EFTA00102999

355 ("It is well established that '[w]hether to prosecute and what charge to file or bring before a 
grand jury are decisions that generally rest in the prosecutor's discretion,' and 'a defendant has no 
constitutional right to elect which of two applicable federal statutes shall be the basis of his 
indictment and prosecution . . . .'" (brackets and ellipses in original) (quoting United States v. 
Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 124 (1979)). 
Only after the Court has heard all of the evidence at trial and received the jury's verdict 
will the defense motion be ripe. Accordingly, the motion should be denied as premature. 
X. 
The Defendant's Various Disclosure Motions Should be Denied 
Maxwell's motions also include an assortment of requests for orders requiring the 
Government to make various disclosures, all of which are meritless or, at best, premature. 
A. 
Bill of Particulars Is Not Warranted 
First, the defendant moves for a bill of particulars, demanding the Government set out an 
array of details regarding the Government's theory of its case and anticipated witness testimony. 
The defendant, like all defendants, is entitled to sufficient information to understand the charges 
against her, to prepare a defense, and to protect against double jeopardy. 
However, the 
Government has provided such information, and much more, in the Indictment, extensive 
discovery, and various pretrial filings, including this memorandum. The defendant will also 
receive trial exhibits, a witness list, and Jencks Act material reasonably in advance of trial. As 
such, she has not established an entitlement to a bill of particulars under well-established governing 
law. 
1. 
Applicable Law 
The proper purpose of a bill of particulars under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 7(f) 
is "to provide defendant with information about the details of the charge against him if this is 
174 
EFTA00103199

necessary to the preparation of his defense, and to avoid prejudicial surprise at trial." United States 
v. Torres, 901 F.2d 205, 234 (2d Cir. 1990), abrogated on other grounds by United States v. 
Marcus, 628 F.3d 36, 41 (2d Cir.2010) (emphasis added) (internal quotation mark omitted). 
Accordingly, "[a] bill of particulars is required `only where the charges of the indictment are so 
general that they do not advise the defendant of the specific acts of which he is accused.' United 
States v. Walsh, 194 F.3d 37, 47 (2d Cir. 1999) (quoting Torres, 901 F.2d at 234); see United 
States v. Mahabub, No. 13 Cr. 908 (AJN), 2014 WL 4243657, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 26, 2014). 
In exercising its broad discretion to determine whether the charges are so general that they 
require supplementation through a bill of particulars, the Court should consider not just the text of 
the Indictment, but also discovery and other information supplied to the defendant to date. See 
United States v. Bortnovsky, 820 F.2d 572, 574 (2d Cir. 1987); see also, e.g., Pierre-Louis, 2018 
WL 4043140, at *7 (denying request for bill of particulars where indictment charged sex 
trafficking conspiracy spanning two decades because indictment and discovery "would suggest 
that defendant has enough information to apprise him of the charges with enough precision to 
enable him to prepare a defense, avoid unfair surprise at trial, and preclude a second prosecution 
for the same offense"); United States v. Block, No. 16 Cr. 595 (JPO), 2017 WL 1608905, at *6-7 
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 28, 2017) (denying request for bill of particulars as to alleged fraud and unindicted 
co-conspirators where indictment sufficiently advised defendant of nature of charges against him 
and described with specificity acts he allegedly committed, nature of conspiracy, and explained in 
language closely tracking statute crimes alleged); United States v. Monserrate, No. 10 Cr. 965 
(CM), 2011 WL 3480957, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 2011) (denying request for bill of particulars 
where discovery and indictment was "sufficient to apprise the defendant of the charge" and to 
allow him to prepare for trial); United States v. Trippe, 171 F. Supp. 2d 230, 240 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) 
175 
EFTA00103200

(denying bill of particulars request in stock fraud case where indictment was fifteen pages long 
and substantial discovery had been provided). 
Although the Government cannot provide "mountains of documents to defense counsel" 
as a substitute for a bill of particulars where one would otherwise be required, see Bortnovsky, 820 
F.2d at 575, the provision of voluminous discovery in combination with some guidance about what 
is most relevant can vitiate a need for further particulars, see, e.g., United States v. Mandell, 710 
F. Supp. 2d 368, 385 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (denying request for particularization of alleged 
misrepresentations where the indictment was thirty-four pages long and Government had provided 
voluminous, organized discovery). In no event should volume of discovery alone warrant a bill of 
particulars; "[w]hile [a] [c]ourt may sympathize with counsel's task of reviewing a large quantity 
of materials that continue to be produced," that concern is addressed by granting the defense 
sufficient time in which to conduct the review in advance of trial. See United States v. Levy, No. 
11 Cr. 62 (PAC), 2013 WL 664712, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 2013). 
A bill of particulars would undoubtedly be helpful to the defense in any case. But "the law 
does not impose upon the Government an obligation to preview its case or expose its legal 
theories," United States v. Leonelli, 428 F. Supp. 880, 882 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), and therefore "[t]he 
ultimate test must be whether the information sought is necessary, not whether it is helpful." 
United States v. Mitlof, 165 F. Supp. 2d 558, 569 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (emphasis added); Mahabub, 
2014 WL 4243657, at *2 ("The purpose of a bill of particulars is to ensure that a defendant has the 
information necessary to prepare a defense, not to turn over all information that would aid the 
defendant."); United States v. Rittweger, 259 F. Supp. 2d 275, 292-93 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (denying 
bill of particulars request as "'an impermissible attempt to compel the Government to provide the 
176 
EFTA00103201

evidentiary details of its case' (quoting United States v. Biaggi, 675 F. Supp. 790, 810 (S.D.N.Y. 
1987)). 
A bill of particulars should not be misused to compel the Government to disclose "the 
manner in which it will attempt to prove the charges, the precise manner in which the defendant 
committed the crime charged, or a preview of the Government's evidence or legal theories." 
Mitlof, 165 F. Supp. 2d at 569; see also Torres, 901 F.2d at 234 ("Acquisition of evidentiary detail 
is not the function of the bill of particulars.' (quoting Hemphill v. United States, 392 F.2d 45, 49 
(8th Cir. 1968))). The "wheres, whens and with whoms"' are "beyond the scope of a bill of 
particulars." Mitlof, 165 F. Supp. 2d at 569 (citing Torres, 901 F.2d at 233-34; Jimenez, 824 F. 
Supp. 351, 363 (S.D.N.Y. 1993)); see also, e.g., United States v. D 'Amico, 734 F. Supp. 2d 321, 
335 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) ("A bill of particulars is not a general investigative tool, a discovery device 
or a means to compel the government to disclose evidence or witnesses to be offered prior to trial."' 
(quoting United States v. Gibson, 175 F. Supp. 2d 532, 537 (S.D.N.Y. 2001))); United States v. 
Bellomo, 263 F. Supp. 2d 561, 580 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) ("A bill of particulars is not designed to: 
obtain the government's evidence; restrict the government's evidence prior to trial; assist the 
defendant's investigation; obtain the precise way in which the government intends to prove its 
case; interpret its evidence for the defendant, or disclose its legal theory."); United States v. Henry, 
861 F. Supp. 1190, 1197 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) ("This instrument should not function to disclose 
evidence, witnesses, and legal theories to be offered by the Government at trial or as a general 
investigative tool for the defense."). 
There are good reasons why bills of particulars are warranted only where the allegations in 
the indictment, as supplemented by discovery and other disclosures, are so general as to render it 
impossible to prepare a defense. Because "a bill of particulars confines the Government's proof 
177 
EFTA00103202

to particulars furnished," it can "restrict unduly the Government's ability to present its case." 
Henry, 861 F. Supp. at 1197; see also Minot 2014 WL 4243657, at *2 (recognizing that "care 
must be taken" because "[t]he government's presentation of evidence at trial is limited to the 
particulars contained in the bill"); United States v. Samsonov, No. 07 Cr. 1198 (CM), 2009 WL 
176721, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 23, 2009) ("The vehicle of a bill of particulars serves to inform a 
defendant of the nature of the charge, when he is otherwise insufficiently informed, and must not 
be misused to compel disclosure of how much the Government can prove, nor to foreclose the 
Government from using proof it may develop as the trial approaches."). Moreover, where the 
Government's provision of particulars is tantamount to an itemized preview of its proof, it creates 
the very real danger that a defendant will "tailor her testimony to explain away the Government's 
case." Henry, 861 F. Supp. at 1197. These concerns animate the rule that "if the defendant has 
been given adequate notice of the charges against her and can prepare fully for trial with reasonably 
diligent efforts, the Government cannot be required to disclose additional details about its case." 
Id. 
2. 
Discussion 
There is no basis for a bill of particulars in this case. The charges against the defendant 
are clear from the face of the Indictment, which provides significant detail regarding the charged 
crimes. As is apparent from the 18-page Indictment, the charges concern the defendant's 
participation in conspiracies to transport and entice minor girls to travel with the intent that they 
engage in illegal sex acts with Jeffrey Epstein from 1994 through 1997, and the defendant's attempt 
to cover up that conduct during her civil deposition testimony in 2016. Specifically, the Indictment 
makes plain that the defendant is charged with engaging in a conspiracy to transport minor girls 
with intent that they engage in sexual activity with Epstein, engaging in a conspiracy to entice 
178 
EFTA00103203

minor girls to travel with the intent that they engage in sexual activity with Epstein, aiding and 
abetting the transportation and enticement of a particular minor girl interstate for the purpose of 
engaging in sex acts with Epstein, and lying about those same crimes during her 2016 civil 
deposition testimony. The charged time periods are made plain in each count, as is the statute she 
is accused of violating. 
The speaking Indictment in this case goes above and beyond a mere recitation of the 
elements of each offense by detailing the defendant's specific role in the crimes charged. Among 
other things, it specifies three minor victims in particular and describes the steps the defendant 
took with respect to each as part of the charged crimes. See, e.g., Indictment ¶ 7. Additionally, 
the Indictment details the types of sex acts that Epstein committed with the minor victims as part 
of the charged crimes and the locations where those acts occurred. See, e.g., id. ¶ 5-6. In this way, 
the Indictment makes clear the Government's theory that the defendant groomed three minor girls 
to engage in sex acts in Florida, New Mexico, New York, and London with Epstein between 1994 
and 1997. The Indictment further specifies during which portion of that period each of those three 
victims interacted with the defendant and Epstein as minors. See id. 17. Additionally, the 
Indictment identifies the precise answers that the Government alleges constituted perjury, and 
alleges facts, in the earlier portions of the Indictment, that indicate how and why the Government 
will seek to prove the answers were false. Compare id. ¶¶ 21, 23 with id. ¶¶ 1-11. Simply put, 
this is not a case in which the allegations in the Indictment "are so general that they do not advise 
the defendant of the specific acts of which he is accused." Walsh, 194 F.3d at 47 (internal quotation 
mark omitted) (quoting Torres, 901 F.2d at 234). Thus, the Indictment itself provides a sufficient 
basis to deny the defendant's motion in its entirety. See, e.g., United States v. Bonventre, 646 F 
App'x 73, 79 (2d Cir. 2016) ("1E]videntiaty detail is not the function of the bill of particulars.' 
179 
EFTA00103204

Particulars are necessary only where indictment charges are `so general that they do not advise the 
defendant of the specific acts of which he is accused.'" (internal citation omitted) (quoting Torres, 
901 F.2d at 234; United States v. Chen, 378 F.3d 151, 163 (2d Cir. 2004))); United States v. Wedd, 
No. 15 Cr. 616 (ICBF), 2016 WL 1055737, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 10, 2016) (denying motion for 
bill of particulars where "the Indictment is a `speaking' Indictment that provides a significant 
amount of detail as to the Government's theory of the case and the nature of the proof that will 
underlie the charges at trial"). 
Additional particularity relating to the details of the counts in the Indictment might be 
helpful for the defendant, but that is both true in every case and not the appropriate standard. 
Instead, the inquiry is properly focused on whether the information already available to her is so 
general that a bill of particulars is necessary to the preparation of her defense. Plainly it is not. In 
addition to the speaking Indictment, the defendant has received over 2.7 million pages of discovery 
in this case. Although that is a high volume of discovery, it is clear from the defense's own motion 
that the defense has apparently already reviewed that material (at least in significant part), 
identified relevant materials therein, and is aware of their relevance to the allegations in the 
Indictment. (See, e.g., Def. Mot. 10 at 6). Indeed, much of the discovery is text searchable, and 
the time period that each document relates to is readily ascertainable. 
In this vein, the defendant has received 
61 
61 Records of commercial flights were unavailable by the time the Government opened its 
investigation in this case. Accordingly, the Government has no records of commercial flights that 
the defendant, Epstein, or any victims may have taken during the relevant period. 
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EFTA00103205

and the Government has provided the defense with the 
birth month and year of each minor victim.6z
In other words, as the Government has previously indicated, the discovery provides the 
defendant with more than sufficient information about the three minor victims to permit her to 
prepare for trial. The discovery also provides the defense the ability to identify specific private 
plane flights that are relevant to the Indictment. Any remaining detail regarding the specifics of 
abuse, particular interactions, and additional trips will come from witness testimony. As is to be 
expected when describing events more than two decades in the past, that testimony will provide 
approximate time periods when events occurred, rather than specific dates. Given the information 
the defendant already has from the discovery, the Indictment, and the Government's court filings 
(including this memorandum), any additional detail would essentially serve as early Jencks Act 
production, allowing the defendant to tailor any testimony to the Government's case. The 
discovery gives the defense ample information to assist in its investigation, and given the defense's 
In this memorandum, the Government has also clarified that Minor Victim-3 was 17 years old 
at the time of the events described in the Indictment involving her. See Section VIII, supra. 
181 
EFTA00103206

apparent ability to understand who the three victims are from the productions, there is no real 
concern that the defense will waste efforts conducting any such investigation before receiving 
Jencks Act material.' 
Moreover, with respect to the perjury counts, to the extent there could plausibly be any 
remaining ambiguity about the nature of the charges, the Government has addressed and resolved 
such ambiguity in responding to the instant motions. In this memorandum, the Government has 
summarized how the defendant's false statements during her deposition were material to the 
pending civil litigation. See Section V, supra. Perhaps more importantly, the defendant personally 
participated in that civil litigation, and she is undoubtedly quite familiar with it. 
Together, the discovery productions, briefing in which the Government has described 
aspects of its evidence and theory (see, e.g., Government Memorandum in Opposition to Renewed 
Bail Motion, Dec. 18, 2020, Dkt. No. 100, at 8-12), the contents of this memorandum, and the 
details contained in the Indictment more than adequately inform the defendant of the charges 
against her. This is simply not a case where the "relevance of key events [are] shrouded in 
mystery." See Bortnovsky, 820 F.2d at 574. Accordingly, the Court should deny the motion for a 
bill of particulars. 
B. 
The Defendant's Requests for Early Production of a Witness List and Jencks 
Act Material Should Be Denied 
1. 
Applicable Law 
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16 "does not require the Government to furnish the 
names and addresses of its witnesses in general." United States v. Bejasa, 904 F.2d 137, 139 (2d 
63 Although the victims' identities are clear from the discovery, and the defendant's motion makes 
clear that she strongly suspects their identities, there is no basis to require the Government to turn 
over the names of its witnesses, including its victim-witnesses in advance of its Jencks Act 
production, which is customary in this District. See Section X.B., infra. 
182 
EFTA00103207

Cir. 1990). Thus, "Iiin the absence of a specific showing that disclosure [of a witness list] [is] 
both material to the preparation of [the] defense and reasonable in light of the circumstances 
surrounding [the] case,' the request for a witness list should be denied." United States v. Russo, 
483 F. Supp. 2d 301, 309 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (quoting Bejasa, 904 F.2d at 139-40). "Courts in the 
Second Circuit typically deny motions for the early disclosure of witness lists where, as here, 
Defendants have not made a specific showing of need." United States v. Rivera, No. 16 Cr. 175 
(LGS), 2017 WL 1843302, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. May 8, 2017). The claim that "given the complexity 
of the case, disclosure of the government witness list will level the playing field" amounts to an 
"abstract statement of need" that does not justify provision of a witness list. Russo, 483 F. Supp. 
2d at 309. 
The Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500, covers disclosure of statements or reports made by 
Government witnesses, and the rule mandates that such materials not be the subject of discovery 
or inspection "until said witness has testified on direct examination in the trial of the case." 18 
U.S.C. § 3500(a); see also United States v. Coppa, 267 F.3d 132, 145 (2d Cir. 2001) ("[T]he Jencks 
Act prohibits a District Court from ordering the pretrial disclosure of witness statements."); United 
States v. Thompson, No. 13 Cr. 378 (AN), 2013 WL 6246489, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 3, 2013) 
(denying request for early production of Jencks Act material in light of Coppa). 
Typically in this District, and as is the case here, the Government confirms that it will 
produce 3500 material and Giglio (or impeachment) material reasonably in advance of trial, and 
will engage in good faith discussions with the defense regarding a schedule for pretrial disclosures. 
See United States v. Sergentakis, No. 05 Cr. 230 (JFK), 2005 WL 1994014, at *1-2 (S.D.N.Y. 
Aug. 17, 2005) ("18 U.S.C. § 3500(b) calls for production of Government witness statements after 
the witness `has testified on direct examination.' The Government response ... that '[c]onsistent 
183 
EFTA00103208

with the regular practice in this District, the Government intends to make Section 3500 material 
available to the defense at the same time as impeachment material, [and that] in order to avoid any 
delay in the trial, the Government will produce such material sufficiently in advance of each 
Government witness's testimony' ... is more than adequate."); United States v. Gallo, No. 98 Cr. 
338 (JGK), 1999 WL 9848, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 11, 1999) ("[T]he Government has indicated that 
it is aware of its obligations under Giglio .. . and the Jencks Act and that it will provide the required 
information to the defendants in accordance with its responsibilities under Giglio and the Jencks 
Act sufficiently in advance of each witness's testimony to allow adequate time to prepare for cross-
examination. These representations are sufficient."). 
2. 
Discussion 
Trial is still more than four months away. The degree of complexity to this case, and the 
volume of discovery, is on par with other recent high-profile trials in this District, and in those 
cases witnesses have typically been disclosed approximately three to four weeks before trial. E.g., 
Gatto, 17 Cr. 686 (LAK); Blaszczak, 17 Cr. 357 (LAK); Skelos, 15 Cr. 317 (ICMW); Silver, 15 Cr. 
93 (VEC); Uthricht, 14 Cr. 68 (KBF). As the Government has noted for some time now, the 
Government intends to match or even go above and beyond that practice in this case. Specifically, 
the Government has offered repeatedly to provide non-testifying witness statements to the defense 
as much as eight weeks before trial, thereby allowing extra time for the defense to determine 
whether it wishes to call any of the witnesses the Government does not intend to present at trial, 
and to provide testifying witness statements and Giglio material as much as four weeks in advance 
of trial. Given that the defense has already been able to initiate its investigation of the charges, 
and given that the discovery makes clear who the three minor victims are, eight weeks should be 
ample time to review non-testifying witness statements, and four weeks is more than enough time 
184 
EFTA00103209

to review the statements of testifying witnesses. The Government remains open to engaging in 
good faith discussions with the defense to mutually agree on a schedule for reciprocal pretrial 
disclosures.64 Accordingly, the motion for a witness list and early production of Jencks Act 
material should be denied. 
C. 
The Defendant's Additional Requests for Disclosure Should Be Denied 
The defendant also makes a variety of motions seeking disclosures to which she is not 
entitled, all of which should be denied. 
First, the defendant requests 
, which the defense attached to their motion as Exhibit B. (Def. Mot. 
10 at 7-8). The defense assumes that because 
thereby, according to the defense, rendering any record of 
those interviews exculpatory. But that defense theory rests on a faulty premise. The Government 
has reviewed the document memorializing 
and 
confirmed that it inculpates the defendant and contains nothing exculpatory. The Government has 
also reviewed 
and 
confirmed that it also inculpates the defendant. The Government has, however, identified a single 
line in 
that could arguably be considered helpful to 
the defense.65 With the possible exception of that one line, there is nothing exculpatory contained 
6° The Government has requested reciprocal discovery from the defendant and, to date, she has 
produced nothing. 
65 In articular 
185 
EFTA00103210

in 
. Accordingly, the records of 
these interviews constitute witness statements covered by the Jencks Act and are not subject to 
disclosure by statute until after each witness has completed direct examination at trial. See 18 
U.S.C. § 3500. As noted above, however, the Government fully intends to provide all Jencks Act 
material of both testifying and non-testifying witnesses, which will of course include the records 
relating to these interviews, to the defense multiple weeks in advance of trial. The Government 
respectfully submits that is sufficient to meet its obligations with respect to these documents, and 
the defendant's motion for their immediate disclosure should be denied. 
Second, the defendant's request for an unredacted copy of the FBI report attached to the 
Defense Motion as Exhibit C should be denied as moot because the Government has already 
produced an unredacted copy of that report to the defense. (Def. Mot. 10 at 8-9). Specifically, the 
document was produced without redactions under bates numbers SDNY_GM_00380550 through 
SDNY GM 00380554 as part of the Government's discovery production dated November 9, 
2020." This motion should accordingly be denied as moot. 
Third, the defendant's request for unredacted copies of the FBI report regarding-
is based purely on her speculation that the redacted portions 
of those materials contain exculpatory information. (Def. Mot. 10 at 8-9). Once again, the 
Out of an abundance of caution, toda the Government has informed defense counsel 
of this single line 
Notably, the unredacted report does not contain 
demonstrating that defense counsel's speculation about 
supposed Brady material lurking beneath redactions is inaccurate. The redacted copy defense 
counsel attached as Exhibit C was recovered during the execution of a search warrant for one of 
Epstein's devices and was produced to defense counsel in the form in which it was recovered from 
the device. In other words, defense counsel has received two copies of this same document: the 
redacted version that Epstein had on one of his devices, and the unredacted version from the FBI's 
files. 
186 
EFTA00103211

Government has reviewed the full report and confirmed that there is nothing exculpatory contained 
therein. To the contrary, the report inculpates the defendant. Accordingly, the defendant is not 
entitled to its immediate disclosure. The Government will produce an unredacted version of this 
document together with all other witness statements in advance of trial.' 
Fourth, the defense requests production of pages from a personal diary that is in the custody 
of a civilian third party and is not in the custody or control of the Government. (Def. Mot. 10 at 
10). Leaving aside the fact that the defense cites no authority for the proposition that the 
Government has an obligation to obtain the personal papers of a third party, see United States v. 
Collins, 409 F. Supp. 3d 228, 239 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) ("The Government's 'Brady obligations extend 
only to materials within prosecutors' possession, custody or control or, in appropriate cases, that 
of the Department of Justice, perhaps another part of the Executive Branch, or a comparable state 
authority involved in the federal prosecution.'" (quoting United States v. Blaszczak, 308 F. Supp. 
3d 736, 742 (S.D.N.Y. 2018))), the Government has already represented that it has asked the third 
party at issue about the materials the defendant purports to seek and that no such materials exist. 
In particular, to the extent the defense is concerned with whether there are diary entries from the 
spring of 1996, the Government has already indicated in response to the defendant's second bail 
motion that it is aware of none. (See Dkt. No. 100 at 11 n. 2 ("Because this victim stopped writing 
in her journal about a month after that first meeting with Epstein, there are no entries regarding the 
subsequent trip she took months later to visit Epstein, during which she met the defendant. This 
victim provided the Government with copies of her journal entries relating to Epstein and informed 
the Government that the remaining entries are personal in nature and have nothing to do with 
67 As is the case with the other redacted document referenced in this motion, the redacted copy 
defense counsel attached as Exhibit D was recovered during the execution of a search warrant for 
one of Epstein's devices and was produced to defense counsel in the form in which it was 
recovered from the device. 
187 
EFTA00103212

Epstein or the defendant.")). In other words, the defendant again seeks supposedly exculpatory 
evidence that does not exist. The defendant offers no basis on which to conclude that this 
representation is false or that any such evidence does in fact exist. As such, this motion should be 
denied. 
Fifth, the defendant asks this Court, again without citing any legal authority, to order the 
Government to produce copies of all subpoenas it has issued for the defendant's records as part of 
its investigation in this case. (Def. Mot. 10 at 11). This incredibly broad request is nothing more 
than a fishing expedition inappropriately seeking the details of investigative requests made through 
the grand jury process. The defense has cited no legal basis for the Court to direct the Government 
to provide the defense with copies of the subpoenas themselves (as opposed to records or other 
materials received in response to such subpoenas), let alone every subpoena issued for the 
defendant's records during a multi-year and ongoing grand jury investigation. The types of 
requests issued by the grand jury have no conceivable bearing on the defense or on any motion the 
defense may seek to bring. The Government has already produced to the defense all discoverable 
material that it has received in response to subpoenas issued to date during this investigation. In 
the absence of any legal authority justifying this request, it should be denied. Additionally, for the 
reasons discussed above in Sections I and IV, the defendant is not entitled to discovery or a hearing 
relating to her motion to dismiss the Indictment based on the NPA or her motion to suppress 
subpoena returns. 
Sixth, the defendant asks the Court to direct the Government to immediately disclose any 
Brady and Giglio material. (Def. Mot. 10 at 11-13). The motion for disclosure of Brady material 
should be denied as moot because the Government has conducted a search for any such material 
and has already disclosed any potentially exculpatory information in its possession of which it is 
188 
EFTA00103213

aware, consistent with the Rule 5(f) Brady order previously issued by the Court in this case. See 
Fed. R. Crim. P. 5(f); Dkt. No. 68. The Government recognizes its continuing obligation to 
disclose any Brady material, and to make a diligent search for any relevant material that may be 
in the possession of the prosecution team, including investigating agents and officers. As the 
Government has already emphasized in this case, the Government takes its disclosure obligations 
very seriously and has committed to being transparent with the Court and the defense regarding its 
approach to obtaining and reviewing files, including other agency files, that may be relevant to 
this case. (See, e.g., Gov't Letter dated October 7, 2020, Dkt. No. 63). Consistent with that 
commitment, the Government has completed an initial review of its files for Brady material and 
Rule 16 material and has produced more than 2.7 million pages of discovery as a result of that 
review. These productions have included specific disclosures of certain witness statements that 
may arguably be exculpatory. The Government also intends to produce all statements and potential 
impeachment material in its possession regarding any potential witness identified during its 
investigation, including those individuals whom the Government does not intend to call at trial. 
As discussed below, the Government is in the process of reviewing all files in its possession for 
potential impeachment material. The Government remains cognizant of its Brady obligations and 
will promptly produce any potentially exculpatory material if any is identified during that review. 
The Government is not currently aware of any undisclosed Brady material in its possession, 
but it will certainly provide timely disclosure of any additional Brady material if any such material 
comes to light. Courts in this Circuit routinely deny specific requests for Brady material where, 
as here, the Government has made a good-faith representation to the court and defense counsel 
that it recognizes and has complied with its disclosure obligations under Brady. See, e.g., 
Thompson, 2013 WL 6246489 at *9 ("In light of the Government's 'good-faith representation to 
189 
EFTA00103214

the court and defense counsel that it recognizes and has complied with its disclosure obligations 
under Brady,' 
defendants' 
request 
for 
immediate 
or 
otherwise 
early 
production of Brady materials is denied." (internal citation omitted) (quoting United States v. 
Perez, 940 F. Supp. 540, 553 (S.D.N.Y.1996))); Gallo, 1999 WL 9848, at *8 (denying defendant's 
motion to compel production of purported Brady material based on Government's representations 
that "it is aware of its obligations under Brady . . . and will produce any Brady material to the 
defense well before trial"); United States v. Campo Flores, No. 15 Cr. 765 (PAC), 2016 WL 
5946472, at *II (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 12, 2016) ("The Government represents that it is aware of its 
obligation under Brady; that it has complied; and will continue to comply. That is sufficient to 
deny Defendants' motion for Brady relief." (internal citations omitted)). Given the Government's 
extensive efforts to review its files for any material warranting disclosure, and its commitment to 
continue meeting its disclosure obligations, the motion should be denied. 
For similar reasons, the motion for disclosure of Giglio material should be denied as 
premature. The Government is fully aware of its obligation to disclose impeachment material, is 
in the process of reviewing all files in its possession for any such material, and will produce any 
such material several weeks in advance of trial. As noted above, that is consistent with governing 
law in this Circuit, and the defendant cites no authority for the proposition that she is entitled to 
such material as much as four months in advance of trial. Courts in this Circuit have repeatedly 
refused to compel disclosure of impeachment or Giglio material well in advance of trial, and the 
defense has provided no particularized basis for even earlier disclosure here. See United States v. 
Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 701 (1974) ("Generally, the need for evidence to impeach witnesses is 
insufficient to require its production in advance of trial."); Campo Flores, 2016 WL 5946472, at 
*II ("The Government has represented that it will make impeachment material relating to its 
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anticipated witnesses available . . . ten days before trial. There is no need to depart from the 
customary rule in this district of disclosure shortly before trial."); United States v. Seabrook, No. 
10 Cr. 87 (DAB), 2010 WL 5174353, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 14, 2010) ("The Government represents 
to the Court that it is aware of its Brady, Giglio, Jencks Act, and 404(b) obligations and will 
comply with them in a timely fashion, as appropriate. Based on the Government's representations, 
and on the current posture of this case, the Court expects that the Government will comply timely 
with all of its obligations under Brady, Giglio, the Jencks Act, and Rule 404(b), and does not find 
a need to order compliance at this time." (internal citation omitted)); Russo, 483 F. Supp. 2d at 308 
("Here the government has represented that it intends to produce Giglio material no later than the 
Friday of the week before a witness is scheduled to testify at trial, in accordance with its usual 
practice. To the extent that the government's disclosure in this case proves unusually voluminous 
or complex, 
the 
government 
has 
in 
good-faith 
represented 
that 
it 
intends to 
produce Giglio material sufficiently in advance of their witnesses' testimony so as to avoid any 
delay in trial. At the time of those disclosures, to the extent that Defendants feel that additional 
time is necessary given the volume or complexity of the materials provided, the Court will 
consider applications to continue or recall witnesses. It is unnecessary, however, to 
order early disclosure at this time."); United States v. Canter, 338 F. Supp. 2d 460, 461-62 
(S.D.N.Y. 2004) (denying analogous motion and noting that "[li]t has been the practice of this 
Court and of other courts in this district to require that the Government produce these materials a 
few days before the start of trial"). Because the Government has committed to providing the 
defense with Giglio material multiple weeks in advance of trial, which is ample time for the 
defense to prepare its cross-examination of the Government's witnesses, this motion should be 
denied. 
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Seventh, the defendant seeks a proffer of all co-conspirator statements that the Government 
intends to offer at trial pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 801(dX2)(E). (Def. Mot. 10 at 13-
14). In making this motion, the defense cites authority confirming that co-conspirator statements 
may be admitted at trial on a conditional basis without the need for any pretrial consideration of 
their admissibility. See United States v. Tracy, 12 F.3d 1186, 1199 (2d Cir. 1993) ("The decision 
as to whether the four prerequisites have been met, like all other preliminary questions of 
admissibility, is to be made by the court. If the government succeeds in persuading the court that 
the conditionally admitted coconspirator statements were made during and in furtherance of a 
conspiracy of which both the declarant and the defendant were members, the statements are 
allowed to go to the jury. If the court is not so persuaded, it either should instruct the jury to 
disregard the statements, or, if those statements were `so large a proportion of the proof as to render 
a cautionary instruction of doubtful utility,' should declare a mistrial." (internal citations omitted) 
(quoting United States v. Geaney, 417 F.2d 1116, 1120 (2d Cir. 1969))). Indeed, the Second 
Circuit has rejected the suggestion that non-exculpatory co-conspirator statements are discoverable 
under Rule 16 or by any means other than the Jencks Act. See In re U.S., 834 F.2d 283, 284-87 
(2d Cir. 1987) (issuing a writ of mandamus reversing District Court's order directing the 
Government "to produce all oral statement made by the defendants and coconspirators that the 
Government planned to offer at trial as admissions of a defendant" under Fed. R. Evid. 801). 
Consistent with the Government's intention to produce Jencks Act material several weeks in 
advance of trial, the defense will receive notice of any co-conspirator statements that the 
Government may seek to introduce through witness statements with sufficient time to raise any 
objections with the Court. Accordingly, this motion should be denied 
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Finally, the defendant requests early disclosure of Rule 404(b) material that the 
Government may seek to introduce at trial. (Def. Mot. 10 at 17). As is customary in this district, 
the Government will provide notice to the defense of its intent to use any such evidence at least 45 
days in advance of trial, which will leave sufficient time for the defense may file any motions in 
limine to be considered at the final pretrial conference. See Thompson, 2013 WL 6246489 at *9 
("The Government has represented that it will disclose the substance of [the 404(b) evidence it 
intends to introduce at trial] ... in a timely fashion in order to permit the defendants the opportunity 
to challenge admission and to permit the Court to make an appropriate finding. This is all that Rule 
404(b) requires." (alterations in original) (internal citation omitted)); United States v. Tranquillo, 
606 F. Supp. 2d 370, 383 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) ("The Government has indicated that it will make the 
required disclosure two weeks prior to trial, a practice that typically comports with Rule 404(b)); 
United States v. Fennell, 496 F. Supp. 2d 279, 284 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) ("The government has in good 
faith noted its obligations under Rule 404(b), and indicated that it intends to provide notice of the 
404(b) evidence it intends to introduce two weeks before the beginning of trial. There is therefore 
no need to issue the order Defendant seeks."). Accordingly, this motion should be denied. 
XI. 
The Use of a Grand Jury Siting in White Plains Was Entirely Proper 
On June 29, 2020, amidst a global pandemic that suspended grand juries across the country, 
the Government sought and obtained an indictment from a grand jury of the Southern District of 
New York (the "Southern District" or "SDNY") sitting in White Plains. The defendant now 
challenges the pool from which that grand jury was drawn, alleging that it does not reflect a "fair-
cross section of the community," and moves to dismiss the Indictment under the Sixth 
Amendment. (Def. Mot. 9 at I). As set forth below, the defendant's arguments rely on faulty 
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