EFTA00191587

We have a guy here who molested a neighbor boy almost every day for 2-3 years. The boy's 
family" moved. In 2006 and again in 2007, the boy travelled from another state to Los Angeles 
to visit the defendant, and was again molested on each trip. 
I would like to charge defendant with 2423(a) - transportation of a minor with intent to 
engage in criminal sexual activity. 
However, I cannot prove that the defendant PAID for the 
boy's trip, or arranged the travel. Do you think it is sufficient if I can prove that the 
guy caused the travel, by speaking to the victim's parents and encouraging/suggesting that 
the boy come and visit him, and facilitated the travel by picking the boy up at the airport, 
allowing the boy to stay at his home, etc - all with the intention that he would molest the 
boy once the boy arrived? 
3 
EFTA00192247

Villafana, Ann Marie C. (USAFLS) 
From: 
Senior, Robert (USAFLS) 
Sent: 
Wednesday, March 12. 2008 10:23 AM 
To: 
Villafana, Ann Marie C. (USAFLS) 
Subject: 
RE: Another victim issue 
If any man is approaching her in an unwanted fashion and won't relent, I would suggest that she call campus security. 
I'm not sure that a school is a "public place" to the extent that anybody can come on campus and hassle students. I'm 
sure they wouldn't let unauthorized vendors come on campus so why would they let a grown man repeatedly harass 
one of their students. It would help if she has the name and the number of the investigator. Campus security would 
then be wise to warn him to not send a surrogate to hassle, i.e. aid and abet the continued harassment. Just a thought 
that may be worth exploring. 
From: Villafana, Ann Marie C. (USAFLS) 
Sent: Wednesday, March 12, 2008 8:20 AM 
To: Senior, Robert (USAFLS) 
Subject: Another victim issue 
Hi Bob — Apparently one of Epstein's investigators is following one of our victims around her campus. She 
keeps telling him that she doesn't want to talk and he continues to approach her. In addition to the direct 
contact, she feels intimidated that he is approaching other people on campus and that others will find out about 
her involvement with JE. This is the same victim who called us about Jeff Herman. Is there anything that we 
can do? 
A. Marie Villafaiia 
Assistant U.S. Attorney 
500 S. Australian Ave, Suite 400 
West Palm Beach, FL 33401 
Phone 561 209-1047 
Fax 561 820-8777 
1 
EFTA00192248

Villafana, Ann Marie C. (USAFLS) 
From: 
Greenberg, Bonnie (USAMD) 
Sent: 
Wednesday, March 12, 2008 10:15 AM 
To: 
Villafana, Ann Marie C. (USAFLS) 
Subject: 
RE: Appointment of counsel for victims? 
Could you let me know if you get any info? I have a similar situation---an adult victim who was photographed when she 
was a child. She wants an attorney before she talks to us. 
From: Villafana, Ann Marie C. (USAFLS) 
Sent: Wednesday, March 12, 2008 8:27 AM 
To: USAEO-PSC-Coordinators 
Subject: Appointment of counsel for victims? 
Good morning, everyone. Sorry to bother. 
I am investigating a child exploitation case with a large number of victims. They were teenagers when they 
were victims and many are now over the age of IS. Investigators for the defense are following them around, 
showing up on campus, and making visits to their parents' homes. (Many victims' parents do not know about 
the conduct under investigation.) The victims have told the investigators that they do not want to talk, but they 
continue to be harassed. The case has not yet been indicted, so I can't simply ask the assigned district judge to 
rein in the defense. 
Does anyone have any experience or advice on getting counsel appointed for such victims? The guardian ad 
litem statute seems to be limited to victims who are currently minors and the material witness statute seems to 
be limited to situations where there is a strong possibility of flight. 
Any help and samples would be greatly appreciated. Thank you all. 
A. Marie Villafticia 
Assistant U.S. Attorney 
500 S. Australian Ave, Suite 400 
West Palm Beach, FL 33401 
Phone 561 209-1047 
Fax 561 820-8777 
2 
EFTA00192249

Villafana, Ann Marie C. (USAFLS) 
From: 
Braden, Myesha 
Sent: 
Wednesday, March 12, 2008 10:01 AM 
To: 
Villafana, Ann Marie C. (USAFLS) 
Subject: 
Re: Appointment of counsel for victims? 
Is there an anti-trafficking NGO nearby? If they have attorneys on staff, they are usually 
willing to provide pro bono counsel. The only trick is to make sure that they don't 
interfere with the prosecution. Another option may be a domestic violence NGO. 
Sent from my BlackBerry Wireless Device 
 
 Original Message  
From: Villafana, Ann Marie C. (USAFLS) <[email protected]> 
To: USAEO-PSC-Coordinators <[email protected]> 
Sent: Wed Mar 12 08:27:02 2008 
Subject: Appointment of counsel for victims? 
Good morning, everyone. Sorry to bother. 
I am investigating a child exploitation case with a large number of victims. They were 
teenagers when they were victims and many are now over the age of 18. Investigators for the 
defense are following them around, showing up on campus, and making visits to their parents' 
homes. (Many victims' parents do not know about the conduct under investigation.) The 
victims have told the investigators that they do not want to talk, but they continue to be 
harassed. The case has not yet been indicted, so I can't simply ask the assigned district 
judge to rein in the defense. 
Does anyone have any experience or advice on getting counsel appointed for such victims? The 
guardian ad litem statute seems to be limited to victims who are currently minors and the 
material witness statute seems to be limited to situations where there is a strong 
possibility of flight. 
Any help and samples would be greatly appreciated. Thank you all. 
A. Marie Villafana 
Assistant U.S. Attorney 
500 S. Australian Ave, Suite 400 
West Palm Beach, FL 33401 
Phone 561 209-1047 
Fax 561 820-8777 
1 
EFTA00192250

Villafana, Ann Marie C. (USAFLS) 
From: 
Gelber, 
Sent: 
Wednes..ch 12, 2008 9:53 AM 
To: 
Villafana, Ann Marie C. (USAFLS) 
Subject: 
Re: Appointment of counsel for victims? 
Having said that, I recently had a case involving 16 victims where we got an order of 
protection to call off defense investigators. I will send you the motion so you have it in 
your back pocket. 
 
 Original Message  
From: Villafana, Ann Marie C. (USAFLS) <Ann.Marie.C.Villafanailusdoj.gov> 
To: USAEO-PSC-Coordinators <[email protected]> 
Sent: Wed Mar 12 08:27:02 2008 
Subject: Appointment of counsel for victims? 
Good morning, everyone. Sorry to bother. 
I am investigating a child exploitation case with a large number of victims. They were 
teenagers when they were victims and many are now over the age of 18. Investigators for the 
defense are following them around, showing up on campus, and making visits to their parents' 
homes. (Many victims' parents do not know about the conduct under investigation.) The 
victims have told the investigators that they do not want to talk, but they continue to be 
harassed. The case has not yet been indicted, so I can't simply ask the assigned district 
judge to rein in the defense. 
Does anyone have any experience or advice on getting counsel appointed for such victims? The 
guardian ad litem statute seems to be limited to victims who are currently minors and the 
material witness statute seems to be limited to situations where there is a strong 
possibility of flight. 
Any help and samples would be greatly appreciated. Thank you all. 
A. Marie Villafana 
Assistant U.S. Attorney 
500 S. Australian Ave, Suite 400 
West Palm Beach, FL 33401 
Phone 561 209-1047 
Fax 561 820-8777 
2 
EFTA00192251

Villafana, Ann Marie C. (USAFLS) 
From: 
Patel, Krishna (USACT) 
Sent: 
Wednesday, March 12, 2008 9:42 AM 
To: 
Villafana, Ann Marie C. (USAFLS) 
Subject: 
RE: Appointment of counsel for victims? 
I believe so but we are permitted to appoint CJA to any potential witnesses. The way I normally do it is to subpoena my 
witnesses to the grand jury. Obviously anyone subpoenaed to the grand jury has a right to have an attorney. After 
talking to them, I let the court know that they want an attorney. I have had no problems at all. I am staring 1591 sex 
trafficking case on Monday involving many minors, some of which I have had CJA counsel appointed. In light of real 
witness tampering concerns I also had a protective order entered which required the defense counsel to inform us of 
the name of the investigator and then our FBI agent was permitted to call the witnesses to let them know only this 
individual could contact them and they were free to talk to the investigator or not. 
From: Villafana, Ann Marie C. (USAFLS) 
Sent: Wednesday, March 12, 2008 9:05 AM 
To: Patel, Krishna (USACT) 
Subject: RE: Appointment of counsel for victims? 
I know about the guardian ad litem provision but it is specifically limited to victims who arc currently minors. 
Have you ever done this for a minor-victim who is now an adult? Would you mind sending a sample? Thank 
you! 
A. Marie Villafidia 
Assistant U.S. Attorney 
500 S. Australian Ave, Suite 400 
West Palm Beach, FL 33401 
Phone 561 209-1047 
Fax 561 820-8777 
From: Patel, Krishna (USACT) 
Sent: Wednesday, March 12, 2008 9:02 AM 
To: Villafana, Ann Marie C. (USAFLS) 
Subject: RE: Appointment of counsel for victims? 
I routinely get CiA counsel appointed for victims. I don't know how it is done in your district but we talk to the victims 
about whether they want counsel and then write a letter (especially if they are minors or in their late teens►. There is a 
provision in the criminal code for appointing a guardian ad litem. 
From: Villafana, Ann Marie C. (USAFLS) 
Sent: Wednesday, March 12, 2008 8:27 AM 
To: USAEO-PSC-Coordinators 
Subject: Appointment of counsel for victims? 
Good morning, everyone. Sorry to bother. 
3 
EFTA00192252

I am investigating a child exploitation case with a large number of victims. They were teenagers when they 
were victims and many are now over the age of 18. Investigators for the defense are following them around, 
showing up on campus, and making visits to their parents' homes. (Many victims' parents do not know about 
the conduct under investigation.) The victims have told the investigators that they do not want to talk, but they 
continue to be harassed. The case has not yet been indicted, so I can't simply ask the assigned district judge to 
rein in the defense. 
Does anyone have any experience or advice on getting counsel appointed for such victims? The guardian ad 
litem statute seems to be limited to victims who are currently minors and the material witness statute seems to 
be limited to situations where there is a strong possibility of flight. 
Any help and samples would be greatly appreciated. Thank you all. 
A. Marie Villajaila 
Assistant U.S. Attorney 
500 S. Australian Ave, Suite 400 
West Palm Beach, FL 33401 
Phone 561 209-1047 
Fax 561 820-8777 
4 
EFTA00192253

Villafana, Ann Marie C. (USAFLS) 
From: 
Brown, Rodney (USAFLM) 
Sent: 
Wednesday, March 12, 2008 9:26 AM 
To: 
Villafana, Ann Marie C. (USAFLS) 
Subject: 
FW: Appointment of counsel for victims? 
From: Brown, Rodney (USAFLM) 
Sent: Wednesday, March 12, 2008 9:23 AM 
To: Villafana, Ann Marie C. (USAFLS) 
Subject: RE: Appointment of counsel for victims? 
Good morning. Two thoughts. First, can you approach your local Legal Aid clinic for some pro bono 
attorneys? I bet that some young associates from big firms would love to get out of the library and do 
some real justice. Second, consider sending the defense counsel a letter identifying the victims that 
do not wish to be interviewed and reminding counsel about 18 U.S.C. Section 1512(b). That may be 
a deterrent. 
D. Rodney Brown 
Assistant United States Attorney 
Middle District of Florida 
Jacksonville Division 
From: Villafana, Ann Marie C. (USAFLS) 
Sent: Wednesday, March 12, 2008 8:27 AM 
To: USAEO-PSC-Coordinators 
Subject: Appointment of counsel for victims? 
Good morning, everyone. Sorry to bother. 
I am investigating a child exploitation case with a large number of victims. They were teenagers when they 
were victims and many are now over the age of 18. Investigators for the defense are following them around, 
showing up on campus, and making visits to their parents' homes. (Many victims' parents do not know about 
the conduct under investigation.) The victims have told the investigators that they do not want to talk, but they 
continue to be harassed. The case has not yet been indicted, so I can't simply ask the assigned district judge to 
rein in the defense. 
Does anyone have any experience or advice on getting counsel appointed for such victims? The guardian ad 
litem statute seems to be limited to victims who are currently minors and the material witness statute seems to 
be limited to situations where there is a strong possibility of flight. 
Any help and samples would be greatly appreciated. Thank you all. 
A. Marie Villafaiia 
Assistant U.S. Attorney 
500 S. Australian Ave, Suite 400 
West Palm Beach, FL 33401 
5 
EFTA00192254

Phone 561 209-1047 
Fax 561 820-8777 
6 
EFTA00192255

Villafana, Ann Marie C. (USAFLS) 
From: 
Brown, Rodney (USAFLM) 
Sent: 
Wednesday, March 12, 2008 9:23 AM 
To: 
Villafana, Ann Marie C. (USAFLS) 
Subject: 
RE: Appointment of counsel for victims? 
Good morning. Two thoughts. First, can you approach your local Legal Aid clinic for some pro bond 
attorneys? I bet that some young associates from big firms would love to get out of the library and do 
some real justice. Second, consider sending the defense counsel a letter identifying the victims that 
do not wish to be interviewed and reminding counsel about 18 U.S.C. 
D. Rodney Brown 
Assistant United States Attorney 
Middle District of Florida 
Jacksonville Division 
From: Villafana, Ann Marie C. (USAFLS) 
Sent: Wednesday, March 12, 2008 8:27 AM 
To: USAEO-PSC-Coordinators 
Subject: Appointment of counsel for victims? 
Good morning, everyone. Sony to bother. 
I am investigating a child exploitation case with a large number of victims. They were teenagers when they 
were victims and many are now over the age of 18. Investigators for the defense are following them around, 
showing up on campus, and making visits to their parents' homes. (Many victims' parents do not know about 
the conduct under investigation.) The victims have told the investigators that they do not want to talk, but they 
continue to be harassed. The case has not yet been indicted, so 1 can't simply ask the assigned district judge to 
rein in the defense. 
Does anyone have any experience or advice on getting counsel appointed for such victims? The guardian ad 
litem statute seems to be limited to victims who are currently minors and the material witness statute seems to 
be limited to situations where there is a strong possibility of flight. 
Any help and samples would be greatly appreciated. Thank you all. 
A. Marie Villajaila 
Assistant U.S. Attorney 
500 S. Australian Ave, Suite 400 
West Palm Beach, FL 33401 
Phone 561 209-1047 
Fax 561 820-8777 
7 
EFTA00192256

Villa,fana, Ann Marie C. (USAFLS) 
From: 
Gelber. 
Sent: 
Wednesira 12.2008 9:23 AM 
To: 
Villafana, Ann Marie C. (USAFLS) 
Subject: 
Re: Appointment of counsel for victims? 
Nothing is preventing the women from getting an attorney on their own and/or seeking a 
restraining order even without an attorney. A law school clinic or legal aid should be able 
to help them. In the long run, it is better for your case if they take these steps on their 
own with minimal involvement from the prosecution. 
 
 Original Message  
From: Villafana, Ann Marie C. (USAFLS) <Ann.Marie.C.Villafanajusdoj.gov> 
To: USAEO-PSC-Coordinators <[email protected]> 
Sent: Wed Mar 12 08:27:02 2008 
Subject: Appointment of counsel for victims? 
Good morning, everyone. Sorry to bother. 
I am investigating a child exploitation case with a large number of victims. They were 
teenagers when they were victims and many are now over the age of 18. Investigators for the 
defense are following them around, showing up on campus, and making visits to their parents' 
homes. (Many victims' parents do not know about the conduct under investigation.) The 
victims have told the investigators that they do not want to talk, but they continue to be 
harassed. The case has not yet been indicted, so I can't simply ask the assigned district 
judge to rein in the defense. 
Does anyone have any experience or advice on getting counsel appointed for such victims? The 
guardian ad litem statute seems to be limited to victims who are currently minors and the 
material witness statute seems to be limited to situations where there is a strong 
possibility of flight. 
Any help and samples would be greatly appreciated. Thank you all. 
A. Marie Villafana 
Assistant U.S. Attorney 
500 S. Australian Ave, Suite 400 
West Palm Beach, FL 33401 
Phone 561 209-1047 
Fax 561 820-8777 
8 
EFTA00192257

Viltafana, Ann Marie C. (USAFLS) 
From: 
Peters, Jim (USAID) 
Sent: 
Wednesday, March 12, 2008 10:39 AM 
To: 
Villafana, Ann Marie C. (USAFLS) 
Subject: 
RE: Appointment of counsel for victims? 
We have had GAL's appointed pre-indictment. Here are a couple of examples. Neither was over 18, however. If they 
were minors at the time of the crime, I'd give it a run and see if the court raises the issue. 
111 
Young.Guardian Young.GALdeclar Duncan.Guardia Duncan.GALded Duncan.GALMoti 
Order.wpd 
arion.wpd 
nOrder.wpd 
aration.wpd 
on.wpd 
From: Villafana, Ann Marie C. (USAFLS) 
sent: Wednesday, March 12, 2008 6:27 AM 
To: USAEO-PSC-Coordinators 
Subject: Appointment of counsel for victims? 
Good morning, everyone. Sorry to bother. 
I am investigating a child exploitation case with a large number of victims. They were teenagers when they 
were victims and many are now over the age of 18. Investigators for the defense are following them around, 
showing up on campus, and making visits to their parents' homes. (Many victims' parents do not know about 
the conduct under investigation.) The victims have told the investigators that they do not want to talk, but they 
continue to be harassed. The case has not yet been indicted, so I can't simply ask the assigned district judge to 
rein in the defense. 
Does anyone have any experience or advice on getting counsel appointed for such victims? The guardian ad 
litem statute seems to be limited to victims who are currently minors and the material witness statute seems to 
be limited to situations where there is a strong possibility of flight. 
Any help and samples would be greatly appreciated. Thank you all. 
A. Marie Villafatia 
Assistant U.S. Attorney 
500 S. Australian Ave, Suite 400 
West Palm Beach, FL 33401 
Phone 561 209-1047 
Fax 561 820-8777 
1 
EFTA00192258

Harold Lee BATIELL, Appellant, 
UNITED STATES of America, 
Appellee (two cases). 
Nos. 18945, 19344. 
United States Court of Appeals 
Eighth Circuit. 
Nov. 19, 1968. 
Certiorari Denied Feb. 24,1969. 
See 89 S.Ct 865. 
Prosecution for having persuaded, 
induced, enticed, and caused woman to go 
from one state to another for immoral 
purposes. 
The United States District 
Court for the District of Minnesota, 
Earl R. Larson, J., rendered judgment, 
and defendant appealed. The Court of 
Appeals, Vogel, Circuit Judge, held that 
refusal to respond to jury's request for 
further definition of word "induces", 
other than to state that words were to 
be given their common usage, was not 
error. 
Affirmed. 
L Prostitution 4=4 
Word "induces" in second section of 
Mann Act is one of common usage and 
meaning and requires no explanation or 
definition. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2422. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other Judicial constructions and 
R. Criminal Law 4=4038(1) 
Defendant may not assign as error 
any inaccuracy in instructions without 
first having called attention of trial court 
thereto, thus giving it opportunity of 
making correction. Fed.Rules Crim.Proc. 
rule 30, 18 U.S.C.A. 
3. Criminal Law 4=1038 
Trial court's failure to respond to 
jury's request for further definition of 
word "induces" in Mann Act was not 
plain error. Fed.Rules Crim.Proc. rule 
52(b), 18 U.S.C.A.; 18 U.S.C.A. § 2422. 
4. Criminal Law 41=883(3) 
Trial court's refusal, in prosecution 
for having persuaded, Induced, enticed 
and caused woman to go in interstate 
a 
at
l 
BATSELL 
STATES 
latal
commerce for immoral purposes, to re-
spond to jury's request for further defi-
nition of word "induces", other than to 
state that words were to be given their 
common usage, was not error. 18 U.S. 
C.A. § 2422. 
8. Criminal Law 4=1173(10 
That jury returned verdict of not 
guilty under first section of Mann Act 
and guilty under second section did not 
indicate that. jury, which had unsuccess-
fully requested further definition of 
words "inducement" or "induces", was 
confused as to the meaning of these 
terms in second section. 18 U.S.C.A. $§ 
2421, 2422. 
8. Prostitution 4=8 
Jury could properly return verdiet 
of not guilty under first section of Mann 
Act and guilty under second section even 
though evidence would have justified 
finding of guilty under both sections. 
18 U.S.C.A. H 2421, 2422. 
7. Prostitution 4=1 
Offenses prescribed by first and sec-
ond sections of Mann Act are separate 
and distinct. 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2421, 2422. 
395 
8. Crhninal Law 4=633(1) 
In presiding over jury trial, judge 
must exercise discretion in many ways, 
including determination of time to be 
allowed for argument length of direct 
and cross-examination, keeping of open-
ing statements within proper bounds, 
proper conduct of parties, witnesses and 
counsel, excluding of witnesses, etc. 
9. CriMillti Law o=.711 
Limiting of counsel to one hour of 
argument on each side, in case which was 
neither complex nor protracted, was not 
abuse of discretion, and defendant with 
not denied fair trial by limitation, court. 
having in fact allowed defense counsel' 
one hour and 40 minutes. 
10. Prostitution 0:v4 
Evidence sustained conviction for 
having persuaded, induced, enticed and 
caused woman to go from one state to 
another for immoral purposes. 18 U.S. 
C.A. § 2422. 
EFTA00192259

396 
403 FEDERAL REPORTER. 24 SERIES 
11. Witnesses 04=283 
Trial court's statement when defense 
counsel, after lengthy cross-examination 
of prosecution witness, said that he might 
like to recall witness, that if there were 
to be more cross-examinations counsel 
should continue now, whereupon cross-
examination was continued and defense 
counsel concluded with "no further qua-
tons", was not improper although wit-
ness had been recalled four times by 
prosecution at earlier trial at which she 
claimed loss of memory. 
12. Criminal Law Q=912(2) 
New trial motion based upon alleged 
recantation of material witness should 
be viewed with disfavor. 
Fsd.Rules 
Crim.Proc. rule 83, 18 U.S.C.A. 
13. Criminal Law 4=942(2), 1136(3) 
New trial motions based on alleged 
recantation of material witness are gen-
erally addressed to sound judicial discre-
tion of trial court and there will be no 
reversal except for clear abuse. 
Fed. 
Rules Crim.Proc. rule 33, 18 U.S.C.A. 
14. Criminal Law C-'942(2) 
Denial of new trial sought on ground 
of alleged recantation of material wit-
ness who, at hearing on motion, main-
tained that her testimony at trial had 
been truthful and testified that recanta-
tion had been due to fear and threats. 
was not abuse of discretion. Fed.Rules 
Crim.Proc. rule 33, 18 U.S.C.A. 
Ellis Olkon, Minneapolis. Minn., for 
appellant, and Sheldon J. Eviden, Min-
neapolis, Minn., on the briefs. 
I. The exact wording of the tint iallet• 
meat is: 
-The United States Grand Jury 
charges: 
'That on or about the 22nd day of 
May. 1966, In the District of Minnesota, 
Fourth Division. 
IIAROLD LEE RATSF.LL 
did knowingly procure nod obtain an 
airline passenger ticket from Northwest 
Airlines. Inc., a common carrier in 
interstate commerce, said airline pas-
senger ticket to be used by Gloria 
J. Earl Cutid, Act. U. S. Atty., Min-
neapolis, Minn., for appellee, Patrick J. 
Foley, U. S. Atty., and Nell P. Convery, 
Asst. U. S. Atty., Minneapolis, Minn.. on 
the brief. 
Before VOGEL, LAY and BRIGHT, 
Circuit Judges. 
VOGEL, Circuit Judge. 
We are concerned here with two sepa-
rate appeals in a criminal conviction. 
The first appeal is from a judgment of 
conviction entered against appellant-de-
fendant, Harold Lee Bated!, for violation 
of Section 2422 of the Mann Act, 18 
§ 2421 et seq. The second ap-
peal is from the District Court's denial 
of defendant's motion, pursuant to Rule 
33, Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 
18 U.S.C.A.. for a new trial on the ground 
of newly discovered evidence. In each 
case we affirm. 
The issues in the appeal from the 
judgment of conviction will be considered 
first. The defendant was indicted in the 
District of Minnesota under 18 U.S.C.A. 
§ 2421 for having procured interstate 
transportation for one Gloria Jean Hull 
(hereinafter "Miss Hull") from Min-
neapolis, Minnesota to New York City 
"for the purpose of prostitution, de-
bauchery and other immoral purposes, 
and with intent on the part of (defend-
ant] to induce, entice, and compel (Miss 
Hull] to give herself up to the practice 
of prostitution and debauchery and other 
immoral practices", and under 18 U.S. 
C.A. I 2422 for having persuaded. in-
duced, enticed and caused Miss Hull to go 
from Minneapolis to New York for the 
aforesaid purposes' 
Joan flail for travel in Interstate coin. 
mew* from .Minneapolis-St. Paul Inter-
national Airport. Weld Chamberlain 
Field, District of Minnesota. to New 
York City, State of New York. for the 
purpose of prostitution, debauchery and 
other immoral Perimists, and with in-
tent on the part of Herold Lee sateen 
to Unlace, entice, and compel the said 
Gloria Jean Hull to give hermit on 
to the practice of prostitution and 
debauchery and other Immoral prac• 
tires, whereby the said Gloria Jean 
EFTA00192260

The two indictments were consolidated 
for trial.. What is hereinafter referred 
to as the first trial was commenced in 
the United States District Court in Min-
neapolis, Minnesota, before the Honor-
able Earl R. Larson and a Jury on March 
20, 1967. 
On March 27, 1967, after 
considerable testimony had been taken. 
the court granted defendant's motion for 
a 
• The second trial, also before Judge 
Larson and a Jury, commenced in St. 
Paul, Minnesota, on June 6, 1967. This 
trial resulted in defendant's acquittal of 
the charge. under 18 U.S.C.A. § 2421 
(the first. indictment) and defendant's 
conviction .for violation of 18 U.S.C-A. 
§ 2422 (the second indictment). 
The defendant relies generally on three 
grounds in his appeal from the Judgment 
of conviction: 
"I. 
"The defendant was denied a fair 
trial because the Jury's confusion as to 
the word 'inducement' in the statute 
18 U.S.C. § 2422 was never clarified 
even after the Jury requested clarifi-
cation and the confusion was manifest 
in the inconsistent verdicts returned 
by the Jury. 
"II. 
"In view of completely contradictory 
stories told by complaining witness, 
[the] evidence was insufficient to sus-
tain conviction. 
"III. 
"Refusal of the court to allow de-
fendant to recall Gloria Jean Hull, the 
Hall was transported in interstate com-
merce la violation of Title 18 U.S.C. 
2421." 
The second indictment states: 
"The United States •Grand Jury 
charges: 
"That on or about the 22nd day of 
May, 1988, In the District of Minnesota.. 
Fourth Division, 
HAROLD LEE RATSELL 
did knowingly persuade, induce and en-
tice a woman, that is, Gloria Jean 
Hull, to go from Minneapolis, County of 
Hennepin, State and District of /din-
newts. to New York City, State of New 
SATSELL r, UNITED STATES 
ate asses rid X6 need 
key prosecution witness after the pros-
ecution had been allowed to recall her 
on four separate occasions, constituted 
reversible error." 
In order to properly resolve defendant's 
contentions, it is necessary to analyze 
in some detail the proceedings of the 
first and second trials. 
During the first trial, Miss Hull, the 
alleged victim of the unlawful act charg-
ed against the defendant, suffered a 
"memory lase" until recalled by the prose-
cution for the fourth time. Upon being 
recalled the fourth time, she testified, 
after stating that her memory had re-
turned, that she made the trip from 
Minneapolis to New York without in-
ducement, enticement or persuasion by 
the defendant; that she went to New 
York to run away from her problems; 
that she did not know what she would be 
doing in New York; that although she 
did have sexual adventures in New York. 
she did so of her own free accord; that 
she boarded the airplane in Minneapolis 
with the defendant; and that defendant 
purchased her plane ticket 
At this 
point defendant's motion for a mistrial 
was granted. 
The second trial was delayed until Miss 
Hull, who disappeared after the first 
trial, could be located by the FBI and 
confined as a material witness under a 
310,000 bond. At this trial, Miss Hull 
testified that she was 18 years of age et 
the time of the alleged unlawful acts; 
that she first met defendant when she 
was 14 or 16; that she attended a reform 
school for girls at Sauk Center, Minne-
sota; that the night before the trip to 
397 
York, for the purpose of proetitution 
and debauchery and for other immoral 
purposes and with the Intent and pur-
pose on the part of Harold Lee /lat-
een that Gloria Jean Hull should en-
gage In the practice of prostitution and 
debauchery and other Immoral prem. 
dm, and Harold Lee Batten did there-
by knowingly cense Gloria Jean Hull 
to go and to be carded and transported 
as a passenger upon the line and route 
of Northwest Orient Airlines, a common 
carder in interstate commerce, in 
violation of Title 18, United State. 
Code, Section 2422." 
EFTA00192261

398 
403 FEDERAL REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
New York she stayed at the defendant's 
father's home in Minneapolis, although 
her mother's residence was also in Minne-
apolis; that she was driven to the air-
port accompanied by the defendant's 
sister, the sisters boy friend, and the 
defendant; that she went to New York 
voluntarily after having been persuaded 
by the defendant; that it was "under-
stood" that what she would be doing in 
New York would be prostitution; that 
after the defendant "persuaded" her to 
go to New York, she went voluntarily; 
that defendant purchased her airplane 
ticket; and that defendant boarded the 
plane with her. 
She further testified 
that the defendant drove her from the 
New York airport to the Park Sheraton 
Hotel, where they met Nancy Ubcl (who 
later became defendant's wife); that de-
fendant then took her to the Taft Hotel, 
where she registered after receiving S20 
from him; that he took her to her first 
"trick" the next morning; and that he 
subsequently took her to two or three 
other "tricks". During her sojourn in 
New York she continued to earn money 
as a prostitute, giving most of it to 
Nancy Ubel and to the defendant. Miss 
Hull's testimony with reference to the 
trip from Minneapolis to New York, the 
fact that the defendant accompanied her 
on the trip, her activities in New York as 
a prostitute, and the defendant's ac-
quaintance and relationship with her 
there is substantially corroborated by 
the testimony of other witnesses. 
The 
defendant himself did not testify. 
The record indicates that the case was 
submitted to the jury in the early after-
noon of June 8, 1967. At 4:45 p. m. 
the jury returned to the courtroom and 
the following transpired: 
"THE COURT: I have this written 
note from the Foreman of the jury: 
'Please reread the final instructions to 
the jury including a definition of 
terms, especially inducement and in-
tent; also, the specific four points on 
each indictment.' 
This is signed by 
Mr. Cherrier, your Foreman. Do you 
want me to read all of the instruc-
tions? 
"JURY FOREMAN: There seemed 
to be some confusion on our part es-
pecially on the term 'inducement' and 
also in the instructions on the four 
points that had to do with each in-
dictment. This is what we got hung 
up on. 
"THE COURT -. I didn't give you 
ar.y definition in my instructions of 
inducement or persuasion or entice-
ment, which are the terms that are 
used in the instructions. I didn't give 
you any definitions of those terms 
because I assumed that these are terms 
in common usage. On the matter of 
'intent,' I did give you three instruc-
tions which might have some applica-
tion on each of the two indictments. 
I listed the essential elements, which 
are four in number. Do you want me 
to reread all of the instructions? Do 
you want me to reread the instructions 
as they go to the matter of 'intent' and 
also the essential elements for each 
indictment? 
"JURY FOREMAN: I think so." 
After reiterating the essential ele-
ments for the ¢ 2421 indictment, the 
court stated: 
"With respect to Title 18, U.S.C., 
Section 2422, I instructed you as fol-
lows: 
"The essential elements required to 
be proved in order to establish the 
offense charged under Title 18, Section 
2422, are these: 
"1. The act of inducing, enticing 
or persuading a woman or girl, in this 
case Gloria Jean Hull, to travel in 
interstate commerce. 
"2. Doing such act with the intent 
or purpose that the woman or girl 
would engage in prostitution or other 
immoral practices. 
"3. Causing the interstate trans-
portation of a woman or girl, in this 
case Gloria Jean Hull, by common 
carrier for the immoral purpose. 
"4. Doing such act or acts know-
ingly and wilfully. 
EFTA00192262

"The burden Is on the prosecution 
to prove all of the essential elements 
beyond a reasonable doubt 
"(I will reread these four essential 
elements.) 
"(The four essential elements were 
reread.) 
"JURY FOREMAN: 
One other 
point that you brought out earlier had 
to do with a person going on a common 
carrier with or without—I believe it 
was wilfully inducing—for the purpose 
of inducing an illegal act. I believe 
that was one of the four points on the 
intent 
"TIlE COURT: You are talking 
about these four points in the essential 
elements? 
"JURY FOREMAN: Yea. 
"THE COURT: I will reread the 
essential elements in 2421. 
• 
• 
• 
• 
. 
• 
"The other section, Section 2422, the 
four elements are: 
"1. The act of inducing, enticing 
or persuading a woman or girl, in this 
ease Gloria Jean Hull, to travel in 
interstate commerce. 
"2. Doing such act with the intent 
I
purpose that the woman or girl 
uld engage in prostitution or other 
Immoral practice. 
"3. Causing the interstate trans-
portation of the woman or girl by 
common carrier for the immoral pur-
pose. 
"4. Doing such act or acts know-
ingly and wilfully. 
"Perhaps this might be sufficient 
for your purposes now." 
The jurors thereafter appeared satis-
fied with the court's explanation and 
defendant's counsel took no exception and 
made no request On the following day, 
June 9, 1967, the jurors returned their 
verdict of not guilty as to § 2421 and 
guilty as to § 2422. Upon defendant's 
request, the jurors were polled. Each 
answered in the affirmative as to the 
two verdicts. 
HATBELL LIMITED 
/MATHS 
399 
ate as 
PIA at (110) 
As noted, defendant contends on appeal 
that be was denied a fair trial because 
the jury's alleged confusion as to the 
meaning of the word "inducement" in 
§ 2422 "was never clarified even after 
the jury requested clarification • • •." 
In response to the jurors' written re-
quest, the trial court did not substitute 
or use a synonym for the term "induce-
ment" as used in the instruction or the 
words "induce" or "induces" as used in 
the statutes. Instead the court made it 
perfectly clear that the words "induce-
ment", "persuasion" and "enticement" 
were to be given their common usage and 
had not acquired • special legal meaning. 
The jurors, and defendant's counsel, ap-
peared satisfied with such explanation. 
Furthermore, the court carefully and 
meticulously set out the elements of the 
offenses under §§ 2421 and 2422. 
(1-4) The word "induces" in § 2422 
is one of common usage and meaning 
and requires no explanation or definition. 
In the first Mann Act case 
fore the 
Supreme Court, Caminetti 
United 
States, 1917, 242 U.S. 470, a 485-486, 
37 S.Ct. 192, at 194, 61 L.Ed. 442, the 
court stated: 
"It is elementary that the meaning 
of a statute must, in the first instance, 
be sought in the language in which the 
act is framed, and if that is plain, and 
if the law is within the constitutional 
authority of the law-making body 
which passed it, the sole function of 
the courts is to enforce it according 
to its terms. [Citations omitted.] 
"Where the language is plain and ad-
mits of no more than one meaning the 
duty of interpretation does not arise 
and the rulea which are to aid doubt-
ful
!
mean' ga need no discussion. 
Hamilton 
Rathbone, 175 U.S. 414, 
421 (20 
.Ct. 165, 44 L.Ed. 219). 
There is no ambiguity in the terms 
of this act. It is specifically made an 
offense to knowingly transport or 
cause to be transported, etc., fa inter-
state commerce, any woman or girl for 
the purpose of prostitution or de-
bauchery, or for 'any other Immoral 
purpose,' or with the intent and pur-
EFTA00192263

400 
409 FEDERAL REPORTER. >td SERIES 
pose to induce any such woman or girl 
to become a prostitute or to give her-
self up to debauchery, or to engage in 
any other immoral practice. 
"Statutory words are uniformly pre-
sumed, unless the contrary appears, to 
be used in their ordinary and usual 
sense, and with the meaning commonly 
attributed to them. • • • " (Em-
phasis supplied.) 
This court said through Judge Garda' 
in Terminal R. Asa'n of St. Louis 
Howell, 8 Cir., 1948, 165 F.2d 135, 140: 
"It would be strange indeed if it 
could be said to be error to lay down 
the law in the exact language of the 
statute upon which the action is 
based." 
Furthermore, we said in Williams I 
United States, 8 Cir., 1964, 328 F. 
256, 262, cert. denied, 1964, 377 U.S. 
969, 84 S.Ct. 1651, 12 LEd2d 739: 
"A court may and generally should, 
where the law governing a case is ex-
pressed in a statute, employ the lan-
guage of the statute in its inetructio 
Terminal R. Amen of St Louis 
Howell, Cir., 
165 F.2d 135, 14
Maynard 
United States, 94 U.S.App. 
D.C. 347, 15 F.2d 336, 339. Except 
where the statute is complex or not 
expressed in ordinary language—
which is not the situation here—any 
amplification which a party may desire 
to have made must be the subject of 
a requested instruc 'on by him." 
See, also, Caldwell 
United States, 
I 
8 Cir., 1964, 338 F 
385, 391, cert. 
denied, 1964, 380 U.S. 984, 85 S.Ct. 
1354, 14 L.Ed.2d 277. In addition, Rule 
30, Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 
18 U.S.C.A., precludes the assignment as 
error of any inaccuracy In the instruc-
tions without first having called the 
attention of the trial court thereto, thus 
giving it the opportunity of making cor-
rection. No objection or exception was 
taken here and most certainly this is not 
a plain 
ror situation under Rule 62(b). 
Singer 
United States, 1965, 380 U.S. 
i
24, 38, 5 S.Ct. 783, 13 L.Ed.2d 630; 
Jones v. United States, 8 Cir., 1968, 396 
F.2d 66, 67-68; Rimerman I 
United 
States, 8 Cir., 1967, 374 F.2d 51, 255. 
cert. denied, 1961, 387 U.S. 931 87 S.Ct. 
2053. 18 L.Ed.2d 992; Aggers I United 
States, 8 Cir., 1966, I8 F.2d 44, 748, 
cart denied, Coates 
United States, 
1967, 385 U.S. 1010, 
7 S.Ct 719, 17 
L.Ed.2d 548. We find no error, plain or 
otherwise, in the court's failure to fur-
ther elucidate the meaning of the words 
"inducement" or "induces". 
[5-7) The defendant contends that 
the fact that the jury returned a verdict 
of not guilty under § 2421 and guilty 
under § 2422 indicates its confusion as to 
the meaning of "inducement" or "in-
duces". We do not agree. It was en-
tirely within the province of the jury 
to find as it did. Even though it must 
be conceded that the evidence offered 
by the government would fully have justi-
fied a jury finding of guilty under both 
§ 2421 and § 2422, the offenses 
r
pro-
scribed by these secti 
are separate 
and distinct LePage 
United States, 
8 Cir., 1945, 146 F.2d 63 , 587, 166 A.L.R. 
965. Even if it could be said that the 
verdicts were inconsistent, this court has 
held that the inconsistency of verdicts up-
on separate counts of an indictment does 
not entitle the defendant to a reversal 
of the judgment upon the counts for 
which he was convicted. Jones 1. United 
y
States, 
ir., 1968, 396 F.2d 6 , 67-68; 
Aggers 
United States, 8 Cir., 1966, 
11
6 F. 
744, 748, cert denied, Coates 
United States, 1967, 385 U.S. 1010. 
7 S.Ct. 719, 17 L.Ed2d 648. 
Under the defendant's general asser-
tion that he was denied a fair trial is the 
claim that the time for defense counsel's 
summation was unreasonably limited by 
the trial court After both sides had 
rested and the attorneys were about to 
commence their arguments to the jury, 
the court suggested that counsel should 
limit themselves to not more than one 
hour on a side. After defense counsel 
had argued for more than an hour, he 
was interrupted by the court and his 
attention called to the matter of time. 
He was, however, granted another thirty 
minutes. In all, defendant's counsel 
EFTA00192264

BATSELL v. UNITED STATES 
401 
attas403 Fad IN (1969) 
used one hour and forty minutes for 
perienced and trying his first felony 
his argument. 
case in federal court. We find no error. 
[8, 9] In presiding over a jury trial, 
a judge is required to exercise his dis-
cretion in many ways, including the de-
termination of the time to be allowed for 
argument to the jury on each side, the 
length of direct and cross-examination 
of witnesses, the keeping of opening 
statements within proper bounds, the 
proper conduct of parties, witnesses and 
counsel, the excluding of witnesses from 
the courtroom during the examination of 
other witnesses, etc. 
This case was 
neither complex nor protracted in extent. 
Defense counsel succeeded in obtaining 
one hour and forty minutes for his sum-
mation, despite the court's previous sug-
gestion that each side limit itself to one 
hour. At the close of defense counsel's 
argument, he made no complaint to the 
court and at no time did he point out any 
issues or facts which he had not had 
time to discuss with the jury. At no 
time did counsel object to the original 
one-hour limitation given by the trial 
court. Judge Mattheispeaking for this 
court, said in Butler 
United States, 8 
Cir:, 1963, 317 F2d 249, 257, 6 A.L.R.3d 
582, 594: 
"It is axiomatic that the limitation 
of time for arguments of counsel is 
within the sound discretion of the 
trial judge. 
"A reversal may be required where 
counsel is restricted within unreason-
able bounds so that he is unable to fully 
and fairly present his case." 
See, also. United States
 Mills, 6 Ci
1966, 366 F.2d 512; 
nited States 
i 
Roviaro,
Cir., 1967, 379 F.2d 911; 
Barnard 
United States, 9 Cir., 1965, 
842 F2d 
9, cert. denied, 1966, 382 U.S. 
948. 86 S.Ct. 403, 15 L.Ed.2d 366, re-
hearing denied, 1966, 382 U.S. 1002, 86 
S.Ct. 667, 16 L.Ed2d 491. 
Here, the 
limiting of counsel to one hour of argu-
ment on each side was not, in our opin-
ion, an abuse of discretion. In granting 
additional time thereafter, the court ex-
ercised substantial liberality with de-
fense counsel, who claimed to be inex-
403 F.20--14 
[10] Appellant's next contention is 
that the evidence was insufficient to sus-
tain conviction because of the contra-
dictory stories told by Miss Hull, the 
prosecution's main witness. The conflict 
between Miss Hull's testimony at the 
first and second trials was substantially 
and repetitiously brought to the jurors' 
attention during her extensive cross-ex-
amination. It was the function of the 
jury to evaluate this testimony and sepa-
rate fact from fiction. Evidence is not 
necessarily insufficient merely because 
a witness' testimony has been contradic-
tory and the explanations therefor diffi-
cult of belief. We also note that Miss 
Hull's testimony concerning defendant's 
persuasion of her to travel from Minne-
apolis to New York City accompanied by 
the defendant and for the purposes of 
prostitution is substantially corroborated 
by other testimony. We find no insuffi-
ciency here. 
Defendant's last claim of error in his 
appeal from the judgment of conviction is 
that the trial court refused to allow him 
to recall Miss Hull after the prosecution 
had been allowed to recall her on four 
separate occasions during the first trial. 
Be that as it may, Miss Hull was called 
by the prosecution but once during the 
second trial, which is the trial which re-
stilted in defendant's conviction and with 
which we are here concerned. 
Miss 
Hull's alleged loss of memory during the 
first trial and her inconsistent state-
ments were well gone over in cross-
examination; an examination of the 
transcript reveals that 88 pages thereof 
were utilized by government counsel in 
direct examination of Miss Hull, whereas 
defense counsel's cross-examination ex-
tends over 78 pages. As defense counsel 
approached the termination of his cross-
examination, the following colloquy oc-
curred: 
"Q [By Mr. Olkon] What I am con-
cerned with, Gloria, is when you are 
telling the truth. Are you telling the 
truth now? 
"A Yes, I am telling the truth now. 
EFTA00192265

402 
409 FEDERAL REPORTER, 24 smuts 
"Q Are you certain that tomorrow 
you will not have a new story? 
"A I am certain I will not have a 
new story. 
"Q Then why for a day and one-
half did you tell the Honorable Court 
and the ladies and gentlemen of th 
jury that you couldn't remember an 
thing—a simple fact of whether y 
ever boarded a plane? 
"A I told you that answer a million 
times already. 
"THE COURT: This is repetitious, 
Mr. Olken. 
"MR. OLKON: No further ques-
tions. 
"MR. CONVERT: No further ques-
tions. 
"THE COURT: You may be ex-
cused, Miss Hull. 
"MR. 
OLKON: Your 
Honor, 
I 
would like to possibly recall her. 
"THE COURT: The direct examina-
tion was one hour and eight minutes 
and you have had one hour and 45 
minutes of cross-examination. If there 
is more cross-examination you will con-
tinue it right now. 
"MR. OLKON: Okay, there is more 
cross-examination." 
Cross-examination then continued for 
three more pages, after which defense 
counsel said, "No further questions." 
[11] We find no abuse of discretion 
upon the part of the trial court. An ex-
amination of the entire record indicates 
complete fairness by the court In all 
rulings and in granting defendant's re-
quests. The trial court did not limit 
the cross-examination of Miss Hull, but 
directed only that if there was to be 
further cross-examination, it was to be 
completed at that time. As noted, after 
defense counsel continued with cross-
examination for some time, he ended with 
the statement, "No further questions." 
A thorough examination of the entire 
record convinces us that defendant had 
a fair trial and that no error was com-
mitted. 
We turn now to defendant's appeal 
from the District Court's denial of de-
fendant's motion, pursuant to Rule 33. 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, for 
a new trial on the ground of newly dis-
covered evidence. While defendant's ap-
peal from his judgment of conviction was 
pending in this court, he filed the above 
motion on the basis that Miss Hull, on 
March 6, 1968, had repudiated her testi-
mony and claimed that the defendant did 
not induce, persuade or entice her to go 
from Minneapolis to New York in viola-
tion of the Mann Act. This court then 
stayed disposition of the appeal and di-
rected that the District Court consider 
the motion for new trial. On April 17, 
1968, the District Court held a hearing 
at which Miss Hull (then Mrs. Harpole) 
testified. She maintained that her testi-
mony at the second trial was the truth. 
In denying the motion for a new trial on 
the grounds of newly discovered evidence, 
the trial court stated: 
"On April 17, 1968, Mrs. Harpole 
(Miss Hull] testified that before 
March 6. 1968, she had knowledge of 
a threat from a younger brother of a 
friend of defendant that if the defend-
ant was convicted she would be killed. 
She testified also that on or about 
March 6 that she was afraid of her 
safety and the safety of her family. 
It should be noted here that during 
the first trial the victim's mother had 
been assaulted by persons considered 
by the mother to be friends of the 
defendant 
"Again, it. has to be emphasized that 
the victim testified on April 17, 1968, 
that she told the truth at the second 
trial. She has not, therefore, recanted 
her testimony. The threats the vic-
tim describes to her person are real. 
The threats or coercion defendant's 
counsel describes are in his mind as 
indicated in the March 6, 1968, tran-
I
ript and his questions. The affida-
ta of the F.B.I. agents refute any 
aim of threats or coercion. • • • " 
[12,13] The trial court denied the 
motion, pointing out that motions for 
new trial on the grounds of newly die-
EFTA00192266