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violated, and shall initiate its prosecution on any offense within sixty (60) days' of 
(sic] giving notice of the violation. Any notice provided to Epstein pursuant to this 
paragraph shall be provided within 60 days of the United States learning of facts 
which may provide a basis for a determination of a breach of the Agreement. 
After timely fulfilling all the terms and conditions of the Agreement, no 
prosecution for the offenses set out on pages I and 2 of this Agreement, nor any 
other offenses that have been the subject of the joint investigation by the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation and the United States Attorney's Office, nor any offenses 
that arose from the Federal Grand Jury investigation will be instituted in this 
District, and the charges against Epstein, if any, will be dismissed. 
Agreement, at 2. 
Consistent with the Agreement and its position that the Federal Criminal Action continues 
to remain pending, the USAO recently sent letters to attorneys for people that the USAO has 
designated as "victims." In those letters, the USAO asked, "iljf you do file a claim under 18 
. § 2255 and Mr. Epstein denies that your client is a victim of an enumerated offense, please 
provide notice of that denial to the undersigned (AUSA]." See Decl. of 
Exhs. 6 
& 7, at 2 (July 9, 2008). The clear implication of the USAO's request (by which the USAO 
appears to involve itself in the instant litigation, despite advising the recipients that it cannot "take 
part in or otherwise assist in civil litigation," Id.), is that the USAO believes that such denial might 
breach the Agreement. 
Accordingly, the Federal Criminal Action remains "pending." 
Discussion 
I. 
Section 3509(k) Applies to Investigations, Not Just Indictments. 
While there is no unsealed indicted criminal case against Mr. Epstein, the government's 
criminal investigation against him remains open. Section 3509(k) clearly applies to stay civil 
cases during the pendency, not only of indicted criminal cases, but also of yet-to-be-closed 
investigations. 
The term "criminal action" is not expressly defined in § 3509(k). It is defined, however, 
by a closely related statute. Title 18, 
§ 1595 provides a civil remedy for "forced labor" and 
"sex trafficking" violations, but stays such actions "during the pendency of any criminal action 
arising out of the same occurrence in which the claimant is the victim." (A copy of § 1595 is 
3 
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attached hereto as Exhibit "B"). In enacting § 1595, Congress specifically intended that the term 
"criminal action" would be applied extremely broadly. Accordingly, Congress took pains to 
ensure that courts would give it the broadest possible construction and, for that reason, specified in 
the definition provision that "criminal action" also "includes investigation." 
18 
1595(bX2). The only reported decision addressing this provision interpreted it according to its 
plain language. See Aral. Khan, No. CV 07-1251, 2007 WL 1726456, *2 (E.D.N.Y. June 14, 
2007) (ordering "all proceedings in this case stayed pending the conclusion of the government's 
criminal investigation of the defendants and of any resulting criminal prosecution") (emphasis 
added). 
Given that the USAO's Agreement with Epstein indicates that: 
• 
the grand jury's subpoenas remain "outstanding" (Agreement, at 5); 
• 
the subpoenas are "held in abeyance" (id.); 
• 
the subpoenas are not "withdrawn" (id); 
• the parties must "maintain their evidence" (id.) (which would be entirely unnecessary if 
the investigation against Epstein were closed); 
• "any" existing "charges" will not "be dismissed" until after Epstein has "timely 
fulfill[ed] all the terms and conditions of the Algreement" (id. at 2); and 
• "prosecution in this District . . . shall be deferred" (id.) (but not closed or dismissed). 
- - then, the only reasonable conclusion is that the Federal Criminal Action remains "pending." 3
The plaintiffs argue that a § 3509(k) stay would be "inconsistent with Mr. Epstein's 
Agreement with the U.S. Attorney" which the plaintiffs claim is reproduced in the lead 
3 The ordinary meaning or the adjective "pending" is "Nemaining undecided; awaiting decision ...." Black's Law 
Dictionary 1154 (8th ed. 2004). The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit routinely relies on 
Black's Law Dictionary for the definition of statutory terms, including in criminal cases. See e.g., United States'. 
Young. 528 F.3d 1294, 1297 n.3 (11th Cir. 2008) (definitions of criminal "complaint" and "indictment"); United 
States'. Brown. 526 F.3d 691, 705 (11th Cir. 2008) (definition of "knowingly" in criminal statute). A Westlaw 
search revealed that in 2008 alone, the Ekvtnth Circuit has already published eight opinions relying on Black's Law 
Dictionary for definitions. See also, White'. Klitskie, 281 F.3d 920, ns (9th Cir. 2002) (relying on Black's Law 
Dictionary, in the context of a criminal case, for the definition of "pending" as "awaiting decision"); Swartz I. 
Meyers, 204 F.3d 417, 421 (3d Cir. 2000) (relying on Black's Law Dictionary for the definition of "pending," 
expressly because "'pending' is not defined in the statute"). Any common-sense reading of the Agreement and the 
USAO's recent sworn construction of it, is consonant with the Federal Criminal Action's "remaining undecided" and 
"awaiting decision." See Unified Gov't of Athens-Clarke County'. Athens Newspapers. LLC, No. S0761133, 
_S.E.2d 
2008 WL 2579238, *3 (Ga. lune 30, 2008) (reviewing a public-records request against Georgia's 
"pending investigation" exception to its open-records law, and holding that "a seemingly inactive investigation which 
has not yet resulted in a prosecution logically "remains undecided," and is therefore -pending," until it "is concluded 
and the file closed") (emphasis added). 
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prosecutor's July 10 letter to their counsel (attached to Plaintiffs' responses as Exhibit A). 
Apparently, on July 10, the lead prosecutor sent a letter to the plaintiffs' lawyer stating that "lolne 
. . condition to which Epstein has agreed" is that each plaintiff "will have .the same rights to 
proceed under Section 2255 as she would have had, if Mr. Epstein had been tried federally and 
convicted of an enumerated offense." See Response Memo, at 5 & Ex. A, at 1-2 (emphasis 
added). This argument warrants absolutely no consideration, however, since the plaintiffs have 
not pled any claims under 18 
. § 2255. 
11. 
Section 3509(k) Applies Even After a Plaintiff Turns 18. 
Without citing to a single case, the plaintiffs argue that § 3509(k) does not apply to 
plaintiffs over the age of 18. An examination of the legislative history and related statutes shows 
that this unsupported argument must be rejected. 
The parallel stay provision in § 1595, discussed supra at 3-4, mandates, without exception, 
that 
any 
civil 
action 
brought 
under 
that 
section 
for 
violations 
of 
§ 1591 (prohibiting transportation of minors for prostitution) "shall be stayed during the pendency 
of any criminal action arising out of the same occurrence in which the claimant is the victim." 18 
U.S.C. § 1591(b)(1). Whether the § 1595 plaintiff has turned 18 does not vitiate the efficacy of 
this mandatory stay. 
An example illustrates why the stay provided in § 3509(k) has the same broad scope as the 
stay provided in § 1591(b)(1). As discussed above, § 3509(k) stays any civil suit for injury to a 
minor, arising out of the same occurrence as a pending criminal action. One type of civil suit 
falling within § 3509(k)'s ambit is a suit seeking redress for a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a). 
Section 2423(a) - - just like § 1591 - - prohibits transportation of minors for prostitution. The 
elements of both statutes arc identical. There would simply be no legitimate basis for Congress to 
differentiate between the consequences attached to violating these two sections. Thus, just as 
Congress mandated under § 1595(b)(1) that civil discovery shall be stayed when there is an 
ongoing federal investigation under § 1591 (even after the victim turns 18), the identical treatment 
should apply under § 3509(k) to civil actions brought for the identical violation of § 2423(a). 
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Logic compels a rule requiring continued application of the § 3509(k) stay to a putative 
victim who has since turned 18. Consider again the example of § 2243(a). Assume that the 
USAO is investigating a § 2243(a) violator with two alleged victims; one who is now 17, and one 
who has turned 19. Assume further that both decide to sue the alleged offender while the USAO 
is still in the process of conducting its criminal investigation. Why would Congress prohibit the 
defendant from conducting civil discovery in the 17-year-old's lawsuit, but permit him to conduct 
full discovery in the 19-year-old's lawsuit, including taking the depositions of both the 19- and the 
17-year-old, the federal investigating agents and all the grand-jury witnesses? This could not have 
been Congress' intent. 
The legislative history to a statute resembling § 1595 is also instructive. When Congress 
enacted 181.1. § 2255, it provided a civil remedy to any "minor . . . victim" of enumerated 
federal sex offenses. See Child Abuse Victims' Rights Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-500, 100 Stat. 
1783. § 703 (1986). In 2006, Congress amended the statute to clarify that the civil cause of action 
was available not just while the victim was a minor, but even after she or he turned 18. See Pub. 
L. 109-248, 120 Stat. 650, § 707 (bXIXA) (amending § 2255 to permit suit by adults who were 
victims of enumerated federal offenses when they were minors, by deleting "Any minor who is la 
victim]" and adding "Any person, who, while a minor, was [a victim]"). Meanwhile, the stay 
provisions of § 3509(k) remained unchanged. There is no reason to think that Congress would 
afford prosecutors protection for their investigations while the victims were minors, but 
completely eliminate those protections the moment one of the victims turned 18. 
The District Court for the Northern District of Florida confirmed this position and 
specifically rejected the plaintiffs' contrary argument. See Doe I. Francis. No. 5:03 CV 260, 2005 
WL 950623, at *2 (N.D. Fla. 2005). The plaintiffs there argued that "the stay should be lifted due 
to the fact that the minor Plaintiffs have now reached the age of majority during the pendency of 
the state criminal case." Id. The court found this argument "unavailing . . . given the victims' 
minor status at the time of the events giving rise to the underlying claims." Id. (Interestingly, the 
arguments made by Jane Doe Nos. 2-5 in their oppositions to Epstein's motion to stay presently 
6 
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pending before this Court, are literally lifted' from the plaintiffs' brief submitted to, and rejected 
by, the Northern District of New York in Francis.) The court specifically held that "because the 
victims were minors at the time of the Defendants' actions alleged in both [the civil and 
criminal] cases, § 3509(k) applies." Id. (emphasis added). 
The United States Department of Justice has itself emphatically embraced the 
interpretation of § 3509(k) as applying to stay all civil actions relating to sex offenses against 
minors, pending the completion of a parallel criminal action, without regard to whether the 
plaintiff has turned 18 during her civil lawsuit: 
The subsection should stay all pending civil actions in the wake of a criminal 
prosecution. Notably, in the context of 18 USC § 2255 ("civil remedy for personal 
injuries"), all civil actions are stayed pending the completion of a criminal action. 
See also 18 1:SC § 3509(k). 
H.R. Rep. 108-264(11), 108th Cong., 1st Sess. (2003), reprinted at 2003 WL 22272907, at *16-17 
("agency view" by the Department of Justice on bill later codified at 18 
. § 1595). 
The Department specifically argued to Congress in the clearest terms: "We believe that 
prosecutions should take priority over civil redress and that prosecutions should be complete prior 
to going forward with civil suits." 14. at 17 (emphasis added). Nowhere did the Department 
remotely suggest - - as the plaintiffs have implied - - that pending prosecutions warrant less 
protection (Le., should be "hinder[ed1") simply because a particular civil plaintiff happens to reach 
his or her 18th birthday. 
III. 
A Stay is Mandatory Despite Resulting "Delay" to Civil Lawsuits. 
Inherent in any § 3509(k) stay is delay to the progress (discovery, trial, appeal) of all 
related civil lawsuits. Congress recognized this in enacting the stay provision, which necessarily 
prioritized the interests of completing a criminal investigation and prosecution over the interests of 
a particular plaintiff in seeking personal pecuniary damages. Based on this reasoning, the Francis 
Compare Doe I. Francis, Case No. 5:03cv260-MCR-WCS (N.D. Fla.), Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' 
Motinn to Reconsider Plaintiffs Motion to Lift Stay and for Status Conference (DE 92. available on PACER), with 
Plaintiffs Memorandum of Law in Response to Defendant's Motion to Stay, filed in Case Nos. 08-cv-80119-KAM 
Woe No. 2, DE 25), 08-cv-80232•KAM (Doe No. 3, DE 20), 08-cv-80380-KAM (Doe No. 4, DE 31), and 08-cv-
80381-KAM (Doe No. S. DE 29). 
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court specifically refused to provide any relief to plaintiffs "simply because the state [criminal] 
matter is not progressing as fast as they would hope." 2005 WL 950623, at *2. The court made 
this determination despite the plaintiffs' complaints about the "frustrating delay" and that "the 
state criminal case 'has languished for almost two years with no end in sight," finding that this "is 
a. matter to be addressed in state [criminal] court." Id. Accordingly, the anticipated delay in this 
case, attendant to the term of the deferred-prosecution agreement, does not change the clear 
command of § 3509(k). 
According to their own pleadings, the plaintiffs waited between three and six years before 
filing these lawsuits,5 and so cannot rightfully claim prejudice from additional temporary delay. 
IV. 
Section 3509 Aside, a Discretionary Stay is Warranted. 
Even, arguendo, were this Court not to apply the mandate of § 3509, a discretionary stay 
should still be entered during the pendency of the Federal Criminal Action. SEC'. Healihsouih 
Corp.. 261 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1326 (N.D. Ala. 2003) ("No question exists that this court has the 
power to stay a civil proceeding due to an active, parallel criminal investigation."). Other federal 
statutes support such a stay -- particularly when the criminal action may be adversely affected by 
the civil litigation. For example, under 18 
§ 2712(eX1), "the court shall stay any action 
commenced [against the United States] if the court determines that civil discovery will adversely 
affect the ability of the Government to conduct a related investigation or prosecution of a related 
criminal case." Allowing these lawsuits to progress while Epstein remains subject to the Federal 
Criminal Action will prejudice him irrevocably and irreparably. As provided below, there are 
several adverse effects to allowing the civil litigation to proceed while the Federal Criminal Action 
remains pending. 
In these lawsuits, Epstein has a right to defend himself. In the Federal Criminal Action, 
Epstein has a right against self-incrimination.6 Without a stay, Epstein will be immediately forced 
to abandon one of these rights. 
Jane Does No. 2 and No. 3 allege that their claims arose "Mit or about 2004-2005r Jane Does No. 4 and No. S 
allege that their claims arose "Mn or about 2002-2003." Complaints, 18. 
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Should he choose his Fifth Amendment rights, he will expose himself to an adverse 
inference at the summary-judgment stage and at trial. See generally. Wehlingl. Columbia Broad. 
Sys., 611 F.2d 1026, 1027 (5th Cir. 1980) (observing that "invocation of the privilege would be 
subject to the drawing of an adverse inference by the trier of fact"). 
On the other hand, should Epstein choose his right to defend himself in these lawsuits, the 
USAO will be able to use his responses at every stage of the discovery and trial process (e.g., his 
Answer, responses to document requests, responses to requests for admissions, sworn answers to 
interrogatories, answers to deposition questions, and trial testimony) to his detriment in the 
Federal Criminal Action.' 
In these lawsuits, even before civil discovery begins, under the Initial Disclosures required 
by Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 and S.D. Ma. Local Rule 26.1, Epstein "must" disclose the identities of all 
the witnesses he would call in his defense to the Federal Criminal Action (Rule 26(aXIXAX0), 
copies of "all documents" he "may use to support this] defenses" (Rule 26(a)(1)(A)(ii)), as well as 
the identity of "any" expert witness he "may use at trial," along with mandatory disclosure of "a 
written report" containing "a complete statement of all opinions the [expert] will express and the 
basis and reasons for them" (Rule 26(a)(2XA) and (B)(i)). 
In contrast, in the pending Federal Criminal Action, which is governed exclusively by the 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the USA° would not be entitled to compel pm-trial 
production of any of this information. See Fed. R. Cr. P. 16(bX1XA), J), and 16(bX2); United 
Stales 
Argomaniz, 925 F.2d 1349, 1355-56 (11th Cir. 1991) (explaining act-of-production 
privilege ). 
Thus, absent a stay of this civil action, the USA() would receive fundamentally unfair 
access to defense information and highly prejudicial advance insight into criminal defense 
6 The privilege a plies in "instances where the witness has reasonable cause to apprehend danger' of criminal 
liability. Hoffman'. United States, 341 U.S. 479,486 (1951). 
7 This could give the LISAO a tremendous advantage in prosecuting Epstein in the Federal Criminal Action. See 
Comment, Using Equitable Powers to Coordinate Parallel Civil and Criminal Actions, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 1023, 1030 
(1985) (observing that "the prosecutor may have access to detailed civil depositions of the accused witnesses, while 
the rules of criminal procedure bar the accused from deposing the prosecutor's witnesses"). 
9 
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strategy. See Comment, 98 Harv. L. Rev. at 1030 ("To the extent that a prosecutor acquires 
evidence that was elicited from the accused in a parallel civil proceeding, the criminal process 
becomes less adversarial."). 
Without a stay in place, discovery will proceed, including against third panics. Mr. 
Epstein will have no alternative but to issue subpoenas seeking evidence from state and federal 
law-enforcement officers. For example, Epstein is clearly entitled to discover evidence of prior 
statements (including inconsistent statements) given by witnesses whom law-enforcement has 
previously interviewed. See, e.g.. Cox I Treadway. 75 F.3d 230, 239 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding that 
district court properly admitted testimony of prosecutor about prior inconsistent statements that 
witness made to the prosecutor). Likewise, Epstein may be entitled to discovery of relevant 
evidence that is in the present possession of the grand jury or other law-enforcement agencies. 
See, e.g.. Simpson I Hines, 729 F. Supp. 526, 527 (E.D. Tex. 1989) ("The grand jury has 
concluded its deliberations . 
. The need for secrecy of these specific tapes no longer outweighs 
other concerns."); Golden Quality Ice Cream Co., Inc. I Deerfield Specialty Papers. Inc., 87 
F.R.D. 53, 59 (E.D. Pa. 1980) ("[W]here, as here, the grand jury has completed its work and all 
that is sought are those documents turned over to the grand jury by the corporations which are 
defendants in the civil case, the considerations . . . militating against disclosure are beside the 
point.") (citing Douglas Oil Co. of Calif Petrol Stops Nw., 441 U.S. 211 (1979)). 
In response to such third-party subpoenas to law-enforcement witnesses, we anticipate that 
it will be the government, not Mr. Epstein, who will object to discovery in these civil cases, until 
the final conclusion of the Federal Criminal Action. 
Conclusion 
Because these lawsuits arise from the same allegations as the Federal Criminal Action, this 
Court should stay these cases until that criminal action is no longer pending. 
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Respectfully submitted, 
LEWIS TEIN, P.L. 
3059 Grand Avenue, Suite 340 
Coconut Grove Florida 33133 
Tel: 
Fax: 
By: 
GUY A. LEWIS 
Fla. Bar No. 623740 
MICHAEL R. TE1N 
Fla. Bar No. 993522 
ATTERBURY, GOLDBERGER & WEISS, P.A. 
250 Australian Avenue South, Suite 1400 
West Palm.
h
 Beach Florida 334 
Tel. a 
Fax. 
By: 
Jack A. Goldberger 
Fla. Bar No. 262013 
Attorneys for Defendant Jeffrey Epstein 
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE WITH LOCAL RULE 7:I.A.3 
While defense counsel admittedly did not confer with plaintiffs' counsel prior to filing the motion 
to stay, it was by no means in willful disregard of the Local Rule. Shortly after the filing of the 
motion and before plaintiffs filed their response memoranda suggesting that no conference had 
taken place, the parties did confer in a good-faith and specific attempt to resolve the motion and 
were unable to do so, because plaintiffs' counsel would not agree to a stay. Accordingly, the brief 
delay in conducting the Rule 7.1 conference did not prejudice the plaintiffs at all or result in 
unnecessary judicial intervention. It is perhaps worth noting that, contrary to their Rule 7.1 
certificate, plaintiffs did not confer prior to filing their motion to extend time to file their response 
memoranda (which extension defendant did not oppose anyway, including on the basis of failure 
to comply with Rule 7.1). Further information on the reasons the Rule 7.1 conference for the 
instant motion to stay was conducted after filing the motion to stay will be provided to the Court 
upon its request, preferably ex pane in order to avoid disclosure of privileged information. The 
defendant respectfully requests the opportunity to make such an ex pane disclosure in the event 
that the Court considers denying the motion under Local Rule 7.1.A.3. In any event, we apologize 
to the Court for non-compliance with the pre-filing requirement of the Rule, would have conferred 
even sooner had plaintiffs pointed the issue out immediately upon receipt of our motion, did 
confer with plaintiffs' counsel prior to filing the motion to seal this reply, and commit to precise 
compliance with the Rule for the remainder of this litigation. 
te e
Jack 'oldberger, Michael Tein 
II 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a copy of the foregoing was served on July 28, 2008 by U.S. 
mail on all counsel named on the service list. 
Michael R. Tein 
SERVICE LIST 
Jeffrey M. Herman, Esq. 
Stuart S. Mermelstein, Esq. 
Adam D. Horowitz, Esq. 
Herman & Mermelstein, P.A. 
18205 Biscayne Boulevard, Suite 2218 
Miami, Florida 33160 
12 
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA 
NO. 08-80119-CIV-MARRA/JOHNSON 
JANE DOE NO. 2, 
Plaintiff, 
1. 
JEFFREY EPSTEIN, 
Defendant. 
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO STAY 
THIS CAUSE comes before the Court on Defendant Jeffrey Epstcin's Motion to Stay 
(DE 12), filed June 20, 2008. The motion is now fully briefed and is ripe for review. The Court 
has carefully considered the motion and is otherwise fully advised in the premises. 
Defendant Jeffrey Epstein ("Defendant") seeks a stay of this civil action under a federal 
statute which reads, in pertinent part, as follows: 
If, at any time that a cause of action for recovery of compensation for 
damage or injury to the person of a child exists, a criminal action is 
pending which arises out of the same occurrence and in which the child is 
the victim, the civil action shall be stayed until the end of all phases of the 
criminal action and any mention of the civil action during the criminal 
proceeding is prohibited. As used in this subsection, a criminal action is 
pending until its final adjudication in the trial court. 
18 
§ 3509 (k). In his motion, Defendant cites a state case, Florida I. Epstein, No. 2006 
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CF 09454AXX (Fla. Cir. Ct. 2008)1 and a federal case, In re Grand Jury, No. FGJ 07-103(WPB) 
(S.D. Fla.), that arise out of the same occurrences and arc pending and thus require a stay of this 
civil case. The federal "case," according to Defendant, involves a "deferred-prosecution" 
agreement whereby the U.S. Attorney agreed to suspend its investigation of Defendant while 
"retaining the right to reactivate the grand jury." (DE 24.) Defendant essentially reasons, 
because the U.S. Attorney could bring criminal charges against Defendant, that a criminal action 
is "pending." The Court rejects this definition of a "pending criminal action." 
When interpreting the text of a statute, the Court begins with the plain meaning of the 
text. In re Hedrick, 524 F.3d 1175, 1186 (11* Cir. 2008). If the plain meaning of a statute is 
clear, the Court should not deviate from that interpretation. Id. Pending is defined as "remaining 
undecided" and "awaiting decision." Blacks Law Dictionary (86 ed. 2004).2 Likewise, an 
'As Defendant recognizes, the state court case was "finally adjudicated" and thus no 
longer pending as of June 30, 2008. (See DE 12.) 
'Defendant attempts to argue that the fact that grand jury subpoenas are still 
"outstanding" and "not withdrawn" and that the grand jury will not be dismissed until Defendant 
completes his obligations under the state plea agreement means that a "criminal action" is 
"pending." (Def. Reply 4.) Defendant misunderstands the purpose of a grand jury. A grand 
jury, as Blackstone writes, is composed of citizens who "inquire, upon their oaths, whether t4re 
be sufficient cause to call upon the party to answer" the charge of criminal activity. Beavers" 
Henkel, 194 U.S. 73, 84 (1904) (quoting William Blackstone, 4 Commentaries *303). The grand 
jury's sole purpose is to inquire into whether there is probable cause to bring an individual before 
a tribunal to determine his guilt r innocence of an alleged crime. Id. The grand jury is simply 
an investigative body. See U.S.*. Alred, 144, F.3d 1405, 1413 (11th Cir. 1998). A "criminal 
action" is not instigated by the calling of a grand jury, because a grand jury is convened "to 
determine whether a crime has beensorrunitted and whether criminal proceedings should be 
1 
instituted against any person." U.S. . Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 344 (1974). An "action" is 
commenced against a person after the grand jury actually finds probable cause to make an 
individual answer specific charges and renders a bill of indictment against that individual. Until 
a grand jury's investigation is complete and there has been a determination by a lawful authority 
that probable cause exists, there can be no criminal action. 
2 
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Page 3 of 5 
"action" is defined as a "criminal judicial proceeding." Id. Because the U.S. Attorney has not 
filed an indictment or an information against Defendant, the Court fails to sec how there is an 
undecided judicial proceeding in federal court against Defendant. 
Defendant argues that this statute should be read to include the definition of "criminal 
action" used in 18 
§ 1595(b)(2), which reads as follows: "In this subsection, a 'criminal 
action' includes investigation and prosecution and is pending until final adjudication in the trial 
court." Defendant argues that "Congress specifically intended that the term 'criminal action' 
would be applied extremely broadly" under § 1595, so Congress "took pains to ensure that courts 
would give it the broadest possible construction" and defined "criminal action" as including 
investigatory stages. (Def. Reply 4.) Defendants argue that the Court should borrow this 
definition. 
The Court disagrees. The Court believes that Congress's inclusion of this broader 
definition under § 1595 evinces Congressional intent to depart from the normal meaning of the 
term "criminal action."' This addition to the text suggests that Congress knows the plain 
meaning of the term "criminal action" and that Congress decided, under § 1595, that the 
definition of "criminal action" should be broader. In contrast, Congress could have made such an 
addition to § 3509 had it intended the mandatory stay provision to apply to pre-indictment 
investigations, but it did not. In other words, by not broadening the definition of "criminal 
action" § 3509, Congress intended that the term should only have its ordinary meaning: that an 
indictment or information has been filed naming a specific defendant. Instead, it seems clear that 
'In fact, Congress made this intent clear by stating that this broader definition of a 
"criminal action" applied only "in this subsection." 
3 
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Congress intended that these two statutory provisions should each have a different scope. 
Defendant's argument of statutory construction fails. 
The single case cited by Defendant in support of his motion is not on point. In Doe I 
Francis, No. 5:03CV260/MCR/WCS, 2005 WL 517847 (N.D. Fla. Feb. 10, 2005), the stay was 
entered because criminal charges had been filed against the defendant in a state court several 
months earlier (i.e., the defendants had been indicted by the state attorney). See Memorandum in 
Support of Motion to Stay Proceedings Pending Outcome of Parallel Criminal Proceedings at 3, 
Doe 1 iFrancis,No. 5:03CV260/MCIVWCS (N.D. Fla. Dec. 2, 2003). The Court agrees with 
Defendant that a stay under § 3509(k) is mandatory when a criminal action is pending; the Court 
simply disagrees that the "deferred-prosecution agreement" constitutes a pending criminal action. 
The Court also does not believe a discretionary stay is warranted. Defendant did not seek 
this relief in his motion; including such a request in the reply brief is inappropriate. Further, the 
Court sees no reason to delay this litigation for the next thirty-three months. After all, Defendant 
is in control of his own destiny — it is up to him (and him alone) whether the plea agreement 
reached with the State of Florida is breached. If Defendant does not breach the agreement, then 
he should have no concerns regarding his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. The 
fact that the U.S. Attorney (or other law enforcement officials) may object to some discovery in 
these civil cases is not, in an of itself, a reason to stay the civil action. Any such issues shall be 
resolved as they arise in the course of this litigation. 
Accordingly, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows: 
I. Defendant's Motion to Stay (DE 12) is DENIED. 
2. Defendant's Motion for Hearing (DE 27) is DENIED AS MOOT. 
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Page 5 of 5 
3. Plaintiff's Motion for an Extension of Time to File Response (DE 18) is GRANTED NUNC 
PRO TUNC. 
DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at West Palm Beach, Palm Beach County, 
Florida, this 4th day of August, 2008. 
KENNETH A. MARRA 
United States District Judge 
Copies furnished to: 
all counsel of record 
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-,119-KAM 
Docum,.., 23 
Entered on FLSD Docket 07h '2008 
Page 1 of 4 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA 
CASE NO.: 08-CV-80119-MARRA-JOHNSON 
JANE DOE NO. 2, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JEFFREY EPSTEIN, 
Defendant. 
to 
FILED EX PARTE 
UNDER SEAL 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO FILE EX PARTE AND UNDER SEAL 
EFTA00175684

Case 9:08-cv-ud119-KAM 
Docume.... 23 
Entered on FLSD Docket 07/14,2008 
Page 2 of 4 
Pursuant to S.D. Fla. L.R. 5.4, defendant Jeffrey Epstein hereby moves to 
file his Notice of Continued Pendency of Federal Criminal Action, as well as this 
motion, ex parse arid under seal, stating as follows: 
1. 
In support of his motion to stay [DE 12], defendant has herewith filed 
a Notice of Continued Pendency of Federal Criminal Action. 
2. 
The Notice relates to a confidential agreement between the United 
States Attorney's Office for the Southern District of Florida and the defendant. 
3. 
The information contained in the Notice is material to this Court's 
consideration of Epstein's motion to stay. 
4. 
To avoid disclosure of confidential material, Epstein requests leave to 
file the Notice, and this motion, ex parte and under seal. 
5. 
Pending a ruling from this Court, Epstein has not served this motion 
or the Notice on counsel for plaintiff. 
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Page 3 of 4 
WHEREFORE, defendant Jeffrey Epstein respectfully requests leave to file 
this motion and his Notice of Continued Pendency of Federal Criminal Action, a 
parte and under seal. 
Respectfully submitted, 
LEWIS TEIN, P.L. 
3059 Grand Avenue, Suite 340 
Coconut Grove Florida 33133 
Tel: 
Fax: 
By: 
GUY A. LEWIS 
Fla. Bar No. 623740 
MICHAEL R. TEIN 
Fla. Bar No. 993522 
ATTERBURY, GOLDBERGER & WEISS, P.A. 
250 Australian Avenue South, Suite 1400 
West Palm Beach Florida 33401 
Tel. 
Fax. 
By: 
JACK A. GOLDBERGER 
Fla. Bar No. 262013 
jgoldberger®agwpa.com 
Attorneys for Defendant Jeffrey Epstein 
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Page 4 of 4 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that this motion, in accordance with S.D. Fla. L.R. 
5.4, has not been served on opposing counsel and was filed under seal on July 10, 
2008. 
Michael R. Tein 
4 
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,..,./119-KAM 
Documt,.., 24 
Entered on FLSD Docket 07/  ,2008 
Page 1 of 4 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA 
CASE NO.: 08-CV-80119-MARRA-JOHNSON 
JANE DOE NO. 2, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JEFFREY EPSTEIN, 
Defendant. 
O co 
I 
N
1
O 
1.7 
FILED EX PARTE 
UNDER SEAL 
EFTA00175688