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21 
more understanding of the G77." 
On balance, the actual effect of policy issues and ideologies on the 2012 elections 
remains uncertain. But the way that Australia successfully managed to limit possible 
damage from its Middle East positions shows that judicious steps and a good 
communication strategy can help compartmentalize difficult issues. 
In this regard, the Finnish campaign probably suffered from a communication deficit. 
Australia and Luxembourg both succeeded in building a narrative that emphasized 
their bilateral relationships, joint interests, or a shared identity with each potential voter. 
As noted earlier, the campaign strategy chosen by these two candidates focused on 
such goals. But their everyday attitude also contributed to it. For instance, one delegate 
observed, "The permanent representative of Luxembourg was very approachable. She 
was present at all events, and always the first to agree to meet candidates from other 
countries for other posts." 
Finland, on the other hand, had more difficulties in emphasizing its shared interests and 
bilateral relationships with voters. Although its image in New York was generally 
considered as good, its actual achievements and its own identity were less known to 
many delegations. 
Finland's communication strategy, focused on UN issues, did not help to give others a 
better sense of the country. The campaign did not communicate enough on Finland's 
own achievements and identity. In a paradoxical way, Finland—which had always been 
a leader in women's rights and gender equality—had no woman playing a visible role in 
its campaign team. 
Finland also did not manage to give an emotional dimension to its campaign, the way 
Luxembourg did in New York. According to delegates, Finland's communication seemed 
intermittent, based on specific events or initiatives, whereas its two competitors subtly 
but continuously reminded other delegations of their candidacies. 
Finland's campaign was probably also handicapped by the fact that its foreign policy 
tools, and in particular its official development assistance (ODA), are largely focused 
toward multilateral institutions. Apart from the group of its ten or so cooperation 
partners, Finland was not in a position to show to potential voters the actual results of its 
contributions to international development. As one delegate put it, "It's not enough to 
have a good UN record, you need to better explain what you do." 
6. Ethics 
As is the case for all candidates running for elections, countries campaigning for a seat 
at the Security Council have to face, at one moment or another, difficult ethical 
dilemmas on how votes should or should not be won. 
EFTA01074037

All three candidates seem to have cautiously refrained from committing to defend 
specific positions at the Council, especially on regional issues, that would not be 
consistent with their traditional policies. As one delegate indicated: "Authenticity and 
integrity matter. There is no point in hiding. You cannot take commitments you would 
not respect once you are elected at the Security Council. Candidates need to preserve 
their long-term credibility." 
Beyond policy issues, the way candidates can use the tools of their foreign policy during 
the campaign, and in particular their official development assistance (ODA), is also 
often debated. 
According to interviews, it appears that all candidates made sure to respect agreed 
guidelines on development policies during their campaign. They assumed that they 
could, when requested during the campaign, provide punctual assistance only if it was 
consistent with their existing policies. One delegate mentioned that a handful of 
countries offered electoral support in exchange for funding of dubious projects, but such 
offers were not accepted by the candidate who had been approached. 
As one delegate noted, "the ODA status is a key element of the campaign and countries 
are aware of it." All candidates emphasized their development cooperation. 
Luxembourg's effort, with 1.05% of its gross national income devoted to ODA, was well 
perceived. Australia benefited from the increase in its ODA. 
Finland's long track record as an important donor was also an asset, but probably to a 
lesser degree than for its competitors. Almost half of Finland's ODA is delivered through 
multilateral channels and, hence, less "visible," according to some, than that of Australia 
or Luxembourg." It also seems that Finland's development cooperation tools and 
procedures were less geared to responding to punctual requests than the ones of its 
competitors. 
*** 
In hindsight, Finland was at a disadvantage compared to its two competitors. It was 
caught "in the middle" and had difficulties to establish a profile consistent with its own 
identity. It did not have the reach and the resources of Australia as a regional power, 
and it could not play the "small-state" card, which was the mark of Luxembourg. The 
"anti-EU sentiment" forced a competition with Luxembourg that Finnish diplomats had 
probably not anticipated. Their strategy, focused on UN issues, did not appeal enough 
to other member states, which tend to put a premium on issues of bilateral interest. 
More importantly, Finland did not have the same natural constituency that Australia and 
Luxembourg could rely on, thanks to cultural, geographic, and historic ties. 
Given its strong record and good image at the UN, Finland would probably have been 
1d According to OECD/DAC data, Finland allocated in 2011 40 % of its ODA in unearmarked contributions 
to multilateral institutions (compared with 32% for Luxembourg and 14% 
for Australia). 
www.oecd.org/dac/stats/statisticsonresourceflowstodevelopingcountries.htm 
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23 
more at ease with a different set of competitors. But the specific configuration of the 
2012 election and the way Australia and Luxembourg played their strengths narrowed 
its chances of success. There is no way to tell if a different campaign would have 
yielded a happier outcome for Finland. Some of the issues with which Finnish diplomats 
had to wrestle in the run-up to the election are of a structural nature. They probably 
could not have been overcome with a different campaign. These issues relate to the 
definition of the international profile of the country, the structure of its development 
cooperation policy, and the balance between its multilateral and bilateral diplomacies. 
The post-election phase offers an opportunity for Finland to take stock of these 
elements and move forward. 
II. 
Lessons learned 
The many interviews conducted for this survey offered opportunities to identify lessons 
learned from the 2012 campaign which can be of use for Finland but also for its close 
partners of the Nordic states and of the European Union, as well as for other UN 
members. Some of these lessons are directly related to elections. Others deal with 
larger issues and go beyond the electoral context at the UN. 
1. For Finland 
Finland should remain engaged in the work of the United Nations and on the 
international scene. In the wake of its defeat at the Security Council election, Finland 
might be tempted to reduce its involvement with the United Nations or with other 
countries. On the contrary, Finland should use the lessons learned from the campaign 
to build on its strengths and adapt, where needed, its diplomatic tools. 
1.1. 
Stay engaged in the work of the UN 
The reality which emerges from interviews with delegates in New York is that last year's 
elections have not tarnished the image of the country at the UN. Most delegates 
acknowledge Finland's good UN record and consider that electoral successes or 
failures come and go and are part of the life of the organization. They minimize the 
significance of the electoral vote: "What differentiated the candidates was unpredictable. 
It's a beauty contest. It's like the stock market. You win, you lose." Several delegates 
noted that the big winner of the 2012 election, Australia, had failed in its previous bid 
sixteen years ago. 
As interviews showed, Finland has many assets and brings a contribution to the work of 
the UN which is widely respected. 
Finland should certainly continue what it currently does. This includes its contributions 
to UN funds and programs (though, as indicated below, some adaptation could be 
considered), but also specific initiatives like its work on mediation and conflict 
prevention. It also includes its support to informal dialogue among member states at the 
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24 
UN to facilitate discussions on policy issues and to help improve working methods of 
UN bodies. For instance, since 2003, Finland has hosted a retreat every fall for current 
and incoming members of the Security Council to share their experiences and reflect on 
the work of the Council. More than fifty states have participated in this retreat since its 
creation. Finland also started a similar annual retreat two years ago for the current and 
incoming presidents and vice-presidents of the General Assembly and its main 
committees. Continuing these initiatives would be a useful support to the work of the UN 
and a good investment for Finland. 
Finland could do even more. Participation in peace operations has traditionally been a 
strong point in its UN record. However—due to budgetary and other constraints-its 
contributions to UN operations have significantly decreased in the past two decades. Its 
participation in EU- and NATO-led operations also decreased recently. Finland's overall 
contribution to international missions dropped from a high of about 2,000 in the 1990s to 
currently around 400 soldiers and 100 civilians.15 Finland could reflect on ways to revive 
its participation in peace operations and bring concrete support to current efforts to 
address crises, in particular in Africa. 
1.2. 
Sharpen its international profile and communicate more effectively 
Finland's international profile reflects its values and priorities. Delegates with whom IPI 
met generally recognized these values—in particular human rights and gender equality, 
rule of law, sustainable development—and the role played by Finnish officials and 
personalities as problem solvers or mediators. 
But interviewees sometimes seemed to wonder what differentiated Finland from its 
regional partners within the Western group, the EU, or among the Nordics. As noted 
earlier, most delegates thought that there was no significant difference in terms of 
policies between the three candidates. Some considered that Finland's values and roles 
could seem contradictory. One delegate observed that Finland was generally perceived 
as not having a "hidden agenda," but at the same time that its positions on social issues 
could give the impression that it was among those which tend to "impose their concepts 
and do not recognize cultural differences." 
Right or wrong, perceptions matter, and views expressed by several delegates suggest 
that there may be a need for Finland to make sure that the gap does not widen between 
its objectives and the way some of its policies are perceived internationally. 
Finland could seize the current opportunity to reflect on its international profile, on what 
makes this profile different or similar to the ones of its closest partners, and on ways to 
communicate more effectively about what it stands for and what it does. 
One can look, for instance, at Finland's voluntary contributions to multilateral 
organizations. These contributions are an important dimension of the country's support 
15 See Finland's country profile in IPI's project "Providing for Peacekeeping," available at 
www.ipinst.org/peace-operations/providing-for-peacekeeping/programslist.html . 
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25 
to the work of the UN and other institutions. But several interviewees noted that such 
contributions, spread across a wide range of programs and agencies, may not give a 
proper visibility to this important effort. Finland could consider a more selective funding 
strategy and concentrate its efforts on a smaller number of funds and agencies working 
in areas which match its most important priorities. This would help build a more 
concrete narrative on Finland's development aid. 
For the Foreign Ministry, a more effective communication strategy would also require a 
reflection on ways to better include communication techniques in the training and 
professional development of diplomats. The 2012 election showed how Luxembourg—
thanks to a well-thought-out communication strategy and to the skills of its campaign 
team—successfully managed to create with other countries a shared sense of mutual 
understanding that won widespread sympathy to its candidacy. More attention could be 
paid to communication skills and style in the multilateral context. 
1.3. 
Diversify its bilateral partnerships 
Finland's involvement in the work of multilateral organizations cannot be separated from 
its bilateral diplomacy. One of the main lessons learned from this survey of the 2012 
election is that, to win international support, dynamic bilateral relationships remain what 
matters most. 
Finland could review the tools at its disposal—its diplomatic network, its capacity to 
engage partners in joint initiatives, and its ODA—to better diversify its bilateral 
partnerships. 
Finland's substantial diplomatic network is a strong asset. But the campaign has 
revealed a few blind spots—in particular in Francophone Africa—and a certain deficit of 
communication with Arab countries. Following up on previous efforts to adapt its 
representation abroad,i6 Finland could explore how to fill in these gaps. Cooperation 
with other Nordic or EU countries might be a way to identify cost-effective options. 
Finland's ODA is a major asset and could perhaps be more clearly connected to its 
foreign policy. Development cooperation and Finland's diplomacy are already closely 
interdependent. As one interviewee noted, "Finland puts its money where its mouth is." 
But there may be a need to reflect on ways to better integrate Finland's development 
cooperation with its foreign policy and have it become part of its bilateral dialogue with a 
wider range of countries. 
In a context of heavy budgetary and staffing constraints, the emphasis put on a limited 
number of cooperation partners and on multilateral channels to deliver ODA makes 
eminent sense. There is no question that Finland should continue to prioritize the most 
effective use of its resources from a development perspective. But by redeploying only a 
margin of its ODA to bilateral cooperation, Finland could reach out to a wider range of 
16 See Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Finland, Report on Finland's Representation Abroad, September 
2009, available at http://formin.finlandEpublic/default.aspx?nodeid=4475384contentlan=28,culture=en-US. 
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'16 
countries than it currently does. 
According to OECD/DAC data,17 Finland currently allocates 40 % of its ODA in 
unearmarked contributions to multilateral institutions (compared with 35% for Sweden, 
27% for Denmark, and 24% to Norway). If Finland were to align itself with its Nordic 
partners, and devote for instance only 35% of its ODA—like Sweden—to general 
support to multilateral organizations instead of 40%, it would free more than 75 million 
US dollars annually that it could allocate to bilateral cooperation. Going down to 27%—
which would be comparable to what Denmark does—would free more than 180 million 
US dollars. Alternatively, given that Finland's ODA is expected to grow in the coming 
years,ie it could choose to allocate its surpluses to bilateral development cooperation. 
This would not diminish Finland's standing with multilateral institutions and would create 
opportunities to engage a more diverse group of partners with whom it could conduct 
small-scale projects. 
The recommendations proposed above should not be misinterpreted as an invitation to 
subordinate foreign policy priorities to the quest for optimal performance at UN 
elections. For a country like Finland, major election campaigns only take place once 
every fifteen to twenty years, and electoral strategies are probably not the best guide for 
defining policies. But the analysis of the recent electoral campaign helps to shed light on 
some gaps in Finland's diplomacy. These recommendations are meant to help 
Finland—or other countries with a similar profile—explore ways to better pursue its 
priorities, to build more diversified relationships, and to better connect with the rest of 
the UN membership. 
2. For the Nordic countries 
Finland's defeat came at the same time as Sweden's failure to be elected to the UN 
Human Rights Council and four years after Iceland's unsuccessful bid for a Security 
Council seat. Although each election had its own logic, many in New York consider 
these recent failures as "a wake-up call for the Nordics." 
Still, some delegates warned against "jumping to conclusions too quickly." Interviews 
confirmed the generally "good image" of Nordic countries at the UN, even though some 
expressed more nuanced views.i9
Several elements, however, are worth noting. 
Given their long-time record of support to conflict prevention, mediation, and peace-
making, their leading role in many UN and international debates and initiatives, and their 
17 ODA from DAC countries to multilateral organizations in 2011, 
available at www.oecd.org/dadstats/statisticsonresourceflowstodevelopingcountries.htm . 
18 In the EU, Finland is committed to achieve by 2015 an ODA/GNI rate of 0.7% (from 0.53% in 2011). 
See Finland's Development Policy Programme, February 16, 2012, available at 
http://formin.finlandEpublicklefault.aspx?contentid=251855&nodeid=15452&contentlan=2&culture=en-
US . 
19 See section 1-5 above. 
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17 
generous contributions to the UN and to its peace operations, Nordic countries may 
have been tempted to see themselves as—according to one delegate—a "moral pillar" 
of the UN. 
Large segments of the UN membership acknowledge this particular profile of the 
Nordics. But, as far as electoral campaigns are concerned, they also tend to consider a 
Nordic candidate as one competitor among others, and very often not too different 
politically from the other Western candidates. 
Nordic states may need to better take into account these evolving views. They may also 
want to revisit their UN record. If Nordic funding to UN funds and programs remains 
higher than that of other donors, Nordic participation in UN peace operations has 
declined over the last two decades. Support for peace efforts has been less prominent. 
For a number of countries the Nordic "difference" has become less evident. Several 
delegates wondered about the "visibility" of Nordic aid. Some mentioned the more 
prominent profile assumed by new actors like Turkey, India, or—in the development 
field—China. 
Nordic countries that are also members of the EU may also wish to revisit the way they 
reconcile these two identities. It appears that, during the campaign, Finland did not get 
full EU support. According to interviews, its European profile seemed less evident to 
some fellow EU members than that of Luxembourg. In a similar way, Ireland got strong 
European backing at the election to the Human Rights Council, but not Sweden. 
There is a need for the Nordic states to address these perceptions. They could in 
particular reflect together on how a renewed commitment to the work of the UN and a 
more effective communication strategy could help them remain true to their values and 
at the same time engage more effectively with the other countries. Indeed, many of the 
Nordic countries' numerous achievements can be an inspiration for others if the Nordics 
find the right way to communicate about them.2°
3. For the EU 
Recent campaigns showed sensitivities among UN member states on the issue of the 
representation of European Union countries at the Security Council. 
Such sensitivities, exacerbated by the recent debates on the EU status at the General 
Assembly, will probably remain for a while. Even if the "anti-EU sentiment" fades away, 
EU countries can hardly expect to continue—as they did in the previous decade—to 
regularly get the two seats allocated to the WEOG at Security Council elections (except 
if they have a "clean slate," with only two candidates for two seats, or if all three 
candidates are from the EU). 
In this context, competition between EU members for elections at the Security Council—
20 See The Economist, "The Next Supermodel," Special Report on the Nordic Countries, February 2-8, 
2013. 
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28 
or other major UN elections—plays against the interest of EU members themselves. It 
gives a competitive edge to the non-EU candidates who enter the race and who can 
count on voters, including EU members, to split their support between EU and non-EU. 
Within the EU, intra-European competition also generates disappointment for the 
candidate that is not supported by its closest partners and resentment among member 
states in case some EU members actually take sides in the campaign. 
Vis-a-vis the UN membership, competition between EU members shows a lack of unity 
and solidarity within the Union and belies the European aspiration to a common foreign 
policy. 
The members of the EU need to reflect on these perceptions and on ways to avoid 
competition among EU members at future elections. 
This issue raises numerous difficulties both political—EU membership should not make 
it more difficult for countries to candidate to a seat at the Security Council—and 
technical—how to organize rotation between EU and non-EU countries for the WEOG 
seats or for the Eastern European seat? 
A clear understanding among EU members that they need to work together to avoid 
electoral competition would strengthen the credibility of the EU foreign policy and would 
help enhance its contribution to the work of the UN. 
4. For the UN membership 
Big electoral campaigns are now a fact of life at the United Nations. The contest for 
seats at the Security Council is probably the most intense, but elections to other posts-
such as the presidency of the General Assembly—or to other UN bodies—including 
ECOSOC and its subsidiary commissions or committees—are sometimes also very 
competitive. Countries tend to devote a larger amount of resources and mobilize at a 
higher political level to promote their candidacies. The stakes are higher than they used 
to be twenty years ago. 
Some delegates believe that such competition is inherently a "healthy process" and a 
rare occasion for member states to present themselves to the UN membership and to 
submit their foreign policy to a reality check. Others are more "uncomfortable" with big 
campaigns and all the effort which is put into them. They consider that too much energy 
and resources are invested in these contests and distract from the real work of the UN. 
Member states could consider various options to build on the merits of open debate and 
fair competition while at the same time limiting the risks of opportunistic actions which 
are not in the long-term interest of the organization. 
4.1 
Electoral campaigns require that candidates approach each potential voter and 
engage in a dialogue to find some common ground that can yield voter support. Bilateral 
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29 
considerations are a decisive factor. But member states could also use this 
opportunity—more often than is currently the case-to engage the candidates on 
policy issues at the UN. 
4.2 
Substantial financial resources are invested in electoral campaigns at the UN—
mostly for elections to the Security Council but also increasingly for elections to other 
bodies. Some countries are transparent about their campaign budget,21 others are not. 
Candidates also leverage their development cooperation to woo voters, but the issue 
remains generally quite opaque. 
Some reflection on these issues is needed. UN members cannot pretend to ignore 
them. There is probably not much point in trying to establish new rules or a code of 
conduct. But on a voluntary basis some countries could take the initiative to promote 
transparency in electoral campaigns, and this may create incentives for others. 
On a voluntary basis, a candidate could: 
Be transparent from the very beginning of the campaign about its campaign 
budget (i.e., additional expenses for staff, communication, visits, compared to 
normal expenses in non-campaign years), and 
Reaffirm the rules and principles of its development cooperation (and preferably 
their consistency with internationally-agreed rules and guidelines, such as the 
ones of OECD-DAC). 
Candidates would only need to disclose their additional expenses during the campaign 
years. This would not penalize those candidates who consistently devote important 
resources to UN funding or to activities related to the UN independently from their 
electoral ambitions. 
Increased transparency could help limit the inflation of campaign budgets as well as 
opportunistic behaviors of countries that might adapt their development cooperation to 
short-term electoral purposes. 
4.3 
Beyond the issue of elections, interviews conducted for this survey shed light on 
a need for a dialogue on the financing of development cooperation. 
Interviews for this study clearly showed diverging views among UN members on 
development cooperation and expectations related to it. Numerous delegates, in 
particular from the G77, indicated that donors are gauged according to the "visibility" of 
the aid they provide. According to interviews, new donors from the global south tend to 
prefer funding tangible projects, whereas traditional donors put the emphasis on more 
indirect forms of cooperation. 
21 All three WEOG candidates made this information available to their parliaments, and Australia also 
communicated about it to the larger public. 
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30 
Each set of donors seems to follow its own rules: South-South cooperation for the new 
donors, OECD-DAC for the traditional ones, with little overlap between the two. if the 
shared goal is to promote development, there might be a need to reflect on how to 
create some common ground between these different models. 
In addition to ODA and South-South cooperation, new modalities for funding 
international development are also emerging, such as innovative financing or revenue 
collected from emission trading. It would be useful to engage a dialogue on these 
opportunities and to reach a common understanding. 
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31 
Methodology 
The present study was undertaken by the International Peace Institute (IPI) at the 
request of the Foreign Minister of Finland. Its objective is to provide an independent 
assessment and lessons learned of the 2012 elections for the WEOG seats at the 
Security Council. 
IPI interviewed more than 50 delegates and senior officials from all regional groups in 
member states missions in New York and in capitals, as well as a few independent 
experts. For approximately 30 of these interviews, IPI used a semi-structured 
questionnaire—matching the headings of this report—which allowed new ideas to be 
brought up during the discussion as a result of what the interviewees were saying. The 
other 20 interviews were based on a more limited set of questions. 
Most of these interviews took place in February and March 2012. All of them were 
conducted on a strictly confidential basis. 
IPI is an international, not-for-profit think tank—with offices in New York and Vienna—
dedicated to promoting the prevention and settlement of conflict by strengthening 
multilateral institutions. It conducts its work in an independent and impartial way. 
IPI is grateful to the government of Finland for trusting the Institute with this study and 
for its willingness to promote transparency on a matter which is sensitive for all UN 
member states. IPI is also grateful to all officials, delegates, and experts who agreed to 
be interviewed and shared their views in the most candid way. 
The interviews were conducted by Terje Rod-Larsen, President of IPI, Francois Carrel-
Billiard, Managing Director, and Francesco Mancini, Senior Director of Research. 
Frangois Carrel-Billiard served as Rapporteur. 
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