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Request No. 7. All surveillance videos, slides, film, videotape, digital recording or other audio 
or video depiction or image of the Palm Beach Residence. 
Request No. 8. All documents referring or relating to Plaintiff Jane Doe No. 2, including without 
limitation, web pages, social networking site pages, correspondence, videotapes and 
audiotapes. 
Request No. 9. (Not at issue) .2 All statements taken, transcribed or recorded from any person 
referring or relating to Defendant's sexual conduct, massages given to Defendant or any issue 
in these cases. 
Request No. 10. All documents referring to or relating to air travel and aircraft used by 
Defendant, including without limitation, flight logs and flight manifests. 
Request No. 11. Any and all documents referring to or relating to modeling agencies, including 
but not limited to documents relating to or reflecting communications with female models. 
Request No. 12. (Not at issue). All photographs, videotapes, digital images and other 
documents depicting or showing females who, at the time thereof, were under the age of 21, 
which were taken or created by or for Defendant and not intended for sale commercially to the 
public. 
Request No. 13. (Not at issue.) All photographs and painting of females which were displayed 
in any of Defendant's homes or residences in the time frame of these requests, including 
without limitation, photographs in standing or sitting frames or wall frames. 
Request No. 14. Any and all documents consisting of, referring or relating to communications 
between Jeffrey Epstein and Haley Robson, including, but not limited to, letters, notes, text 
messages, messages on social networking sites, and e-mails. 
Request No. 15. Any and all documents consisting of, referring or relating to communications 
between Jeffrey Epstein and Sarah Kellen, including, but not limited to, letters, notes, text 
messages, messages on social networking sites, and e-mails. 
Request No. 16. Any and all documents consisting of, referring or relating to communications 
between Jeffrey Epstein and Nada Marcinkova, including, but not limited to, letters, notes, text 
messages, messages on social networking sites, and e-mails. 
Request No. 17. Any and all documents consisting of, referring or relating to communications 
between Jeffrey Epstein and Ghislaine Maxwell, including, but not limited to, letters, notes, text 
messages, messages on social networking sites, and e-mails. 
Request No. 18. Any and all documents and photographs placed by Defendant at any time in 
the period of these requests on a social networking website, including without limitation, 
Facebook.com and MySpace.com. 
2 "Plaintiff concedes that the act of producing items in response to request no. 9, concerning 
witness statements, and requests nos. 12-13, concerning photographs or images of females, 
may implicate the Fifth Amendment." Plaintiff's motion, p. 5, fn. 6. 
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Request No. 19. Any and all documents reflecting or consisting of communications between 
Jeffrey Epstein and MC2 Models or Jean-Luc Brunel, relating or referring to females coming into 
the United States from other countries to pursue a career in modeling, including, but not limited 
to, letters, notes and e-mails. 
Request No. 20. Any and all documents referring or relating to gifts or loans to females under 
the age of 21, including, but not limited to, notes, receipts and car rental agreements. 
Request No. 21. Any and all personal calendars or schedules of or for Jeffrey Epstein from 
January 1, 2003 to the present. 
Request No. 22. All documents written by Jeffrey Epstein consisting of personal thoughts, 
feelings or descriptions of events, incidents or occurrences in Defendant's life, including without 
limitation, any diaries of Jeffrey Epstein. 
Request No. 23. All documents referring to or relating to Jeffrey Epstein's purchase or 
consumption of prescription medicine. 
As discussed in the supporting memorandum law herein, it is well settled that the 
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination also encompasses situations as 
here where the act of production itself involves a testimonial compulsion. Hubbell 
supra. In responding to each request, EPSTEIN would be compelled admit that such 
documents existed, admit that the documents were in his possession or control, and 
were authentic. In other words, the very act of production of the category of documents 
requested would implicitly communicate "statements of fact." Hubbell, supra; Hoffman,
supra. The act of production might not only provide evidence to support a conviction, 
but also a link in the chain of evidence for prosecution. Such compulsion to produce is 
the same as being compelled to testify. The acts of EPSTEIN in being required to 
produce the requested documents imply assertions of fact — admitting the documents 
exist, admitting the documents are in his possession or control, and admitting the 
documents are authentic. Again, in reading each of the production requests in Nos. 1, 
2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, and 23, (like the 
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interrogatories), it is clear that the very act of production of such documents could 
implicate EPSTEIN in a crime. 
As noted above, EPSTEIN is constitutionally entitled to follow the advice of 
counsel in asserting the applicable Fifth Amendment privilege under the guarantee of 
effective assistance of counsel. Accordingly, based on the facts and circumstances of 
this case, and under applicable law, Defendant's assertion of the protections afforded 
under the 5th, 6th, and 14th Amendments of the United States Constitution are required 
to be upheld. 
II. Defendant's objections made in addition to the constitutional based 
protections are required to be upheld. 
A. Constitutional issues are required to be addressed first. 
Obviously, the constitutional issues raised in Defendant's response permeate not 
only discovery, but the entire action itself. Defendant would suggest to the Court that 
the constitutional issues be decided before the additional objections are addressed. 3 In 
fact, in arguing certain of the additional objections, Defendant's constitutional rights 
under the 5th, 6th and 14th Amendments are clearly implicated. In setting forth factual 
reasons to support the additional objections, Defendant is being compelled to testify in 
response to a specific discovery request, thus, impeding his privilege against self-
incrimination and guarantee of effective assistance of counsel. The same is true if 
Defendant is required to prepare privilege logs. (In section IV of her motion, Plaintiff 
recognized, in addressing Defendant's assertion that an adverse inference would be 
improper, that "It is first necessary to determine whether the Fifth Amendment privilege 
is validly asserted in response to particular questions."). Thus, Defendant also requests 
3 Should this Court overrule Defendant's constitutional based privileges and guarantees, 
Defendant will likely take an immediate appeal of such ruling. 
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that should this Court rule that the Fifth Amendment does not apply to certain of the 
discovery requests, that Defendant be given an additional 20 days from the date of the 
order thereon in which to assert other objections and privileges. 
In alternative and addition to the applicable constitutional based protections, 
Defendant also raised objections to each of the interrogatories and requests for 
production. (See sections V, VI, and VII, pp. 7-12, of Plaintiffs motion to compel). 
Defendant will address Plaintiffs arguments pertaining to the additional objections in the 
order presented in Plaintiffs motion. 
B. Interrogatory No. 8. Production Request No. 23 
Section V. A. of plaintiffs motion pertains to interrogatory no. 8 — 
Identify all of Jeffrey Epstein health care providers in the past (10) ten years, including 
without limitation, psychologists, psychiatrists, mental health counselors, physicians, 
hospitals and treatment facilities. 
In addition to the constitutional protections, Defendant also stated — 
... In addition to and without waiving his constitutional privileges, Defendant also objects 
as the interrogatory is overbroad and seeks information that is neither relevant to the 
subject matter of the pending action nor does it appear reasonably calculated to lead to 
the discovery of admissible evidence. In addition, such information is privileged pursuant 
to Rule 501, Fed. Evid., and §90.503, FIa.Evid. Code. In addition, such information is 
protected by the provisions of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act 
(HIPAA). 
Federal Rule of Evidence 401 provides that - "'Relevant evidence'" means 
evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence 
to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be 
without the evidence." Pursuant to Rule 26(b)(1), the scope of discovery is as follows — 
Unless otherwise limited by court order, the scope of discovery is as follows: Parties 
may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's 
claim or defense—including the existence, description, nature, custody, condition, and 
location of any documents or other tangible things and the identity and location of 
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persons who know of any discoverable matter. For good cause, the court may order 
discovery of any matter relevant to the subject matter involved in the action. Relevant 
information need not be admissible at the trial if the discovery appears reasonably 
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. All discovery is subject to 
the limitations imposed by Rule 26(b)(2)(C). 
Plaintiffs complaint alleges a time period of 2004-05 as to when the alleged 
sexual misconduct of Defendant occurred. Plaintiffs request seeks to have EPSTEIN 
list "all health care providers" and "hospitals and treatment facilities" over a "ten year 
period." On its face, the interrogatory is overbroad as it seeks information over a 10 
year period that is neither relevant nor does it "appear reasonably calculated to lead to 
the discovery of admissible evidence." EPSTEIN's physical health is not in issue in this 
matter. Whether or not he was treated for the flu over the past ten years is not relevant 
to any party's claim or defense in this matter. The same is true for whether or not 
Defendant received treatment for a physical ailment at a hospital or facility over a 10 
year period. Plaintiff fails to tailor her question such that it can be determined what type 
of information she is seeking regarding "health care providers" and "hospitals and 
treatment facilities." 
The 10 year period is overbroad as it seeks information 
approximately 5 years prior to and four years after the alleged incident. 
As to "psychologists, psychiatrists, mental health counselors," and the "hospitals 
and treatment facilities" where Defendant may or may not have received treatment from 
such professionals, such information would be protected under Fed. Evid. Rule 501 and 
§90.503, FIa.R.Evid. Rule 501 provides —
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States or provided by 
Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory 
authority, the privilege of a witness, person, govemment, State, or political subdivision 
thereof shall be governed by the principles of the common law as they may be 
interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of reason and experience. 
However, in civil actions and proceedings, with respect to an element of a claim or 
defense as to which State law supplies the rule of decision, the privilege of a witness 
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person, government, State, or political subdivision thereof shall be determined in 
accordance with State law. 
(Emphasis added). 
Plaintiff alleges diversity jurisdiction, and thus, state law of Florida controls 
application of the privilege. 2nd Am. Complaint, ¶5. The elements of Plaintiff's alleged 
claims in Counts I - Sexual Battery and Counts II - Intentional Infliction of Emotional 
Distress are also controlled by state law. Erie R.Co. v. Tompkins, 58 S.Ct. 817 (1938). 
Accordingly, the privileges recognized under state law apply to this action under Rule 
501. See, for example, 1550 Brickell Associates v. Q.B.E. Ins. Co. 253 F.R.D. 697, 
699 (S.D. Fla. 2008)("Attorney-client privilege is governed by state law in diversity 
actions."). 
§90.503(2), Fla. Stat., provides — 
(2) A patient has a privilege to refuse to disclose, and to prevent any other person from 
disclosing, confidential communications or records made for the purpose of diagnosis 
or treatment of the patient's mental or emotional condition, including alcoholism and 
other drug addiction, between the patient and the psychotherapist, or persons who are 
participating in the diagnosis or treatment under the direction of the psychotherapist. 
This privilege includes any diagnosis made, and advice given, by the psychotherapist 
in the course of that relationship. 
As summarized in C.L. v. Judd, 993 So.2d 991, 995 (2d DCA Fla. 2007): 
Under the psychotherapist-patient privilege, a patient has a privilege to refuse 
to disclose confidential information or records made for the purpose of 
diagnosis or treatment of mental conditions, including any diagnoses made by 
the psychotherapist. § 90.503(2), Fla. Stat. (2005); see Pauker v. Olson, 834 
So.2d 198, 200 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002). The psychotherapist-patient privilege does 
not apply: (1) during involuntary commitment proceedings, (2) when there is a 
court-ordered mental examination, or (3) when the patient raises and relies on 
the issue of his or her mental condition in litigation as part of any claim or 
defense. § 90.503(4); Roberson, 884 So.2d at 980; State v. Famiglietti, 817 
So.2d 901, 903 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002). The privilege does not allow the invasion of 
a patient's privileged communications with his or her psychotherapist. 
Roberson, 884 So.2d at 979. 
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None of the three situations listed as exceptions to the privilege above exist in the 
present case to make the privilege inapplicable. 
Plaintiffs position is that the protection afforded under §90.503, Fla. Stat., does not 
apply "in a case of child abuse under Florida Statute §39.204." See endnote 2 for full 
text of §39.204, Fla. Stat.2 (¶'s Motion, p. 8-9). See Carson v. Jackson, 466 So.2d 
1188, 1192 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985); and Doherty v. John Doe No. 22, 957 So.2d 1267 (4th
DCA 2007). A reading of these cases establishes that §39.204 does not provide 
Plaintiff with a carte blanche access to Defendant's medical history. The Court is 
required to hold an in camera inspection to determine if the information sought by 
Plaintiff relates to "communications involving known or expected child abuse." Id. 
As stated above, on its face the interrogatory is overbroad and encompasses 
information that has no relevance to the claims or defenses nor is it reasonably 
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Compelling Defendant to 
identify each and every health care provider, including psychologists, psychiatrists, 
mental health counselors, and hospital or treatment facility over the past ten year 
period, is not proper at this time. Plaintiff should be required to limit the information 
sought, as well as the time period, in her interrogatory, thus allowing the Defendant and 
Court to determine whether such information is relevant and discoverable. 
As to Defendant's HIPAA (Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act) 
objection, as noted in the case cited in Plaintiffs motion Allen v. Woodford, 2007 WL 
309485 (E.D. Cal. 2007), (p. 9), HIPPA institutes procedural safeguards to protect the 
privacy of an individual's medical information and history. In the context of HIPAA, 
Courts have recognized three methods of health care discovery (assuming it's relevant) 
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in civil litigation: (1) Obtaining a patient authorization that complies with the 
requirements and criteria, tailored to the specific case, of HIPAA as set forth in 45 
C.F.R. §164.508; (2) Court Order, which also complies with the requirements of HIPAA 
ensuring that the privacy and confidentiality of the information is protected; and (3) 
Subpoena or discovery request, which again comply with the strictures of HIPAA, 
including that the person whose records are being sought has been given proper notice. 
See Handbook of Federal Civil Discovery And Disclosure (2d Edition), Chap. 18, Sect. 
A - Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), §18.3 - Discovery of 
health care information in civil litigation; and Graham v. Dacheikh, 991 So.2d 932, at fn. 
3 (2d DCA Fla. 2008)("Even under HIPAA, 
if the records are produced during normal 
discovery they are typically produced in a manner that restricts the persons who may 
access the documents and requires their return at the end of the litigation. See 45 
C.F.R. §164.512(e)."). 
In production request no. 23, Plaintiff seeks — "All documents referring to or relating 
to Jeffrey Epstein's purchase or consumption of prescription medicine." On its face, this 
production request is over broad and seeks non-relevant information. For example, 
whether or not EPSTEIN takes prescription medicine for (purely as an example and for 
argument) blood pressure or cholesterol control has absolutely no relevance to this 
action. 
Accordingly, EPSTEIN's objections to interrogatory no. 8 and production request 
no. 23 are required to be upheld. Plaintiff is not entitled to carte blanche discovery of 
Defendant's medical information. 
C. Plaintiffs Second Request For Production 
Regarding Plaintiffs request for - 
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All policies of insurance, including the declarations page and all binders, amendments, 
and endorsements, covering Defendant's residence at 358 El Brillo Way, Palm Beach, 
FL 33480. 
Defendant is willing to produce a "redacted version" of the policies only for the 
years 2003, 2004, and 2005. Plaintiff, in her motion has agreed to limit her request to 
those years. However, as stated in Defendant's objection, such "policies contain value 
and/or asset information which is not relevant, material nor calculated to lead to the 
discovery of admissible evidence at this point in time; said information is both private 
and confidential." Plaintiffs motion does not address Defendant's additional objection 
concerning the "value and/or asset information." Discovery of such information is 
premature and not relevant at this time. The relevant purpose of Plaintiffs discovery 
request is to determine whether some type of coverage is provided for the claims 
asserted. 
Any additional information concerning Defendant's value and asset 
information is required to be redacted. Plaintiff recently filed her Second Amended 
Complaint; Defendant has until April 3, 2009 (pursuant to an extension) to respond to or 
answer the complaint if Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged her causes of action. In counts I 
and II of her complaint, Plaintiff also seeks punitive damages. Defendant anticipates 
filing a motion to bifurcate the punitive damages claim — seeking to try liability first and 
then, a determination as to the amount, if necessary. In this way, Defendant's private 
financial information is protected until and if it becomes necessary to determine the 
amount of punitive damages to be awarded. 
D. Overbroad, relevance objections to discovery. 
As to Plaintiffs argument regarding Defendant's objections based on relevancy 
and the over-breadth of Plaintiffs discovery requests, (Part VII. A, pp. 10-11, of 
Motion To Compel), in her motion Plaintiff represents that she is seeking the discovery 
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for a time period beginning January 1, 2003 to the present. As to interrogatory nos. 1, 
2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, and 12, Defendant disagrees that time period proposed by 
Plaintiff is reasonable. Plaintiffs complaint alleges that the conduct involving her took 
place in 2004-05. The scope and breadth of these interrogatories evidences that 
information sought has absolutely no relevance and is not reasonably calculated to lead 
to the discovery of admissible evidence. The same is true for production request nos. 
5, 6, 7, 10, 11, 18, 20, 21, 22, and 23. As discussed more fully below, the length of the 
time period, along with the scope and breadth of the information and items sought, 
makes such requests improper under the rules governing discovery. 
Without waiving any of the other alternative and additional objections asserted, 
Defendant does not disagree with the time period of January 1, 2003 to present as to 
interrogatory nos. 13, 14, 15, 16, and 17; and production request nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 14, 
15, 16, and 17. Defendant addresses the additional alternative objections below. 
Plaintiffs motion to compel fails to address each of the discovery requests on an 
individual basis with respect to the objections asserted. A reading of each of the 
discovery requests, set forth above herein, establishes that each of the interrogatories 
and production requests is overbroad on its face and, thus, seeks non-relevant 
information. All of the interrogatories and production requests are phrased such that 
they encompass "all persons," "all Employees," "all telephone numbers," "all 
documents," "any and all," and so on. Contrary to Plaintiffs assertion, the definition of 
"employee" is on its face over broad and encompasses non-relevant information. (pp. 
11-12 of Plaintiff's motion). Plaintiff should be required to restrict the information that is 
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sought to the issues relevant to this action and the claims asserted by her and defenses 
to those claims. 
E. Work Product; Attorney Client Privilege 
Plaintiff asserts that Defendant failed to provide a privilege log in asserting his 
objections based on attorney-client and work product privileges to interrogatories nos. 
13, 14, and 17, and production requests nos. 4 — 8 and 10 — 23. First, a reading of the 
particular discovery requests reveals that the encompass attorney-client and work 
product privileged material. Secondly, as set forth above herein, in being compelled to 
create a privileged log is in essence compelled testimony to which Defendant's 
constitutional protections would apply. Again, as stated previously, it makes judicial 
sense to decide the constitutional issues first, before deciding the additional objections 
to the discovery requests. 
F. Rules 408 and 410. Fed. Evid. Code; 490.410, Fla. Stet - Production 
requests nos. 1 - 5. 
Production requests nos. 1 - 5 set forth above herein, all pertain to the 
negotiation and eventual entering into of a Non-Prosecution Agreement (NPA) with the 
United States Attorney's Office (USAO) for the Southern District of Florida. See part I 
above herein. Again, the constitutional issues raised in Defendant's response permeate 
these discovery requests. The full text of Federal Evidence Rules 408 and 410, and 
Florida Statute §90.410, are set forth in endnote 3.3 Under the protections afforded by 
these evidentiary rules such documents are not subject to discovery. 
G. Third Party Privacy Rights 
In production requests nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 11, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 
and 22, Defendant has raised the additional objection that the privacy rights of third 
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parties are implicated. See specified requests. As noted by the United States Supreme 
Court in Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 454, 92 S.Ct. 1029, 1038, at fn. 10 (1972): 
In Stanley 394 U.S., at 564, 89 S.Ct., at 1247, the Court stated:'(A)Iso 
fundamental is the right to be free, except in very limited circumstances, from 
unwanted governmental intrusions into one's privacy." The makers of our 
Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable to the pursuit of 
happiness. They recognized the significance of man's spiritual nature, of his 
feelings and of his intellect. They knew that only a part of the pain, pleasure and 
satisfactions of life are to be found in material things. They sought to protect 
Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions, and their sensations. 
They conferred, as against the Government, the right to be let alone-the most 
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized man.' [Citations 
omitted]. 
The fundamental right of privacy is not only guaranteed under by the Fourteenth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution, but also under the Constitution of the 
State of Florida, Art. I, Sect. 23. As summarized by the Florida Supreme Court in 
Shaktman v. State, 553 So.2d 148, 150-51 (Fla. 1989): 
The right of privacy, assured to Florida's citizens, demands that individuals be 
free from uninvited observation of or interference in those aspects of their lives 
which fall within the ambit of this zone of privacy unless the intrusion is 
warranted by the necessity of a compelling state interest. In an opinion which 
predated the adoption of section 23, the First District aptly characterized the 
nature of this right. 
A fundamental aspect of personhood's integrity is the power to control 
what we shall reveal about our intimate selves, to whom, and for what 
purpose. 
Bryon. Harless, Schaffer, Reid & Assocs., Inc. v. State ex rel, Schellenberq, 
360 So.2d 83, 92 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978), quashed and remanded on other 
grounds, 379 So.2d 633 (Fla.1980). Because this power is exercised in varying 
degrees by differing individuals, the parameters of an individual's privacy can be 
dictated only by that individual. The central concern is the inviolability of one's 
own thought, person, and personal action. The inviolability of that right assures 
its preeminence over "majoritarian sentiment" and thus cannot be universally 
defined by consensus. 
(Emphasis added). 
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Clearly, the nature of the questions and production requests identified would 
require EPSTEIN to identify third parties and necessarily thwart such individuals' rights 
to assert their constitutional right of privacy as guaranteed under the United States and 
Florida Constitutions. See generally Eisenstadt v. Baird, supra at 454-455 (The right 
encompasses privacy in one's sexual matters and is not limited to the marital 
relationship.). 
Conclusion 
Under applicable law and the facts and circumstances of this case, Defendant's 
assertions of his constitutional privileges and guarantees are required to be upheld. To 
rule otherwise would render EPSTEIN's constitutional protections meaningless. Also, 
the constitution issues so permeate this action that this Court should first decide those 
issues before deciding the merits of any additional objections raised by EPSTEIN. 
EPSTEIN is between the proverbial "rock and a hard place" in asserting is constitutional 
guarantees and then being compelled to make factual arguments regarding the 
application of his additional objections. EPSTEIN's additional objections as discussed 
herein are also required to be upheld. 
WHEREFORE Defendant requests that this Court deny Plaintiffs motion to 
compel and uphold EPSTEIN's assertion of his constitutional protections and, in the 
alternative or in addition to, uphold his additional objections to Plaintiffs discovery 
requests. 
Certificate of Service 
WE HEREBY CERTIFY that a true copy of the foregoing has been sent via U.S. 
Mail and facsimile to the following addressees this 25th day of March, 2009. 
Adam D. Horowitz, Esq. 
Jack Alan Goldberger 
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Clearly, the nature of the questions and production requests identified would 
require EPSTEIN to identify third parties and necessarily thwart such individuals' rights 
to assert their constitutional right of privacy as guaranteed under the United States and 
Florida Constitutions. See generally Eisenstadt v. Baird, supra at 454-455 (The right 
encompasses privacy in one's sexual matters and is not limited to the marital 
relationship.). 
III. Conclusion 
Under applicable law and the facts and circumstances of this case, Defendant's 
assertions of his constitutional privileges and guarantees are required to be upheld. To 
rule otherwise would render EPSTEIN's constitutional protections meaningless. Also, 
the constitution issues so permeate this action that this Court should first decide those 
issues before deciding the merits of any additional objections raised by EPSTEIN. 
EPSTEIN is between the proverbial "rock and a hard place" in asserting is constitutional 
guarantees and then being compelled to make factual arguments regarding the 
application of his additional objections. EPSTEIN's additional objections as discussed 
herein are also required to be upheld. 
WHEREFORE Defendant requests that this Court deny Plaintiffs motion to 
compel and uphold EPSTEIN's assertion of his constitutional protections and, in the 
alternative or in addition to, uphold his additional objections to Plaintiff's discovery 
requests. 
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Certificate of Service 
WE HEREBY CERTIFY that a true copy of the foregoing has been sent via U.S. 
Mail and facsimile to the following addressees this 25th day of March 2009. 
Adam D. Horowitz, Esq. 
Stuart S. Mermelstein, Esq. 
18205 Biscayne Boulevard 
Suite 2218 
Miami, FL 33160 
305-931-2200 
Fax: 305-931-0877 
ahorowitz(hermanlaw.com 
Irivera
hermanlaw.com 
Counsel for Plaintiff Jane Doe #2 
Jack Alan Goldberger 
Atterbury Goldberger & Weiss, P.A. 
250 Australian Avenue South 
Suite 1400 
West Palm Beach, FL 33401-5012 
561-659-8300 
Fax: 561-835-8691 
jaaescabellsouth.net 
Co-Counsel for Defendant Jeffrey 
Epstein 
Respe 
By: 
ROB R D. C ITTON 
, ESQ. 
Florida Bar No. 22416 
rcrit(bciclaw.com 
MICHAEL J. PIKE, ESQ. 
Florida Bar #617296 
mpikeebcIclaw.com 
BURMAN, CRITTON, LUTTIER & COLEMAN 
515 N. Flagler Drive, Suite 400 
West Palm Beach, FL 33401 
561-842-2820 
Fax: 561-515-3148 
(Co-counsel for Defendant Jeffrey Epstein) 
'Title 18. Crimes and Criminal Procedure 
Part I. Crimes 
Chapter 117. Transportation for Illegal Sexual Activity and Related Crimes 
§ 2422. Coercion and enticement 
(a) Whoever knowingly persuades, induces, entices, or coerces any individual to travel in 
interstate or foreign commerce, or in any Territory or Possession of the United States, to 
engage in prostitution, or in any sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a 
criminal offense, or attempts to do so, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 
20 years, or both. 
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(b) Whoever, using the mail or any facility or means of interstate or foreign commerce, or within 
the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States knowingly persuades, 
induces, entices, or coerces any individual who has not attained the age of 18 years, to engage 
in prostitution or any sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal 
offense, or attempts to do so, shall be fined under this title and imprisoned not less than 10 
years or for life. 
2006 Amendments. Subsec. (b). Pub.L. 109-248, § 203, struck out "not less than 5 years and 
not more than 30 years" and inserted "not less than 10 years or for life". 
2003 Amendments. Subsec. (a). Pub.L. 108-21, § 103(a)(2)(A), struck out "10' and inserted 
"20". 
Subsec. (b). Pub.L. 108-21, § 103(a)(2)(B), struck out "15" and inserted "3W. 
Pub.L. 108-21, § 103(b)(2)(A)(i), struck out ", imprisoned" and inserted "and imprisoned not less 
than 5 years and". 
Pub.L. 108-21, § 103(b)(2)(A)(ii), struck out ", or both" at end of subsec. (b). 
2 39.204. Abrogation of privileged communications in cases involving child abuse, 
abandonment, or neglect 
The privileged quality of communication between husband and wife and between any 
professional person and his or her patient or client, and any other privileged communication 
except that between attorney and client or the privilege provided in s. 90.505, as such 
communication relates both to the competency of the witness and to the exclusion of 
confidential communications, shall not apply to any communication involving the 
perpetrator or alleged perpetrator in any situation involving known or suspected child 
abuse, abandonment, or neglect and shall not constitute grounds for failure to report as 
required by s. 39.201 regardless of the source of the information requiring the report, failure to 
cooperate with law enforcement or the department in its activities pursuant to this chapter, or 
failure to give evidence in any judicial proceeding relating to child abuse, abandonment, or 
neglect. 
(Emphasis added). 
3 Relevancy and Its Limits 
Rule 408. Compromise and Offers to Compromise 
(a) Prohibited uses.—Evidence of the following is not admissible on behalf of any party, when 
offered to prove liability for, invalidity of, or amount of a claim that was disputed as to validity or 
amount, or to impeach through a prior inconsistent statement or contradiction: 
(1) furnishing or offering or promising to furnish—or accepting or offering or promising to accept—
a valuable consideration in compromising or attempting to compromise the claim; and 
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Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM 
Document 63 
Entered on FLSD Docket 03/25/2009 
Page 37 of 37 
Jane Doe No. 2 v. Epstein 
Page 36 
(2) conduct or statements made in compromise negotiations regarding the claim, except when 
offered in a criminal case and the negotiations related to a claim by a public office or agency in 
the 
exercise 
of 
regulatory, 
investigative, 
or 
enforcement 
authority. 
(b) Permitted uses.--This rule does not require exclusion if the evidence is offered for purposes 
not prohibited by subdivision (a). Examples of permissible purposes include proving a witness's 
bias or prejudice; negating a contention of undue delay; and proving an effort to obstruct a 
criminal investigation or prosecution. 
CREDIT(S) 
(Pub.L. 93-595, § 1, Jan. 2, 1975, 88 Stat. 1933; Apr. 12, 2006, eff. Dec. 1, 2006). 
Rule 410. Inadmissibility of Pleas, Plea Discussions, and Related Statements 
Except as otherwise provided in this rule, evidence of the following is not, in any civil or criminal 
proceeding, admissible against the defendant who made the plea or was a participant in the 
plea discussions: 
(1) a plea of guilty which was later withdrawn; 
(2) a plea of nob contendere; 
(3) any statement made in the course of any proceedings under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure or comparable state procedure regarding either of the foregoing pleas; or 
(4) any statement made in the course of plea discussions with an attorney for the prosecuting 
authority which do not result in a plea of guilty or which result in a plea of guilty later withdrawn. 
However, such a statement is admissible (i) in any proceeding wherein another statement made 
in the course of the same plea or plea discussions has been introduced and the statement 
ought in fairness be considered contemporaneously with it, or (ii) in a criminal proceeding for 
perjury or false statement if the statement was made by the defendant under oath, on the record 
and in the presence of counsel. 
CREDIT(S) 
(Pub.L. 93-595, § 1, Jan. 2, 1975, 88 Stat. 1933; Pub.L. 94-149, § 1(9), Dec. 12, 1975, 89 Stat. 
805; Apr. 30, 1979, eff. Dec. 1, 1980.) 
Florida Evidence Code 
90.410. Offer to plead guilty; nob contendere; withdrawn pleas of guilty 
Evidence of a plea of guilty, later withdrawn; a plea of nob contendere; or an offer to plead 
guilty or nob contendere to the crime charged or any other crime is inadmissible in any civil or 
criminal proceeding. Evidence of statements made in connection with any of the pleas or offers 
is inadmissible, except when such statements are offered in a prosecution under chapter 837. 
CREDIT(S) 
Laws 1976, c. 76-237, § 1; Laws 1978, c. 78-361, § 8. 
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