EFTA00175214

Case 9:08-cv-80811-KAM 
Document 81 
Entered on FLSD Docket 05/13/2009 
Page 3 of 7 
Page 3 
significant fact that a stay may be issued in light of an ongoing investigation. It is clear from the 
NPA and Jack Goldberger's Affidavit (attached to the Motion to Stay) ". . .that the criminal 
matters against Epstein remain ongoing until the NPA expires by its terms in late 2010. . ., and 
the threat of criminal prosecution against Epstein by the USAO continues presently and through 
late 2010." See Jack Goldberger's Affidavit, ¶5 (attached to the Motion to Stay)(DE 51). In 
fact, the FBI refused to provide information regarding this case and other related cases filed 
against Epstein ". . .stating the materials are at this time exempt from disclosure because they are 
in an investigative file, i.e., the matter is still an ongoing criminal investigation." 
See Jack 
Goldberger's Affidavit, ¶7 (attached to the Motion to Stay)(DE 51). 
Additionally, Plaintiff's response downplays the fact that civil discovery may result in the 
USAO claiming a breach of the NPA. Epstein wishes to vigorously defend this case and others 
filed against him; however, he does not wish to risk waiver of his 5th Amendment privileges, at 
least before the NPA expires or any investigation is closed. 
Further, Plaintiff adopts the arguments set forth in Jane Doe's Response to the Motion to 
Stay filed in 08-CIV-80893, which asserts that the NPA is not attached to Epstein's Motion to 
Stay. The Court has a copy of the NPA. While it may be sealed, this Court may review same, in 
camera. As such, Plaintiff's Best Evidence argument (as adopted) is entirely misplaced and 
should be disregarded. 
a. 
Justice Requires The Entry of A Stay 
As set out in the Motion to Stay, once the NPA expires, EPSTEIN intends to testify to all 
relevant and non-objectionable inquiries made to him in discovery be it a deposition, in 
interrogatories or in production requests. However, the current circumstances are such that by 
3 
EFTA00175354

Case 9 I;18-cv-80811-KAM 
Document 81 
Entered on FLSD Docket 05/13/2009 
Page 5 of 7 
Page 5 
for a stay of the civil case until the criminal aspects/investigation of Defendant's companion case 
are closed). 
Here, Epstein is not required to "contemplate an in haec verba iron-clad comparison of 
separate issues by direct proof." St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company v. U.S., 24 CI.Ct 
at 516. Instead, a reading of the complaint, the NPA (in camera), the pleadings in support of and 
against Epstein's Motion to Stay along with other pleadings in the clerk's file, makes it clear that 
the facts in the instant matter and those in the ongoing investigation are "related" and/or 
"substantially similar." Id. As such, permitting this civil action to go forward would create a 
hardship on Epstein in that he will be forced to invoke his 5th Amendment Privilege and risk 
loosing this case by virtue of not being able to present evidence, or waive that right and risk a 
potential criminal prosecution. Eastwood v, U.S., 2008 WL 5412857, *1 (E.D. Tenn.))("When a 
party to a civil action is subject to criminal proceedings and/or investigations that relate to such 
civil action, courts will often stay the civil proceeding so as to prevent the use of civil discovery 
and evidentiary procedures to obtain evidence for use in the criminal matter). Id. Courts will 
also stay a civil case to preserve 5th Amendment rights. Id, Further, a comparison of Fed.R.Civ. 
Pro. 26 may expand the rights of criminal discovery beyond the limits of Fed.R.Crim.Pro. 16(b). 
Epstein satisfies the requirements to stay this action as set forth in St. Paul Fire and in Eastwood, 
including the similarity of issues underlying the civil litigation and ongoing criminal 
investigation. As such, a stay should be entered in the instant matter. 5se also U.S. v. 
$75,020.00 in United States Funds, et al., 2009 WL 1010359 (M.D. G.a. 2009). 
5 
EFTA00175355

Case 9:08-cv-80811-KAM 
Document 81 
Entered on FLSD Docket 05/13/2009 
Page 7 of 7 
Page 7 
served this day on all counsel of record identifily t e following Service List in the 
manner specified by CM/ECF on this a day of 
, 2009 
Richard Horace Willits, Esq. 
Richard H. Willits, P.A. 
2290 10th Avenue North 
Suite 404 
La - A.0 L33461 
Jack Scarola, Esq. 
Jack P. Hill, Esq. 
Searcy 
Denney Scarola 
Barnhart 
Shipley, P.A. 
2139 Palm Beach Lakes Boulevard 
ach, FL 33409 
ax: 
[email protected] 
johAsearcylaw.com 
Co-Counsel for Plaintiff 
Jack Alan Goldberger, Esq. 
Atterbury Goldberger & Weiss, P.A. 
250 Australian Avenue South 
Suite 1400 
ach, FL 33401-5012 
ax: 
[email protected] 
Counsel for Defendant Jeffrey Epstein 
Bruce Reinhart, Esq. 
Bruce E. Reinhart, P.A. 
& 250 S. Australian Avenue 
Suite 1400 
ach, FL 33401 
ounse or e en ant 
Res 
By: 
RO 
., ESQ. 
Florida Bar No. 224162 
rcritnbciclaw.com 
MICHAEL J. PIKE, ESQ. 
Florida Bar #617296 
mpikenbciclaw.com 
BURMAN, CRITTON, LUTTIER & COLEMAN 
515 N. Flagler Drive, Suite 400 
_
ach, FL 33401 
Phone 
Fax 
7 
EFTA00175356

Case 9:08-cv-80811-KAM 
Document 78 
Entered on FLSD Docket 05/08/2009 
Page 1 of 25 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA 
CASE NO.: 08-CV-80811-MARRA/JOHNSON 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
JEFFREY EPSTEIN and 
Defendants, 
/ 
DEFENDANT EPSTEIN'S REPLY TO PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM IN RESPONSE 
TO DEFENDANT, JEFFREY EPSTEIN'S, MOTION TO DISMISS FIRST AMEDNED 
COMPLAINT FOR FAIURE TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION, AND MOTION FOR 
MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT; MOTION TO STRIKE, AND SUPPORTING 
MEMORANDUM OF LAW, (dated April 13, 20091 
Defendant, JEFFREY EPSTEIN, ("EPSTEIN"), by and through his undersigned 
counsel, files his reply to Plaintiffs Memorandum in Response to Defendant, JEFFREY 
EPSTEIN's, Motion to Dismiss First Amended Complaint For Failure to State A Cause 
of Action; And Motion for More Definite Statement; Motion to Strike, And Supporting 
Memorandum of Law, dated April 13, 2009, (hereinafter "Plaintiff's response"). In reply 
to Plaintiff's response and further supporting Defendant's motion to dismiss Count I 
through XXXI of Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint for failure to state a cause of 
action, and for more definite statement, or to strike, [DE 47), dated April 12, 2009, 
(hereinafter "Defendant's motion"), Defendant states: 
I. The 2003 version of 18 U.S.C. 42255 applies to this action. 
A. 
The statute in affect during the time the alleged acts occurred is the applicable 
version of 18 U.S.C. §2255; in this action — the 2003 version (quoted at p. 7, 
EFTA00175357

Case 9:08-cv-80811-KAM 
Document 78 
Entered on FLSD Docket 05/08/2009 
Page 3 of 25 
v. Epstein, et al. 
113 
These provisions demonstrate that retroactive statutes raise particular 
concerns. The Legislature's unmatched powers allow it to sweep away settled 
expectations suddenly and without individualized consideration. Its responsivity 
to political pressures poses a risk that it may be tempted to use retroactive 
legislation as a means of retribution against unpopular groups or individuals. As 
Justice Marshall observed in his opinion for "1498 the Court in Weaver v. 
Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 101 S.Ct. 960, 67 L.Ed.2d 17 (1981), the Ex Post Facto 
Clause not only ensures that individuals have "fair warning" about the effect of 
criminal statutes, but also "restricts governmental power by restraining arbitrary 
and potentially vindictive legislation." td., at 28-29, 101 S.Ct., at 963-964 
(citations omitted). FN20 
FN20. See Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 513-514, 109 S.Ct. 706, 
732, 102 L.Ed.2d 854 (1989) ("Legislatures are primarily policymaking bodies that 
promulgate rules to govern future conduct. The constitutional prohibitions against 
the enactment of ex post facto laws and bills of attainder reflect a valid concern 
about the use of the political process to punish or characterize past conduct of 
private citizens. It is the judicial system, rather than the legislative process, that is 
best equipped to identify past wrongdoers and to fashion remedies that will create 
the conditions that presumably would have existed had no wrong been committed") 
(STEVENS, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment); James v. United 
States, 366 U.S. 213, 247, n. 3, 81 S.Ct. 1052, 1052, n. 3, 6 L.Ed.2d 246 (1961) 
(retroactive punitive measures may reflect "a purpose not to prevent dangerous 
conduct generally but to impose by legislation a penalty against specific persons or 
classes of persons"). 
As discussed more fully below herein, these well entrenched constitutional 
protections and presumptions against retroactive application of legislation establish that 
the version of 18 U.S.C. §2255 (2003) in effect at the time of the alleged conduct 
applies to the instant action, and not the amended version as claimed by Plaintiff. 
B. 
Not only is there no clear express intent stating that the statute is to apply 
retroactively, but applying the current version of the statute, as amended in 2006, would 
be in clear violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution as it 
would be applied to events occurring before its enactment and would increase the 
EFTA00175358

Case 9:08-cv-80811-KAM 
Document 78 
Entered on FLSD Docket 05/08/2009 
Page 5 of 25 
In. 
v. Epstein, et al. 
Page 5 
2006 amended version of §2255 without any legal discussion supporting a retroactive 
application. (See p. 3 of Plaintiffs response). 
§2255 is contained in Title 18 of the United States Codes - "Crimes and Criminal 
Procedure, Part I. Crimes, Chap. 110. Sexual Exploitation and Other Abuse of 
Children? 18 U.S.C. §2255 (2003), is entitled Civil remedy for personal injuries, and 
imposes a presumptive minimum of damages in the amount of $50,000.00, should 
Plaintiff prove a violation of the specified criminal statutes, and suffer personal injury 
with actual damages. Thus, the effect of the 2006 amendments, effective July 27, 2006, 
would be to triple the amount of the statutory minimum previously in effect during the 
time of the alleged acts. (Taking Plaintiffs position that the presumptive minimum is 
meant to be multiplied per violation — the damages would be 4.5 million. The express 
language of the statute has no multiplier.) 
No case has yet decided the specific issue before this Court —whether application 
of the 2006 version of §2255, which increased the statutorily presumed minimum 
damages from $50,000 to $150,000, regardless of the actual amount of damages 
suffered and proven, is prohibited from application under the Ex Post Fact Clause to the 
specified criminal acts occurring prior to the statutes effective date of July 27, 2006. 
The statute, as amended in 2006, contains no language stating that the application is to 
be retroactive. Thus, there is no manifest intent that the statute is to apply retroactively, 
and, accordingly, the statute in effect during the time of the alleged conduct is to apply. 
Landgraf v. USI Film Products, supra, at 1493, ("A statement that a statute will become 
EFTA00175359

Case 9:08-cv-80811-KAM 
Document 78 
Entered on FLSD Docket 05/08/2009 
Page 7 of 25 
v. Epstein, et al. 
Mandatory Victim Restitution Act of 1996 (MVRA) to the defendant whose criminal 
conduct occurred before the effective date of the statute, 18 U.S.C. §3664(f)(1)(A), even 
though the guilty plea and sentencing proceeding occurred after the effective date of the 
statute. On July 19, 1996, the defendant Siegel pleaded guilty to various charges under 
18 U.S.C. §371 and §1956(a)(1)(A), (conspiracy to commit mail and wire fraud, bank 
fraud, and laundering of money instruments; and money laundering). 
He was 
sentenced on March 7, 1997. As part of his sentence, Siegel was ordered to pay 
$1,207,000.00 in restitution under the MVRA which became effective on April 24, 1996. 
Pub.L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, 1229-1236. The 1996 amendments to MVRA 
required that the district court must order restitution in the full amount of the victim's loss 
without consideration of the defendant's ability to pay. Prior to the enactment of the 
MVRA and under the former 18 U.S.C. §3664(a) of the Victim and Witness Protection 
Act of 1982 (VWPA), Pub.l. No. 97-291, 96 Stat. 1248, the court was required to 
consider, among other factors, the defendant's ability to pay in determining the amount 
of restitution. 
When the MVRA was enacted in 1996, Congress stated that the amendments to 
the VWPA "shall, to the extent constitutionally permissible, be effective for sentencing 
proceedings in cases in which the defendant is convicted on or after the date of 
enactment of this Act [Apr. 24, 1996)." Siegel, supra at 1258. The alleged crimes 
occurred between February, 1988 to May, 1990. The Court agreed with the defendant's 
position that 1996 MVRA "should not be applied in reviewing the validity of the court's 
EFTA00175360

(Case 9:08-cv-80811-KAM 
Document 78 
Entered on FLSD Docket 05/08/2009 
Page 9 of 25 
v. Epstein, et al. 
Page 9 
In the instant case, in answering the first question, it is clear that that imposition of 
a minimum amount of damages, regardless of the amount of actual damages suffered 
and proven by a minor victim, is meant to be a penalty or punishment. See statutory 
text and House Bill Reports, cited above herein, consistently referring to the 
presumptive minimum damages amount under §2255 as "punishment" or "penalties? 
According to the Ex Post Facto doctrine, although §2255 is labeled a "civil remedy," 
such label is not dispositive; "if the effect of the statute is to impose punishment that is 
criminal in nature, the ex post facto clause is implicated." See generally, Roman 
Catholic Bishop of Oakland v. Superior Court 28 Cal.Rptr.3d 355, at 360, citing Kansas 
v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 360-61 (1997). The effect of applying the 2006 version of 
§2255 would be to triple the amount of the presumptive minimum damages to a minor 
who proves the elements of her §2255 claim. (Under Plaintiff's attempted approach —
the presumptive minimum would potentially increase from 1.5 million to 4.5 million 
($50,000 X 30; $150,000 X 30). The fact that a plaintiff proceeding under §2255 has to 
prove a violation of a criminal statute to recover damages thereunder, further supports 
that the imposition of a minimum amount, regardless of the amount of a victim's actual 
damages sustained, is meant and was enacted as additional punishment or penalty for 
violation of criminal sexual exploitation and abuse of minors. 
Accordingly, this Court is required to apply the statute in effect at the time of the 
alleged criminal acts. Not only is there no language in the 2006 statute stating that it is 
to apply retroactively, but further, such application of the 2006 version of 18 U.S.C. 
§2255 to acts that occurred prior to its effective date would have a detrimental and 
EFTA00175361

Case 9:08-cv-80811-KAM 
Document 78 
Entered on FLSD Docket 05/08/2009 
Page 11 of 25 
v. Epstein, et al. 
age 11 
When a case implicates a federal statute enacted after the events in suit, the 
court's first task is to determine whether Congress has expressly prescribed the 
statute's proper reach. If Congress has done so, of course, there is no need to 
resort to judicial default rules. When, however, the statute contains no such 
express command, the court must determine whether the new statute would 
have retroactive effect, i.e., whether it would impair rights a party possessed 
when he acted, increase a party's liability for past conduct, or impose new 
duties with respect to transactions already completed. If the statute would 
operate retroactively, our traditional presumption teaches that it does not 
govern absent clear congressional intent favoring such a result. 
Here, there is no clear expression of intent regarding the 2006 Act's application to 
conduct occurring well before its enactment. Clearly, however, as discussed in part B 
herein, the presumptive minimum amount of damages of $150,000 was enacted as a 
punishment or penalty upon those who sexually exploit and abuse minors. 
See 
discussion of House Bill Reports and Congressional background above herein. The 
amount triples the previous amount for which a defendant might be found liable, 
regardless of the amount of actual damages sustained and proven. The new statute 
imposes a substantial increase in the monetary liability for past conduct. (As discussed 
below, Plaintiff also proposes that the minimum damage amount is to apply on a per 
violation basis; the absurdity of such position is further magnified when one considers 
that the presumptive damages amount was tripled to $150,000). 
As stated in Landoraf, "the extent of a party's liability, in the civil context as well as 
the criminal, is an important legal consequence that cannot be ignored." Courts have 
consistently refused to apply a statute which substantially increases a party's liability to 
conduct occurring before the statute's enactment. Landqraf, supra at 284-85. Even if 
the effective date of the Act. The Court determined that statutory text in question, §102, was 
subject to the presumption against statutory retroactivity. 
EFTA00175362

Case 9:08-cv-80811-KAM 
Document 78 
Entered on FLSD Docket 05/08/2009 
Page 13 of 25 
v. Epstein, et al. 
age 13 
count complaint, including a single cause of action pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §2255 (Count 
I), along with 11 other counts based on state law ranging from negligence to intentional 
and negligent infliction of emotional distress. The defendants moved to dismiss Count I 
because "plaintiffs have not pled sufficient facts to satisfy one of the predicate felonies 
mentioned in the statute." 
In describing the remedy created under 18 U.S.C. §2255(a), the Eastern District 
of Pennsylvania stated that the statute "authorizes a civil remedy for personal injuries 
suffered by a minor victim of certain federal felonies, ... ." Id, at 4. In other words, a 
minor, who Is a victim of any of the specified predicate criminal acts, may bring a §2255 
claim "to recover the actual damages such minor sustains," regardless if a plaintiff 
proves one or multiple violations. As long as a plaintiff proves any violation of a 
specified criminal act and that he or she suffered personal injury, he or she is entitled to 
the presumptive minimum of damages imposed by the applicable statute - $50,000 in 
the instant case, even if the amount of actual damages proven is less. Again, the 
statute says nothing about the presumptive damages amount being for each violation or 
incident alleged. 
In her response, (pp. 3-9), Plaintiff at one point states that the express language 
allows for "a separate cause of action for each separate incident," but then goes on to 
rely on statutory interpretation principles applied when the language is vague or 
ambiguous. See p. 4 of response where Plaintiff states - "A review of the wording of 18 
U.S.C. §2255 demonstrates no ambiguity." Plaintiff then references a portion of the 
legislative history and background on "Masha's Law." Plaintiff can cite to no case law 
EFTA00175363

Case 9:08-cv-80811-KAM 
Document 78 
Entered on FLSD Docket 05/08/2009 
Page 15 of 25 
v. Epstein, et al. 
1,15 
Plaintiff's reliance on In re Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. (Konop v. Hawaiin Airlines, 
Inc.I 355 B.R. 225 (D. Hi. 2006), is misplaced. Unlike the Stored Communications Act, 
18 U.S.C. §2707(c), endnote', at issue in the Hawaiian Airlines case, the presumptive 
minimum is tied to the minor or person proving that she or he has suffered personal 
injury, along with actual damages sustained, as a result of any violation. To even bring 
a cause of action under §2255, a "minor/person" must prove a violation of enumerated 
criminal statute and "suffer personal iniury as a result of such violation." Only then 
"shall" such minor "recover the actual damages such minor sustains ... . 
Any 
minor/person as described in the preceding sentence shall be deemed to have 
sustained damages of no less than $50,000/$150,000 in value." The statute at issue In 
Hawaiian Airlines does not address personal injury type damages. Significantly, the 
court found that the Stored Communications Act does not even require that the plaintiff 
prove actual damages or profits made by the violator to recover the statutory cap. 
Recovery under §2255, unlike the Stored Communications Act, is limited to a 
minor/person "who suffers personal injury" and mandates a recover of "actual 
damages," no matter how little is actually proven, of the statutory minimum. 
Hawaiian Airlines actually supports Defendant's position. The Court discussed 
and distinguished the Privacy Act, relying on Doe v. Chao, 540 U.S. 614, 124 S.Ct. 
1204 (2004), which contained similar language to the Stored Communications Act, but 
concluded that $1,000 minimum damage award under the Privacy Act was not subject 
to multiplication on a per violation basis because it was limited to a plaintiff who proves 
actual damages. See endnote 2 for relevant text of Privacy Act.2 In Doe v. Chao, the 
EFTA00175364

Case 9:08-cv-80811-KAM 
Document 78 
Entered on FLSD Docket 05/08/2009 
Page 17 of 25 
la. 
Epstein, et at 
Page 17 
applying the rule of lenity, the Court sided with the Defendants' interpretation of the 
Lacey Act which makes illegal the possession of snook caught in specified jurisdictions. 
The snook had been caught in Nicaraguan waters. The defendants filed a motion to 
dismiss asserting the statute did not encompass snook caught in foreign waters. The 
United States disagreed. Both sides presented reasonable interpretations regarding the 
reach of the statute. In dismissing the indictment, the Court determined that the rule of 
lenity required it to accept defendants' interpretation. 
Also requiring dismissal Plaintiff has failed to sufficiently allege 
the requisite §2266 predicate acts. (Plaintiff's Response, P. 10) 
Also requiring dismissal of Plaintiffs purported §2255 claim(s) is Plaintiff's failure 
to sufficiently allege any violation of a requisite predicate act as specifically identified in 
subsection (a) of the statute. Plaintiff in her response, p. 10, agrees that she has failed 
to sufficiently allege the predicate act(s) required by §2255. Defendant has no objection 
to Plaintiff attempting to amend, but Plaintiff should be required to plead a single cause 
of action under §2255 (2003), without seeking to multiply the presumptive minimum 
damages. 
IV. 18 U.S.C. 42255 does not allow for the recovery of punitive damages. 
Thus, Plaintiff's request for punitive damages under §2265 is required to be 
dismissed or stricken. (Plaintiffs Response, Part III, p. 11-18). 
Plaintiff's reliance on Tachiona v. Mugabe, 216 F.Supp.2d 262 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), 
is misplaced as the federal statute at issue, the Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA), is 
clearly distinguishable. (Plaintiffs response, p. 11). See endnote 3 for relevant text.' 
Unlike §2255 which expressly provides that a successful plaintiff "shall recover the 
actual damages such minor/person sustains," the TVPA simply states that an individual 
EFTA00175365

Case 9:08-cv-80811-KAM 
Document 78 
Entered on FLSD Docket 05/08/2009 
Page 19 of 25 
. v. Epstein, et al. 
.19 
sustained" and imposes a minimum damages amount should plaintiff prove the 
elements of her claim. 
Plaintiffs reference, at p. 13 of her response, to the fact that the legislature 
eliminated a proposed three-fold damages provision in favor of the "actual damages" 
language also supports Defendant's position. Remember, this statute was enacted as 
part of the criminal statutory scheme to punish those who sexually abuse and exploit 
children. In addition to facing the payment of "actual damages" to a minor/person who 
suffered personal injury as a result of predicate act violation, such an individual also 
faces criminal prosecution and the additional accompanying penalties of spending many 
years in jail. Despite Plaintiff's attempted reliance on the legislative discussions and 
history prior to the passage of §2255, the ultimate decision is reflected in the language 
of the statute itself which allows for the recovery of "actual damages," and does not 
include punitive damages. Accordingly, Plaintiff's claim for punitive damages under 18 
U.S.C. §2255 is required to be dismissed/stricken. 
VI. 
Count XXXI — "Sexual Battery" is required to be dismissed for failure to 
state a cause of action. In the alternative, Plaintiff should be required to more 
definitely state whether she is attempting to allege a claim under Florida 
common or statutory law, or some federal law, and further allege the required 
elements and factual allegations. (Response, Part IV, pp. 15-161 
In her response, at p. 16, Plaintiff claims that "Count XXXI — Sexual Battery° is 
brought pursuant to Florida common law. Defendant stands on his original motion. If 
Plaintiff Is proceeding under Florida common law, then she should more definitely state 
such cause of action pleading the requisite elements of a common law sexual battery 
EFTA00175366

Case 9:08-cv-80811-KAM 
Document 78 
Entered on FLSD Docket 05/08/2009 
Page 21 of 25 
MIv. Epstein, at al. 
Page 21 
By: 
ROBERT D. 
TTON, JR., ESQ. 
Florida Bar No 224162 
rcritAbcIclaw.com 
MICHAEL J. PIKE, ESQ. 
Florida Bar #617296 
mpikeRbcIclaw.com 
BURMAN, CRITTON, LUTTIER & COLEMAN 
515 N. Flagler Drive, Suite 400 
giltF 
axhon e 
ch, FL 33401 
(Counsel for Defendant Jeffrey Epstein) 
See 18 U.S.C. §27074, of the Stored Communications Act for provision at issue. 
Title 18. Crimes and Criminal Procedure 
Part I. Crimes 
Chapter 121. Stored Wire and Electronic Communications and Transactional 
Records Access 
§ 2707. Civil action 
(a) Cause of action.--Except as provided in section 2703(e), any provider of 
electronic communication service, subscriber, or other person aggrieved by any 
violation of this chapter in which the conduct constituting the violation is engaged in 
with a knowing or intentional state of mind may, in a civil action, recover from the 
person or entity, other than the United States, which engaged in that violation such 
relief as may be appropriate. 
(b) Relief.--In a civil action under this section, appropriate relief includes--
(1) such preliminary and other equitable or declaratory relief as may be appropriate; 
(2) damages under subsection (c); and 
(3) a reasonable attorney's fee and other litigation costs reasonably incurred. 
(c) Damages.--The court may assess as damages in a civil action under this 
EFTA00175367

Case 9:08-cv-80811-KAM 
Document 78 
Entered on FLSD Docket 05/08/2009 
Page 23 of 25 
v. Epstein, et al. 
1.23 
functions of the officer or governmental entity making the disclosure, is a violation of 
this chapter. This provision shall not apply to information previously lawfully 
disclosed (prior to the commencement of any civil or administrative proceeding 
under this chapter) to the public by a Federal, State, or local governmental entity or 
by the plaintiff in a civil action under this chapter. 
2 
See §552a(g)(4), in bold, for relevant section of statute. 
Title 5. Government Organization and Employees 
Part I. The Agencies Generally 
Chapter 5. Administrative Procedure 
Subchapter II. Administrative Procedure 
*§ 552a. Records maintained on individuals 
(g)(1) Civil remedies.--Whenever any agency 
(A) makes a determination under subsection (d)(3) of this section not to amend 
an individual's record in accordance with his request, or fails to make such review in 
conformity with that subsection; 
(B) refuses to comply with an individual request under subsection (d)(1) of this 
section; 
(C) fails to maintain any record concerning any individual with such accuracy, 
relevance, timeliness, and completeness as is necessary to assure fairness in any 
determination relating to the qualifications, character, rights, or opportunities of, or 
benefits to the individual that may be made on the basis of such record, and 
consequently a determination is made which is adverse to the individual; or 
(D) fails to comply with any other provision of this section, or any rule 
promulgated thereunder, in such a way as to have an adverse effect on an 
individual, 
the individual may bring a civil action against the agency, and the district courts of 
the United States shall have jurisdiction in the matters under the provisions of this 
subsection. 
(2)(A) In any suit brought under the provisions of subsection (g)(1)(A) of this 
section, the court may order the agency to amend the individual's record In 
accordance with his request or in such other way as the court may direct. In such a 
case the court shall determine the matter de novo. 
EFTA00175368

Case 9:08-cv-80811-KAM 
Document 78 
Entered on FLSD Docket 05/08/2009 
Page 25 of 25 
v. Epstein, et al. 
1.5 
(Emphasis addled). 
EFTA00175369

Case 9:08-cv-80811-KAM 
Document 39 
Entered on FLSD Docket 02/09/2009 
Page 1 of 91 
VS. 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA 
CASE NO.: 08-CV-80811-CIV-MARRA/JOHNSON 
Plaintiff(s), 
alY
EPSTEIN and 
Defendant(s). 
FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT 
Parties, Jurisdiction and Venue 
COMES NOW the Plaintiff, a, 
and brings this First Amended Complaint 
against the Defendants, JEFFREY EPSTEIN and 
an 
and states as 
follows: 
1. 
This is an action for damages in excess of $75,000.00, exclusive of 
interest and costs. 
2. 
This Complaint is brought under a fictitious name in order to protect the 
identity of the Plaintiff, a, 
because this Complaint makes allegation of sexual 
assault and child abuse of a then minor. 
3. 
At all times material to this cause of action, the Plaintiff, 
was a 
resident of Palm Beach County, Florida. 
EFTA00175370

Case 9:08-cv-80811-KAM 
Document 39 
Entered on FLSD Docket 02/09/2009 
Page 3 of 91 
vs. Epstein, et al. 
08-CV-80811-CIV-MARRA/JOHNSON 
First Amended Complaint 
Defendant, JEFFREY EPSTEIN'S, residence by the Defendant's employees and 
assistants. When the employees and assistants left the then minor Plaintiff and other 
minor girls alone in a room at the Defendant's mansion, the Defendant, JEFFREY 
EPSTEIN, himself would appear, remove his clothing, and direct the then minor Plaintiff 
to remove her clothing. He would then perform one or more lewd, lascivious, and 
sexual acts, including, but not limited to, masturbation, touching of the then minor 
Plaintiff's breasts and buttock, and solicitation and enticement of the then minor Plaintiff 
to engage in sexual acts with another female in JEFFREY EPSTEIN'S presence. 
11. 
The Plaintiff, 
, was the first brought to the Defendant, JEFFREY 
EPSTEIN'S, mansion in late May or early June of 2002, when she was fifteen-years old 
and in middle school. 
12. 
The Defendant, JEFFREY EPSTEIN, a wealthy financier with a lavish 
home, significant wealth, a network of assistants and employees, used his resources 
and his influence over a vulnerable minor child to engage in a systematic pattern of 
sexually exploitive behavior. 
13. 
Beginning in approximately late May or early June of 2002, and continuing 
until approximately August of 2003, the Defendant coerced and enticed the 
Impressionable, vulnerable, and economically deprived then minor Plaintiff to commit 
various acts of sexual misconduct. These acts occurred, on average, one to three times 
per week from late May or early June of 2002 until August of 2003. At a bare minimum, 
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Case 9:08-cv-80811-KAM 
Document 39 
Entered on FLSD Docket 02/09/2009 
Page 5 of 91 
Mt vs. Epstein, et al. 
Case No.: 08-CV-80811-CIV-MARRA/JOHNSON 
First Amended Complaint 
exploitation of minor children, prostitution, sexual performance by a child, lewd and 
lascivious assaults, sexual battery, contributing the delinquency of a minor and other 
crimes, specifically including, but not limited to, those crimes designated in 18 USC 
§2241, §2242, §2243, §2421, and §2423, criminal offenses outlined In Chapter 800 of 
the Federal Codes, as well as those designated in Florida Statutes §796.03, §796.07, 
§796.045, §796.04, §39.01; and §827.04. 
16. 
The above-described acts took place in Palm Beach County, Florida, at 
the residence of the Defendant, JEFFREY EPSTEIN. Any assertions by the Defendant, 
JEFFREY EPSTEIN, that he was unaware of the age of the then minor Plaintiff are 
belled by his actions and rendered irrelevant by the provisions of applicable Florida 
Statutes concerning the sexual exploitation and abuse of a minor child. The Defendant, 
JEFFREY EPSTEIN, at all times material to this cause of action, knew and should have 
known of the Plaintiff, 
.'s minority. 
17. 
In June 2008, in the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit in Palm Beach County, 
Florida, the Defendant, JEFFREY EPSTEIN, entered pleas of "guilty" to various Florida 
state crimes involving the solicitation of minors for prostitution and the procurement of 
minors for the purpose of prostitution. 
18. 
As a condition of that plea, and in exchange for the Federal Government 
not prosecuting the Defendant, JEFFREY EPSTEIN, for numerous federal offenses, 
Defendant, JEFFREY EPSTEIN, additionally entered into an agreement with the 
5 
EFTA00175372

Case 9:08-cv-80811-KAM 
Document 39 
Entered on FLSD Docket 02/09/2009 
Page 7 of 91 
Case o.: 
Epstein, et al. 
Case o.: 08-CV-80811-CIV-MARRA/JOHNSON 
First Amended Complaint 
21. 
In late May or early June of 2002, 
. was first introduced to 
Defendant, JEFFREY EPSTEIN. 
. was brought to JEFFREY EPSTEIN'S 
residence by a female friend of hers. 
sat on the couch while the female friend 
took off her own clothes, mounted JEFFREY EPSTEIN who was wearing only a towel 
and lying on a table, and performed a sexual act upon JEFFREY EPSTEIN in the 
presence of 
In exchange for her participation as an observer of JEFFREY 
EPSTEIN'S lewd and lascivious conduct, 
was paid $300 by JEFFREY 
EPSTEIN. 
22. 
As a condition of the Defendant, JEFFREY EPSTEIN's criminal plea, and 
in exchange for the Federal Government not prosecuting the Defendant for numerous 
federal offenses, the Defendant, JEFFREY EPSTEIN, additionally entered into an 
agreement with the Federal Government to the following: "Any person, who while a 
minor, was a victim of an offense enumerated in Title 18, United States Code, Section 
2255, will have the same rights to proceed under section 2255 as she would have had, 
if Mr. Epstein had been tried federally and convicted of an enumerated offense. For 
purposes of implementing this paragraph, the United States shall provide Mr. Epstein's 
attorneys with a list of individuals whom it was prepared to name in an indictment as 
victims of an enumerated offense by Mr. Epstein. Any judicial authority interpreting this 
provision, including any authority determining evidentiary burdens if any a Plaintiff must 
meet, shall consider that it is the intent of the parties to place these identified victims in 
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EFTA00175373