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not required to request detention in district where defendants were arrested and initially 
appeared, but could do so when defendants first appeared in charging district; "first 
appearance" for p rposes of § 3142(f) is not necessarily the same as "initial appearance"). 
Cf. United States 
Evans, 62 F.3d 1233, 1235-38 (9th Cir. 1995) (while defendant was 
entitled to detention hearing before magistrate in arresting district, only district court in 
charging district had authority to review the order). 
Practice note. At "removal" proceedings, pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. Rule 40, 
or any other similar hearing following an arrest outside the prosecuting district, 
the prosecutor should make clear on the record that detention will be sought and 
take any other necessary steps to ensure that the defense has no colorable basis 
later to claim that there was a failure t 
eet the "
of
first appearance" provision of 
§ 3142(f). See generally United States 
Valenzuela-Verdigo, 815 F.2d 1011, 
1013-16 (5th Cir. 1987) (detention hearing, although not held until 18 days after 
arrest, was not untimely where prosecutor in arresting district had requested 
pretrial detention and hearing date was set but subsequently delayed with 
apparent agreement of parties due to transfer of prisoner to charging district and 
schedule of defendant's counsel). However, failure to comply with the "first 
i
appearance" provision does not necessarily bar the court om detaining the 
defendant after the detention hearing. See United States 
Montalvo-Murillo, 
495 U.S. 711, 716- 17 (1990) ("Neither the timing requirements nor any other 
part of the Act can be read to require, or even suggest, that a timing error must 
result in releai of a person who should otherwise be detained."). See also 
United States 
Moncada-Pelaez, 810 F.2d 1008, 1009-10 (11th Cir. 1987) 
(where defendant was temporarily detained under § 3142(d), hearing could be 
held at any time within the 10-day temporary detention period). 
26.4 Standard of proof 
westlaw query 18 +S 3142(E) /P SAFETY OR APPEARANCE 
The judge deciding a pretrial detention motion must order a defendant held without 
bail if it is shown that no condition or combination of conditions of release will reasonably 
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assure either the defendant's appearance in court or the safety of the community or any 
individual. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e). In other words, the key detention issue is whether a 
defendant's release poses such a danger to the community—or any specific person, such 
as a witness—or such a risk of flight, that he should be held in jail pending trial. 
• Safety. Section 3142(f) provides that the government must prove "by clear and 
convincing evidence" that no conditions of release will assure the safety of the 
community or any individual. 
• Appearance. Circuit Courts of Appeals have held the government must prove by a 
preponderance of the evidence that no conditions of release will assur the 
defendant's appearance in court as required. See, r., United States 
Cisneros, 
328 F.3d 610, 616 (10th 
r.
i 
2003); United States 
Xulam, 84 F.3d 441, 442 (D.C. 
Cir. 1996); Ur(1ed States 
Kirk, 992 F.2d 1218 (6th Cir.1993)(unpublished order); 
United States 
Dillon, 938 F.2d 1412, 1416 (1st Cir. 19911 United States v. 
Araneda, 899 .2d 368, 370 (5th Cir 1990); United States 
King, 849 F.2d 485, 
ii 
489 (11th Cir. 988); United States! Himler, 797 F.2d 156, 161 (3d Cir. 1986); 
United States 
Chimurenga, 760 F. d 400, 405-06 (2d . . 1985); United States I. 
Portes, 786 F. d 758, 765 (7thtir. 1985); United States 
Orta, 760 F.2d 887, 891 
(8th Cir. 1985); United States 
Motamedi, 767 F.2d 140 , 1406 (9th Cir. 1985). 
26.5 Detention hearing 
westlaw query 18 +S 3142(F) /P 26.2 OR JENCKS 
At a detention hearing, "the rules concerning the admissibility of evidence in criminal 
trials do not apply to the presentation and consideration of information at the hearing." 
18 U.S.C. § 3142(f). However, the Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500, does apply at pretrial 
detention hearings. See Fed. R. Crim. P. Rule 46(j) (Rule 26.2 generally applies to a 
detention hearing under § 3142) and Rule 26.2 (production of witnesses' statements). 
Thus, if a defendant is being prosecuted upon a criminal complaint following an arrest on 
probable cause, the court commonly will schedule a consolidated preliminary and detention 
hearing at which the prosecution must make available "Jencks" statements. If a 
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defendant's detention hearing follows an indictment, the government may proceed solely 
by proffer without the need to call a witninause the indictment itself establishes 
probable cause. See, 
g., United States
} 
39 Fed.Appx. 278, 278-79 (6th C 
2002); United States 
Smith, 79 F.3d 1208, 1210 (D.C. Cir.1996); United States
Trosper, 809 F.2d 110 , 111015th Cir. 1987); United States 
Vargas, 804 F.2d 1 , 163 
st Cir. 1986); United States 
Suppa, 799 F.2d 115, 117 (3d Cir. 1116); United States 
Dominguez, 783 F.2d 702, 706 n. 7 (7th Cir 1986); United States 
Contreras, 
76 F.2d 51, i 
(2d Cir. 1985); United States I Hazime, 762 F.2d 34, 37 (6th Cir. 1985); 
United States 
Hurtado, 779 F.2d 1467, 1479 (11th Cir. 1985). 
Practice notes. 
1. In some instances, when proceeding by proffer, it may be tactically adroit to bring to 
the hearing a government witness, such as the supervising case agent, and make 
that witness available to the court or defense counsel if either wishes to obtain 
additional evidence or information. A witness thus being called by the court or 
defense counsel is not subject to the requirements of the Jencks Act. See Fed. R. 
Crim. P. Rule 26.2 (a). 
2. In hearings at which the government will proffer evidence derived from intercepted 
communications, for example, from court-authorized "wiretaps," there is a 
requirement under "Title III,"18 U.S.C. § 2510-2522, more particularly § 2518(9), for 
ten-days' notice to the defendant. This can conflict with the three-day continuance 
limit under § 3142(f), which defense counsel may try to employ to preclude the 
proffer of evidence based upon wiretaps. Section 2518(9) itself provides for a waiver 
by the court of the ten-day period upon finding that it is not possible to furnish the 
information ten days before the hearing and that the delay will not be prejudicial. If 
the defendant insists on ten-days notice, this could constitute "good cause" to extend 
the tim for a detention hearing beyond the statute's three day limit. See United 
States 
Salerno, 794 F.2d 64, 70 (2d Cir. 1986). 
26.6 Rebuttable presumptions 
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westlaw query 18 i-S 3142(E) 
The most important section of the Bail Reform Act in drug prosecutions, after 
18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(1)(C), is 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e). This section provides for a rebuttable 
presumption that no condition or combination of conditions of release will reasonably 
assure the safety of the community where there is a showing of probable cause that: 
(1) the defendant has committed a drug crime for which pretrial detention is 
authorized; that is, a violation of the Controlled Substances Act with a maximum 
term in prison of ten or more years, as well as crimes under the other two 
federal drug laws referred to in § 3142(f)(1)(C); 
(1) the defendant has committed a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c): using or 
carrying a firearm during and in relation to, or possessing a firearm in 
furtherance of, a drug-trafficking crime; and 
(1) the defendant is a "released" or "recidivist" offender subject to a 
presumption applying to defendants who have recently committed detainable 
crimes while on pretrial release. 
As noted above, an indictment itself constitutes a finding of probable cause. 
A second rebuttable presumption attaches to defendants accused of crimes 
identified in (1) and (2) above, that no condition or combination of conditions 
will reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required. § 3142(e). 
Note. Although probable cause to believe that a defendant has 
committed an 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) crime gives rise to the presumptions, 
it is not obvious that a § 924(c) offense alone allows a § 3142(f) 
motion for pretrial detention. Given that committing a § 924(c) 
offense raises presumptions favoring detention, it would be a statutory 
anomaly if the charge did not authorize pre-trial detention under 
§ 3142(f). Since a § 924(c) crime is not itself a violation of the 
Controlled Substances Act, if it is "detainable," it either must be (A) as 
a crime of violence under § 3142(f)(1)(A), or (B) as a crime with a 
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maximum sentence of life imprisonment under § 3142(f)(1)(B). For 
purposes of bail, crimes of violence are defined in § 3156(a)(4), and it 
appears that § 924(c) would only qualify under § 3156(a)(4)(B), as a 
felony that, "by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical 
force against the person or property of another may be used in the 
course of committing the offense." Similarly, § 924(c)'s penalty 
provisions generally speak of mandatory minimum sentences, rather 
than explicitly authorizing a maximum sentence of life imprisonment. 
Nevertheless, § 924(c)(1)(C)(ii) does prescribe life imprisonment for a 
defendant convicted of the offense under certain circumstances. 
Moreover, Amendment 642 to the U.S. Sentencing Commission 
Guidelines Manual, which took effect November 1, 2002, reflects a 
decision to treat a § 924(c) offense as a "life crime" for purposes of the 
career offender sentencing enhancement. See Amendments to the 
Guidelines Manual, Supplement to Appendix C, 277-78 (November 1, 
2002) amendment 642, "Reason for Amendment"). See also United 
States 
Woodruff, 296 F.3d 1041, 1049 (11th Cir. 2002). In the great 
bulk of situations, this is only of academic concern, but the anomaly 
can arise when a defendant is charged with a crime involving less than 
50 kilograms of marijuana and a § 924(c) offense. As the marijuana 
charge is not a detainable offense (because the maximum penalty is 
five years in prison), a pretrial detention motion can only be made if 
the § 924(c) offense is an independent basis for pretrial detention. This 
also arises when thetnderlying drug-trafficking crime involves 
Schedule III, IV, or 
controlled substances (which are not subject to a 
maximum punishment of imprisonment for ten years or more). 
26.7 Temporary detention 
westlaw query 18 +5 3142(D)(1)(A) 
Another key provision of the Bail Reform Act is 18 U.S.C. § 3142(d), which authorizes 
periods of temporary detention of up to ten working days where the defendant commits an 
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offense while op some form of judicial supervision, such as parole, probation, release 
pending sentencing, or pretrial release in a felony case. See § 3142(d)(1)(A)(i)-(iii). Most 
foreign nationals who do not have a "green card," that is, who are not lawfully admitted for 
permanent residence, are also subject to a ten-day hold. See § 3142(d)(B). The purpose 
of the temporary detention is to give supervising authorities—parole board, probation 
officer, trial judge, or the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (formerly 
INS)—a chance to issue a warrant for the defendant. See § 3142(d). A motion for a ten-
day hold imposes a duty on the government to notify the supervising authority of the 
defendant's new charge. See § 3142(d). 
Practice notes. 
• When the government seeks both a detention hearing after a three-day continuance, 
§ 3142(f), and also temporary detention, § 3142(d), the court may effectively 
combine the two matters and set a consolidated hearing within the ten-day period, 
but later than the three days permitted for a strictly pretrial detention hearing. Or the 
court may construe the time limits more narrowly and require a detention hearing in 
three days, even though the defendant will nevertheless remain jailed after the three 
days elapse pursuant to the ten-day hold. Under either view, however, ten-day holds 
do not "tack," and a defendant who satisfies more than one ground for temporary 
detention under § 3142(d) may only be detained for a total of ten days. 
• Section 3142(d) requires two findings for temporary detention: (a) that the defendant 
is on some form of release or not a lawful U.S. resident, and (b) that the defendant 
may be a danger to the community or a risk of flight. As a result, some judges may 
conclude that they have discretion to deny a motion for temporary detention, even 
when it is clearly established that a defendant is on parole, probation, or pretrial 
release for a felony. Although this question may arise in non-drug cases, it should not 
be an issue in narcotics prosecutions because of the rebuttable presumptions that the 
defendant is a danger and risk of flight. 
• Section 3142(d)(1)(A)(i) authorizes temporary detention only for defendants released 
before trial in felony cases, not misdemeanors, but under § 3142(d)(1)(A)(ii), any 
defendant facing sentence or released pending appeal may be held for up to ten days. 
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26.8 Other bases for denying bail 
Even though a serious narcotics charge itself is sufficient for pretrial detention, 
employing one or more of the other five bases for denying bail can bolster the 
government's case for detention. Consequently, sound litigating tactics suggest moving for 
pretrial detention on every applicable ground available under § 3142(f): 
1. Where there is a serious risk that a defendant might try to obstruct justice, § 3142(f) 
(2)(B), for example, by attempting to influence, intimidate, or harm a witness or 
juror. This is a valuable additional ground upon which to seek pretrial detention, and 
is often available in drug cases—it focuses the Court's attention on a threat to a 
specific, live person, rather than on the more generalized notion of community safety; 
2. Where a defendant is also charged with a crime of violence, § 3142(f)(1)(A)), as 
often is the case in RICO and CCE prosecutions based upon narcotics conspiracies; 
3. Where a defendant is a serious risk of flight, § 3142(f)(2)(A), there is no drawback to 
specifically seeking detention on this ground, in addition to relying on the 
presumption that drug defendants are a risk of flight; 
4. Where a defendant is also charged with an offense for which the maximum sentence 
is life imprisonment or death, § 3142(f)(1)(B); and 
5. Where the "recidivist" provision of § 3142(f)(1)(D) authorizes pretrial detention if a 
defendant has previously committed two or more "detainable offenses"; that is, 
crimes which themselves would have permitted a pretrial detention motion under 
§ 3142(f)(1). As fairly few defendants have extensive federal criminal records, this 
provision also incorporates state and local convictions that would have been 
detainable had they been subject to federal jurisdiction. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(1)(D). 
As a result, a defendant with two or more serious state drug felonies or crimes of 
violence (or one of each) is subject to pretrial detention independent of the maximum 
sentence of the current federal felony narcotics charge. 
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rage i i kit IL 
Practice note. When litigating a pretrial detention motion, the legislative history of 
the 1984 Bail Reform Act is a fertile source of authority. For example, it confirms the 
argument that the law reflects a congressional intent to detain defendants who 
commit crimes while on pretrial release or who are recidivist offenders. See S.Rep. 
No. 98-225, at 307 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182. Among its useful 
language is: 
The Committee also notes, with respect to the factor of community ties, 
that it is aware of the growing evidence that the presence of this factor 
does not necessarily reflect a likelihood of appearance, and has no 
correlation with the question of the safety of the community. . . . [T]he 
Committee wishes to make it clear that it does not intend that a court 
conclude that there is no risk of flight on the basis of community ties 
alone. . . .
Id., 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3207. 
Under current law, consideration of a defendant's criminal history is 
confined to his record of convictions. While a prior arrest should not be 
accorded the weight of a prior conviction, the Committee believes that it 
would be inappropriate to require the judge in the context of this kind of 
hearing to ignore a lengthy record of prior arrests, particularly if there were 
convictions for similar crimes. . . . In any event, independent information 
concerning past criminal activities certainly can, and should, be considered 
by a court. 
Id. at 3206 n.76 (citations omitted). 
26.9 Nebbia hearings 
If a monetary or property bond is set, the prosecution may request the court to order 
that—before the release of the defendant—a Nebbia hearing be held to determine whether 
the collateral for the court (or the collateral provided the bail bondsman) is tainted. See 
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rage IL 01 IL 
1
18 U.S.C. § 3 
2(g)(4); United States, Nebbia, 357 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1966). See also 
United States 
Patel, 1995 WL 55737 (N.D. III. 1995) (unpublished memorandum 
opinion and or er) (notwithstanding the tax returns and testimony tendered by the 
defense, the defense failed to convincingly establish that the properties offered as security 
for the bond "were purchased solely with legitimate funds"). Nebbia-type hearings are 
particularly important when someone other than the defendant is posting the collateral, as 
they present an opportunity for the judge to establish on the record that the sureties are 
bona fide and understand the risks th
 are undertaking, such as potential loss of their 
c
property. See generally United tates I Noriega-Sarabia, 116 F.3d 417, 420-21 (9th Cir. 
1997). See also United States 
Hammond, 204 F.Supp.2d 1157, 1166-67 (E.D.Wis. 
2002) (sufficiency of the secure y offered). 
26.10 Resources 
The main treatise on federal detention and bail law is: Hon. John L. Weinberg, Federal 
Bail and Detention Handbook (2003), which is updated regularly. Another source collecting 
decisions on detention cases is: Propriety of denial of pretrial bail under Bail Reform Act, 
75 A.L.R. Fed. 806. Links to relevant internal DO) monographs and memoranda appear on 
the USABook Bail and Release topic page at 
http://10.173.2.12/usao/eousa/ole/tables/subject/bai I. htm. 
26.11 Acknowledgments 
This Chapter was adapted and updated from material originally written by then Senior 
Trial Attorney Robert Lipman, NDDS, for the 1999 edition of Federal Narcotics 
Prosecutions. 
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA 
Case No. 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
vs. 
JEFFREY EPSTEIN, 
Defendant. 
Notice of Appeal From Magistrate's 
Order Denying Pre-Trial Detention 
Comes now the United States of America, by and through its undersigned Assistant United 
States Attorney, and files this Notice of Appeal from the Order of United States Magistrate Judge 
, U.S. District Court for the 
District of 
, entered 
on April 
, 2008, which denied the United States' request for pre-trial detention as to defendant 
Jeffrey Epstein. 
United States Magistrate Judge  
 set a $ 
 cash bond, with the 
following conditions: 
. The United States gave notice 
of its intent to appeal the bond order and asked the Magistrate Judge to stay execution of the bond 
pending the Court's determination of this appeal. The Magistrate Judge granted the motion and the 
defendant remains in custody. 
Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3145(a), if "a person is ordered released by a magistrate judge, or 
by a person other than a judge of a court having original jurisdiction over the offense . . . the attorney 
for the Government may file, with the court having original jurisdiction over the offense, a motion 
EFTA00191636

for revocation of the order or amendment of the conditions of release." Accordingly, the United 
States hereby files this emergency motion with the District Judge assigned to the case for immediate 
revocation of the Magistrate Judge's Order. 
THE CHARGES IN THE INDICTMENT 
On April 
, 2008, a Grand Jury sitting in the Southern District of Florida returned a 
twenty-nine-count indictment charging defendant Jeffrey Epstein' with one count of conspiracy to 
use a means of interstate commerce to persuade, induce, or entice nineteen minors to engage in 
prostitution, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371; eight counts of knowingly, in and affecting commerce, 
recruiting, enticing, and obtaining eight minors to engage in commercial sex acts, in violation of 18 
U.S.C. § 1591(a)(1); twelve substantive counts of using a means of interstate commerce to persuade, 
induce, or entice twelve minors to engage in prostitution or other criminal sexual activity, in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b); one count of conspiracy to travel in interstate commerce for the 
purpose of engaging in illicit sexual conduct, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2423(e); and four counts 
of traveling in interstate commerce for the purpose of engaging in illicit sexual conduct with a person 
under 18 years of age, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b). Jane Does #1 through #19 were all 
minors at the time of their involvement with defendant Epstein. Jane Doe #11 was a resident of New 
York; the remaining Jane Does were all residents of Palm Beach County, Florida, at the time of their 
involvement with defendant Epstein. 
Count 1 carries a statutory maximum sentence of five years' imprisonment. Counts 2 
through 10 each carry a statutory maximum sentence of forty years' imprisonment. Counts 11 
through 23 each carry a statutory mandatory minimum sentence of five years' imprisonment up to 
'Epstein is named as a defendant in twenty-seven counts. 
2 
EFTA00191637

a maximum of thirty years' imprisonment. Counts 24 and 26 through 29 each carry a maximum of 
thirty years' imprisonment. 
THE FACTS OF THE OFFENSE 
The investigation of Jeffrey Epstein initially was undertaken by the City of Palm Beach 
Police Department in response to a complaint received from the parents of a 14-year-old girl, S. G.,2
from Royal Palm Beach. When S. G. and another girl began arguing at school because the other girl 
accused S. G. of being a prostitute, one of the school principals intervened. The principal searched 
S. G.'s purse and found $300 cash. The principal asked S. G. where the money came from. 
initially claimed that she earned the money working at "Chik-Fil-A," which no one believed. 
then claimed that she made the money selling drugs; no one believed that either. 
finally 
admitted that she had been paid $300 to give a massage to a man on Palm Beach Island. 
parents approached the Palm Beach Police Department ("PBPD") about pressing charges. 
PBPD began investigating the recipient of the massage, Jeffrey Epstein, and two of his 
assistants, Sarah Kellen and Nadia Marcinkova. PBPD identified approximately 27 girls who went 
to Epstein's house to perform "sexual massages" (not including one licensed massage therapist) or 
who recruited girls to do the same. The girls' ages ranged from 14 years' old to 23 years' old. Some 
girls saw Epstein only once and some saw him dozens of times. The "sexual massages" performed 
also varied. Some girls were fully clothed while they massaged Epstein; some wore only their 
underwear; and some were fully nude. During all of these massages, Epstein masturbated himself 
and he would touch the girl performing the massage, usually fondling their breasts and touching their 
2S.G. currently is not one of the Jane Does referenced in the indictment. 
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EFTA00191638

vaginas - either over their clothing or on their bare skin. Epstein often used a vibrator to masturbate 
the girls and digitally penetrated a number of them. For the girls who saw him more often, Epstein 
graduated to oral sex and vaginal sex. Epstein sometimes brought his assistant/girlfriend, Nadia 
Marcinkova, into the sexual activity. 
On October 18, 2005, PBPD obtained a search warrant with the assistance of the Palm Beach 
County State Attorney's Office ("PBSAO"). By this time, PBSAO had already been contacted by 
Epstein's cadre of lawyers. When PBPD arrived at Epstein's home two days later (10/20/05) to 
execute the search warrant, they found several items conspicuously missing. For example, computer 
monitors and keyboards were found, but the CPUs were gone. Similarly, surveillance cameras were 
found, but they were disconnected and the videotapes were gone. Nonetheless, the search did 
recover some evidence of value, including message pads showing messages from many girls over 
a two-year span. The messages show girls returning phone calls to confirm appointments to "work." 
Messages were taken by Sarah Kellen, Nadia Marcinkova, and Adriana Ross. The search also 
recovered numerous photos of Epstein sitting with naked girls whose ages are undetermined. 
Photographs taken inside the home show that the girls' descriptions of the layout of the home 
and master bedroom/bathroom area are accurate. PBPD also found massage tables and oils, the high 
school transcript of one of the girls, and sex toys. 
In sum, the PBPD investigation showed that girls from a local high school would be 
contacted by one of Epstein's assistants to make an appointment to "work." 
Up to three 
4 
EFTA00191639

appointments each day would be made. The girls would travel to Epstein's home in Palm Beach 
where they would meet Epstein's chef and Epstein's assistant—usually Kellen—in the kitchen. The 
assistant normally would escort the girls upstairs to the master bedroom/bathroom area and set up 
the massage table and massage oils. The assistant would leave and Epstein would enter the room 
wearing a robe or a towel. He would remove the clothing and lie face down and nude on the 
massage table. Epstein would then instruct the girl on what to do and would ask her to remove her 
clothing. After some time, Epstein would turn over, so that he was lying face up. Epstein would 
masturbate himself and fondle the girl performing the massage. When Epstein climaxed, the 
massage was over. The girl was instructed to get dressed and to go downstairs to the kitchen while 
Epstein showered. Epstein would pay the girl—usually $200—and if it was a "new" girl, would ask 
for the girl's phone number to contact her in the future. Girls were encouraged to find other girls to 
bring with them. If a girl brought another girl to perform a "massage," each girl would receive $200. 
The PBPD investigation consists primarily of swom taped statements from the girls. When 
PBPD began having problems with PBSAO, they approached the FBI. The investigation was 
formally presented to FBI and to me after PBSAO "presented" the case to a state grand jury and that 
grand jury returned an indictment charging Epstein with three counts of solicitation of prostitution. 
The State of Florida has since dismissed its charges after the United States initiated 
prosecution. 
ARGUMENT 
The defendant was arrested in the Northern District of Texas and, today, had a bond hearing. 
The United States sought to have the defendant detained pending trial based upon the presumption 
5 
EFTA00191640

of detention as well as the defendant's risk of flight and danger to the community. 
This is a case where detention is presumed, both as to risk of flight and as a danger to the 
community. The law regarding this presumption is as follows: 
Where the Court finds probable cause to believe that the defendant committed one 
of the offenses listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e), [which includes the violations of 18 
USC 2242 and 2243 as charged by the grand jury]' 
a statutory rebuttable presumption arises that no condition or combination of 
conditions will reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required and the 
safety of the community. Assuring a criminal defendant's appearance at trial is a 
legitimate government objective. Detaining adults who prey on children for the 
adult's sexual gratification or for the production of child pornography is also a 
legitimate government objective. One of the fundamental duties of government is 
public safety, including protecting children from sexual predators. . . . Once it is 
determined that the presumption applies, the defendant bears a limited burden of 
production to rebut that presumption by coming forward with evidence he does not 
pose a danger to the community or a risk of flight. Once a defendant has met his 
burden of production relating to these two factors, the presumption favoring detention 
does not disappear entirely, but remains a factor to be considered among those 
weighed by the district court. 
United States,. Abaci, 350 F.3d 793, 797 (8th Cir. 2003) (internal citations omitted). 
ht determining how much weight to accord the presumption after the defendant has come 
forward to meet his burden of production, the Second Circuit explains: 
A judicial officer conducting a detention hearing should, even after a defendant has 
come forward with rebuttal evidence, continue to give the presumption of flight some 
weight by keeping in mind that Congress has found that these offenders [who fall 
within the presumption] pose special risks of flight, and that "a strong probability 
arises" that no form of conditional release will be adequate to secure their appearance. 
The judge of magistrate thus should consider those legislative findings among the 
other factors to be weighed in deciding whether a defendant should be detained. 
United States'. Martir, 782 F.2d 1141, 1144 (2d Cir. 1986) (internal citations omitted) (discussing 
'A grand jury indic 
nt provides the probable cause required by the statute to *gger the 
presumption. United States . Hurtado 779 F.2d 1467 (11th Cir. 1985); 
Ouartermaine, 913 F.2d 910 (11th Cir. 1990). 
6 
EFTA00191641

narcotics defendants). 
In United States'. Sciacca one of the district judges in the Southern District of Florida 
summarized the Eleventh Circuit's approach to the analysis of the presumption as follows. Once it 
is determined that the statutory presumption applies based upon the crime charged, then 
"the defendant carries the burden of production to come forward with evidence to 
rebut the presumption." United State v. Ouartermaine, 913 F.2d 910, 916 (11th Cir. 
1990). Although the statutory presumption places a burden of production on a 
defendant, the burden of persuasion concerniig the dangerousness [or risk of flight) 
remains on the government. United States King, 849 F.2d 485, 488 (11th Cir. 
1988). .. . The kind of evidence which a defendant must produce to satisfy his burden 
1
of production must "suggest that he . . . is] either not dangerous or not likely to flee 
if turned loose on bail." United States . Hurtado, 779 F.2d 1467, 1479 (11th Cir. 
1985). If the defendant produces such evidence, the presumption does not disappear 
but "remains in the case as an evidentiary finding militating against release, to be 
weigh[ed] alor with other evidence relative to factors listed in section 3142 (g). 
United States . King, 849 F.2d 485, 488 (11th Cir. 1988). 
Sciacca (unpublished opinion), Court File No. 03-80164-Cr-Hurley, at pp. 4-5 (S.D. Fl. Feb. 25, 
2004). 
Here, the defendant's blatant disregard of the order of the Florida court regarding his contact 
with the victim shows his continued dangerousness. In addition, there is evidence that he is having 
"romantic" chats with other minors, including one located in Texas. 
Furthermore, in considering a defendant's risk of flight, the Court must consider the 
defendant's ties to the community where the prosecution occurs, not merely his ties to the United 
States at large or the district in which he is arrested. See, e.g., United States'. Adipietro, 773 F. 
Supp. 1270 (W.D. Mo. 1991). The only tie that the defendant has to the Southern District of Florida 
is the victim in this case. He is not employed here, does not live here, and does not attend school 
here. The defendant's lack of ties to the Southern District of Florida and the amount of time that he 
7 
EFTA00191642

will be facing on federal charges also are evidence of an incentive to flee. Count 1 of the indictment 
carries a five year mandatory minimum sentence, up to a maximum of 30 years, and Count 2 carries 
a maximum of 30 years. Both also carry a recommended supervised release term of life. 
The United States Magistrate Judge in the Northern District of Texas considered these factors 
and determined that a 512,000 cash bond was sufficient to secure the safety of the community in the 
Southern District of Florida and to secure the defendant's appearance at trial. 
For the foregoing reasons, the United States respectfully requests that the Court revoke the 
order of the Magistrate Judge and order the defendant detained pending his intial appearance in the 
Southern District of Florida. 
Respectfully submitted, 
R. ALEXANDER ACOSTA 
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY 
By: A. MARIE VILLAFARA 
ASSISTANT U.S. ATTORNEY 
Florida Bar # 0018255 
500 Australian Avenue, Suite 400 
West Palm Beach, FL 33401 
(561) 820-8711/561 820-8777 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was served by facsimile this 21st 
day of April, 2006, to Heidi Perlett, Esq. Counsel for Defendant. 
A. MARIE VILLAFARA 
8 
EFTA00191643

ASSISTANT UNITED STATES ATTORNEY 
9 
EFTA00191644

Memorandum 
Subjai 
Third Supplement to Prosecution Memorandum: 
Operation Leap Year: United States'. Jeffrey Epstein. et al. 
Dale 
2/19/08 
To: 
Robert Senior, Chief, Criminal Division 
Rolando Garcia, Deputy Chief, Criminal Division 
Karen Atkinson, Chief, Northern Region 
From: 
cc: 
A. Marie Villafafia 
Drew Oosterbaan 
Myesha Braden 
INTRODUCTION 
This third supplement summarizes the changes to the indictment and prosecution 
memo since the first presentation in May 2007. The most significant changes are the 
exclusion of some victims and the inclusion of newly discovered victims. The order of the 
indictment also has been changed. 
For the reasons set forth below, a number of girls who were originally considered for 
the indictment are being excluded at this time. Some may be re-added, but, for strategic 
reasons, I believe that this indictment should focus on victims who are unknown to Epstein's 
counsel. Of the nineteen victims listed in this indictment, eleven were not part of the State 
investigation. Only one of the girls who testified in the state grand jury is included in our list. 
We believe that approximately eight of these girls are unknown to the defense. 
I. VICTIMS DELETED FROM THIS INDICTMENT 
A. 
Persons Recruited b 
R. — 
G. 
P. 
L. 
Myesha Braden and I have discussed the possibility of removing 
R. and her 
recruits entirely from the indictment because of the amount of press coy 
that 
has 
received over her statement to police that she was "like Heidi Fleiss." 
has been very 
i
unwilling to speak to us and, even after assurances that she wo 
treated as a victim, she 
insisted on full immunity before she would meet. Excluding also removes 
the ammunition about Detective Recarey and alleged misrepresentations of 
EFTA00191645

statements to Recarey. 
also was the person who instructed the girls to say they were 
18. The evidence related to girls outside her group about knowledge of age is stronger and 
will weaken their defense that Epstein had a rule that all of the girls had to be over 18. 
By removing 
and treating her 
nindicted co-conspirator, we also make it 
easier to introduce discussions between 
and the other defendants and 
statements to others under the co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule. 
Applying this approach would result in the potential removal of seven victims ( 
plus six others). I have removed six for the following reasons: 
First, I have L-111 • ved 
G. 
was 14 years' old when she was brought to 
M
in's home by
R., one of the Epstein's main recruiters. At 
instruction, 
lied to Epstein about her age—telling him that she was an eighteen-year-old senior at 
Wellington High 
I. In her statements to the Palm Beach Police Department and the 
state grand jury, 
admitted that
pain masturbated in her presence and placed a 
massager/vibrator on her vagina. In M 
statement to
hurtled& after leaving 
Epstein's home, and in her statement to the FBI and AUSA Villafafta, 
admitted that 
Epstein digitally penetrated her. Epstein's criminal activity came to light when 
stepmother learned of a fight between 
and a friend at school over $300 cash found in 
purse. 
cooperated with the Palm Beach Police and made recorded telephone 
calls with 
to set up a second "massage" with Epstein. Handwritten notes were found 
in Epstein's trash confirming this second meeting. 
Despite all of this corroborating evidence, 
is not being included (for now, at 
least) because her father, and ste mother have filed a civil suit against Epstein seeking "in 
excess of 50 million dollars." 
father is represented by Jeff Herman. 
father 
also has been in frequent contact with the journalist at "Vanity Fair" magazine, and, as 
mentioned in the original pros memo, he has a prior federal fraud conviction. After the suit 
was filed, 
mother filed a motion to intervene and to stay the proceedings until 
turns 18. In her affidavit, 
other avers that 
and her father have been estranged 
for several months, and that 
neither knew nor a proved of the filing of the lawsuit. If 
mother is correct, we may decide to add 
into a superseding indictment, but for 
now the safer course is to exclude allegations related to her.' 
' We are monitoring the status of the litigation and intend to subpoena transcripts of relevant 
depositions. There also is a possibility that Epstein's attorneys have violated federal law by 
distributing to the press identifying information about a child sex abuse victim and by harassing that 
2 
EFTA00191646