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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA 
CASE NO.: 08-CV-80119-MARRA-JOHNSON 
JANE DOE NO. 2, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
JEFFREY EPSTEIN, 
Defendant. 
Defendant, Jeffrey Epstein's Motion To Stay And Or Continue Action For Time Certain Based On 
Parallel Civil And Criminal Proceedings With Incorporated Memorandum Of Law 
Defendant, JEFFREY EPSTEIN, (hereinafter "EPSTEIN") by and through his 
undersigned attorneys, hereby moves this Court for the entry of an order staying or continuing 
this action for a time certain (i.e., until late 2010 when the NPA expires), pursuant to the 
application of the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and the fact that a parallel 
proceeding is ongoing and being investigated. In support of his motion, EPSTEIN states: 
I. 
Introduction 
At the outset, EPSTEIN notes this Court's prior Order, (DE 33), in which this Court 
denied a motion for stay brought by Defendant's prior counsel. In that instance, Defendant's 
counsel requested a mandatory stay under 18 U.S.C.A. §3509(k) which the court denied. In 
denying the request for the stay, this Court stated that a discretionary stay was not appropriate at 
the time the order was entered but also stated, in part, that "Any such issues shall be resolved as 
they arise in the course of litigation." As discussed herein, "special circumstances" now exist 
which, in the "interests of justice," merit the entry of a stay of this civil action until the criminal 
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matter in the I5th Judicial Circuit is "closed" in accordance with the United States Attorney's 
Office ("USAO") Non-Prosecution Agreement ("NPA") and until the NPA expires. 
Moreover, EPSTEIN was indicted by a grand jury in or around July 2006. See Exhibit 
"A". The Non-Prosecution Agreement is part of the record in connection with that indictment, 
which is signed by the State Attorney of the 15°' Judicial Circuit in and for Palm Beach County, 
Florida ("SAO"). In fact, the NPA acknowledges the investigation performed by the SAO. 
Further, the USAO was present at the Plea hearing whereby the NPA was made part of the 
record. Thus, there is no question that a parallel criminal matter exists in that the SAO's case 
remains open and the NPA lives along side it, which places EPSTEIN under great scrutiny by the 
USAO. The NPA actually places an affirmative duty upon EPSTEIN to undertake discussions 
with the SAO to ensure compliance with the NPA. That check and balance, therefore, remains in 
the hands of the SAO, which has a parallel criminal proceeding. Here, the threat of prosecution 
is real, substantial, and present should the USAO determine that EPSTEIN somehow violated the 
NPA. As discussed below, because the NPA fails to define what constitutes a breach, the USAO 
has apparently taken it upon itself to determine whether a breach has occurred and whether to 
seek criminal prosecution. In fact, the USAO has already attempted to claim violations of the 
NPA due to, among other things, EPSTEIN defending the civil actions against him. Clearly, it is 
NOT simply EPSTEIN's choice as to whether he violates the NPA — that discretion apparently 
lies with the USAO. For this reason alone, a stay is required until the NPA expires. 
The difference between this Motion and the prior motion to stay in is due to the ripeness 
of the issues discussed herein. 
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H. 
THE NPA 
By its terms, the NPA took effect on June 30, 2008 and expires by those same terms in 
late 2010 so long as EPSTEIN complies with the terms and conditions — violations of which 
remain undefined. The NPA, which remains under seal, outlines various obligations on the part 
of EPSTEIN including, but not limited to, pleading guilty to the Indictment and Information 
before the 15th Judicial Circuit, recommendations for his sentencing before the 15'h Judicial 
Circuit, waiver of challenges to the Information filed by the SAO, waiver of right to appeal his 
conviction, agreement not be afforded benefits for gain time, and the agreement to not prosecute 
others listed thereon so long as EPSTEIN does not breach and fulfills the requirements of the 
NPA. 
What the NPA does not outline or define is what constitutes a breach or what act or 
omission constitutes a breach thereof 
Therefore, the USAO apparently believes it has the 
discretion to make that unwritten and undefined determination, which places an unreasonable 
burden upon EPSTEIN in defending the civil claims in that he has no idea what the USAO will 
define as a breach in the event he does not assert his 5th Amendment Rights. As an example, the 
USAO has already claimed that EPSTEIN violated the NPA by: 
1. 
investigating the Plaintiffs (by and though his attorneys) whom brought civil suits 
against him for purposes of defending those civil actions; 
2. 
contesting damages in this action and in the other civil actions; 
3. 
making statements to the press about this Plaintiff or other Plaintiffs by and 
though his attorneys; and 
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office. 
4. 
using the word "jail" instead of "imprisonment" in the plea agreement with SA's 
See Exhibit "B" Goldberger Affidavit - EPSTEIN's criminal counsel. 
These allegations are silly, unfounded and alleged violations which are not defined as 
violations under the NPA but arrived at by the USAO. Thus, EPSTEIN is left with "Morton's 
Fork" in his side - the undesirable choice of taking the 5th Amendment and having a judgment 
(summary or otherwise) entered against him in the civil action or the undesirable choice of 
subjecting himself to discovery in the civil action before the NPA expires and, thus, face the 
possibility of criminal prosecution by the USAO based upon some illusory breach deemed by the 
USAO by way of information obtained through civil discovery proceedings. This is inherently 
unfair, the danger is clear, and the playing field is not level in light of the NPA language or lack 
thereof. 
As a result, the threat of criminal prosecution against EPSTEIN by the USAO continues 
presently and through late 2010. 
HI. 
Justice Requires The Entry of A Stay Because Defendant Is Being 
Forced To Choose Between Waiving His 5th Amendment Privilege Or Risk 
Losing This Civil Case And Forfeiting Other Constitutional Guarantees Of 
Due Process And Effective Assistance Of Counsel 
Once the NPA expires, EPSTEIN fully intends to testify to all relevant and non-
objectionable inquiries made to him in discovery be it a deposition, in interrogatories or in 
production requests. (Emphasis Added) However, the current circumstances are such that by 
testifying or responding to discovery, EPSTEIN will be required to waive his constitutional 
privileges, thereby subjecting himself to criminal prosecution and scrutiny by the USAO as a 
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result of matters alleged in this civil action (and others before this Court and in the State of 
Florida 15th Judicial Circuit Court, Palm Beach County). 
The special circumstances of this action are such that a stay or continuance for a time 
certain is NOT prejudicial and is required to be entered so that: 
(1) EPSTEIN is not required to waive his Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination under the United States Constitution resulting in severe prejudice to EPSTEIN in 
pending criminal matters; and 
(2) EPSTEIN is not forced to choose between waiving his Fifth Amendment right against 
self-incrimination or losing the civil case. 
Here, in asserting his Fifth Amendment Privilege, the Plaintiff is afforded an opportunity 
rarely given - that is, to put on only her evidence without any counterevidence from Defendant 
resulting in a judgment of liability against EPSTEIN. This is inherently unfair and precisely the 
special circumstances where "in the interests of justice" a stay is required. Ventura v. Broskv 
2006 WL 3392207 (S.D. Fla. 2006), glikg,
r 
United States v. Lot 5. Fox Grove 23 F.3d 359 (11th
Cir. 1994). In Ventura, a stay was entered where a Defendant was confronted with issue of 
waiving his 5th Amendment Privilege or to loose a civil case by way of motion for summary 
judgment. Id. Here, EPSTEIN is not requesting a mandatory stay. EPSTEIN only asks that this 
court recognize that "special circumstances" exists in this matter and enter a stay in the "interests 
of justice" and only for a specified period of time (i.e., after the NPA expires). See also 
Securities and Exchange Commission 755 F.Supp. 1018, 1019 (S.D. Fla. 1990)(Defendant was 
in precarious position while being subject to criminal investigation and reasoning that 
compelling Defendant to speak by ordering an accounting of alleged illicit funds would directly 
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impinge his right against self-incrimination). The court found it appropriate to grant the request 
for stay. (Emphasis Added). 
Citing to U.S. v. Lot 5. Fox Grove, supra, the Southern District Court, Florida, in 
Ventura v. Brosky, 2006 WL 3392207 (S.D. Fla. 2006), stated — 
The Eleventh Circuit has also created a test for these circumstances. stating that 
where there exists a concurrent civil and criminal proceeding, a court must stay 
a civil proceeding pending resolution of a related criminal prosecution when 
"special circumstances" so require in the "interests of justice." 
(Bold emphasis added). See also United States v. Kordel, 397 U.S. 1, 12 & n. 27, 90 S.Ct. 763, 
769-70 & n.27 (1970). The Ventura Court went on to state that "situations where a defendant in 
both criminal and civil proceedings must choose whether to waive his privilege against self-
incrimination or to lose the civil case in summary or default judgment proceedings have met this 
test's burden and warrant a stay." Id. The Ventura court granted the stay. Here, the 15th Judicial 
Circuit action lives along with the NPA. 
In making a decision to enter such a stay, the court may consider the following factors: 
(1) 
the interests of the Plaintiffs in proceeding expeditiously with litigation, or any 
aspect of it, and the potential prejudice of Plaintiff to the delay; 
(2) 
the burden which any particular aspect of the proceedings may impose on the 
defendant; 
(3) 
the convenience of the court in the management of its cases, and the efficient use 
of judicial resources; 
(4) 
the interests of persons not parties to the civil litigation; and 
(5) 
the interest of the public in the pending civil and criminal litigation. 
See U.S. v. Pinnacle Quest International, 2008 WL 4274498 (N.D. Fla. 2008). 
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First, in applying the 'above factors, the Plaintiff in the instant matter will not be 
prejudiced simply by claiming a delay in time. Second, the burden is far greater on EPSTEIN if 
he is forced to waive his 5th Amendment Privilege or remain silent and have a judgment entered 
against him or choose to testify and face criminal prosecution. Third, efficient use of judicial 
resources would be rendered upon a stay by way of preventing an appeal if such a stay is not 
entered. The Court has broad discretion to enter such a stay. Fourth, the interests of the 
individuals outlined in the NPA will be served because EPSTEIN's fulfillment of NPA alleged 
obligations is determinative upon whether the USAO prosecutes those individuals or whether the 
claims will be dropped upon the expiration of the NPA. Finally, the interest of the public in the 
pending civil and criminal cases will not be prejudiced as EPSTEIN is already serving his term 
whereby a plea was entered in the 15 Judicial Circuit action. 
a. 
Application of the 51h Amendment 
Next, the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination "permits a person not to 
answer official questions put to him in any other proceeding, civil or criminal, formal or 
informal, where the answers might incriminate him in future criminal proceedings." Edwin v. 
Price 778 F.2d 668, 669 (11i' Cir. 1985), citing Lefkowitz v. Turley 414 U.S. 70, 77, 94 S.C. 
316, 322 (1973). See also Ohio v. Reiner 532 U.S. 17, 21, 121 S.Q. 1252 (2001)(The Fifth 
Amendment privilege is also available to those who claim innocence. One of the Fifth 
Amendment's "basic functions ... is to protect innocent men ... `who otherwise might be 
ensnared by ambiguous circumstances."); Mallov v. Hogan, 84 S.Ct. 1489, 1495 (1964Xthe 
Fifth Amendment's Self-Incrimination Clause applies to the states through the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment - "[i]t would be incongruous to have different standards 
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determine the validity of a claim of privilege based on the same feared prosecution, depending 
on whether the claim was asserted in state or federal court."); Kastigar v. U.S., 406 U.S. 441, 
444-45, 92 S.Ct. 1653 (1972)(The Fifth Amendment privilege "can be asserted in any 
proceeding, civil or criminal, administrative or judicial, investigatory or adjudicatory; and it 
protects against any disclosures which the witness reasonably believes could be used in a 
criminal prosecution or could lead to other evidence that might be so used. This Court has been 
zealous to safeguard the values which underlie the privilege." (Emphasis added)). 
The United States Supreme Court made it clear that the scope of the Fifth Amendment 
Privilege includes the circumstances as here "the act of producing documents in response to a 
subpoena (or production request) has a compelled testimonial aspect." United States v. Hubbell 
530 U.S. 27, 36, 120 S.Ct. 2037, 2043 (2000); see also Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 
(1976); McCormick on Evidence, Title 6, Chap. 13. The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 
§138 (61h Ed.). The privilege against self-incrimination may be asserted during discovery when a 
litigant has "reasonable grounds to believe that the response would furnish a link in the chain of 
evidence needed to prove a crime against a litigant." A witness, including a civil defendant, is 
entitled to invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege whenever there is a realistic possibility that the 
answer to a question could be used in anyway to convict the witness of a crime or could aid in 
the development of other incriminating evidence that can be used at trial. Id; Pillsbury Company 
v. Conboy, 495 U.S. 248, 103 S.Ct. 608 (1983). 
Certainly, if the USAO decides to prosecute EPSTEIN for an alleged violation of the 
NPA, it would undoubtedly be able to use information obtained during discovery against him or 
use that information to aid in the development of other evidence against him at a criminal trial. 
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The USAO is already claiming violations of the NPA based upon EPSTEIN defending the civil 
actions and, at the same time, while EPSTEIN asserts the 5'h Amendment. Imagine, because that 
is all we can do based on the lack of wording in the NPA, what violations the USAO will assert 
if EPSTEIN is forced to waive his 56 Amendment privilege to defend himself in this and the 
other civil actions. 
The Fifth Amendment provides, in relevant part, that "No person ... shall be compelled 
in any Criminal Case to be a witness against himself." Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 
486, 71 S.Ct. 814 (1951), citin Feldman v. United States, 1944, 322 U.S. 487, 489, 64 S.Ct. 
1082, 1083, 88 L.Ed. 1408." The Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination is 
"accorded liberal construction in favor of the right it was intended to secure." "The immediate 
and potential evils of compulsory self-disclosure transcend any difficulties that the exercise of 
the privilege may impose on society in the detection and prosecution of a crime." Id., at 490; 
and In re Keller Financial Svcs. of Flan Inc. 259 B.R. 391, 399 (M.D. Fla. 2000). The privilege 
not only extends to answers that would in themselves support a conviction under a criminal 
statute but likewise embraces those which would furnish a link in the chain of evidence needed 
to prosecute the claimant for a crime. 
pSkgr Blau v. United States, 1950, 340 U.S. 159, 71 
S.Ct. 223. The Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination "permits a person not to 
answer official questions put to him in any other proceeding, civil or criminal, formal or 
informal, where the answers might incriminate him in future criminal proceedings." Edwin v. 
Price, 778 F.2d at 669, citing Lefkowitz v. Turley 414 U.S. 70, 77, 94 S.C. 316, 322 (1973). As 
EPSTEIN is here, "the claimant must be 'confronted by substantial and 'real,' and not merely 
trifling or imaginary, hazards of incrimination.' 
generally, United States v. Apfelbaum, 445 
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U.S. 115, 128, 100 S.Ct. 948, 956, 63 L.Ed.2d 250 (1980)). $ 
also United States v. Neff, 615 
F.2d 1235, 1239 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 925, 100 S.Ct. 3018, 65 L.Ed.2d 1117 
(1980)(Information is protected by the privilege not only if it would support a criminal 
conviction, but even if "the responses would merely `provide a lead or clue' to evidence having a 
tendency to incriminate."). EPSTEIN falls under each of the above category of cases. 
The United States Supreme Court has made clear that the scope of the Fifth Amendment 
Privilege also encompasses the circumstance where "the act of producing documents in response 
to a subpoena (or production request) has a compelled testimonial aspect." United States v. 
Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 36, 120 S.Ct. 2037, 2043 (2000); 
also Fisher v. United States 425 U.S. 
391 (1976). In explaining the application of the privilege, the Supreme Court stated: 
We have held that "the act of production" itself may implicitly communicate 
"statements of fact." By "producing documents in compliance with a subpoena, 
the witness would admit that the papers existed, were in his possession or control, 
and were authentic." Moreover, as was true in this case, when the custodian of 
documents responds to a subpoena, he may be compelled to take the witness stand 
and answer questions designed to determine whether he has produced everything 
demanded by the subpoena. The answers to those questions, as well as the act of 
production itself, may certainly communicate information about the existence, 
custody, and authenticity of the documents. Whether the constitutional privilege 
protects the answers to such questions, or protects the act of production itself, is a 
question that is distinct from the question whether the unprotected contents of the 
documents themselves are incriminating. 
"The issue presented in those cases was whether the act of producing subpoenaed 
documents, not itself the making of a statement, might nonetheless have some 
protected testimonial aspects. The Court concluded that the act of production could 
constitute protected testimonial communication because it might entail implicit 
statements of fact: by producing documents in compliance with a subpoena, the 
witness would admit that the papers existed, were in his possession or control, and 
were authentic. United States v. Doe. 465 U.S., at 613. and n. 11. 104 S.Ct. 1237; 
Fisher. 425 U.S., at 409-410. 96 S.Ct. 1569; id. at 428. 432. 96 S.Ct. 1569 
(concurring opinions). See Braswell v. United States. [487 U.S..1 at 104, 108 S.Ct. 
2284; J id.] at 122. 108 S.Ct. 2284 (dissenting opinion). Thus, the Court made 
clear that the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination applies to acts 
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that imply assertions of fact."... An examination of the Court's application of these 
principles in other cases indicates the Court's recognition that, in order to be 
testimonial, an accused's communication must itself, explicitly or implicitly, relate 
a factual assertion or disclose information. Only then is a person compelled to be a 
'witness' against himself." Doe v. United States. 487 U.S.. at 209-210. 108 S.Ct. 
2341 (footnote omitted). 
Finally, the phrase "in any criminal case" in the text of the Fifth Amendment might 
have been read to limit its coverage to compelled testimony that is used against the 
defendant in the trial itself. It has, however, long been settled that its protection 
encompasses compelled statements that lead to the discovery of incriminating 
evidence even though the statements themselves are not incriminating and are not 
introduced into evidence. Thus, a half century ago we held that a trial judge had 
erroneously rejected a defendant's claim of privilege on the ground that his answer 
to the pending question would not itself constitute evidence of the charged offense. 
As we explained: 
"The privilege afforded not only extends to answers that would in themselves 
support a conviction under a federal criminal statute but likewise embraces those 
which would furnish a link in the chain of evidence needed to prosecute the 
claimant for a federal crime." Hoffman v. United States. 341 U.S. 479. 486, 71 
S.Ct. 814, 95 L.Ed. 1118 (19511. 
Compelled testimony that communicates information that may "lead to 
incriminating evidence" is privileged even if the information itself is not 
inculpatory. Doe v. United States. 487 U.S. 201. 208. n. 6. 108 S.Ct. 2341, 101 
L.Ed.2d 184 (1988). 
It's the Fifth Amendment's protection against the 
prosecutor's use of incriminating information derived directly or indirectly from 
the compelled testimony of the respondent that is of primary relevance in this case. 
The privilege against self-incrimination may be asserted during discovery when a litigant 
has "reasonable grounds to believe that the response would furnish a link in the chain of 
evidence needed to prove a crime against a litigant." A witness, including a civil defendant, is 
entitled to invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege whenever there is a realistic possibility that the 
answer to a question could be used in anyway to convict the witness of a crime or could aid in 
the development of other incriminating evidence that can be used at trial. Id• Pillsbury Company 
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v. Conbov, 495 U.S. 248, 103 S.Ct. 608 (1983). 5se also, Hubbell, supra, as to what is 
encompassed by the phrase "in any criminal case" contained in the Fifth Amendment. 
As noted, the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination is broad. Hoffman; 
In re Keller Financial Svcs., supra. To deny a witness the right to invoke the privilege, the judge 
must be perfectly clear, from a careful consideration of all the circumstances in the case, that the 
witness is mistaken, and that the answers cannot possibly have such tendency to incriminate. gI
at 488, 399. Recognizing the breadth and magnitude of this constitutional privilege, the United 
States Supreme Court in discussing how a court is to analyze the application of the privilege 
stated — 
... It is for the court to say whether his silence is justified, Rogers v. United States 
1951, 340 U.S. 367, 71 S.Ct. 438, and to require him to answer if 'it clearly appears 
to the court that he is mistaken.' Temple v. Commonwealth, 1880, 75 Va. 892, 899. 
However, if the witness, upon interposing his claim, were required to prove the 
hazard in the sense in which a claim is usually required to be established in court, he 
would be compelled to surrender the very protection which the privilege is designed 
to guarantee. To sustain the privilege, it need only be evident from the implications 
of the question, in the setting in which it is asked, that a responsive answer to the 
question or an explanation of why it cannot be answered might be dangerous because 
injurious disclosure could result. The trial judge in appraising the claim 'must be 
governed as much by his personal perception of the peculiarities of the case as by the 
facts actually in evidence.' 
Hoffman supra at 486-487. 
Hoffman and its progeny establish that "in view of the liberal construction of the 
provision [protecting against self-incrimination], after a witness has asserted the privilege, he 
should be compelled to provide the requested information only if it "clearly appears" to the court 
that the witness was mistaken in his invocation of the privilege." (Emphasis added). In re Keller 
Financial Svcs., supra at 399, ciSgr Hoffman at 486. 
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In the instant case, the privilege applies as Defendant EPSTEIN "has reasonable cause to 
apprehend danger from a direct answer." The risk of incrimination resulting from being subject 
to discovery or to testify in his own defense while the NPA exists is "substantial and real" and 
"not trifling or imaginary haphazards of communication." See generally, In re Keller Financial 
Svcs., supra at 400. Based on the nature of Plaintiff's claims, along with the ongoing scrutiny 
of the USAO in the criminal matters, EPSTEIN has "reasonable grounds to believe that his 
responses to the discovery would furnish a link in the chain of evidence needed to prove a crime 
against him. Finally, in order to preserve the privilege, the privilege must be asserted or one 
risks the loss or waiver of this liberty ensuring protection. See generally, U.S. v. White, 846 
F.2d 678, 690 (11th Cir. 1988)("First, it ignores the settled principle which requires a witness to 
assert his Fifth Amendment rights. A witness who testifies at any proceeding, instead of asserting 
his Fifth Amendment rights, loses the privilege. ... A civil deponent cannot choose to answer 
questions with the expectation of later asserting the Fifth Amendment."). 
Also applicable in upholding the assertion of the Fifth Amendment privilege is the 
guarantee of effective assistance of counsel by the Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. 
See Yarborough v. Gentry, 124 S.Ct. 1, 540 U.S. 1, 157 L.Ed.2d 1 (2003)(Sixth Amendment 
guarantees criminal defendants effective assistance of counsel.), on remand 381 F.3d 1219. The 
United States Constitutional guarantees are applicable to the states through the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Obviously, EPSTEIN's assertion of his constitutional privileges and protections is 
on the advice of counsel. Again, EPSTEIN continues to face criminal prosecution by the USAO 
until the expiration of the NPA; under the constitutional guarantee of effective assistance of 
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counsel, he is entitled to follow the recommended advice of his criminal defense attorney. See 
Goldberger Affidavit attached hereto. 
EPSTEIN's invocation of his constitutional protections of the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth 
Amendments must be upheld for the reasons set forth herein; otherwise such constitutional 
protections would be rendered meaningless. Already and recently, Defendant EPSTEIN in his 
Response and Objections to discovery, attached hereto as Exhibit "C", has been required to 
assert, on advice of counsel, his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, along 
with his constitutional rights afforded under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United 
States Constitution. Thus, EPSTEIN's entitlement to a stay is ripe for determination. 
Based upon the foregoing, a stay is warranted in this action as the Defendant is being 
forced to choose between the assertion of his Fifth Amendment right or losing this case by 
judgment (summary or otherwise) or waiver of his 5'h Amendment right and face potential 
criminal prosecution. 
By: 
ROBERT D. CRITTO , JR., ESQ. 
Certificate of Service 
WE HEREBY CERTIFY that a true copy of the foregoing has been sent via U.S. 
Mail and facsimile to the following addressees this 25th day of March, 2009. 
Adam D. Horowitz, Esq. 
Stuart S. Mermelstein, Esq. 
18205 Biscayne Boulevard 
Suite 2218 
Miami, FL 33160 
305-931-2200 
Fax: 305-931-0877 
ahorowitzehermanlaw.com 
Iriveraahermanlaw.com 
Counsel for Plaintiff Jane Doe #2 
Jack Alan Goldberger 
Atterbury Goldberger & Weiss, P.A. 
250 Australian Avenue South 
Suite 1400 
West Palm Beach, FL 33401-5012 
561-659-8300 
Fax: 561-835-8691 
jaqesoAbellsouth.net 
Co-Counsel for Defendant Jeffrey 
Epstein 
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Respec 
By: 
ROBERT D. CRITTON, JR., ESQ. 
Florida Bar No. 224162 
rcritabcIclaw.com 
MICHAEL J. PIKE, ESQ. 
Florida Bar #617296 
mpikeebelclaw.com 
BURMAN, CRITTON, LUTTIER & COLEMAN 
515 N. Flagler Drive, Suite 400 
West Palm Beach, FL 33401 
561-842-2820 
Fax: 561-515-3148 
(Co-counsel for Defendant Jeffrey Epstein) 
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INDICTMENT 
A TRUE BILL 
.#031;zet-
L. 
IN THE NAME OF AND BY THE AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA -; 
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE FIFTEENTH JUDICIAL 
CIRCUIT OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA 
For Palm Beach County, at the Spring Term thereof, in the year of our Lord Two Thousand and Six, to-wit: 
The Grand Jurors of the State of Florida, inquiring in and for the body of said County of Palm Beach, upon their 
oaths do present that JEFFREY E. EPSTEIN in the County of Palm Beach aforesaid, in the Circuit and State 
aforesaid, 
COUNT ONE 
FELONY SOLICITATION OF PROSTITUTION 
on or about or between the 1st day of August in the year of our Lord Two Thousand and Four and October 31, 
2005, did solicit, induce, entice, or procure another to commit prostitution lewdness, or assignation, contrary to 
Florida Statute 796.07(1) on three or more occasions between August 01, 2004 and October 31, 2005, 
contrary to Florida Statute 796.07(2)(f) and (4)(c). (3 DEG FEL)(LEVEL 1) 
against the form of the statute, to the evil example of all others, and against the peace and dignity of the State 
of Florida. 
I hereby certify that I have advised the Grand Jury returning this indictment as authorized and required by law. 
,•:/
•
Assistant State Atf may of the— 
Fifteenth Judicial Circuit of the State 
of Florida, prosecuting for the said 
State 
DATE 
it 
4 
EXHIBIT
Jeffrey E. Epstein, Race: White, Sex: Male, DOB: January 20, 1953, SS#: 090-44.3348; Issue Warrant 
EFTA00222540

Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM 
Document 65-3 
Entered on FLSD Docket 03/25/2009 
Page 1 of 3 
AFFIDAVIT OF JACK A. GOLDBERGER, ESQUIRE 
STATE OF FLORIDA 
) SS 
COUNTY OF PALM BEACH 
) 
BEFORE 
ME, 
the 
undersigned 
authority, 
personally 
appeared 
having personal knowledge and being duly sworn, deposes and says: 
1. 
I, Jack A. Goldberger, have personal knowledge of the matters set 
forth herein. I am an attorney licensed to practice in the State of Florida since 
1978. I am a partner with the law firm of Atterbury Goldberger & Weiss, P.A., 
located at One Clearlake Centre, Suite 1400, 250 Australian Avenue South, West 
Palm Beach, FL 33401. 
2. 
My practice includes and specializes in the defense of criminal 
matters. I am board certified in criminal law. I have been and currently am the 
criminal defense attorney for JEFFREY EPSTEIN. 
3. 
I represented Mr. EPSTEIN in the negotiation of and entering into a 
Non-Prosecution Agreement with the United States Attorney's Office (USAO) for 
the Federal Southern District of Florida. The terms and conditions of the Non-
Prosecution Agreement also entailed the entering of a Plea Agreement with the 
State Attorney's Office, Palm Beach County, State of Florida. 
(The Non-
Prosecution Agreement shall hereinafter be referred to as the "NPA"). 
4. 
By its terms, the NPA took effect on June 30, 2008. Also, pursuant 
to the terms of the NPA, any criminal prosecution against EPSTEIN is deferred 
as long as the terms and conditions of the NPA are fulfilled by EPSTEIN. 
EXHIBIT 
EFTA00222541

Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM 
Document 65-3 
Entered on FLSD Docket 03/25/2009 
Page 2 of 3 
5. 
The criminal matters against EPSTEIN remain ongoing until the 
NPA expires by its terms in late 2010 and as long as the USAO determines 
EPSTEIN has complied with those terms and conditions. The threat of criminal 
prosecution against EPSTEIN by USAO in the Southern District of Florida 
continues presently and through late 2010. 
6. 
Pursuant to the terms of the NPA, the USAO possesses the right to 
declare that the agreement has been breached, give EPSTEIN's counsel notice, 
and attempt to move forward with a prosecution. As of the date of this Affidavit, 
the USAO has taken the position on a number of occasions that it might consider 
the following actions by EPSTEIN to be a breach of the NPA. 
• Investigation by EPSTEIN (by and through his attorneys) of this Plaintiff 
and the other Plaintiffs in other pending civil cases for purposes of 
defending the civil actions; 
• EPSTEIN's contesting damages in this action and other civil actions. 
• EPSTEIN or his legal representatives making statements to the press 
about this Plaintiff or the other Plaintiffs. 
• Using the word "jail" instead of "imprisonment" in the plea agreement with 
the Palm Beach County State Attorney's Office. 
7. 
EPSTEIN, through counsel, submitted a Freedom of Information 
Act request to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) for documents relating to 
this and the other cases; the FBI denied the request stating the materials are at 
this time exempt from disclosure because they are in an investigative file, i.e. the 
matter is still an ongoing criminal investigation. 
Page - 2 - 
EFTA00222542

Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM 
Document 65-3 
Entered on FLSD Docket 03/25/2009 
Page 3 of 3 
8. 
The NPA expires in late 2010. 
FURTHER THE AFFIANT SAYETH NAUGHT 
Jack A. Goldberger, Esq. 
STATE OF FLORIDA 
COUNTY OF PALM BEACH 
I hereby Certify that on this day, before me, an officer duly authorized to 
administer 
oaths 
and 
take 
acknowledgments, 
personally 
appeared 
Jack A. Goldberger, Esquire, known to me to be the person described in and who 
executed the foregoing Affidavit, who acknowledged before me that he/she 
executed the same, that I relied upon the following form of identification of the 
above named person:  lectipm
 .j
 , and that an oath was/was 
not taken. 
WILNESS my hand and official seal in the County and State last aforesaid 
this  /9 
 day of  
reef 4 
 , 2009. 
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NOTARY PUBLIC/STATE OF FLORIDA 
COMMISSION NO.: 
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MY COMMISSION EXPIRES: 
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 3 /101 
Page - 3 - 
EFTA00222543

Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM 
Document 65-4 
Entered on FLSD Docket 03/25/2009 
Page 1 of 37 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA 
CASE NO.: 08-CV-80119-MARRA-JOHNSON 
JANE DOE NO. 2, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
JEFFREY EPSTEIN, 
Defendant. 
DEFENDANT EPSTEIN'S RESPONSE & OBJECTIONS 
TO PLAINTIFF'S AMENDED FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES 
Defendant, JEFFREY EPSTEIN, by and through his undersigned attorneys, 
serves his responses and objections to Plaintiffs December 9, 2008 Amended First Set 
Of Interrogatories To Defendant Jeffrey Epstein, attached hereto. 
Certificate of Service 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true copy of the foregoing has been sent by fax and 
U.S. Mail to the following addressees this  26th 
 day of January, 2009: 
Adam D. Horowitz, Esq. 
Jeffrey Marc Herman, Esq. 
Stuart S. Mermelstein, Esq. 
18205 Biscayne Boulevard 
Suite 2218 
Miami, FL 33160 
305-931-2200 
Fax: 305-931-0877 
a horowitz(&hermanlaw.com 
jherman
hermanlaw.com 
Iriveraa,hermanlaw.com 
Counsel for Plaintiff Jane Doe #2 
Jack Alan Goldberger 
Atterbury Goldberger & Weiss, P.A. 
250 Australian Avenue South 
Suite 1400 
West Palm Beach, FL 33401-5012 
561-659-8300 
Fax: 561-835-8691 
jaqesq(&bellsouth.net 
Co-Counsel for Defendant Jeffrey Epstein 
e OM P
/16EXHIBIT e 
EFTA00222544