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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA 
JANE DOE NO. 2, 
CASE NO.: 08-CV-80119-MARR)VJOHNSON 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JEFFREY EPSTEIN, 
Defendant. 
JANE DOE NO. 3, 
CASE NO.: 08-CV-80232-MARR)VJOHNSON 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JEFFREY EPSTEIN, 
Defendant. 
JANE DOE NO. 4, 
CASE NO.: 08-CV-80380-MARR)VJOHNSON 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JEFFREY EPSTEIN, 
Defendant. 
JANE DOE NO. 5, 
CASE NO.: 08-CV-80381-MARR)VJOHNSON 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JEFFREY EPSTEIN, 
Defendant. 
EFTA00221179

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JANE DOE NO. 6, 
CASE NO.: 08- 80994-CIV-MARRA/JOHNSON 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JEFFREY EPSTEIN, 
Defendant. 
JANE DOE NO. 7, 
CASE NO.: 08- 80993-CIV-MARRA/JOHNSON 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JEFFREY EPSTEIN, 
Defendant. 
PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM OF LAW 
IN OPPOSITION TO MOTIONS TO DISMISS 
Plaintiffs, Jane Does 2-7, by and through undersigned counsel, file this Memorandum of Law 
in Opposition to Motions to Dismiss. pursuant to S.D.Fla.L.R. 7.1(C), as follows: 
I. 
Introduce 
 and Summary 
Defendant's Motions to Dismiss and for More Definite Statement filed in each of the above-
captioned cases pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(6)(6) and 12(e) essentially concede that Plaintiffs have 
alleged the elements of the claims asserted in Counts I and III of each pleading, but contend that 
more factual allegations are necessary for these claims. The pleadings at issue contain a short and 
plain statement of the claims showing that the Plaintiffs are entitled to relief in accordance with 
Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). The specific facts sought by Defendant may properly be the subject of 
discovery, but are not necessary for purposes of pleading. Accordingly, Defendant's Motions are 
without merit and should be denied in their entirety. 
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II. 
Facts Plead 
The pleadings in these six cases are all similarly structured and assert the same claims. In the 
section entitled "Factual Allegations" each describes the plan and scheme of Defendant Epstein to 
recruit underage girls to his Palm Beach mansion for "massages". (Jane Doe No. 2 Amd. Compl. '111 
10-11; Jane Doe No. 3 Amd. Comp.1 10-11; Jane Doe No. 4 Amd. Compl. 111-12; Jane Doe No. 5 
Amd. Compl. 1 10-11; Jane Doe No. 6 Amd. Compl. 111-12; Jane Doe No. 7 Amd. Compl. 11-12). 
The pleading then alleges that, consistent with this scheme, the Plaintiff was lured to Epstein's Palm 
Beach mansion to give a massage for monetary compensation. (Jane Doe No. 2 Amd. Compl. 1 12; 
(Jane Doe No. 3 Amd. Compl. 1 12; Jane Doe No. 4 Amd. Compl. 1 13; Jane Doe No. 5 Amd. 
Compl. 1 12; Jane Doe No. 6 Amd. Compl. 1 13; Jane Doe No. 7 Amd. Compl. 1 13). The Plaintiff 
was directed up a flight of stairs to a room where Epstein instructed the Plaintiff to remove her 
clothes and give him a massage. Epstein then masturbated and sexually assaulted the Plaintiff 
during this massage. (Jane Doe No. 2 Amd. Compl. 112; Jane Doe No. 3 Amd. Compl. 112; Jane 
Doe No. 4 Amd. Compl. 113; Jane Doe No. 5 Amd. Compl. 112; Jane Doe No. 6 Amd. Compl. 113; 
Jane Doe No. 7 Amd. Compl. 113). 
Count I of the pleading in each case alleges a claim of sexual assault and battery. Count II 
alleges a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, which Defendant does not seek to 
dismiss in his Motions before the Court. Count III alleges a claim for coercion and enticement to 
sexual activity in violation of 18 U.S.C. §2422. Defendant's Motions to Dismiss seek dismissal of 
Counts I and III for failure to state a claim under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), or alternatively move for a 
more definite statement under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(e) on these Counts. As discussed below, Plaintiffs' 
claims are sufficiently plead, and Defendant's Motions should be denied in their entirety. 
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III. 
Argument 
A. 
THE STANDARD UNDER FED.R.CIV.P. 12(b)(6) 
DOES NOT SUPPORT DISMISSAL 
The gravamen of Defendant's Motion is that Plaintiffs' have not pled sufficient facts in 
support of their claims in Counts I and III. According to Defendant, the pleadings in this case do not 
satisfy "the standard of pleading" established in Bell Atlantic Corp. I. Twombly 127 S.Ct. 1955 
(2007). In making this argument, Defendant would extend Twomblv well beyond its intended 
scope. 
Twombly was an antitrust conspiracy case, in which the Court abrogated the longstanding 
pronouncement first made in Conk/ I. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957), that a complaint should not be 
dismissed under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) "unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove 
no set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to relief." 127 S.Ct. at 1969. The Court 
noted that it did "not require heightened fact pleading of specifics, but only enough facts to state a 
claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Id. at 1974 (emphasis supplied). The antitrust 
conspiracy claim before the Court was dismissed "[b]ecause the plaintiffs here have not nudged their 
claims across the line from conceivable to plausible...." Id. 
Since Twombly, courts and commentators have grappled with the case's meaning and scope. 
Courts within the Eleventh Circuit have held that Twomblv did not alter the standard for dismissal 
under Rule 12(b)(6) in the typical case. See, e.g., CBT Flint Partners. LLC 
Goodmail Systems, 
Inc. 529 F.Supp. 2d 1376, 1379 (N.D. Ga. 2007); Coughlin'. Wal-Mart Stores East LP 2008 WL 
2704381 (M.D. Fla. 2008); Capaz 
Whitaker. Weinstraub & Grizzard. M.D.S, P.A. 2007 WL 
1655473 (M.D. Fla. 2007). In CBT Flint Partners, the Court warned against reading the decision in 
Trombly too broadly: 
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In my view, Trombly did not radically alter the elementary rules of 
civil procedure that have governed litigation in the federal courts for 
the past seventy years. The Court's forced retirement of Conley'. 
Gibson's "no set of facts" language does not change the fundamental 
command of Rule 8 as to what a valid complaint must look like. 
Indeed, the Court made clear that it was not imposing a heightened 
pleading standard. As a general matter, I am loath to assume that the 
Supreme Court circumvented the normal channels for amending the 
Federal Rules. The Court's "new standard" was merely a specific 
way to articulate a solution to what it perceived to be a specific 
pleading problem, in a specific area of law that inflicted a high cost 
upon antitrust defendants. It was not a broad based new license for 
federal courts to ramp up pleading requirements. 
529 F.Supp. 2d at 1379 (citations omitted). 
The standard for pleading in the federal courts remains controlled by Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2), 
which "only requires a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to 
relief in order to give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it 
rests." Capaz, 2007 WL 1655473 at * I. While the scope of Twombly may not be entirely clear, it 
plainly cannot be read to turn pleadings into a discovery device, as Defendant advocates here in 
seeking dismissal for failure to plead detailed factual allegations. 
In Iabal I. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143 (2d Cir. 2007), the Court reviewed and analyzed in depth 
Twombly's "conflicting signals", and ultimately held that the Supreme Court did not impose "a 
universal standard of heightened fact pleading," but rather a "flexible 'plausibility standard' ". Id. 
at 157-158. This standard "obliges a pleader to amplify a claim with some factual allegations in 
those contexts where such amplification is needed to render the claim plausible." Id. (emphasis 
original). See also Sales'. All Florida Dialysis Services, Inc., 2007 WL 3231723 *2 n.2 (S.D. Fla. 
2007) (noting that Twombly was inapplicable because the defendants did not raise the type of 
pleading deficiencies confronted in Twomblv - lack of specific time, place or person involved in the 
alleged antitrust conspiracies). 
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The instant allegations and claims cannot be compared to the speculative antitrust conspiracy 
alleged in Twombly. See 127 S.Ct. at 1965. There should be no doubt that the Plaintiffs' claims are 
plausible. Accordingly Twombley is not authority for dismissal of the pleadings in these cases. 
IL 
THE ELEMENTS OF COUNT I FOR SEXUAL ASSAULT 
AND BATTERY ARE SUFFICIENTLY ALLEGED 
In each case, the claim in Count I is labeled "Sexual Assault and Battery." Assault and 
battery are closely related common law intentional torts that are often alleged together. See Herzfeld 
I. Herzfeld, 781 So.2d 1070 (F1a.2001) (noting that plaintiff alleged intentional tort of "assault and 
battery" based on allegations of sexual abuse); Sullivan I. Atlantic Federal Savings & Loan, 454 
So.2d 52 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984) (holding that a cause of action for assault and battery cannot be based 
entirely on an omission). A common law assault occurs when a person "acts intending to cause a 
harmful or offensive contact with the person of the other, or an imminent apprehension of such 
contact, and the other is thereby put in such imminent apprehension". Restatement (Second) of 
Torts, Assault §21 (1965). "A battery consists of the infliction of a harmful or offensive contact 
upon another with the intent to cause such contact or the apprehension that such contact is 
imminent". See Paul 
Holbrook, 696 So.2d 1371 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997). See also Scelta 
Delicatessen Support Services, Inc., 57 F.Supp. 2d 1327, 1358-59 (M.D. Fla. 1999) (allegation that 
defendant attempted to put his hands down plaintiff's dress, and that there was an actual and 
intentional touching, sufficient to state a claim for battery); Hogan'. Tavzel, 660 So.2d 350 (Fla. 5th 
DCA 1995) (tortfeasor may be liable for battery for infecting another with a sexually transmitted 
disease). 
Defendant does not contend that the Plaintiffs failed to allege these elements of the common 
law torts of assault and battery in Count I of their pleadings. Rather, Defendant argues that the 
pleadings fail to allege the specific facts of "what was said or done to Plaintiff'. Defendant thus 
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misconstrues Twombly. All of the Plaintiffs allege essentially the same plan and scheme of 
Defendant to lure underage girls to his Palm Beach mansion for "massages", leading to Defendant 
engaging in sexual activities with the Plaintiffs. The specific facts concerning what was said and 
done prior to and during the course of these "massages" is the proper subject of discovery, not the 
pleadings. Plaintiffs satisfy the pleading requirements of Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2), and Twombly does 
not require more specific fact pleading in these cases. 
III. 
PLAINTIFFS SUFFICIENTLY ALLEGE A CLAIM 
IN COUNT III FOR VIOLATION OF 18 U.S.C. 42422 
The pleadings in Count III closely track the language of 18 U.S.C. §2422, and thus set forth 
the elements of a violation of this Statute, as follows: 
(i) Allegation in Complaint. Epstein used a facility or means of interstate commerce 
to knowingly persuade, induce or entice Jane Doe, when she was under the age of 18 years, 
to engage in prostitution or sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a 
criminal offense; and 
(ii) 18 U.S.C. §2422(b). Whoever, using the mail or any facility or means of 
interstate or foreign commerce, . . . knowingly persuades, induces, entices, or coerces any 
individual who has not attained the age of 18 years, to engage in prostitution or any sexual 
activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal offense, or attempts to do so. . . 
18 U.S.C. §2455(b); Jane Doe 2 Amd. Compl. 1 29; Jane Doe 3 Amd. Compl. 1 29; Jane Doe 4 
Amd. Compl. 1 30; Jane Doe 5 Amd. Comp!. 1 29; Jane Doe 6 Amd. Compl. 1 28; Jane Doe 7 Amd. 
Compl. 1 29. Defendant does not appear to contend that Plaintiffs have failed to allege the elements 
of a violation of 18 U.S.C. §2422 in Count III, but instead argues that further factual allegations are 
necessary. As with Count I, such specific facts are the proper subject of discovery, and need not be 
set forth in the pleadings under Rule 8(a)(2). There is no issue of plausibility concerning the 
Plaintiffs' claims under 18 U.S.C. §2422. Indeed, the Plaintiffs in these cases were notified by the 
U.S. Attorney's office that the Defendant has agreed that each Plaintiff has the same right to proceed 
on her federal statutory claim "as she would have had if Mr. Epstein had been tried federally and 
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convicted of an enumerated offense." 
July 10, 2008 letter from A. Marie Villafafia, Assistant 
U.S. Attorney, attached hereto as Exhibit "A"). 
Defendant also attempts to make much of a typographical error that appears in Count III in 
the "Wherefore" clause demanding a judgment for damages. There, the pleading inadvertently 
makes reference to 28 U.S.C. §2255(a) instead of 18 U.S.C. §2255(a). As is clear from the 
Defendants' Motions, Defendant is well aware that this is a typographical error and that the intent is 
to reference 18 U.S.C. §2255. In any event, this reference concerns the Plaintiffs' damages, not the 
elements of Plaintiff's claim set forth in the paragraphs above it.' Count III nonetheless satisfies 
Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(3), as the "Wherefore" clause states that Plaintiff seeks actual and compensatory 
damages, costs of suit, attorneys' fees and such other and further relief as this Court deems just and 
proper. If deemed necessary, the typographical error in the "Wherefore" clause of Count III can be 
corrected by interlineation. It does not warrant a dismissal and repleading. 
IV. 
THERE IS NO BASIS FOR DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT 
A motion for more definite statement under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(e) may only be granted "if a 
pleading is so vague or ambiguous that a party cannot reasonably be required to frame a responsive 
pleading." Hernandez'. Two Brothers Farm, LLC, 2008 WL 4405409 *1 (S.D. Fla. 2008) (quoting 
Betancourt I. Marine Cargo Mgmt., 930 F. Supp. 606, 608 (S.D. Fla. 1996)). Federal courts 
disfavor motions for more definite statement. Home Mgmt. Solutions. Inc. 1. Prescient. Inc., 2007 
WL 2412834 (S.D. Fla. 2007). Most importantly, "Defendants may not use a motion for more 
definite statement as a means of discovery regarding those claims." Hernandez, 2008 WL 4405409 
at *1. Yet that is exactly how Defendant Epstein uses his Motions for More Definite Statement. He 
' As a result, this reference in error to 28 U.S.C. 2255(a) is not set forth in a paragraph to which 
Defendant would be expected to frame an answer. 
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seeks by these Motions specific facts which are the proper subject of discovery, not pleadings. 
Accordingly, Defendants Motions for More Definite Statement should be denied. 
I
Conclusion 
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs respectfully request that Defendant's Motion to Dismiss 
be denied in their entirety. 
Dated: October 31, 2008. 
Respectfully submitted, 
By:  
s/ Jeffrey M. Herman 
Jeffrey M. Herman (FL Bar No. 521647) 
[email protected] 
Stuart S. Mermelstein (FL Bar No. 947245) 
[email protected] 
Adam D. Horowitz (FL Bar No. 376980) 
ahorowitz@ hermanlaw.com 
HERMAN & MERMELSTE1N, P.A. 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs Jane Doe 
18205 Biscayne Blvd., Suite 2218 
Miami, Florida 33160 
Tel: 305-931-2200 
Fax: 305-931-0877 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on October 31, 2008, I electronically filed the foregoing document with 
the Clerk of the Court using CM/ECF. I also certify that the foregoing document is being served this 
day to all parties on the attached Service List in the manner specified, either via transmission of 
Notices of Electronic Filing generated by CM/ECF or in some other authorized manner for those 
parties who are not authorized to receive electronically Notices of Electronic Filing. 
s/ Jeffrey M. Herman 
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SERVICE LIST 
DOE vs. JEFFREY EPSTEIN 
United States District Court, Southern District of Florida 
Jack Alan Goldberger, Esq. 
[email protected] 
Michael R. Tein, Esq. 
[email protected] 
Robert D. Critton, Esq. 
[email protected] 
Michael Pike, Esq. 
[email protected] 
s/ Jeffrey M. Herman 
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