged 
Minor Victim-3 to provide Epstein with a massage. During the ensuing manin 
engaged 
in at least one sex act with Minor Victim-3. Subsequently, the defendant iMINIMIEMP3, 
who was still 17 years old, to return to the defendant's home in London and massage MB again. 
Once again, the defendant encouraged Minor Victim-3 to provide a massage to Epsar During 
the ensuing massage, Epstein engaged in at least one sex act with Minor Victim-3. 
Following those two encounters, the defendant and Epstein invited Minor Victim-3 to 
travel with them to Florida, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and New York. Minor Victim-3 eventually 
accepted these invitations, but she does not recall whether she was 17 or 18 when she took her first 
trip at Epstein and the defendant's invitation. When Minor Victim-3 traveled with Epstein and the 
defendant, she provided additional massages to Epstein, during which he engaged in multiple sex 
acts with Minor Victim-3. Over the course of their interactions, the defendant made multiple 
statements to Minor Victim-3 reflecting the defendant's awareness that Epstein engaged in sex 
acts with Minor Victim-3. On at least one occasion, the defendant asked Minor Victim-3 if she 
knew any other young females who could engage in sex acts with Epstein. 
158 
EFTA00095250

B. 
Applicable Law 
"Although the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure grant the Court authority to strike 
surplusage from an indictment, see Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(d), '[i]t has long been the policy of courts 
within the Southern District to refrain from tampering with indictments."' United States v. Bin 
Laden, 91 F. Supp. 2d 600, 621 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (quoting United States v. Jimenez, 824 F. Supp. 
351, 369 (S.D.N.Y. 1993)). "Motions to strike surplusage from an indictment will be granted only 
where the challenged allegations are 'not relevant to the crime charged and are inflammatory or 
prejudicial.' United States v. Scarpa, 913 F.2d 993, 1013 (2d Cir. 1990) (quoting United States 
v. Napolitano, 552 F. Supp. 465, 480 (S.D.N.Y. 1982)). "[I]f evidence of the allegation is 
admissible and relevant to the charge, then regardless of how prejudicial the language is, it may 
not be stricken." Id. (brackets in original) (quoting United States v. DePahna, 461 F. Supp. 778, 
797 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)); see also United States v. Mulder, 273 F.3d 91, 99 (2d Cir. 2001). "This 
standard is an exacting one, and only rarely is alleged surplusage stricken from an indictment." 
United States v. Murgio, 209 F. Supp. 3d 698, 724 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (Nathan, J.) (internal quotation 
marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Smith, 985 F. Supp. 2d 547, 610 (S.D.N.Y. 2014)). 
In setting forth allegations in an indictment, the Government is not limited to description 
of only the bare elements of a crime; rather, an indictment may be used to provide background to 
the charged criminal conduct, to describe the circumstances, means, and methods of an offense, 
and to describe evidence that is otherwise admissible at trial. Simply put, "[s]tatements providing 
background are relevant and need not be struck." United States v. Mostafa, 965 F. Supp. 2d 451, 
466 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (citing Mulder, 273 F.3d at 100). Allegations also will not be stricken where 
they elucidate the circumstances, means, and methods of a charged scheme or would be admissible, 
in the alternative, under Rule 404(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence. See United States v. 
Hernandez, 85 F.3d 1023, 1030 (2d Cir. 1996) (affirming denial of motion to strike surplusage 
159 
EFTA00095251

where "[d]efendants' cocaine-related activity was clearly relevant evidence of the organizational 
structure and method of operation of their heroin conspiracy, and it also tended to establish the 
nature of the relationship between Defendants and their supplier of heroin, defendant Jose Antonio 
Hernandez," and citing Rule 404(b)). 
In terms of timing, "[c]ourts in this district routinely await presentation of the 
Government's evidence at trial before ruling on a motion to strike." Mostafa, 965 F. Supp. 2d at 
467 (citing, inter alia, Scarpa, 913 F.2d at 1012); see also United States v. Ahmed, 10 Cr. 131 
(PKC), 2011 WL 5041456, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 21, 2011). As multiple courts have concluded, 
"'[t]here is little or no purpose in attempting to predict in advance of trial what evidence will prove 
admissible or how specific allegations relate to the overall charges." Smith, 985 F. Supp. 2d at 
612 (brackets in original) (quoting United States v. Butler, 351 F. Supp. 121, 124 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)). 
C. 
Discussion 
The defendant's motion to strike should be denied—or at a minimum deferred until after 
the conclusion of the Government's direct case—because all of the challenged allegations are 
relevant, admissible at trial, and not unduly prejudicial. 
First, the allegations regarding Minor Victim-3 are properly included in the Indictment's 
description of the conspiracies charged in Counts One and Three because evidence of those 
incidents is relevant and admissible at trial as direct evidence of the crimes charged. Counts One 
and Three allege that the defendant participated in conspiracies with Jeffrey Epstein both to 
transport minor victims and to entice minor victims to travel with the intent to commit illegal sex 
acts. Indictment 9¶ 9-11, 15-17. In the course and as part of those conspiracies, the defendant 
groomed multiple minor victims for sexual abuse by Epstein through multiple methods, including 
befriending victims and encouraging minor victims to provide massages to Epstein knowing he 
160 
EFTA00095252

would engage in sex acts with them. Id. ¶¶ I, 4, 7, 14. As detailed in the Indictment, that grooming 
was a fundamental part of both conspiracies because it encouraged minor victims to be alone with 
and to engage in sex acts with Epstein. 
1, 4, 14. It follows that the defendant's role grooming 
Minor Victim-3 to engage in sex acts with Epstein was a part of and therefore constitutes evidence 
of these conspiracies. Id. ¶¶ 7(c), 11(d), 17(d). 
The defense claims that because the Indictment does not allege that each element of 
substantive violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2422 and 2423(a) was met as to Minor Victim-3, her 
experiences cannot be direct evidence of the conspiracies to violate those statutes charged in 
Counts One and Three. But that argument ignores a fundamental tenet of conspiracy law. It is 
axiomatic that a conspiracy does not require a completed substantive crime. See Salinas v. United 
States, 522 U.S. 52, 65 (1997) ("It is elementary that a conspiracy may exist and be punished 
whether or not the substantive crime ensures, for the conspiracy is a distinct evil, dangerous to the 
public, and so punishable in itself."). Indeed, "[i]t is well settled that the essential elements of 
the crime of conspiracy are: (1) that the defendant agreed with at least one other person to commit 
an offense; (2) the defendant knowingly participated in the conspiracy with the specific intent to 
commit the offenses that were the objects of the conspiracy; and (3) that during the existence of 
the conspiracy, at least one of the overt acts set forth in the indictment was committed by one or 
more of the members of the conspiracy in furtherance of the objectives of the conspiracy." United 
States v. Salameh, 152 F.3d 88, 145-46 (2d Cir. 1998). 
Because a conspiracy does not require the completion of a substantive crime, it does not 
matter whether Minor Victim-3 was ever in fact transported as a minor, or whether the elements 
of the substantive crimes of transportation an enticement are satisfied as to her. See Salinas, 522 
U.S. at 65. What matters is whether the Indictment properly alleges that the defendant agreed to 
161 
EFTA00095253

participate in schemes to transport and entice minors to travel with the intent that an illegal sex act 
would be committed, and whether the allegations at issue are relevant and admissible evidence of 
that conspiracy. Here, that is plainly the case. As alleged, the defendant's participation in 
recruiting and grooming Minor Victim-3 to engage in sex acts as a minor with Epstein during the 
period charged in the Indictment, is itself evidence of the defendant's agreements with Epstein to 
identify minor girls to entice and transport for purposes of illegal sex acts.57 Moreover, the 
Government further expects Minor Victim-3 will testify that 
, which is probative of the 
defendant's intent, in her initial interactions with Minor Victim-3, to entice Minor Victim-3 to 
travel and be transported for the purpose of engaging in sexual acts.58 Thus, even if Minor Victim-
3 did not travel as a minor, the events involving Minor Victim-3 outlined in the Indictment 
constitute direct and admissible evidence of the agreements between and the relationship of the 
defendant and Epstein. Because evidence regarding Minor Vitim-3 is therefore relevant and 
admissible at trial, there is no basis to strike these allegations from the Indictment. See Scarpa, 
913 F.2d at 1013. Given the relevance of these allegations, the defendant has not satisfied the 
"exacting" standard required to justify striking portions of an Indictment. Murgio, 209 F. Supp. 
3d at 724 (quoting Smith, 985 F. Supp. 2d at 610). Accordingly, the motion should be denied, or, 
57 The defense motion takes issue with the Indictment's reference to these sex acts as "abuse" 
because, the assert, Minor Victim-3 was above the age of consent in the United Kingdom at the 
time they occurred. The description in the Indictment is factually accurate, however, because 
Minor Victim-3 subjectively experienced these acts with a much older man as traumatic, 
exploitative, and abusive, and she will testify to that effect at trial. To the extent defense counsel 
wishes to request a particular limiting instruction or to seek authorization for a particular line of 
cross-examination regarding the legality of any sex acts that took place in London, the appropriate 
forum to do so is in a motion in limine. 
5ti 
-3 has 
recall„
 she was 
Cvheri 
8 years of . Regardless, the subsequent invitation demonstrates that the grooming 
and sex acts in London were part of conspiracies to entice and transport minors. 
162 
EFTA00095254

at the very least, deferred until "presentation of the Government's evidence at trial" after which 
the Court will have a full understanding of how Minor Victim-3's experiences fit into the charged 
conspiracies. Mostaja, 965 F. Supp. 2d at 467. 
The fact that the Government would be precluded, by virtue of the statute of limitations, 
from brining a charge based exclusively on the experience of Minor Victim-3 is immaterial. It is 
well-established that a prosecution for a conspiracy is timely so long as the conspiracy exists and 
at least one timely overt act is committed in furtherance of the conspiracy within the applicable 
statute of limitations. See United States v. Salmonese, 352 F.3d 608, 614 (2d Cir. 2003) (citing 
Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391, 396-97 (1957)); United States v. Rutkoske, 506 F.3d 
170, 174-75 (2d Cir. 2007); United States v. Mason, 479 F. App'x 397, 398 (2d Cir. 2012). 
Accordingly, overt acts that may, on their own, be untimely can nevertheless serve as direct 
evidence of the existence of a charged conspiracy. See, e.g., United States v. Benussi, 216 F. Supp. 
2d 299, 301-07, 309 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (admitting evidence of otherwise untimely acts during 
conspiracy trial); cl United States v. Marcus, 628 F.3d 36, 43 (2d Cir. 2010) (declining to vacate 
a conviction on a statute with only prospective application when "the Government presented post-
enactment evidence sufficient to satisfy the elements" in addition to evidence of relevant pre-
enactment conduct). Evidence regarding Minor Victim-3 is thus admissible to prove the existence 
of the conspiracy, even if a conviction could not be supported based on her experiences alone.S9
" As a fallback argument, the defense cites United States v. Hsia, 24 F. Supp. 2d 14 (D.D.C. 1998), 
in which a District Judge concluded that alleged overt acts involving concealment or "cover-ups" 
were not obviously within the scope of the charged conspiracy to defraud the United States by 
impairing and impeding the Immigration and Naturalization Service. Id. at 20, 24-26. Although 
the Court denied the motion to strike the alleged surplusage, it ordered the prosecution to provide 
a bill of particulars regarding the alleged acts of concealment. Id. at 26, 33. The case is readily 
distinguishable because the alleged surplusage in Hsia involved a completely different type of 
conduct—obstruction—than that charged in the indictment—fraud. 
Here, by contrast, the 
allegations regarding Minor Victim-3 involve conduct that falls within the heartland of the 
conspiracy: grooming a minor girl to engage in sex acts with Jeffrey Epstein. Moreover, in both 
163 
EFTA00095255

The Government agrees with the defendant that Minor Victim-3 turned 25 before 2003 
and, as a result, a substantive count based exclusively on conduct involving Minor Victim-3 is 
time-barred. As discussed above, however, the conduct involving Minor Victim-1 and Minor 
Victim-2 alleged in the Indictment is timely. Thus, if the jury concludes that the conspiracies 
existed, involved either Minor Victim-1 or Minor Victim-2, and included at least one overt act as 
to either Minor Victim-1 or Minor Victim-2, then Counts One and Three are not time-barred. See 
Sahnonese, 352 F.3d at 614. To ensure that any count of conviction is timely, the Court can instruct 
the jury that it cannot convict solely based on evidence regarding Minor Victim-3. See Benussi, 
216 F. Supp. 2d at 309 (describing a similar jury instruction provided fora conspiracy containing 
some allegations that were time-barred and others that were timely). 
Second, the allegations regarding Minor Victim-3 in the Indictment are no more 
inflammatory or prejudicial than those describing the experiences of Minor Victim-1 and Minor 
Victim-2. The references to "sexual abuse" accurately describe Minor Victim-3's experience of 
sex acts with Epstein as traumatic, exploitative, and abusive, and she will testify to that effect at 
trial. Moreover, because these acts were committed in furtherance of the criminal conspiracies 
charged in the Indictment, it is neither misleading nor prejudicial to imply that this activity 
involved illegal conduct. More to the point, because evidence regarding Minor Victim-3 "is 
admissible and relevant to the charge[s]" contained in Counts One and Three of the Indictment, 
the language describing Minor Victim-3's experiences in the Indictment "may not be stricken" 
"regardless of how prejudicial the language is ...." Scarpa, 913 F.2d at 1013 (quoting DePalma, 
461 F. Supp. at 797). 
the Indictment and in this memorandum, the Government has provided extensive detail regarding 
Minor Victim-3's anticipated testimony, which avoids any concern that the defendant will be 
surprised at trial, which was the animating concern in Hsia. See id. at 33. As such, this motion 
does not offer a basis for a bill of particulars. 
164 
EFTA00095256

Finally, even if Minor Victim-3's experiences did not constitute direct evidence of the 
crimes charges—which they do—this same evidence will also admissible pursuant to Rule 404(b) 
to prove the defendant's knowledge, intent, and modus operandi. Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) 
provides, in pertinent part: 
Evidence of any other crime, wrong, or act is not admissible to prove 
a person's character in order to show that on a particular occasion 
the person acted in accordance with the character. This evidence 
may be admissible for another purpose, such as proving motive, 
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence 
of mistake, or lack of accident. 
"[E]vidence of uncharged criminal conduct is not evidence of `other crimes, wrongs, or acts' under 
Rule 404(b) if that conduct is `inextricably intertwined with the evidence regarding the charged 
offense.'" United States v. Quinones, 511 F.3d 289, 309 (2d Cir. 2007) (quoting United States v. 
Towne, 870 F.2d 880, 886 (2d Cir. 1989)). Where "the indictment contains a conspiracy charge, 
uncharged acts may be admissible as direct evidence of the conspiracy itself." United States v. 
Diaz, 176 F.3d 52, 79 (2d Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. 
Miller, 116 F.3d 641, 682 (2d Cir. 1997)); see also United States v. Thai, 29 F.3d 785, 812 (2d Cir. 
1994). "An act that is alleged to have been done in furtherance of the alleged conspiracy . is not 
an `other' act within the meaning of Rule 404(b); rather, it is part of the very act charged." United 
States v. Concepcion, 983 F.2d 369, 392 (2d Cir. 1992). 
The Second Circuit "follows the `inclusionary' approach to `other crimes, wrongs, or acts' 
evidence, under which such evidence is admissible unless it is introduced for the sole purpose of 
showing the defendant's bad character, or unless it is overly prejudicial under Fed. R. Evid. 403 
or not relevant under Fed. R. Evid. 402." United States v. Pascarella, 84 F.3d 61, 69 (2d Cir. 
1996) (internal citation omitted); see also United States v. Paulin, 445 F.3d 211, 221 (2d Cir. 
2006); United States v. Zackson, 12 F.3d 1178, 1182 (2d Cir. 1993). Under this approach, 
165 
EFTA00095257

uncharged acts are admissible in a conspiracy case where they are used to (i) explain the 
development of the illegal relationship between coconspirators; (ii) explain the mutual criminal 
trust that existed between coconspirators; and/or (iii) complete the story of the crime charged. See 
Diaz, 176 F.3d at 80; United States v. Pipola, 83 F.3d 556, 566 (2d Cir. 1996); United States v. 
Rosa, 11 F.3d 315, 334 (2d Cir. 1993). In addition, evidence of "other acts" is admissible under 
Rule 404(b) if it (i) is advanced for a proper purpose, "such as proving motive, opportunity, intent, 
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident," Fed. R. Evid. 
404(b)(2); (ii) is relevant to the crime for which the defendant is on trial; (iii) has probative value 
that is not substantially outweighed by any unfair prejudicial effect; and (iv) is admitted with a 
limiting instruction to the jury, if requested. See Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 691-
92 (1988); United States v. LaFlam, 369 F.3d 153, 156 (2d Cir. 2004). 
Here, evidence regarding the defendant's interactions with Minor Victim-3 is admissible 
to prove the defendant's knowledge, intent, and modus operandi, all of which are permissible 
purposes under Rule 404(b). Testimony regarding the defendant's efforts to recruit and encourage 
Minor Victim-3 to engage in sex acts with Epstein in the context of massages establishes that the 
defendant knew of Epstein's attraction to minor girls and knew that Epstein used massage to 
initiate sexual contact with minor girls. Similarly, testimony regarding the defendant's interactions 
with Minor Victim-3, including how the defendant befriended Minor Victim-3 and then 
encouraged her to engage in sex acts with Epstein, establishes that the defendant intended for 
minor girls to engage in sex acts with Epstein when she befriended them, invited them to travel, 
and arranged for their travel.60 Finally, the details of how the defendant interacted with Minor 
" Such evidence is particularly probative when it seems apparent from defense filings that the 
defendant plans to argue that even if she were somehow involved in transporting or traveling with 
minors, she had no knowledge or intent that they engage in sexual conduct with Epstein. 
166 
EFTA00095258

Victim-3 demonstrates that the defendant had a specific modus operandi when grooming minor 
girls to engage in sexual activity with Epstein. As with Minor Victim-1 and Minor Victim-2, the 
defendant asked minor girls details about their lives, normalized sexual topics and activity, and 
used her presence as an adult woman to convince minor girls that the sexual activity Epstein 
initiated was normal and acceptable. "The similarity sufficient to admit evidence of past acts to 
establish a recurring modus operandi need not be complete; it is enough that the characteristics 
relied upon are sufficiently idiosyncratic to permit a fair inference of a pattern's existence." United 
States v. Sliker, 751 F.2d 477, 487 (2d Cir. 1984). Here, the defendant's specific and unique 
approach to preparing minor girls to engage in sex acts with Epstein demonstrate the existence of 
such an idiosyncratic pattern warranting admission. 
Other acts evidence is, like all other evidence, inadmissible under Rule 403 if its probative 
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. See Fed. R. Evid. 403. 
Evidence is unfairly prejudicial, however, "only when it tends to have some adverse effect upon a 
defendant beyond tending to prove the fact or issue that justified its admission into evidence." 
United States v. Figueroa, 618 F.2d 934, 943 (2d Cir. 1980). Other acts evidence is typically not 
unfairly prejudicial where it is not "any more sensational or disturbing than the crimes" with which 
the defendant has been charged. United States v. Rolan-Zapata, 916 F.2d 795, 804 (2d Cir. 1990). 
Here, as already discussed, evidence regarding Minor Victim-3's experiences with the defendant 
and Epstein are no more inflammatory or upsetting than those of Minor Victim-1 and Minor 
Victim-2. Those experiences include a wide range of abuse at the hands of Epstein, including 
abuse that the defendant witnessed and participated in herself. Evidence regarding similar events 
involving Minor Victim-3, who was of a similar age and experienced similar types of sexual 
contact, is no more "sensational or disturbing" than the other acts detailed in the Indictment. Id. 
167 
EFTA00095259

Evidence of other acts involving the grooming or abuse of minor victims is regularly admitted for 
similar purposes in cases where charges allege sexual activity with minors. See, e.g., United States 
v. Vickers, 708 F. App'x 732, 737 (2d Cir. 2017) ("As to the testimony concerning Vickers' 
'grooming' of his victims, we conclude that such evidence was admissible even under Rule 404(b), 
because it was probative of Vickers' knowledge of how to secure adolescent boys' trust so that he 
could sexually abuse them. We identify no abuse of discretion in the district court's decision to 
admit all of the challenged testimony [regarding uncharged acts of sexual abuse] under Rule 
403."); United States v. McDarrah, 351 F. App'x 558, 563 (2d Cir. 2009) (affirming admission 
pursuant to Rule 404(b) of defendant's "e-mail responses to the Craigslist advertisements" for 
erotic services because the e-mails "were relevant to his knowledge and intent, because he wrote 
those emails to girls he knew could be minors (he enthusiastically indicated that girls younger than 
18 are acceptable) and his e-mails showed his interest in actual sexual conduct"); United States v. 
Brand, 04 Cr. 194 (PKL), 2005 WL 77055, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 12, 2005) (admitting "evidence 
that Brand exhibited an interest in child erotica and child pornography on the Internet in the period 
leading up to the charged conduct" under Rule 404(b) because evidence was "pertinent to whether 
he used the intemet in an attempt to engage in sexual conduct with" victim). Accordingly, Rule 
403 does not bar the admission of evidence regarding Minor Victim-3, especially given its 
probative value in demonstrating the defendant's knowledge, intent, and moths operandi. 
In sum, because evidence regarding Minor Victim-3's experience is admissible both as 
direct evidence of the conspiracies charged in Counts One and Three and pursuant to Rule 404(b), 
there is no basis to strike the allegations regarding Minor Victim-3 from the Indictment. 
168 
EFTA00095260

IX. 
The Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Count One or Count Three as Multiplicitous Is 
Premature 
The defendant moves to dismiss Counts One or Three on the ground that they are 
multiplicitous. (Def. Mot. 8). Because the Second Circuit has made clear that a multiplicity 
challenge does not become timely until after trial, this motion should be denied as premature. 
A. 
Relevant Facts 
Count One charges the defendant with participating in a conspiracy, in violation of 18 
U.S.C. § 371, to transport minors with the intent to commit an illegal sex act, in violation of 18 
U.S.C. 2422. See Indictment ¶¶ 9-11. Count Three charges the defendant with participating in a 
conspiracy, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371, to entice minors to travel with the intent to commit an 
illegal sex act, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a). See Indictment ¶¶ 15-17. In other words, 
Count One and Count Three charge the defendant with agreeing to commit two separate and 
distinct federal crimes. 
B. 
Applicable Law 
The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution "protects against 
multiple punishments for the same offense." North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969). 
Accordingly, a defendant cannot be sentenced for multiplicitous charges covering the same crime. 
"An indictment is multiplicitous when it charges a single offense as an offense multiple times, in 
separate counts, when, in law and fact, only one crime has been committed." United States v. 
Chacko, 169 F.3d 140, 145 (2d Cir. 1999); see also United States v. Jones, 482 F.3d 60, 72 (2d 
Cir. 2006) ("A claim of multiplicity cannot succeed, however, `unless the charged offenses are the 
same in fact and in law."' (quoting United States v. Estrada, 320 F.3d 173, 180 (2d Cir. 2003)). 
Although the Double Jeopardy Clause does not protect against simultaneous prosecutions for the 
same offense, a defendant does have a right not to be punished twice for the same crime. United 
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States v. Josephberg, 459 F.3d 350, 355 (2d Cir. 2006) (per curiam). Accordingly, "[i]f the July 
convicts on more than one multiplicitous count, the defendant's right not to suffer multiple 
punishments for the same offense will be protected by having the court enter judgment on only 
one of the multiplicitous counts." Id. Similarly, where the judgment of conviction has already 
been entered on multiplicitous counts, that right is protected by vacating the convictions on all but 
one count. Id. 
The Second Circuit has clarified that District Courts should not rule on a motion to dismiss 
a charge on multiplicity grounds until the time of sentencing. See id. (vacating district court's 
dismissal of count as multiplicitous prior to trial, as such a determination before trial is "at best 
premature"). Among other reasons, courts look to "the record as a whole in determining whether 
an indictment is in fact multiplicitous," and the record cannot be fully established until trial is 
complete. United States v. McCouny, 562 F.3d 458, 469 (2d Cir. 2009). Additionally, because 
double jeopardy is meant to protect a defendant from successive punishments for the same offense, 
a multiplicitous count does not violate the Clause unless and until sentence is imposed. See 
Josephberg, 459 F.3d at 355 ("Where there has been no prior conviction or acquittal, the Double 
Jeopardy Clause does not protect against simultaneous prosecutions for the same offense, so long 
as no more than one punishment is eventually imposed."). 
Following the Second Circuit's directive, courts in this Circuit regularly defer ruling on a 
multiplicity motion until after the conclusion of trial. See, e.g., United States v. Halkbank, 15 Cr. 
867 (RMB), 2020 WL 5849512, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 1, 2020) (denying pretrial motion to dismiss 
multiplicitous count and noting that "[c]ourts in this Circuit have routinely denied pre-trial 
motions to dismiss potentially multiplicitous counts as premature." (quoting United States v. 
Medina, 13 Cr. 272 (PGG), 2014 WL 3057917, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July 7, 2014))); United States v. 
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Dumitru, 18 Cr. 243 (LAK), 2018 WL 3407703, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 26, 2018) (denying pretrial 
motion to dismiss multiplicitous count in light of "the Circuit's controlling view that the question 
of multiplicitousness is properly considered only at a later point in the proceedings"); United States 
v. Mostafa, 965 F. Supp. 2d 451, 464 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) ("[M]ultiplicity is properly addressed by 
the trial court at the sentencing stage."); United States v. Ghavami, 10 Cr. 1217 (ICMW), 2012 WL 
2878126, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. July 13, 2012) ("To the extent that the Indictment alleges more than 
one conspiracy . . . , Defendants' multiplicity challenge is premature. Should the jury convict 
Defendants on what the Court ultimately determines to be multiplicitous counts, the Court will 
enter judgment on only one of the multiplicitous convictions." (citations omitted)); United States 
v. Rivera, 09 Cr. 619 (SJF), 2011 WL 1429125, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 13, 2011) ("Since it is 
possible that the jury will convict defendants on only one (1) of the respective counts that they 
allege are multiplicitous, and acquit defendants on all of the counts with which they allege that 
count is multiplicitous, the issue of whether the counts are multiplicitous in violation of the Double 
Jeopardy Clause is premature at the pretrial stage."). 
C. 
Discussion 
The defendant's motion to dismiss Counts One or Three of the Indictment as multiplicitous 
is, at best, premature. Consistent with the directive of the Second Circuit, this Court should defer 
ruling on this motion until after the completion of trial. The additional time will ensure that the 
full factual record is developed before the Court conducts the multiplicity analysis, and the motion 
may become moot depending on the jury's verdict. 
First, the Court cannot conduct the multiplicity analysis before hearing all of the evidence 
regarding the charges contained in the Indictment. Prior to trial, the record will not be fully 
developed, and the Court cannot conduct the necessary analysis to determine whether the counts 
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are in fact multiplicitous. Consistent with the directive of the Second Circuit and the consistent 
practice in this District, the Court should defer conducting any multiplicity analysis until after 
hearing all of the evidence at trial. See Josephberg, 459 F.3d at 355. 
Second, the motion may become moot because it is possible that the jury could conclude 
that the defendant is guilty of one of the charged conspiracies but not guilty of the other. That is 
because each charged conspiracy alleges that the defendant agreed to violate a different criminal 
statute. Count One alleges that the defendant agreed to transport minors with the intent that they 
engage in illegal sex acts. Count Three alleges that the defendant agreed to entice minors to travel 
with the intent that they engage in illegal sex acts. In other words, Count One requires proof of an 
agreement to transport, while Count Three requires proof of an agreement to entice. Transportation 
does not necessarily require enticement, and likewise enticement to travel does not necessarily 
require transportation. See United States v. Griffith, 99 Cr. 786 (HB), 2000 WL 1253265, at *4 
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 5, 2000) (denying post-trial motion to dismiss as multiplicitous 18 U.S.C. § 2422 
transportation charge and 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a) enticement charge involving same alleged conduct 
and noting "[t]hat persuasion and transportation involve proof of different facts is hardly 
contentious"). 
Here, it is possible that the jury could conclude, after hearing all the evidence, that the 
defendant agreed to transport one or more minors interstate, but that she did not agree to entice 
minors to travel. For example, the jury could theoretically conclude that although the defendant 
agreed to arrange transportation for a minor victim, the defendant herself did not agree to persuade 
or entice a minor victim to travel. Likewise, the jury could theoretically conclude that the 
defendant agreed to entice, or encourage, one or more minors to travel interstate, but she did not 
agree to actually transport or assist in the transportation itself. Although the Government expects 
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to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant in fact agreed both to entice and to transport 
one or more minor victims, it is possible that the jury may reach a different conclusion. Depending 
on the inferences the jury draws from the evidence presented at trial, it could convict on one 
conspiracy count while acquitting on the other, or it could conclude that the defendant agreed both 
to transport and to entice, in which case it could convict on both counts. That possibility means 
that a motion to dismiss counts as multiplicitous is premature. Because the Government has the 
discretion to present to the jury both the theory that the defendant agreed to transport and the theory 
that the defendant agreed to entice, the defense motion is premature. See Josephberg, 459 F.3d at 
355 ("It is well established that '[w]hether to prosecute and what charge to file or bring before a 
grand jury are decisions that generally rest in the prosecutor's discretion,' and 'a defendant has no 
constitutional right to elect which of two applicable federal statutes shall be the basis of his 
indictment and prosecution . . .'" (brackets and ellipses in original) (quoting United States v. 
Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 124 (1979)). 
Only after the Court has heard all of the evidence at trial and received the jury's verdict 
will the defense motion be ripe. Accordingly, the motion should be denied as premature. 
X. 
The Defendant's Various Disclosure Motions Should be Denied 
Maxwell's motions also include an assortment of requests for orders requiring the 
Government to make various disclosures, all of which are meritless or, at best, premature. 
A. 
Bill of Particulars Is Not Warranted 
First, the defendant moves for a bill of particulars setting out an array of details regarding 
the Government's theory of its case and anticipated witness testimony. The defendant, like all 
defendants, is entitled to sufficient information to understand the charges against her, to prepare a 
defense, and to protect against double jeopardy. However, the Government has provided such 
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information, and much more, in the Indictment, extensive discovery, and various pretrial filings, 
including this memorandum. The defendant will also receive trial exhibits, a witness list, and 
Jencks Act material reasonably in advance of trial. As such, she has not established an entitlement 
to a bill of particulars under well-established governing law. 
1. 
Applicable Law 
The proper purpose of a bill of particulars under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 7(f) is 
"to provide defendant with information about the details of the charge against him if this is 
necessary to the preparation of his defense, and to avoid prejudicial surprise at trial." United States 
v. Torres, 901 F.2d 205, 234 (2d Cir. 1990), abrogated on other grounds by United States v. 
Marcus, 628 F.3d 36, 41 (2d Cir.2010) (emphasis added) (internal quotation mark omitted). 
Accordingly, "[a] bill of particulars is required `only where the charges of the indictment are so 
general that they do not advise the defendant of the specific acts of which he is accused!" United 
States v. Walsh, 194 F.3d 37, 47 (2d Cir. 1999) (quoting Torres, 901 F.2d at 234); see United 
States v. Mahabub, 13 Cr. 908 (MN), 2014 WL 4243657, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 26, 2014). 
In exercising its broad discretion to determine whether the charges are so general that they 
require supplementation through a bill of particulars, the Court should consider not just the text of 
the Indictment, but also discovery and other information supplied to the defendant to date. See 
United States v. Bortnovsky, 820 F.2d 572, 574 (2d Cir. 1987); see also, e.g., United States v. 
Pierre-Louis, 16 Cr. 541 (CM), 2018 WL 4043140, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 9, 2018) (denying 
request for bill of particulars where indictment charged sex trafficking conspiracy spanning two 
decades because indictment and discovery "would suggest that defendant has enough information 
to apprise him of the charges with enough precision to enable him to prepare a defense, avoid 
unfair surprise at trial, and preclude a second prosecution for the same offense"); United States v. 
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