This is an FBI investigation document from the Epstein Files collection (FBI VOL00009). Text has been machine-extracted from the original PDF file. Search more documents →
FBI VOL00009
EFTA00182748
256 pages
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Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM Document 152 Entered on FLSD Docket 06/10/2009 Page 1 of 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA JANE DOE NO. 2, Plaintiff, vs. JEFFREY EPSTEIN Defendant. JANE DOE NO. 3, Plaintiff, vs. JEFFREY EPSTEIN Defendant. JANE DOE NO. 4, Plaintiff, vs. JEFFREY EPSTEIN Defendant. JANE DOE NO. 5, Plaintiff, JEFFREY EPSTEIN, Defendant. CASE NO.: 08-CV-80119-MARRA/JOHNSON CASE NO.: 08-CV-80232-MARRA/JOHNSON CASE NO.: 08-CV-80380-MARRALJOHNSON CASE NO.: 08-CV-8038I-MARRA/JOHNSON EFTA00182748
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Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM Document 152 Entered on FLSD Docket 06/10/2009 Page 2 of 8 Doe 101 v. Epstein Page 2 JANE DOE NO. 6, Plaintiff, JEFFREY EPSTEIN, Defendant. CASE NO.: 08-80994-CIV-MARRA/JOHNSON CASE NO.: 08-80993-CIV-MARRA/JOHNSON JANE DOE NO. 7, Plaintiff, JEFFREY EPSTEIN Defendant. CASE NO.: 08-80811-CIV-MARRAJJOHNSON Plaintiff, JEFFREY EPSTEIN Defendant. JANE DOE, CASE NO.: 08-80893-CIV-MARRA/JOHNSON Plaintiff, JEFFREY EPSTEIN et al, Defendants. DOE II, CASE NO.: 09-80469-CIV-MARRA-JOHNSON Plaintiff, JEFFREY EPSTEIN et al, Defendants. EFTA00182749
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Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM
Document 152
Entered on FLSD Docket 06/10/2009
Page 3 of 8
Doe 101 v. Epstein
Page 3
JANE DOE NO. 101,
Plaintiff,
JEFFREY EPSTEIN
Defendant.
CASE NO.: 09-80591-CIV-MARRA-JOHNSON
JANE DOE NO. 102,
CASE NO.: 09-80656-CIV-MARRAMOHNSON
Plaintiff,
JEFFREY EPSTEIN,
Defendant.
DEFENDANT EPSTEIN'S RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS JANE DOE NOS. 101 AND 102'S
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE UNDER SEAL RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO STAY OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, TO UNSEAL THE
NONPROSECUTION AGREEMENT (dated 5/29/09, IDE 1281
Defendant, JEFFREY EPSTEIN,
("EPSTEIN"), by and through his undersigned
attorneys responds to the Plaintiffs' Jane Doe No. 101 and Jane Doe No. 102 ("Plaintiffs")
Motion For Leave To File Under Seal Response In Opposition To Defendant's Motion To Stay
Or, In The Alternative, To Unseal The Nonprosecution Agreement, and states:
1.
This Court has already entered orders preserving the confidentiality of the Non-
Prosecution Agreement ("NM") and denying prior attempts to have the document unsealed. See
Court's Orders, attached hereto as Exhibit A and Exhibit B, respectively, entered in In Re: Jane
Does 1 and 2. Petitioners Case No. 08-80736-CIV-MARRA/JOHNSON, A. Order To Compel
Production And Protective Order, [DE 26], dated August 21, 2008, and B. Order [DE 36], dated
February 12, 2009, on Petitioners' Motion To Unseal Non-Prosecution Agreement [DE 28].
Both of these Orders are clear that the terms of the NPA are to remain confidential and remain
EFTA00182750
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Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM Document 152 Entered on FLSD Docket 06/10/2009 Page 4 of 8 Doe 101 v. Epstein Page 4 protected from being disclosed to third parties. The NPA is an agreement between the United States Attorney's Office and EPSTEIN. Plaintiffs' motion presents nothing in support of this Court modifying its prior orders. 2. Significantly, even the United States Attorney's Office (USAO), along with Defendant, has strongly opposed making the NPA public. Attached as Exhibit C hereto is Respondent United States of America's Opposition To Victims' Motion To Unseal Non- Prosecution Agreement, dated October 8, 2008, [DE 29], also filed in In Re: Jane Does 1 and 2, Petitioners, Case No. 08-80736-CIV-MARRA/JOHNSON. In opposing the petitioners' attempts to make public the terms of the NPA, the United States in the Response, Exhibit C, stated: Since the Agreement (NPA) has not been filed under seal with this Court, the legal authority cited by petitoners regarding sealing of documents, United States v. Ochoa-Vasque, 428 F.3d 1015 (11th Cir. 2005), is inapposite. The parties who negotiated the Agreement, the United States Attorney's Office and Jeffrey Epstein, determined the Agreement should remain confidential. They were free to do so, and violated no law in making such an agreement. Since the Agreement has become relevant to the instant lawsuit, petitioners have been given access to it, upon the condition that it not be disclosed further. Petitioners have no legal right to disclose the Agreement to third parties, or standing to challenge the confidentiality provision. After the United States' response, Exhibit C, this Court entered its Order, Exhibit B, agreeing with the United States' position and maintaining the confidentiality of the NPA in accordance with its prior Order, Exhibit A. The "victims" who were provided a copy of the NPA were and are required to maintain the NPA's confidentiality and not disclose the terms to third parties. 3. Other parties in the consolidated cases have been able to file their responses without a similar request being made. Defendant believes that these Plaintiffs can fully respond without the need to file under seal; and reference provisions generally. However if the Court is EFTA00182751
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Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM Document 152 Entered on FLSD Docket 06/10/2009 Page 5 of 8 Doe 101 v. Epstein Page 5 inclined to grant this Order, then in order to continue to protect the confidentiality of the NPA and to comply with the Court's prior Orders, Exhibit A and Exhibit B, Defendant would agree to allow Plaintiff to file under seal ligl• response and reference only those portions (identified herein) of the NPA which are potentially relevant to the issues arising under claims brought pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §2255 and thus, that may have impact on Defendant's motion for stay and Plaintiff's response thereto. Specifically, the only portions relevant for this Court to make a decision on Defendant's motion and Plaintiffs' response are paragraphs 7, 8, 9, and10 of the NPA, and paragraphs 7A, 7B, and 7C of the Addendum To The NPA. WHEREFORE, Defendant requests that this Court enter an Order denying any attempts by Plaintiffs to unseal or make public or to disclose to third parties the terms of the NPA, and to deny Plaintiffs move to file their response under seal; or if the Court is inclined to grant the motion, to allow Plaintiff to file her response to the motion to stay and only the specified portions of the NPA and Addendum thereto under seal. Certificate of Service I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true copy of the foregoing was electronically filed with the Clerk of the Court using CM/ECF. I also certify that the foregoing document is being served this day on all counsel of record identified on the following Service List in the manner specified by CM/ECF on this 10th day of June , 2009 Respectfully sub tted, By: ROBERT D. R1TTON, JR., ESQ. Florida Bar MICHAEL J. PIKE, ESQ. BURMAN, CROTON, LUTTIER & COLEMAN 515 N. Flagler Drive, Suite 400 West Palm Beach, FL 33401 EFTA00182752
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Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM Document 152 Entered on FLSD Docket 06/10/2009 Page 6 of 8 Doe 101 v. Epstein Page 6 Phone Fax (Counsel for Defendant Jeffrey Epstein) EFTA00182753
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Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM Document 152 Entered on FLSD Docket 06/10/2009 Page 7 of 8 Doe 101 v. Epstein Page 7 Certificate of Service Jane Doe No. 2 v. Jeffrey Epstein Case No. 08-CV-80119-MARRA/JOHNSON Stuart S. Mermelstein, Esq. Adam D. Horowitz, Esq. Mermelstein & Horowitz, P.A. 18205 Biscayne Boulevard Suite 2218 Miami FL 3 160 Fax: ssmasexabuseattomev.com Counsel for Plaintiffs in Related Cases Nos. 08-80069, 08-80119, 08-80232, 08-80380, 08- 80381, 08-80993, 08-80994 Richard Horace Willits, Esq. Richard H. Willits, P.A. 2290 10ib Avenue North Suite 404 Lake Worth. FL 33461 Fax: Counsel for Plaintiff in Related Case No. 80811 Brad Edwards, Esq. Rothstein Rosenfeldt Adler 401 East Las Olas Boulevard Suite 1650 Fort Laud rdal F1.33301 Phon • Counsel for Plaintiff in Related Case No. 08- 80893 Paul G. Cassell, Esq. Pro Hac Vice 332 South 1400 E, Room 101 Salt T. aka City, UT 84112 Co-counsel for Plaintiff Jane Doe 08- Isidro M. Garcia, Esq. Garcia Law Firm, P.A. 224 Datura Street, Suite 900 ch, FL 33401 Jack Scarola, Esq. Jack P. Hill, Esq. Scatty Denney Scarola Barnhart & Shipley, P.A. 2139 Palm Beach Lakes Boulevard West Palm Beach, FL 33409 Counsel for Plaintiff, Counsel for Plaintiff in Related Case No. 08- 80469 Robert C. Josefsberg, Esq. Katherine W. Ezell, Esq. Podhurst Orseck, P.A. 25 West Hagler Street, Suite 800 130 EFTA00182754
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Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM Document 152 Entered on FLSD Docket 06/10/2009 Page 8 of 8 Doe 101 v. Epstein Page 8 Bruce Reinhart, Esq. Bruce E. Reinhart, P.A. 250 S. Australian Avenue Suite 1400 West Palm Beach, FL 33401 Counsel for Defendan Theodore J. Leopold, Esq. Spencer T. Kuvin, Esq. Ricci-Leopold, P.A. 2925 PGA Blvd., Suite 200 Palm Beach Gardens, FL 33410 Fax: Counsel for Plaintiff in Related Case No. 08- 08804 Counsel for Plaintiffs in Related Cases Nos. 09-80591 and 09-80656 Jack Alan Goldberger, Esq. Atterbury Goldberger & Weiss, P.A. 250 Australian Avenue South Suite 1400 Beach, FL 33401-5012 Counsel for Defendant Jeffrey Epstein EFTA00182755
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Case 9:08-cv-80993-KAM
Document 86
Entered on FLSD Docket 06/10/2009
Page 1 of 10
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
CASE NO.: 08-CV-80993-MARRA-JOHNSON
JANE DOE NO. 7
Plaintiff,
v.
JEFFREY EPSTEIN,
Defendant.
DEFENDANT EPSTEIN'S FIRST AMENDED ANSWER & AFFIRMATIVE
DEFENSES TO PLAINTIFF'S (FIRST) AMENDED COMPLAINT
Defendant, JEFFREY EPSTEIN, (hereinafter "EPSTEIN"), by and through his
undersigned attorneys, files his Answer to Plaintiff's Amended Complaint [DE 19] and
states:
1. Without knowledge and deny.
2. As to the allegations in paragraphs 2, Defendant asserts his Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination. See DeLisi v. Bankers Ins. Company, 436 So.2d
1099 (Fla. 41" DCA 1983); Malloy v. Hogan, 84 S.Ct. 1489, 1495 (1964)(the Fifth
Amendment's Self-Incrimination Clause applies to the states through the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment - lilt would be incongruous to have different
standards determine the validity of a claim of privilege based on the same feared
prosecution, depending on whether the claim was asserted in state or federal court."); 5
Fed.Prac. & Proc. Civ. 3d §1280 Effect of Failure to Deny — Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination ("...court must treat the defendant's claim of privilege as equivalent to a
specific denial."). See also 24 Fla.Jur.2d Evidence §592. Defendants in civil actions. -
EFTA00182756
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Case 9:08-cv-80993-KAM
Document 86
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Jane Doe No. 7 v: Epstein
Page 2
"... a civil defendant who raises an affirmative defense is not precluded from asserting
the privilege [against self-incrimination], because affirmative defenses do not constitute
the kind of voluntary application for affirmative relief" which would prevent a plaintiff
bringing a claim seeking affirmative relief from asserting the privilege.
3. As to the allegations in paragraph 3, deny.
4. As to the allegations in paragraph 4, deny.
5. As to the allegations in paragraph 5, without knowledge and deny.
6. As to the allegations in paragraphs 6, Defendant asserts his Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination. See DeLisi v. Bankers Ins. Company, 436 So.2d
1099 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983) Malloy v. Hogan, 84 S.Ct. 1489, 1495 (1964)(the Fifth
Amendment's Self-Incrimination Clause applies to the states through the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment - "pit would be incongruous to have different
standards determine the validity of a claim of privilege based on the same feared
prosecution, depending on whether the claim was asserted in state or federal court."); 5
Fed.Prac. & Proc. Civ. 3d §1280 Effect of Failure to Deny — Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination ("...court must treat the defendant's claim of privilege as equivalent to a
specific denial."). See also 24 Fla.Jur.2d Evidence §592. Defendants in civil actions. —
.. a civil defendant who raises an affirmative defense is not precluded from asserting
the privilege [against self-incrimination], because affirmative defenses do not constitute
the kind of voluntary application for affirmative relief" which would prevent a plaintiff
bringing a claim seeking affirmative relief from asserting the privilege.
EFTA00182757
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Case 9:08-cv-80993-KAM
Document 86
Entered on FLSD Docket 06/10/2009
Page 3 of 10
Jane Doe No. 7 v. Epstein
Page 3
7. As to the allegations in paragraphs 7 through 15 of Plaintiff's Second Amended
Complaint, Defendant exercises his Fifth Amendment Privilege against self-
incrimination. See DeLisi v. Bankers Ins. Company, 436 So.2d 1099 (Fla. 4th DCA
1983); Malloy v. Hogan, 84 S.Ct. 1489, 1495 (1964)(the Fifth Amendment's Self-
Incrimination Clause applies to the states through the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment - "[lit would be incongruous to have different standards
determine the validity of a claim of privilege based on the same feared prosecution,
depending on whether the claim was asserted in state or federal court."); 5 Fed.Prac. &
Proc. Civ. 3d §1280 Effect of Failure to Deny — Privilege Against Self-Incrimination
("...court must treat the defendant's claim of privilege as equivalent to a specific
denial."). See also 24 Fla.Jur.2d Evidence §592. Defendants in civil actions.
a civil
defendant who raises an affirmative defense is not precluded from asserting the
privilege [against self-incrimination), because affirmative defenses do not constitute the
kind of voluntary application for affirmative relief' which would prevent a plaintiff bringing
a claim seeking affirmative relief from asserting the privilege.
8.
In response to the allegations of paragraph 16, Defendant realleges and adopts
his responses to paragraphs 1 through 15 of the Second Amended Complaint set forth
in paragraphs 1 through 7 above herein.
9. Defendant asserts the Fifth Amendment Privilege against self-incrimination to
the allegations set forth in paragraphs 17 through 22 of the Second Amended
Complaint. See DeLisi v. Bankers Ins. Company, 436 So.2d 1099 (Fla. 41" DCA 1983);
Malloy v. Hogan 84 S.Ct. 1489, 1495 (1964)(the Fifth Amendment's Self-Incrimination
EFTA00182758
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Case 9:08-cv-80993-KAM
Document 86
Entered on FLSD Docket 06/10/2009
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Jane Doe No. 7 v. Epstein
Page 4
Clause applies to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment - `lilt would be incongruous to have different standards determine the
validity of a claim of privilege based on the same feared prosecution, depending on
whether the claim was asserted in state or federal court."); 5 Fed.Prac. & Proc. Civ. 3d
§1280 Effect of Failure to Deny — Privilege Against Self-Incrimination ("...court must
treat the defendant's claim of privilege as equivalent to a specific denial."). See also 24
Fla.Jur.2d Evidence §592. Defendants in civil actions. —"... a civil defendant who raises
an affirmative defense is not precluded from asserting the privilege [against self-
incrimination], because affirmative defenses do not constitute the kind of voluntary
application for affirmative relief' which would prevent a plaintiff bringing a claim seeking
affirmative relief from asserting the privilege.
10. In response to the allegations of paragraph 23, Defendant realleges and adopts
his responses to paragraphs 1 through 15 of the Second Amended Complaint set forth
in paragraphs 1 through 7 above herein.
11. Defendant asserts the Fifth Amendment Privilege against self-incrimination to
the allegations set forth In paragraphs 24 through 28 of the Second Amended
Complaint. See DeLisi v. Bankers Ins. Company, 436 So.2d 1099 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983);
Malloy v. Hogan, 84 S.Ct. 1489, 1495 (1964)(the Fifth Amendment's Self-Incrimination
Clause applies to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment - "[i]t would be incongruous to have different standards determine the
validity of a claim of privilege based on the same feared prosecution, depending on
whether the claim was asserted in state or federal court.")• 5 Fed.Prac. & Proc. Civ. 3d
EFTA00182759
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Case 9:08-cv-80993-KAM
Document 86
Entered on FLSD Docket 06/10/2009
Page 5 of 10
Jane Doe No. 7 v. Epstein
Page 5
§1280 Effect of Failure to Deny — Privilege Against Self-Incrimination ("...court must
treat the defendant's claim of privilege as equivalent to a specific denial."). See also 24
Fla.Jur.2d Evidence §592. Defendants in civil actions. —"... a civil defendant who raises
an affirmative defense is not precluded from asserting the privilege [against self-
incrimination], because affirmative defenses do not constitute the kind of voluntary
application for affirmative relief" which would prevent a plaintiff bringing a claim seeking
affirmative relief from asserting the privilege.
12. In response to the allegations of paragraph 29, Defendant realleges and adopts
his responses to paragraphs 1 through 15 of the Second Amended Complaint set forth
in paragraphs 1 through 7 above herein.
13. Defendant asserts the Fifth Amendment Privilege against self-incrimination to
the allegations set forth in paragraphs 30 through 35 of the Second Amended
Complaint. See DeLisi v. Bankers Ins. Company, 436 So.2d 1099 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983);
Malloy v. Hogan, 84 S.Ct. 1489, 1495 (1964)(the Fifth Amendment's Self-Incrimination
Clause applies to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment - "[I]t would be incongruous to have different standards determine the
validity of a claim of privilege based on the same feared prosecution, depending on
whether the claim was asserted in state or federal court."); 5 Fed.Prac. & Proc. Civ. 3d
§1280 Effect of Failure to Deny - Privilege Against Self-Incrimination ("...court must
treat the defendant's claim of privilege as equivalent to a specific denial."). See also 24
Fla.Jur.2d Evidence §592. Defendants In civil actions. — "... a civil defendant who raises
an affirmative defense is not precluded from asserting the privilege [against self-
EFTA00182760
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Case 9:08-cv-80993-KAM Document 86 Entered on FLSD Docket 06/10/2009 Page 6 of 10 Jane Doe No. 7 v. Epstein Page 6 incrimination], because affirmative defenses do not constitute the kind of voluntary application for affirmative relief" which would prevent a plaintiff bringing a claim seeking affirmative relief from asserting the privilege. WHEREFORE, Defendant requests that this Court deny the relief sought by Plaintiff. Affirmative Defenses 1. As to all counts, Plaintiff actually consented to and was a willing participant in the acts alleged, and therefore, her claims are barred, or her damages are required to be reduced accordingly. 2. As to all counts alleged, Plaintiff actually consented to and participated in conduct similar and/or identical to the acts alleged with other persons which were the sole or contributing cause of Plaintiffs alleged damages. 3. As to all counts, Plaintiff impliedly consented to the acts alleged by not objecting and by going to Defendant's home with other females and/or by bringing other females to Defendant's home for which Plaintiff received money; and therefore, her claims are barred, or her damages are required to be reduced accordingly. 4. As to all counts, Defendant reasonably believed or was told that the Plaintiff had attained the age of 18 years old at the time of the alleged acts. 5. As to all counts, Plaintiff's claims are barred as she said she was 18 years or older at the time. 6. As to all counts, Plaintiff's alleged damages were caused in whole or part by events and/or circumstances completely unrelated to the incident(s) alleged in the complaint. EFTA00182761
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Case 9:08-cv-80993-KAM Document 86 Entered on FLSD Docket 06/10/2009 Page 7 of 10 Jane Doe No. 7 v. Epstein Page 7 7. Plaintiff's claims are barred by the applicable statute of limitations. 8. As to Plaintiff's claims for punitive damages in Count I — "Sexual Assault & Battery," and Count II — "Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress," such claims are subject to the limitations as set forth in §768.72, et seq., Florida Statutes. 9. As to Plaintiff's claims for punitive damages in Count I — "Sexual Assault & Battery," and Count II — "Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress," such claims are subject to the constitutional limitations and guideposts as set forth in BMW of North America v. Gore, 116 S.Ct 1589 (1996)• Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 127 S.Ct. 1057 (2007)• State Farm v. Campbell, 123 S.Ct 1513 (2003); Engle v. Ligget Group, Inc., 945 So.2d 1246 (Fla. 2006). The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Florida's Constitution, Art. I, §§2 and 9, prohibit the imposition of grossly excessive or arbitrary punishments 10.As to Plaintiffs claims for punitive damages in Count I — "Sexual Assault & Battery," and Count II — "Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress," the determination of whether or not Defendant is liable for punitive damages is required to be bifurcated from a determination of the amount to be imposed. 11. Plaintiff has failed to state a cause of action for sexual assault and/or battery under Count I. 12.As to Count III, Plaintiff has failed to plead a cause of action as she does not and can not show a violation of a predicate act under 18 U.S.C. §2255 (2005). EFTA00182762
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Case 9:08-cv-80993-KAM Document 86 Entered on FLSD Docket 06/10/2009 Page 8 of 10 Jane Doe No. 7 v. Epstein Page 8 13.As to Count III, the version of 18 U.S.C. §2255 in effect at the time of the alleged conduct applies, and, thus, the presumptive minimum damages amount should Plaintiff prove the elements of such claim Is $50,000, and not subject to any multiplier. 14.As to Count III, application of the amended version of 18 U.S.C. §2255, effective July 27, 2006, would be in violation of the legal axiom against retroactive application of an amended statute, and also In violation of such constitutional principles, including but not limited to, the "Ex Post Facto" Clause, U.S. Const. Article I, §9, cl. 3, §10, cl. 1, and procedural and substantive due process, U.S. Const. 14th Amend., 5th Amend. The statute in effect during the time of the alleged conduct applies. 15.As to Count III, application of the amended version of 18 U.S.C. §2255, effective July 27, 2006, is prohibited pursuant to the vagueness doctrine and the Rule of Lenity. A criminal statute is required to give " 'fair warning ... in language that the common world will understand, of what the law intends to do if a certain line is passed. To make the warning fair, so far as possible the line should be clear.' " United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 265, 117 S.Ct. 1219, 137 L.Ed.2d 432 (1997) (quoting McBovle v. United States 283 U.S. 25, 27, 51 S.Ct. 340, 75 L.Ed. 816 (1931)) (omission in original). The "three related manifestations of the fair warning requirement" are: (1) the vagueness doctrine bars enforcement of a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application; (2) the canon of strict construction of criminal statutes, or rule of lenity, ensures fair warning by so resolving ambiguity in a criminal statute as to apply it only to conduct clearly covered; (3) due process bars courts from EFTA00182763
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Case 9:08-cv-80993-KAM Document 86 Entered on FLSD Docket 06/10/2009 Page 9 of 10 Jane Doe No. 7 v. Epstein Page 9 applying a novel construction of a criminal statute to conduct that neither the statute nor any prior judicial decision has fairly disclosed to be within its scope. 16. The applicable version of 18 U.S.C. §2255 creates a cause of action on behalf of a "minor." Plaintiff had attained the age of majority at the time of filing this action, and accordingly, her cause of action is barred. 17.Because Plaintiff has no claim under 18 U.S.C. §2255, this Court is without subject matter jurisdiction as to all claims asserted. 18.Application of the 18 U.S.C. §2255, as amended, effective July 27, 2006, is in violation of the constitutional principles of due process, the "Ex Post Facto" clause, and the Rule of Lenity, in that in amending the term "minor to "person" as to those who may bring a cause of action impermissibly and unconstitutionally broadened the scope of persons able to bring a §2255 claim. 19. 18 U.S.C. §2255 violates the Equal Protection Clause of the 14'h Amendment under the U.S. Constitution, and thus Plaintiff's claim thereunder is barred. 20. 18 U.S.C. §2255 violates the constitutional guarantees of procedural and substantive due process. Procedural due process guarantees that a person will not be deprived of life, liberty or property without notice and opportunity to be heard. Substantive due process protects fundamental rights. Accordingly, Plaintiffs cause of action thereunder is barred. WHEREFORE Defendant requests that this Court deny the lief sought by Plaintiff. Robert D. ritton, Jr. Attorney f. r Defendant Epstein EFTA00182764
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Case 9:08-cv-80993-KAM Document 86 Entered on FLSD Docket 06/10/2009 Page 10 of 10 Jane Doe No. 7 v. Epstein Page 10 Certificate of Service I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true copy of the foregoing was electronically filed with the Clerk of the Court using CM/ECF. I also certify that the foregoing document is being served this day on all counsel of recorthidentified on the following Service List in the manner specified by CM/ECF on this ur Tay of1444-..-•, 2009: Stuart S. Mermelstein, Esq. Adam D. Horowitz, Esq. Mermelstein & Horowitz, P.A. 18205 Biscayne Boulevard Suite 2218 Counsel for Plaintiff Jane Doe #7 Jack Alan Goldberger Atterbury Goldberger & Weiss, P.A. 250 Australian Avenue South Suite 1400 ach, FL 33401-5012 Co-Counsel for Defendant Jeffrey Epstein Respectfully submi d, By: ROBERT D. RITTON, JR., ESQ. Florida Bar o. MICHAEL J. PIKE ESQ. Florida Bar BURMAN, CRIl TON, LUTTIER & COLEMAN 515 N. Flagler Drive, Suite 400 ach, FL 33401 Phone Fax (Co-Counsel for Defendant Jeffrey Epstein) EFTA00182765
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Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM Document 149 Entered on FLSD Docket 06/09/2009 Page 1 of 13 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA JANE DOE NO. 2, Plaintiff, vs. JEFFREY EPSTEIN Defendant. JANE DOE NO. 3, Plaintiff; vs. JEFFREY EPSTEIN Defendant. JANE DOE NO. 4, Plaintiff, vs. JEFFREY EPSTEIN Defendant. JANE DOE NO. 5, CASE NO.: 08-CV-80119-MARRA/JOHNSON CASE NO.: 08-CV-80232-MARRA/JOHNSON CASE NO.: 08-CV-80380-MARRAJJOHNSON CASE NO.: 08-CV-80381-MARRA/JOHNSON EFTA00182766
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Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM Document 149 Entered on FLSD Docket 06/09/2009 Page 2 of 13 Doe 101 v. Epstein Page 2 Plaintiff, JEFFREY EPSTEIN, Defendant. JANE DOE NO. 6, Plaintiff, JEFFREY EPSTEIN, Defendant. JANE DOE NO. 7, Plaintiff; JEFFREY EPSTEIN Defendant. Plaintiff, JEFFREY EPSTEIN Defendant. CASE NO.: 08-80994-CIV-MARRAJJOHNSON CASE NO.: 08-80993-CIV-MARRA/JOHNSON CASE NO.: 08-80811-CIV-MARRA/JOHNSON JANE DOE, CASE NO.: 08-80893-CIV-MARRAJJOHNSON EFTA00182767
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