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AUSA handling the case by the Epstein defense team. (The Justice Department concluded the 
allegations were meritless.) The letter stated that a federal indictment against Epstein Si 
The letter also recounted 
that 
U.S. Attorney's Correspondence at 269. 
29. The December 13, 2007, letter also reveals that the Justice Department stopped 
making victim notifications because of 
U.S. Attorney's Correspondence at 270 (emphasis added). It was a 
deviation from the Justice Department's standard practice to negotiate with defense counsel 
about the extent of crime victim notifications. 
30. The December 13, 2007, letter also demonstrates that the Justice Department was well 
aware of who the victims of Epstein's sexual offenses were. The Justice Department was 
prepared to make notifications to the victims, but suspended those notifications only because 
objections from defense counsel. Id. 
31. The December 13, 2007, letter reveals it would have been possible to confer with the 
victims about the Non-Prosecution Agreement. The U.S. Attorney's Office was fully able to 
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confer with Epstein's counsel about the parameters of the Non-Prosecution Agreement, but 
refused to confer with Epstein's victims about the Agreement. Id. 
32. Following the signing of the Agreement and the modifications thereto, Epstein's 
performance was delayed while he sought higher level review within the Department of Justice. 
See U.S. Attorney's Correspondence passim. A reasonable inference from the evidence is that 
Epstein used his significant political and social connections to lobby the Justice Department to 
avoid significant federal prosecution. The Justice Department has in its possession internal 
documents (i.e., phone logs, mails, etc.) that would reveal the event of those lobbying efforts. 
The Justice Department, however, has refused to make these materials available to the victims. 
33. On January 10, 2008, Jane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2 received letters from the FBI 
advising them that "ft Pis case Is currently under investigation. This can be a lengthy process 
and we request your continued patience while we conduct a thorough investigation." Exhibits 
"F" & "G." The statement in the notification letter was misleading and, in fact, false. The ease 
was not currently "under investigation." To the contrary, the federal eases involving Jane Doe 
#1 and Jane Doe #2 had been resolved by the non-prosecution agreement entered into by Epstein 
and the U.S. Attorney's Office discussed previously. Moreover, the FBI did not notify Jane Doe 
#1 or Jane Doe #2 that a plea agreement had been reached previously, and that part of the 
agreement was a non-prosecution agreement with the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern 
District of Florida. Exhibit "E." Whether the FBI was aware of this fact at this time is unclear. 
In any event, the FBI was acting at the direction of the U.S. Attorney's Office, which clearly did 
not confer with Jane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2 about the case and, by concealing the true state of 
affairs, and failed to treat Jane Doe ill and Jane Doe #2 with fairness. 
Epstein was aware of 
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these actions of the U.S. Attorney's Office and, indeed, solicited these actions of the U.S. 
Attorney's Office. U.S. Attorney's Correspondence at 191-92, 270. 
34. Jane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2 relied on the representations of the U.S. Attorney's 
Office to their detriment. Had they known the true facts of the case — i.e., that Epstein had 
negotiated a non-prosecution agreement — they would have taken steps to object to that 
agreement. Tr. July 11, 2008 at 4-6, 18-19, 28-29. 
35. Undersigned counsel believes that the FBI was lead to believe that their investigation 
of Epstein was going to lead to a federal criminal prosecution and that the FBI was also mislead 
by the U.S. Attorney's office about the status of the case. 
36. In early 2008, Jane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2 believed that criminal prosecution of 
Epstein was extremely important. They also desired to be consulted by the FBI and/or other 
representatives of the federal government about the prosecution of Epstein. In light of the letters 
that they had received around January 10, they believed that a criminal investigation of Epstein 
was on-going — including investigation into Epstein's crimes against them -- and that they would 
be contacted before the federal government reached any final resolution of that investigation. Tr. 
July 11, 2008, at 4-6, 18-19, 22-23, 28-29. 
37. On January 31, 2008, Jane Doe #1 met with FBI Agents and AUSA's from the U.S. 
Attorney's Office. 
She provided additional details of Epstein's sexual abuse of her. The 
AUSA's did not disclose to Jane Doe #1 at this meeting (or any other meeting) that they had 
already negotiated a non-prosecution agreement with Epstein. Exhibit "H." 
38. On about February 25, 2008, Assistant U.S. Attorney Sloman sent an e-mail to Jay 
Lefkowitz, Epstein's criminal defense counsel, explaining that the Justice Department's Child 
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Exploitation Obscenity Section (CEOS) had agreed to review Epstein's objections to the 
proposed plea agreement that had been reached with the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern 
District of Florida. The letter indicated that, should CEOS reject Epstein's objections to the 
agreement, then 
U.S. Attorneys Correspondence at 290-91. 
39. On May 30,2008, another of Mr. Edwards's clients who was recognized as an Epstein 
victim by the U.S. Attorney's Office, received a letter from the FBI advising her that "[Obis case 
Is currently under investigation. This can be a lengthy process and we request your continued 
patience while we conduct a thorough investigation." Exhibit "I." The statement in the 
notification letter was misleading and, in fact, false. 
The case was not currently "tinder 
investigation." To the contrary, the case had been resolved by the non-prosecution agreement 
entered into by Epstein and the U.S. Attorney's Office discussed previously. Exhibit "E." 
40. In mid-June 2008, Mr. Edwards contacted the AUSA handling the case to inform her 
that he represented Jane Doe #1 and, later, Jane Doc #2. Mr. Edwards asked to meet to provide 
information about the federal crimes committed by Epstein against these victims, hoping to 
secure a significant federal indictment against Epstein. The AUSA and Mr. Edwards discussed 
the possibility of federal charges being filed. At the end of the call, the AUSA asked Mr. 
Edwards to send any information that he wanted considered by the U.S. Attorney's Office in 
determining whether to file federal charges. Because of the confidentiality provision that existed 
in the plea agreement, Mr. Edwards was not informed that previously, in September 2007, the 
U.S. Attorney's Office had reached an agreement not to file federal charges. Mr. Edwards was 
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also not informed that resolution of the criminal matter was imminent. This concealment 
prevented Edwards from (among other things) exercising his client's CVRA right to confer with 
the prosecutors about the case. Epstein was aware of this concealment — and, indeed, sought this 
concealment. Tr. July I I, 2008, at 4-6, 18-19,22-23, 28-29. 
41. On Friday, Juno 27, 2008, at approximately 4:15 p.m., the U.S. Attorney's Office 
received a copy of Epstein's proposed state plea agreement and learned that the plea was 
scheduled for 8:30 a.m., on Monday, June 30, 2008. The U.S. Attorney's Office and the Palm 
Beach Police Department attempted to provide notification to victims in the short time that 
Epstein's counsel had provided. The U.S. Attorney's Office called attorney Edwards to provide 
notice to his clients regarding the hearing. The notice, however, was only that Epstein was 
pleading guilty to state solicitation of prostitution charges involving another victim. The U.S. 
Attorney's Office did not tell Edwards that the guilty pleas in state court would bring an end to 
the possibility of federal prosecution pursuant to the plea agreement. Thus, there was no reason 
for attorney Edwards to believe that the guilty pleas in state court had any bearing on the cases of 
Jane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2. As a result, Jane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2 did not attend the plea 
hearing, as they did not think that it was pertinent to their particular cases. Had they known that 
the plea agreement made it impossible to prosecute Epstein federally for his crimes against them, 
they would have objected to this resolution. Jane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2 thus detrimentally 
relied on the inaccurate representations of the U.S. Attorney's Office that their cases were still 
under investigation. Tr. July 1 I, 2008 at 4-6, 18-19, 22-23. 
42. On June 30, 2008, the U.S. Attorney's Office sent an e-mail to Jack Goldberger, 
criminal defense counsel for Epstein, reflecting continuing efforts to keep the NPA secret: Ira 
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U.S. Attorney's Correspondence at 321. 
43. On July 3, 2008, as requested, Mr. Edwards sent to the U.S. Attorney's Office a letter. 
In the letter, Mr. Edwards indicated his client's desire that federal charges be filed against 
defendant Epstein. In particular, he wrote on behalf of his clients: "We urge the Attorney 
General and our United States Attorney to consider the fundamental import of the vigorous 
enforcement of our Federal laws. We urge you to move forward with the traditional indictments 
and criminal prosecution commensurate with the crimes Mr. Epstein has committed, and we 
further urge you to take the steps necessary to protect our children from this very dangerous 
sexual predator." See Exhibit "J." 
44. When Mr. Edwards wrote his July 3, 2008 letter, he was still unaware that a non-
prosecution agreement had been reached with Epstein — a fact that continued to be concealed 
from him (and the victims) by the U.S. Attorney's Office. Mr. Edwards first saw a reference to 
the NPA on or after July 9, 2008, when the Government filed its responsive pleading to Jane 
Doe's emergency petition. That pleading was the first public mention of the non-prosecution 
agreement and the first disclosure to Mr. Edwards (and thus to Jane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2) of 
the possible existence of a non-prosecution agreement. Tr. July II, 2008 at 4-6, 18-19, 22-23, 
28-29. 
45. Mr. Edwards detrimentally relied on the misleading representations made by the U.S. 
Attorney's Office that the case was still tinder investigation when he was writing this letter. He 
would not have wasted his time undertaking a pointless exercise had he known that the U.S. 
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Attorney's Office had previously negotiated a non-prosecution agreement. See Exhibits "E" & 
46. On July 7, 2008, Jane Doe ill filed a petition for enforcement of her rights under the 
CVRA. At the time, Jane Doe NI was not aware of the non-prosecution agreement, so she 
sought a court order directing the Justice Department to confer with her before reaching any such 
agreement. Epstein quickly became aware of this petition. Doc. #1 at 1-2. 
47. On July 9, 2008, the U.S. Attorney's Office sent a victim notification to Jane Doe #1 
via her attorney, Bradley Edwards. That notification contains a written explanation of some of 
the terms of the agreement between Epstein and the U.S. Attorney's Office. A full copy of the 
terms was not provided. A notification was not provided to Jane Doe #2 because the agreement 
limited Epstein's liability to victims whom the United States was prepared to name in an 
indictment. As a result, Jane Doe #2 never received a notification letter about the agreement. 
The notification did not mention the non-prosecution agreement with the U.S. Attorney's Office. 
Exhibits "E" & "K." 
48. The notification that the U.S. Attorney's Office sent to Jane Doe #1 and other victims 
contained false and inaccurate information about the terms of the non-prosecution agreement. 
The false information was specifically approved by Epstein's attorneys. 
Supplemental 
Declaration of A. Marie Villafana, Dec. 22, 2008, doe. #35 at 2-3. 
49. On July I1, 2008, the Court held a hearing on Jane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2's 
Emergency Petition for Enforcement of Rights. During the hearing, the Government conceded 
that Jane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2 were "victims" within the meaning of the Crime Victim's 
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Rights Act. Epstein was aware of these and subsequent proceedings involving the CVRA. Tr. 
July 11, 2008, at 14-15. 
50. During the July II, 2008 hearing, the Government conceded that its agreement had 
been concluded months before the victims were notified about it. See id. at 12 (". . . the 
agreement was consummated by the parties in December of 2007."). 
51. At all times material to this statement of facts, it would have been practical and 
feasible for the federal government to inform Jane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2 of the details of the 
proposed non-prosecution agreement with Epstein, including in particular the fact that the 
agreement barred any federal criminal prosecution. See U.S. Attorney's Correspondence at 191-
92. 
52. One of the senior prosecutors in the U.S. Attorney's Office joined Epstein's payroll 
shortly after important decisions were made limiting Epstein's criminal liability — and 
improperly represented people close to Epstein. During the federal investigation of Epstein, 
Bruce Reinhart was a senior Assistant U.S. Attorney in the U.S. Attorney's Office for the 
Southern District of Florida. Within months after the non-prosecution agreement was signed, 
Reinhart left the Office and immediately went into private practice as a "white collar" criminal 
defense attorney. 
His office coincidentally happened to be not only in the same building (and 
on the same floor) as Epstein's lead criminal defense counsel, Jack Goldberger, but it was 
actually located right next door to the Florida Science Foundation — an Epstein-owned and -run 
company where Epstein spent his "work release." See http://www.brucereinhartlaw.com. 
53. While working in this Office adjacent to Epstein's, Reinhart undertook the 
representation of numerous Epstein employees and pilots during the civil cases filed against 
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Epstein by the victims — cases that involved the exact same crimes and same evidence being 
reviewed by the U.S. Attorney's office when he was employed there. Specifically, he 
represented 
(Epstein's number one co-conspirator who was actually named as such 
in the NPA), his housekeeper (Louella Ruboyo), his pilots Larry Morrison, Larry Visoski, David 
Rogers, William Hammond and Robert Roxburgh. (Hammond and Roxburgh were not deposed, 
but the others were.) See depositions of these individuals in various Epstein civil cases. On 
information and belief, Reinhart's representation of these individuals was paid, directly or 
indirectly, by Epstein. 
Such representations are in contravention of Justice Department 
regulations and Florida bar rules. 
Such representations also give, at least, the improper 
appearance that Reinhart may have attempted to curry with Epstein and then reap his reward 
through favorable employment. 
LEGAL MEMORANDUM 
The victims have previously briefed the issues of why they are entitled to entry of an 
order by this Court finding that the U.S. Attorney's Office violated their rights under the CVRA. 
See doe. #1; doe #9 at 3-11; doe. #19 at 3-9, 14. The victims specifically incorporate those 
pleadings by reference here. In short, as explained in the victims' earlier pleadings, the Office 
violated the victims' right to confer before reaching the non-prosecution agreement and also 
failed to use its best efforts to comply with the CVRA. The victims now provide additional 
briefing on two issues: (I) the CVRA applies to Jane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2 even though no 
indictment was filed in their case; and (2) the Court should find that the government has clearly 
violated the CVRA in this case and set up a briefing schedule and hearing on the appropriate 
remedy. 
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I. 
THE CVRA PROTECTS JANE DOE NI AND JANE DOE #2 EVEN THOUGH 
THIS CASE WAS RESOLVED BY A NON-PROSECUTION AGREEMENT 
RATHER THAN INDICTMENT. 
In this litigation, the Government is apparently taking the position that the Crime 
Victims' Rights Act does not extend rights to Jane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2 because no 
indictment was ever filed in federal court and thus no federal court proceedings were ever held. 
This crabbed litigation position about the'breadth of the CVRA cannot be sustained. Indeed, 
neither the FBI nor the U.S. Attorney's Office itself took this position during the Epstein 
investigation — until the victims in this case filed their petition requesting enforcement of their 
rights. Instead, both the FBI and the U.S. Attorney's Office recognized that because the U.S. 
Attorney's Office was negotiating a non-prosecution agreement that affected the rights of 
specifically identified victims, the CVRA was applicable. 
The Court should reject the 
Government's newly-contrived position. 
A. 
The Plain Language of the CVRA Makes Clear that Victims Have Rights 
Before an Indictment is Filed. 
The CVRA promises crime victims that they will have various rights, including "[CMG 
reasonable right to confer with the attorney for the Government in the case," 18 U.S.C. § 
3771(a)(5) (emphasis added), and "the right to be treated with fairness," 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(8).. 
In earlier pleadings filed in this action, the Government has tried to narrowly construe the CVRA 
so that it applies only to a "court proceeding." See Gov't Response to Victim's Emergency 
Petition (doc. #13) at 1-2. 
The Government's position contravenes the plain language of the CVRA. The CVRA 
guarantees to Jane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2 the right to confer with prosecutors "in the case," 
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not in a "court proceeding." And the CVRA broadly extends a right to them "to be treated with 
fairness" — a right that is not circumscribed to just court proceedings. Indeed, the fact that (as the 
Government notes) the drafters of the CVRA used the term "court proceeding" elsewhere in the 
statute (i.e., 18 U.S.C. § 377 I (a)(2) (victim's right to notice "of any public court proceeding")) 
makes it obvious that they intended to give victims a right to confer that extended beyond simple 
court proceedings — that is, the right to confer about "the case" — as well as a broad right to be 
treated fairly throughout the process. 
Moreover, it is patently obvious that a criminal "case" against Epstein had been going on 
for months before the victims learned about the non-prosecution agreement. As recounted in the 
statement of facts above, both the FBI and the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of 
Florida had opened a "case" involving Epstein's sexual abuse of the victims well before they 
entered into plea negotiations with Epstein. Indeed, as early as June 7, 2007 — more than three 
months before they concluded the NPA with Epstein — the U.S. Attorney's Office sent a notice to 
Jane Doe #1 stating "your case is under investigation." See Exhibit "C" (emphasis added). The 
notice went on to tell Jane Doe 141 that "as a victim and/or witness of a federal offense, you have 
a number of rights." Id. at 1. Among the rights that the U.S. Attorney's Office itself told Jane 
Doc that she possessed was Titre right to confer with the attorney for the United States in the 
case." Of course, she would not have had those rights if she was not covered by the CVRA. 
Interestingly, the letter also advised Jane Doe NI that "if you believe that the rights set forth 
above [e.g., the right to confer and other CVRA rights] are being violated, you have the right to 
petition the Court for relief." Id. at 1. 
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The plain language of the CVRA makes clear that crime victims have right even before 
the filing of any indictment. The CVRA's instructs that crime victims who seeks to assert rights 
in pre•indictment situations should proceed in the court where the crime was committed: "The 
rights described in subsection (a) [of the CVRA] shall be asserted in the district in which a 
defendant is being prosecuted for the crime or, if no prosecution is underway, in the district court 
in the district in which the crime occurred." 18 U.S.C. § 3771(d)(3) (emphasis added). 
The 
victims have relied on this language through their pleadings, but the Government has not offered 
any response. 
The CVRA also directs that "[o]fficers and employees of the Department of Justice and 
other departments and agencies of the United States engaged in the detection, investigation, or 
prosecution of crime shall make their best efforts to see that crime victims are notified of, and 
accorded, the rights described in [the CVRA]." 18 U.S.C. § 3771(c)(1) (emphasis added). Of 
course, there would be no reason to direct that agencies involved in the "detection" and 
"investigation" of crime have CVRA obligations if the Government's construction of the Act 
were correct. 
Plainly, Congress envisioned the victims' rights law applying during the 
"detection" and "investigation" phases of criminal cases. 
For all these reasons, the Court need look no further than the language of the CVRA to 
conclude that the victims in this case had protected rights tinder the Act. 
B. 
Other Courts Have Recognized That Crime Victims Have Rights Before An 
Indictment is Filed. 
In its briefing to date, the Government has yet to cite a single case that has accepted its 
sweeping position that the CVRA only extends rights to victims after the formal filing of an 
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indictment. This is because the case law all cuts the opposite way and recognizes that the CVRA 
does protect victims during the investigation of federal criminal cases. 
In a case remarkably similar to this one, the Fifth Circuit has held that victims have a 
right to confer with federal prosecutors even before any charges are filed. In In re Dean, 527 
F.3d 391, 394 (5th Cir. 2008), a wealthy corporate defendant reached a generous plea deal with 
the Government — a deal that the Government concluded and filed for approval with the district 
court without conferring with the victims. When challenged on a mandamus petition by the 
victims, the Fifth Circuit held: 
The district court acknowledged that "[t]here are clearly rights 
under the CVRA that apply before any prosecution is underway." 
BP Prods., 2008 WL 501321 at *I I, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEX1S 
12893, at *36. Logically, this includes the CVRA's establishment 
of victims' "reasonable right to confer with the attorney for the 
Government." 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(5). At least in the posture of 
this case (and we do not speculate on the applicability to other 
situations), the government should have fashioned a reasonable 
way to inform the victims of the likelihood of criminal charges and 
to ascertain the victims' views on the possible details of a plea 
bargain. 
Id 
As we understand the Government's attempt to distinguish Dean, it asks this Court to 
decline to follow the Fifth Circuit's holding and create a split of authority on this important 
issue, See Gov't Response to Emergency Petn. at 2-3. Instead, the Government would have this 
Court deviate from the Fifth Circuit's well-reasoned opinion because the Circuit's "discussion of 
the scope of the right to confer was unnecessary because the court ultimately declined to issue 
mandamus relief." Gov't Response at 2 (citing Dean, 527 F.3d at 395). This is simply untrue. 
The Fifth Circuit faced a petition for mandamus relief from the victims in that case, asking the 
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Court to reject a proposed "binding" plea agreement negotiated under Fed. R. Crim. P. 
11(c)(1)(C) (i.e., a plea agreement obligating the judge to impose a specific sentence). The 
victims asked for that relief because of the Government's failure to confer with them before the 
charges and accompanying plea agreement were filed. The Fifth Circuit held that the victims' 
rights had been violated in the passages quoted above. It then went on to remand the matter to 
district court for further consideration of the effect of the violations of the victims' rights: 
We are confident, however, that the conscientious district court will fully consider 
the victims' objections and concerns in deciding whether the plea agreement 
should be accepted. 
The decision whether to grant mandamus is largely prudential. We conclude that 
the better course is to deny relief, confident that the district court will take heed 
that the victims have not been accorded their full rights under the CVRA and will 
carefully consider their objections and briefs as this matter proceeds. 
In re Dean, 527 F.3d at 396. Obviously, the Fifth Circuit could not have instructed the District 
Court to "take heed" of the violations of victims' rights unless it has specifically held, as a matter 
of law, that the victims' rights had been violated. 
The Government's next effort to deflect the force of the Fifth Circuit's decision is that the 
Circuit did not directly quote three words found in the CVRA's right to confer — the words "in 
the case." See Gov't Response to Emergency Petn. at 2. But the Fifth Circuit had received 
briefs totaling close to 100 pages in that case and was obviously well aware of the statute at 
hand. Indeed, in the very paragraph the Government claims is troublesome, the Fifth Circuit 
cited to the district court opinion under review, which had quoted all the words in the statute. 
See Unwed States v. BP Products, 2008 WL 501321 at •7 (noting victims right to confer "in the 
case"), cited in In re Dean, 527 F.3d at 394. 
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The Government finally notes that the Fifth Circuit stated that its ruling about the 
Government violating the right to confer applied "in the posture of this case." In re Dean, 527 
F.3d at 394. But the posture of the case involving Epstein here — at least in its relevant aspects --
is virtually identical to the posture there. The Fifth Circuit held that the Government had an 
obligation to confer with the victims before charges were filed and before a final plea 
arrangement was reached. Without giving the victims a chance to confer before hand, the plea 
agreement might be fatally flawed because it did not consider the concerns of the victims. Thus, 
the Fifth Circuit emphasized the need to confer with victims before any disposition was finally 
decided: "The victims do have reason to believe that their impact on the eventual sentence is 
substantially less where, as here, their input is received after the parties have reached a tentative 
deal. As we have explained, that is why we conclude that these victims should have been heard 
at an earlier stage." Id. at 395. The posture in this case is exactly the same — the Government 
should have conferred before the parties "reached a tentative deal." The fact that the deal 
reached hero is slightly different than the deal reached in the Dean case (a non-prosecution 
agreement versus a plea agreement) is truly a distinction without a difference. If anything, the 
facts here cry out for conferral even more than in that case. At least the defendant there agreed 
to plead guilty to a federal felony. 
Here, the wealthy defendant has escaped all federal 
punishment — a plea deal that Jane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2 would have strenuously objected to . 
. . if the Government had given them the chance. 
The Fifth Circuit's decision in Dean has been cited favorably in two recent District Court 
decisions, which provides further support for Petitioner's position here. In United States v. 
Rubin, 2008 WL 2358591 (E.D.N.Y. 2008), the victims argued for extremely broad rights under 
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the CVRA. After citing Dean, the District Court agreed that the rights were expansive and could 
apply before indictment, but subject to the outer limit that the Government be at least 
"contemplating" charges: 
Quite understandably, movants perceive their victimization as having begun long 
before the government got around to filing the superseding indictment. They also 
believe their rights under the CVRA ripened at the moment of actual 
victimization, or at least at the point when they first contacted the government. 
Movants rely on a decision from the Southern District of Texas for the notion that 
CVRA rights apply prior to any prosecution. In United States v. BP Products 
North America, Inc., the district court reasoned that because § 3771(d)(3) 
provided for the assertion of CVRA rights "in the district court in which a 
defendant is being prosecuted for the crime or, if no prosecution is underway, in 
the district court in the district in which the crime occurred," the CVRA clearly 
provided for "rights . . . that apply before any prosecution is underway." (United 
States v. BP Products North America, Inc., Criminal No. H-07-434, 2008 WL 
501321 at '11 (S.D.Tex. Feb.21, 2008) (emphasis in original), mandamus denied 
in part, In re Dean, No. 08-20125, 2008 WL 1960245 (51" Cir. May 7, 2008). 
But, assuming that it was within the contemplation and intendment of the CVRA 
to guarantee certain victim's rights prior to formal commencement of a criminal 
proceeding, the universe of such rights clearly has its logical limits. For example, 
the realm of cases in which the CVRA might apply despite no prosecution being 
"underway," cannot be read to include the victims of uncharged crimes that the 
government has not even contemplated..It is impossible to expect the government, 
much less a court, to notify crime victims of their rights if the government has not 
verified to at least an elementary degree that a crime has actually taken place, 
given that a corresponding investigation is at a nascent or theoretical stage. 
Id. at *6. Here, of course, the criminal investigation went far beyond the "nascent or theoretical 
stage" — to a point where the Government determined that crimes had been committed and that 
the defendant should plead guilty to either a state or federal offense. 
Similarly, at least one other district court has reviewed the issue and agreed with the 
victims' position that crime victims can have rights before charges are filed. Tn rejecting an 
argument that the CVRA should be limited to cases in which a defendant has been convicted, 
United States t Olatn, explained: "Furthermore, the Fifth Circuit has noted that victims acquire 
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rights under the CVRA even before prosecution. See In re Dean, 527 F.3d 391, 394 (5th 
Cir.2008). This view is supported by the statutory language, which gives the victims rights 
before the accepting of plea agreements and, therefore, before adjudication of guilt. See 18 
U.S.C. §3771(a)(4)." 2009 WL 790042 at *2 (E.D.Va. 2009). 
Accordingly, rather than create a split of authority, this Court should follow the Fifth 
Circuit's holding in Dean (and the view of the U.S. District Courts for the Eastern District of 
New York and the Eastern District of Virginia) and conclude that the CVRA extends rights to 
Jane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2 under the facts of this case. 
C. 
The U.S. Attorney's Office Has Previously Recognized that Jane Doe #1 and 
Jane Doe #2 Have Rights Under the CVRA. 
A final reason for concluding that Jane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2 are protected by the 
CVRA is that the U.S. Attorney's Office itself readied that conclusion — well before the victims 
filed this petition. The U.S. Attorney's Office arranged to have the FBI send a notice to, for 
example, Jane Doe #1 informing her that she had rights under the CVRA. Later, in discussions 
with defendant Epstein, the Office explained to Epstein their obligations to the victims under the 
CVRA. Indeed, it was only after Jane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2 filed a petition with this Court 
seeking protection of their rights that the U.S. Attorney's Office reversed its position. The Court 
should reject this remarkable about-face. 
As recounted in more detail above, the U.S. Attorney's Office made clear to both the 
victims and to Epstein that the victims had rights under the CVRA. For example, on about June 
7, 2007, FBI agents hand-delivered to Jane Doe #I a standard CVRA victim notification letter, 
promising that the Justice Department would makes its "best efforts" to protect Jane Doe //I's 
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tights, including "[t]he reasonable right to confer with the attorney for the United States in the 
case" and "to be reasonably heard at any public proceeding in the district court involving 
plea . . . ." Exhibit "C." Similarly, on about November 27, 2007, then First Assistant U.S. 
Attorney Jeff Sloman sent an e-mail to Jay Lefkowitz, defense counsel for Epstein stating: la 
U.S. Attorney's Correspondence at 255 
(emphasis rearranged). 
Apparently, this assertion produced some sort of objection from 
defendant Epstein. The U.S. Attorney's Office, however, rejected those objections hi a letter 
on about December 6, 2007, Jeffrey H. Sloman, First Assistant U.S. Attorney again sent a letter 
to Jay Leflcowitz, reiterating the U.S. Attorney's Office's legal obligations to keep victims 
informed of the status of 
The letter stated: 
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U.S. Attorney's Correspondence at 191-92 (emphasis added). What this correspondence shows 
is that the U.S. Attorney's Office quite clearly took the position with defendant Epstein that the 
CVRA extended rights to Epstein's victims. Yet when the victims in this case filed a petition in 
this Court asking those rights to be respected, the Government simply reversed course. The U.S. 
Attorney's Office had it right the first time — the CVRA does extend rights to Jane Doe #1 and 
Jane Doe #2 in this case. 
1). 
The U.S. Attorney's Office Is Estopped From Arguing that the CVRA Does 
Not Apply in this Case. 
For all the reasons just explained, it is clear that the CVRA applies to this case and the 
Jane Doe #1 and Jane Doc #2 had rights under the Act. Li addition, however, the Government is 
simply stopped from arguing otherwise. The Government told the victims that they had rights 
under the CVRA and would keep them informed about the progress of the case. Exhibits "C," 
"D," "F," & "G." Having made those representations to the victims — and having induced 
reliance by the victims — the Government is stopped from taking a different position now. 
As explained by the Eleventh Circuit, to make out a claim of estoppel against the 
Government, a party must adduce evidence of the following: 
(1) words, conduct, or acquiescence that induces reliance; 
(2) willfulness or negligence with regard to the acts, conduct, or acquiescence; 
(3) detrimental reliance; and 
(4) affirmative misconduct by the Government. 
United States v. McCorkle, 321 F.3d 1292 (I I d' Cir. 2003). Each of these four factors is easily 
met here. 
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First, the Government made statements to the victims that induced reliance. The victims 
received an official notice on Justice Department letterhead that they were crime victims in the 
Epstein case and that the Justice Department would use its "best efforts" to protect their rights. 
Second, these statements wore obviously not accidental — to the contrary, the Government 
specifically and deliberately sent these notices to the victims. 
Third, the victims detrimentally relied on these statements. As explained at greater 
length in the victims proposed facts, the victims were lead to believe that their ease was "tinder 
investigation." As a result, they did not take steps to object to Epstein's plea agreement and, 
indeed, did not even attend the court hearing where Epstein pled guilty. Similarly, their attorney 
(Mr. Edwards) was induced to spend an afternoon writing a letter to the U.S Attorney's Office 
about why Epstein should be federally prosecuted — time that was taken away from other matters 
at his busy law practice. This was a complete wild goose chase, as the U.S. Attorney's Office 
was concealing from Mr. Edwards at the time that a federal non-prosecution agreement had 
already been reached with Epstein. 
Fourth, the U.S. Attorney's Office engaged in affirmative misconduct. We do not make 
this allegation lightly. But the facts recounted above demonstrate the following chain of events. 
The U.S. Attorney's Office first reached a non-prosecution agreement with Epstein, in which it 
agreed not to prosecute him for numerous crimes (including, for example, sex offenses 
committed by Epstein against Jane Doe #1). As part of that agreement, the U.S. Attorney's 
Office agreed to a "confidentiality" provision that forbade publicly disclosing the existence of 
the agreement. 
As a result, the U.S. Attorney's Office (and FBI agents acting under its 
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