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JANE DOE NO. 6 
CASE NO.: 08-CV-80994-MARRA/JOHNSON 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JEFFREY EPSTEIN, 
Defendant. 
JANE DOE NO. 7 
CASE NO.: 08-CV-80993-MARRA/JOHNSON 
C.M.A. 
CASE NO.: 08-CV-80811-MARR/VJOHNSON 
vs. 
JEFFREY EPSTEIN, 
Defendant. 
JANE DOE 
CASE NO.: 013-CV-80893-MARRA/JOHNSON 
Plaintiff, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JEFFREY EPSTEIN, 
Defendant 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JEFFREY EPSTEIN, 
Defendant 
2 
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DOE II 
CASE NO.: 09-CV-80469-MARRA/JOHNSON 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
JEFFREY EPSTEIN, 
Defendant. 
JANE DOE NO. 101 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JEFFREY EPSTEIN, 
Defendant. 
CASE NO.: 09-CV-80591-MARRA/JOHNSON 
JANE DOE NO. 102 
CASE NO.: 09-CV-80656-MARRA/JOHNSON 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JEFFREY EPSTEIN, 
Defendant. 
PLAINTIFF, C.M.A.'S, MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER REGARDING 
TREATMENT RECORDS FROM PARENT-CHILD CENTER, INC, DR. SERGE THYS, 
DOMINIQUE HYPPOLITE/SCHOOL DISTRICT OF PALM BEACH COUNTY, GOOD 
SAMARITAN HOSPITAL ST. MARY'S HOSPITAL, FLORIDA ATLANTIC 
UNIVERSITY AND GLORIA C. HAKKARAINEN, M.D. AND INCORPORATED 
MEMORANDUM OF LAW 
Plaintiff, C.M.A., by and through her undersigned attorneys, hereby files her 
Motion For Protective Order Regarding Treatment Records From Parent-Child Center, 
Inc., Dr. Serge Thys, Dominique Hyppolite/School District of Palm Beach County, Good 
Samaritan Hospital, St. Mary's Hospital, Florida Atlantic University and Gloria C. 
3 
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Hakkarainen, M.D. and Incorporated Memorandum of Law, and in support there of 
states as follows: 
1. 
This is an action to recover money damages against Defendant, 
JEFFREY EPSTEIN, for acts of sexual abuse and prostitution committed upon the then-
minor, C.M.A. 
2. 
Plaintiff has plead thirty separate counts against EPSTEIN for separate 
incidences of abuse committed by EPSTEIN against Plaintiff pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 
§2255. 18 U.S.C. §2255, entitled °Civil remedy for personal injuries", creates a private 
right of action for minor children who were the victims of certain enumerated sex 
offenses. 18 U.S.C. §2255 also creates a statutory floor for the amount of damages a 
victim can recover for a violation of same. Plaintiff has also alleged a single count of 
Sexual Battery against EPSTEIN. 
3. 
There presently exists between the Plaintiff and EPSTEIN a disagreement 
as to whether the statutory damage floor established in 18 U.S.C. §2255 is recoverable 
for each commission of an enumerated sex offenses listed in 18 U.S.C. §2255, or 
whether the statutory damage floor can only be enforced once, regardless of how many 
times a defendant perpetrates an enumerated sex offense against a minor victim. 
4. 
This disagreement between the parties is properly the subject of 
Defendants Motion to Dismiss First Amended Complaint For Failure to State a Cause 
of Action, and Motion For More Definite Statement; Motion to Strike, and Supporting 
Memorandum of Law (Attached hereto as Exhibit "A") which is currently pending before 
this Court 
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5. 
In the event that the Court rules that Plaintiff can recover the statutory 
damage floor established in 18 U.S.C. §2255 for each proven incident of abuse 
committed by EPSTEIN upon her, Plaintiff intends to rely exclusively on the statutory 
damages, rather than those damages which are available at common law. (See 
Plaintiff, C.M.A.'s Conditional Notice of Intent to Exclusively Rely on Statutory Damages 
Provided by 18 U.S.C. §2255 attached hereto as Exhibit "B"). If however, the Court 
rules that the statutory floor applies only one time, regardless of the number of times 
EPSTEIN committed an enumerated sexual offense against her, Plaintiff will be 
pursuing all damages available to her at both common law and by statute. 
6. 
Given Plaintiffs intent to rely exclusively on the statutory damages 
available to her under 18 U.S.C. §2255 as outline above, Plaintiff will not be presenting 
any evidence of the extent of her physical, emotional, or pecuniary injuries, beyond 
evidence that she was the victim of sexual contact to which she was legally incapable of 
consenting by virtue of her age (including, pain and suffering, emotional distress, 
psychological trauma, mental anguish, humiliation, embarrassment, loss of self-esteem, 
loss of dignity, invasion of her privacy, and loss of the capacity to enjoy life). 
Accordingly, any testimony and/or discovery regarding those types of damages would 
not be relevant to any material issue pending in this case. 
7. 
Presently pending before the Court is Defendant EPSTEIN's Motion to 
Compel Plaintiff C.M.A. to Respond to Defendant's First Request to Produce and 
Answer Defendant's First Set of Interrogatories, and to Overrule Objections, and For an 
Award of Defendants Reasonable Expenses (Attached hereto as Exhibit "C"). 
5 
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EPSTEIN is seeking from Plaintiff the production of certain treatment records of hers 
from the Parent-Child Center, Inc., Dr. Serge Thys, a psychiatrist, Dominique 
Hyppolite/School District of Palm Beach County, Good Samaritan Hospital, St. Mary's 
Hospital, Florida Atlantic University and Gloria C. Hakkarainen, M.D. 
8. 
None of the treatment records from the Parent-Child Center, Inc., Dr. 
Serge Thys, Dominique Hyppolite/School District of Palm Beach County, Good 
Samaritan Hospital, St. Mary's Hospital, Florida Atlantic University and Gloria C. 
Hakkarainen, M.D. will have any relevance whatsoever in the event that Plaintiff 
pursues only those statutory damages available to her under 18 U.S.C. §2255. To the 
contrary, the production of these confidential and private treatment records would only 
serve to further humiliate, embarrass, and victimize C.M.A. 
9. 
Furthermore, C.M.A.'s treatment records from the Parent-Child Center, 
Inc., Dr. Serge Thys, Dominique Hyppolite/School District of Palm Beach County, Good 
Samaritan Hospital, St. Mary's Hospital, Florida Atlantic University and Gloria C. 
Hakkarainen, M.D. are protected by the psychotherapist-patient privilege pursuant to 
the Supreme Court's decision in Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 116 S.Ct. 1923 
(1996)("All agree that a psychotherapist privilege covers confidential communications 
made to licensed psychiatrists and psychologists. We have no hesitation in concluding 
in this case that the federal privilege should also extend to confidential communications 
made to licensed social workers in the course of psychotherapy.") Ordinarily, a plaintiff 
does not place her mental condition in controversy merely by requesting damages for 
mental anguish or "garden variety' emotional distress. In order to place a party's mental 
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condition in controversy the party must allege a specific mental or psychiatric disorder 
or intend to offer expert testimony to support their claim of emotional distress. Turner v 
Imperial Stores, 161 F.R.D. 89 (S.D.Cal. 1995). The evidence sought is also protected 
under the substantive privacy rights recognized in Florida Statute §§90.503 and 
90.5035. 
10. 
Accordingly, Plaintiff respectfully moves for the entry of a protective order 
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 26(c) regarding Plaintiffs treatment records from the 
Parent-Child Center, Inc., Dr. Serge Thys, Dominique Hyppolite/School District of Palm 
Beach County, Good Samaritan Hospital, St. Mary's Hospital, Florida Atlantic University 
and Gloria C. Hakkarainen, M.D. More particularly, Plaintiff requests the entry of an 
order precluding the discovery of those records until such time as the Court rules on the 
issue regarding whether the statutory damage floor as contained in 18 U.S.C. §2255 
applies to each proven commission of an enumerated sexual offense by EPSTEIN 
against CMA. Should the Court rule that 18 U.S.C. §2255 provides a per incident 
damage floor, the treatment records would have absolutely no relevance whatsoever. 
In the event that the Court rules that the damage floor applies only once, the parties can 
then further brief the Court as to whether C.M.A has placed her mental condition In 
controversy" such that it operates as a waiver of the psychotherapist-patient privilege. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, C.M.A., respectfully requests that this Court enter a 
protective order preventing the discovery of Plaintiff's treatment records from the 
Parent-Child Center, Inc., Dr. Serge Thys, Dominique Hyppolite/School District of Palm 
Beach County, Good Samaritan Hospital, St. Mary's Hospital, Florida Atlantic University 
7 
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA 
CASE NO.: 08-CV-80811-MARRAIJOHNSON 
C.M. 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
fill
Y EPSTEIN and 
Defendants, 
DEFENDANT JEFFREY EPSTEIN'S MOTION TO DISMISS FIRST 
AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION, 
AND MOTION FOR MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT: MOTION TO STRIKE, 
AND SUPPORTING MEMORANDUM OF LAW 
Defendant, JEFFREY EPSTEIN, ("EPSTEIN"), by and through his undersigned 
counsel, moves to dismiss Count I through XXXI of Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint 
for failure to state a cause of action, and for more definite statement, or to strike, as 
specified herein. Rule 12(b)(6), (e) and (f), Fed.R.Civ.P. (2008); Local Gen. Rule 7.1 
(S.D. Ma. 2008). In support of dismissal, Defendant states: 
The First Amended Complaint attempts to allege 32 counts. Counts I through 
XXX are purportedly brought pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §2255 - Civil Remedies for 
Personal Injuries; Count XXXI is entitled °Sexual Battery," and Count XXXII is entitled 
"Conspiracy to Commit Tortlous Assault only against Defendant, 
." Under 
the heading "Factual Allegations" of the First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff also 
references numerous federal and state criminal statutes, but fails to allege whether or 
not she is attempting to assert claims based on these statutes. (¶15, 1st Am. Comp.). 
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Dismissal is required on the following grounds: (1) A review of the complaint 
allegations establishes that Plaintiff has failed to state the 30 causes of action under 18 
U.S.C.A. 2255. As discussed more fully below herein, this statute does not allow for the 
Plaintiff to allege 30 separate causes of action; rather, the statute allows for the Plaintiff 
to attempt to assert one claim. In addition, Plaintiff has failed to allege a violation of the 
requisite predicate act as identified in 18 U.S.C. §2255 in order to state a cause of 
action. Thus, Counts I through )CO( against EPSTEIN are required to be dismissed. 
Rule 12(b)(6), Fla.R.Civ.P. 
(2) Count XXXI — Sexual Battery is also required to be dismissed for failure to state 
a cause of action as Plaintiff has failed to allege the requisite elements of such claim. 
The count fails to sufficiently allege whether it is being brought pursuant to common or 
statutory law. Further, in Count XXXI, Plaintiff reincorporates in their entirety Counts I 
through XXX; such pleading is improper and requires dismissal under the applicable 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Supporting Memorandum of Law 
I. Motion To Dismiss Standard 
As established by the Supreme Court in Bell Atlantic Corp, V. Twombly 127 
S.Ct. 1955 (2007), a motion to dismiss should be granted if the plaintiff does not plead 
"enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face' Id, at 1974. 
Although the complaint need not provide detailed factual allegations, the basis for relief 
in the complaint must state "more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic 
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Id, at 1965. Further, "If'actual 
allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level ... on the 
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assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact)' Id. 
On a motion to dismiss, the well pleaded allegations of plaintiffs complaint are taken as 
true and construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. M.T.V. v. DeKalb County 
Sch. Dist., 446 F.3d 1153. 1156 (11th Cir.2006). 
Significantly, the Supreme Court in Bell Atlantic Corp. V. Twombly abrogated the 
often cited observation that "a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a 
claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in 
support of his claim that would entitle him to relief." Id, (abrogating and quoting Conley 
v. Gibson. 355 U,S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 102. 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957)). The Supreme 
Court rejected the notion that "a wholly conclusory statement of claim [can] survive a 
motion to dismiss whenever the pleadings le[ave] open the possibility that a plaintiff 
might later establish some 'set of [undisclosed] facts' to support recovery." Id. As 
explained by the Supreme Court in Bell Atlantic Corp., supra at 1664-65: 
While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not 
need detailed factual allegations, ibid.. Sanivan v. American Bd. of 
Psychiatry and Neurology, Inc., 40 F.3d 247. 251 (C.A.7 1994), a plaintiffs 
obligation to provide the "grounds" of his "entitle[ment] to relief" requires 
more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements 
of a cause of action will not do, see Papasan v. Allain. 478 U.S. 265, 286, 
106 S.Ct. 2932, 92 L.Ed.2d 209 (19861 (on a motion to dismiss, courts "are 
not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual 
allegation"). Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief 
above the speculative level, see 5 C. Wright & A. Miller. Federal Practice and 
Procedure & 1216, pp. 235-236 (3d ed.2004) (hereinafter Wright & Miller) 
("[T]he pleading must contain something more ... than ... a statement of facts 
that merely creates a suspicion [of] a legally cognizable right of action"), on 
the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if 
doubtful in fact), see, e.g., Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A.. 534 U.S. 506, 508, 
n. 1, 122 S.Ct. 992. 152 L.Ed.2d 1 (2002); Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 
327. 109 S.Ct. 1827, 104 L.Ed.2d 338 (1989) (" Rule 12(b)(61 does not 
countenance ... dismissals based on a judge's disbelief of a complaint's 
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factual allegations"); Scheuer v. Rhodes. 416 U.S. 232, 236. 94 S.Ct. 1683, 
40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974) (a well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if it 
appears "that a recovery is very remote and unlikely"). 
In discussing Twomblv, the Eleventh Circuit in Walls v. Fla. International Univ. 
495 F.3d 1289, 1295 (11th Cir. 2007), noted - "The Supreme Court's most recent 
formulation of the pleading specificity standard is that 'stating such a claim requires a 
complaint with enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest' the required element." 
In order to sufficiently allege the claim, the complaint is required to identify "facts that 
are suggestive enough to render [the element] plausible." Watts. 495 F.3d at 1296 
(quoting Twomblv, 127 S.Ct. at 1965). 
II. Standard for More Definite Statement, Pleading, & Motion to Strike 
Pursuant to Rule 12(e), a party may move for more definite statement of a 
pleading to which a responsive pleading is allowed where the pleading "is so vague or 
ambiguous that the party cannot reasonably frame a response! The motion is required 
to point out the defects and the desired details. Id. As to the general rules and form of 
pleading, Rules 8 and 10, a claim for relief must contain "a short plain statement of the 
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief," Rule 8(a)(3); and may contain 
alternative claims within a count or as many separate claims. Rule 10(d)(2) and (3). 
Pursuant to Rule 12(f) - Motion to Strike, "the court may strike from a pleading an 
Insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter! 
III. Counts I through XXX, 18 U.S.C. 42255, are required to be dismissed. 
A. 18 U.S.C. 42255 creates a single civil remedy or cause of action on behalf of a minor 
plaintiff against a defendant The civil remedy afforded is not on a "per violation" basis. 
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Contrary to Plaintiffs attempted assertion of 30 separate counts pursuant to 18 
U.S.C.A. §2255 - Civil Remedy for Personal Injunes, this statute creates a single federal 
cause of action or "civil remedy" for a minor victim of sexual, abuse, molestation and 
exploitation. Under the plain meaning of the statutory text, §2255 does not create 
separate causes of action on behalf of a minor against a defendant on a "per violation" 
basis. No where in the statutory text is there any reference to the civil remedy afforded 
by this statute as being on a "per violation" basis. 18 U.S.C. 2255(a) creates a civil 
remedy for "a minor who is a victim of a violation of section 2241(c), 2242, 2243, 2251, 
2251A, 2252, 2252A, 2260, 2421, 2422, or 2423 of this title and who suffers personal 
injury as a result of such violation ... ." See Smith v. Husband, 428 F.Supp.2d 432 
(E.D. Va. 2006); Smith v. Husband, 376 F.Supp.2d 603 (E.D. Va. 2006)• Doe v. 
Liberatore 478 F.Supp.2d 742, 754 (M.D. Pa. 2007); and the recent cases in front of 
this court on Defendant's Motions to Dismiss and For More Definite Statement — Doe 
No. 2 v. Epstein, 2009 WL 383332 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 12, 2009); Doe No. 3 v. Epstein 
2009 WL 383330 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 12, 2009) Doe No. 4 v. Epstein, 2009 WL 383286 
(S.D. Fla. Feb. 12, 2009); and Doe No. 5 v. Epstein, 2009 WL 383383 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 
12, 2009). 
There is no reported case supporting Plaintiffs tortured and nonsensical 
interpretation of §2255. In all of these cases (cited above), each of the Plaintiffs brought 
a single count or cause of action attempting to allege numerous violations of the 
"predicate acts" specifically identified in §2255. "18 U.S.C. §2255 gives victims of 
sexual conduct who are minors a private right of action." Martinez v. White 492 
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F.Supp.2d 1186, 1188 (N.D. Cal. 2007), (emphasis added). 18 U.S.C.A. §2255 "merely 
provides a cause ot action tor damages in •any appropriate united btates uistrict 
Court." Id, at 1189. See also Tilton v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc., 554 F.3d 
1371 (11th Cir. Jan. 15, 2009)(District Court granted plaintiff "the minimum 'actual 
damages' prescribed by §2255(a)," wherein plaintiff alleged that defendants had 
violated three of the statutory predicate acts). 
In improperly attempting to bring 30 separate counts pursuant to §2255, Plaintiffs 
complaint alleges In part that "beginning In approximately late May or early June of 
2002, and continuing until approximately August of 2003, the Defendant coerced and 
enticed the impressionable, vulnerable, and economically deprived then minor Plaintiff 
to commit various acts of sexual misconduct. These acts occurred, on average, one to 
three times per week from late may or early June of 2002 until August 2003. At a bare 
minimum these acts occurred twice a month from June 2002 until August of 2003? Am. 
Complaint, ¶13. Plaintiff then claims the identical damages In each of the 30 §2255 
counts. See ¶¶25, 31, 37, 43, 49, 55, 61, 67, 73, 79, 85, 91, 97, 103, 109, 115, 121, 
127, 133, 139, 145, 151, 157, 163, 169, 175, 181, 187, 193, and 199. As well, in Count 
XXXI, entitled °Sexual Battery," Plaintiff claims the identical "actual damages" in that she 
realleges and Incorporates each and every of the 199 allegations In the 30 prior counts. 
It is well settled that in interpreting a statute, the court's inquiry begins with the 
plain and unambiguous language of the statutory text. CBS. Inc. v. Prime Time 24 
Venture 245 F.3d 1217 (11th Cir. 2001); U.S. v. Castroneves, 2009 WL 528251, *3 
(S.D. Fla. 2009), citing Reeves v, Astrue 526 F.3d 732, 734 (11th Cir. 2008); and Smith 
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v. Husband, 376 F.Supp.2d at 610 ("When interpreting a statute, [a court's] inquiry 
begins with the text."). "The Court must first look to the plain meaning of the words, and 
scrutinize the statute's 'language, structure, and purpose.'" Id. In addition, in construing 
a statute, a court is to presume that the legislature said what it means and means what 
it said, and not add language or give some absurd or strained interpretation. As stated 
in CBS. Inc. supra at 1228 — 'Those who ask courts to give effect to perceived 
legislative Intent by interpreting statutory language contrary to its plain and 
unambiguous meaning are in effect asking courts to alter that language, and '[c]ourts 
have no authority to alter statutory language.... We cannot add to the terms of [the] 
provision what Congress left out.' Merrill, 120 F.3d at 1187." See also Dodd v. U.S. 
125 S.Ct. 2478 (2005); 73 Am.Jur.2d Statutes §124. 
Title 18 of the U.S.C. is entitled °Crimes and Criminal Procedure." §2255 is 
contained in "Part I. Crimes, Chap. 110. Sexual Exploitation and Other Abuse of 
Children." 18 U.S.C. §2255 (2003), is entitled Civil remedy for personal injuries, and 
provides: 
(a) Any minor who is a victim of a violation of section 2241(c), 2242, 2243, 2251, 
2251A, 2252, 2252A, 2260, 2421, 2422, or 2423 of this title and who suffers 
personal Injury as a result of such violation may sue in any appropriate United 
States District Court and shall recover the actual damages such minor sustains 
and the cost of the suit, Including a reasonable attorney's fee. Any minor as 
described in the preceding sentence shall be deemed to have sustained 
damages of no less than $50,000 in value. 
(b) Any action commenced under this section shall be barred unless the complaint 
Is filed within six years after the right of action first accrues or In the case of a 
person under a legal disability, not later than three years after the disability. 
Reading the entire statute in context, no where is there any language indicating 
that a minor plaintiff has a private right of action against a defendant "per violation." 
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Under the statutory rules of construction, had the legislature intended to give a plaintiff 
multiple causes of action against a defendant on a per violation basis, the statute would 
have Included such language. Had Congress wanted to create such a remedy as 
Plaintiff attempts to bring, it could have easily included language of "per violation" after 
the presumptive damages amount in subsection (a). By its own terms, the statute 
provides for the recovery of "actual damages the minor sustains and the cost of the suit, 
including attorney's fees." There is absolutely no language that allows for a plaintiff to 
multiply the specified or presumptive damages recoverable on a "per violation" basis. 
The Plaintiffs position on §2255 puts a strained interpretation with an absurd result. 
The absurdity of Plaintiffs position is further evidenced by Count XXXI — "Sexual 
Battery" where Plaintiff reincorporates each of the 30 counts and seeks the identical 
"actual damages." 
in Martinez v. White, supra, the defendants sought to dismiss plaintiffs' 18 U.S.C. 
§2255 action based on forum non conveniens. The Northern District of California Court, 
relying on the rules of statutory construction, rejected plaintiffs' argument that Congress 
had intended to abrogate the forum non conveniens doctrine in a §2255 action; the 
District Court noted that the statute does not contain a mandatory venue provision. Had 
Congress wanted to get rid of the forum non-conveniens doctrine, it would have said so 
In the statute. Also, in Smith v. Husband, 428 F.Supp. 432; and 376 F.Supp.2d 603, the 
plaintiff invoked "the accompanying civil remedy for these criminal violations, stating that 
she has sustained and continues to sustain physical and mental damages, humiliation, 
and embarrassment as a result of Defendant's criminal acts." In other words, she 
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brought a single cause of action, based on allegations of multiple violations of the §2255 
predicate acts. Furthermore, the court refused to add a venue interpretation that simply 
was not written into the statutory text. See other §2255 cases cited herein. 
For an example of a statute wherein the legislature included the language "for 
each violation" in assessing a "civil penalty," see 18 U.S.C. §216, entitled "Penalties and 
injunctions," of Chapter 11 — "Bribery, Graft, and Conflict of Interests," also contained In 
Title 18 — "Crimes and Criminal Procedure." Subsection (b) of §216 gives the United 
States Attorney General the power to bring a "civil action ... against any person who 
engages In conduct constituting an offense under' specified sections of the bribery, 
graft, and conflicts of interest statutes. The statute further provides in relevant part that 
"upon proof of such conduct by a preponderance of the evidence, such person shall be 
subject to a civil penalty of not more than $50,000 for each violation or the amount of 
compensation which the person received or offered for the prohibited conduct, which 
ever amount is greater." As noted, 18 U.S.C. §2255 does not include such language. 
Accordingly, Plaintiffs multiple counts brought pursuant to §2255 are required to 
be dismissed for failure to state multiple causes of action. 
B. Also requiring dismissal Plaintiff has failed to sufficiently allege 
the requisite §2255 predicate acts. 
Also requiring dismissal of Plaintiffs purported §2255 claim(s) is Plaintiff's failure 
to sufficiently allege any violation of a requisite predicate act as specifically identified in 
subsection (a) of the statute quoted above. Relevant to Plaintiffs complaint, 18 U.S.C. 
2255(a) creates a civil remedy for "a minor who is a victim of a violation of section 
2241(c), 2242, 2243, 2251, 2251A, 2252, 2252A, 2260, 2421, 2422, or 2423 of this title 
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and who suffers personal injury as a result of such violation ... ." See cases cited above 
herein. Plaintiff has failed to plead any factual allegations whatsoever pertaining to 
violations of the specified "predicate acts." In paragraph 15, Plaintiff makes reference 
by citation only to the following federal statutes — 41 8 U.S.C. §§2241, 2242, 2243, 2421, 
and 2423: See endnote following the Certificate of Service herein for the complete 
statutory text.' 
First, Plaintiff's reliance on 18 U.S.C. §2241 in its entirety as a predicate act is 
improper, it is a violation of subsection §2241(c) that is a designated predicate act. A 
reading of the text of the other referenced federal statutes shows that no where in 
Plaintiff's Amended Complaint are there any allegations setting forth the requisite 
elements of the cited predicate act. Further, any attempted reliance by Plaintiff on other 
federal or state statutes not specifically identified in 18 U.S.C. §2255 is improper and 
fails to state a cause of action. See ¶15 of Am. Complaint wherein Plaintiff references 
by citation additional Florida State statutes and thereafter incorporates such reference 
into her §2255 claim(s). See Smith v. Husband, 376 F.Supp.2d, and 428 Supp.2d, 
supra, requiring allegations/evidence to establish predicate act under 18 U.S.C. §2255 
in order to be afforded civil remedy. 
Plaintiff appears to be relying solely on an "agreement with the Federal 
Government' as a basis for imposing liability under 18 U.S.C. §2255. See ¶¶17, 18, 
and 19 of ist Am. Complaint. There is nothing in Plaintiffs allegations that would allow 
for a §2255 claim to go forward without specifying the statutory predicate act and factual 
allegations pertaining to a violation of the requisite predicate act(s). Accordingly, under 
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the standard of pleading as established in Twombly, supra, Plaintiff has failed to 
sufficiently allege the requisite elements of a §2255 claim, thus requinng dismissal; tor 
failure to state a cause of action. 
C. 18 U.S.C. 42255 does not allow for the recovery of punitive damages. 
Thus, Plaintiff's request for punitive damages under $2255 is required to be 
dismissed or stricken. 
In each of the improperly asserted Counts I through XXX, Plaintiff also seeks 
punitive damages. 
A plain reading of 18 U.S.C. §2255, quoted above herein, 
establishes that the statute does not allow for the recovery of punitive damages. Had 
Congress wanted to allow for such a recovery, It could have easily written such 
language into the damages provision of the statute. The legislative body chose not to 
write a punitive damages component into §2255 as it has done in other statutes 
affording civil remedies. In relevant part, §2255 reads - My minor who is a victim of a 
violation of section ... of this title and who suffers personal injury as a result of such 
violation may sue in any appropriate United States District Court and shall recover the 
actual damages such minor sustains and the cost of the suit, including a 
reasonable attorney's fee. Any minor as described in the preceding sentence shall be 
deemed to have sustained damages of no less than $50,000 in value? See discussion 
of rules of statutory construction in part III.A. herein. See subsection (f)(2) of 18 U.S.C. 
§2252A, entitled Certain activities relating to material constituting or containing child 
pornography, also contained in Chapter 110, Part I, Crimes, within which specific 
reference is made to 'compensatory and punitive damages" in setting forth the relief 
•.. 
which may be afforded to a plaintiff in bringing a civil action under §2252A(f). 
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Accordingly, Plaintiffs claims for punitive damages are required to be dismissed with 
prejudice or stricken. 
D. In the alternative, pursuant to constitutional law principles of statutory 
interpretation, 18 U.S.0 62255 is required to be interpreted as creating a 
single "civil remedy" or cause of action on behalf of a minor plaintiff 
against a defendant. The "civil remedy" afforded is not on a "per violation" 
basis. 
As set forth above, it is Defendant's position that the text of 18 U.S.C. §2255 
does not allow a Plaintiff, such as C.M.A., to pursue the civil remedy and the damages 
afforded under the statute on a °per violation" basis. See part 111A. above. In the 
alternative, simply for the sake of argument, if one were to assume that the language of 
§2255 were vague or ambiguous, under the constitutional based protections of due 
process, judicial restraint, and the rule of lenity applied in construing a statute, 
Defendant's position as to the meaning of the statute would prevail over Plaintiffs view. 
See United States v. Santos, 128 S.Ct. 2020, 2025 (2008). As summarized by the 
United States Supreme Court in Santos, supra, at 2025: 
... The rule of lenity requires ambiguous criminal laws to be interpreted in 
favor of the defendants subjected to them. See United States v. Gradwell, 
243 U.S. 476, 485, 37 S.Ct. 407, 61 L.Ed. 857 (1917); McBoyle v. United 
States, 283 U.S. 25, 27, 51 S.Ct. 340, 75 L.Ed. 816 (1931); United States v. 
Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 347-349, 92 S.Ct. 515, 30 L.Ed.2d 488 (1971). This 
venerable rule not only vindicates the fundamental principle that no citizen 
should be held accountable for a violation of a statute whose commands are 
uncertain, or subjected to punishment that is not clearly prescribed. It also 
places the weight of Inertia upon the party that can best induce Congress to 
speak more clearly and keeps courts from making criminal law in Congress's 
stead. ... 
In Santos, the Court was faced with the interpretation of the term "proceeds" in 
the federal money laundering statute, 18 U.S.C. §1956. "The federal money-laundering 
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statute prohibits a number of activities involving criminal 'proceeds." Id, at 2023. Noting 
that the term "proceeds" was not defined in the statute, the Supreme Court stated the 
well settled principle that 'when a term is undefined, we give it its ordinary meaning." Id 
at 2024. Under the ordinary meaning principle, the government's position was that 
proceeds meant "receipts," while the defendant's position was that proceeds meant 
°profits." The Supreme Court recognized that under either of the proffered "ordinary 
meanings," the provisions of the federal money-laundering statute were still coherent, 
not redundant, and the statute was not rendered "utterly absurd." Under such a 
situation, citing to a long line of cases and the established rule of lenity, "the tie must go 
to the defendant." jd, at 2025. See portion of Court's opinion quoted above. "Because 
the 'profits' definition of 'proceeds' is always more defendant friendly that the 'receipts' 
definition, the rule of lenity dictates that it should be adopted." Id. 
Plaintiffs position would subject Defendant EPSTEIN to a punishment that is not 
clearly prescribed — an unwritten multiplier of the "actual damages" or the presumptive 
damages. The rule of lenity requires that Defendant's interpretation of the remedy 
afforded under §2255 be adopted. 
In addition, under the Due Process Clause's basic principle of fair warning - 
... a criminal statute must give fair warning of the conduct that it makes a 
crime ... . As was said in United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617, 74 
S.Ct. 808, 812, 98 L.Ed. 989, 
The constitutional requirement of definiteness is violated by a criminal 
statute that falls to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that 
his contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute. The underlying 
principle is that no man shall be held criminally responsible for conduct 
which he could not reasonably understand to be proscribed' 
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Thus we have struck down a [state] criminal statute under the Due Process 
Clause where it was not 'sufficiently explicit to inform those who are subject 
what
to tt 
 
du 
on their part will en er 
n liable to its 'lend 
b. 
Connally v. General Const. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391, 46 S.Ct. 126, 127, 70 
L.Ed. 322. We have recognized in such cases that 'a statute which either 
forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common 
Intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its 
application violates the first essential of due process of law,' ibid., and that 
'No one may be required at peril of life, liberty or property to speculate as to 
the meaning of penal statutes. All are entitled to be informed as to what the 
State commands or forbids.' Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453, 59 
S.Ct. 618, 619, 83 L.Ed. 888. 
Thus, applying these well-entrenched constitutional principles of statutory interpretation 
and application, Plaintiffs 30 separate counts brought under 18 U.S.C. §2255 are 
required to be dismissed. 
IV. Count XXXI — "Sexual Battery" Is required to be dismissed for failure to 
state a cause of action. In the alternative, Plaintiff should be required to more 
definite►y state whether she is attempting to allege a claim under Florida 
common or statutory law, or some federal law, and further allege the required 
elements and factual allegations. 
In Count XXXI, although entitled "Sexual Battery," Plaintiff improperly realleges 
and incorporates each and every allegation and each and every count (30) which she 
previously attempted to allege, resulting in a count that is 204 paragraphs long and 
Includes reference to Federal and Florida statutory law, while also including language 
sounding in common law. The count Is such a hodgepodge of legal allegations that 
Plaintiff fails to state a legally recognizable or viable cause of action. 
In ¶15, Plaintiff alleges that 'the acts referenced in paragraphs 9 through 14, 
committed by Defendant against the then minor Plaintiff, C.M.A., were committed in 
violation of numerous criminal State and Federal statutes ... , including but not limited 
to, those crimes designated in 18 U.S.C. §§2241, 2242, 2243, 2421, and 2423, criminal 
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