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Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM Document 545 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/12/2010 Page 1 of 37 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA 
JANE DOE NO. 2, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JEFFREY EPSTEIN, 
Defendant. 
CASE NO.: 08-CIV-80119-MARR A/JOHNSON 
Related cases: 
08-80232, 08-08380, 08-80381, 08-80994, 
08-80993, 08-80811, 08-80893, 09-80469, 
09-80591, 09-80656, 09-80802, 09-81092 
DEFENDANT'S, CONSOLIDATED RULE 4 REVIEW AND APPEAL OF PORTIONS 
OF THE MAGISTRATE'S ORDERS DATED FEBRUARY 4, 2010 (DE 462), (DE 480) 
AND APRIL 1, 2010 (DE 513), WITH INCORPORATED OBJECTIONS AND 
MEMORANDUM OF LAW 
Defendant, Jeffrey Epstein (hereinafter "Epstein"), by and through his undersigned 
attorneys, hereby files his Consolidated Rule 4 Review and Appeal of Portions of the 
Magistrate's Orders (DE 462), (DE 480) and (DE 513) pursuant to Rule 60, Fed.R.Civ.P. Rule 4, 
Rule 4(c) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 53(e). In support, Epstein states: 
L 
Introduction 
The Fifth Amendment serves as a guarantee against testimonial compulsion and provides, 
in relevant part, that "[n]o person...shall be compelled in any Criminal Case to be a witness 
against himself" (DE 242, p.5); see also Edwin v. Price, 778 F.2d 668, 669 ( 1 1 th Cir. 1985) 
(citing Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 77 (1973)). 
The privilege is accorded liberal 
construction in favor of the right and extends not only to answers that would support a criminal 
conviction, but extends also to those answers which would furnish a link in the chain of evidence 
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Doe v. Epstein 08-CV80119 
Page No. 2 
needed to prosecute the claimant for a crime. See Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 
(1951). Information is protected by the privilege not only if it would support a criminal 
conviction, but also in those instances where "the responses would merely `provide a lead or 
clue' to evidence having a tendency to incriminate." &,.g United States v. Neff, 315 F.2d 1235, 
1239 (9th Cir.), cent denied, 447 U.S. 925 (1980); Blau v. United States 340 U.S. 159 (1950); 
SEC v Leach, 156 F.Supp.2d 491, 494 (E.D. PA. 2001). Add new case from my e-mail of 
yesterday: (Court in Englebrick v Worthington Industries Inc 670 F Supp2d 1048 (CD Cal, 
2009) 
rejected 
motion 
to 
compel 
in 
helpful 
language: 
"A valid assertion of the privilege does not require an imminent criminal prosecution or 
investigation: 'The right to assert one's privilege against self-incrimination does not depend upon 
the likelihood, but upon the possibility of prosecution' cite omitted ...a possibility of prosecution 
exists where the witness has not received a grant of immunity, the statute of limitations has not 
run, double jeopardy does not apply, and there are no other concrete indications that criminal 
prosecution is barred. See also Belmonte v Lawson., 750 F. Supp. 735, 739 (ED. Va. 
1990X"Courts should avoid engaging in crystal ball forecasts about what a prosecutor may or 
may not do...). 
Significantly, these cases have been consolidated for discovery. Therefore, consistent 
rulings must apply. In making those rulings, this Court must continue to recognize that the 
allegations in the related cases cannot be forgotten. (&g., sag DE 242, 293). Production of 
information in one case could provide a link in the chain of evidence used to prosecute Epstein 
for a crime or provide an indirect link to incriminating evidence in another case and in another 
jurisdiction. M. and infra. 
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Doe v. Epstein 08-CV80119 
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Moreover, in addition to the testimonial privilege discussed herein, the Fifth Amendment 
includes an act of production which encompasses circumstances highly relevant to certain of 
the discovery requests at issue where the act of producing documents in response to a subpoena 
or production request has a compelled testimonial aspect in that it would constitute an implied 
admission as to the defendant's possession or control of the requested documents, as to their 
authenticity, and as to the defendant's selection of them as meeting the requests for production. 
ate United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 35-36 (2000). Thus, where the existence or location 
of the requested documents are unknown, or where production would "implicitly authenticate" 
the requested documents, the act of producing responsive documents is considered testimonial 
and is protected by the Fifth Amendment. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 1 F.3d 87, 93 (2nd 
Cir. 1993); Rudy-Glanzer v. Glanzer, 232 F.3d 1258, 1263 (9th Cir. 2000Xthe "privilege" against 
self-incrimination does not depend upon the likelihood, but upon the possibility of prosecution 
and also covers those circumstances where the disclosures would not be directly incriminating, 
but could provide an indirect link to incriminating evidence). 
In addition, several of the requests outlined below implicate Federal Rules of Evidence 
408, 410 and 502, and the confidentiality protections intrinsic to federal tax returns that would be 
unavailable under 26 U.S.C. 6103 even if a subpoena is served upon the IRS. Furthermore, 
H. Procedural Background 
Epstein filed his Motions for Reconsideration or, Alternatively, Rule 4 Appeal, at DE 477 
and 488. However, this court entered an order (DE 513) allowing for Consolidated Rule 4 
Appeals relative to the above docket entries. 
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Doe v. Epstein 08-CV80119 
Page No. 4 
(a) Jane Doe 
Plaintiff, Jane Doe's Motion to Compel is filed at DE (194). Defendant's Response in 
Opposition is filed at DE (339), and the arguments set forth therein are incorporated herein by 
reference as if completely set forth herein as each apply to request numbers 10, 12 and 13. 
(b) Jane Does 2-8 
Plaintiffs, Jane Doe 2-8s' Motion to Compel is filed at DE (333). Defendant's Response 
in Opposition is filed at DE (390) and the arguments set forth therein are incorporated herein by 
reference as if completely set forth herein as each apply to request number 1 of Plaintiff's First 
request to produce Net Worth Discovery. 
The Request for Production and the responses thereto arc attached as Composite 
Exhibits "A" and "B". 
III. 
The Requests For Production, Argument And Memorandum Of Law 
a. 
Jane Doe - Requests Numbers 7, 9 and 10 
Request No. 7: 
All discovery information obtained by you or your 
attorneys as a result of the exchange of discovery in the State criminal case 
against you or the Federal investigation against you. 
Request No. 9: 
Any documents or other evidentiary materials provided to 
local, state, or federal law enforcement investigators or local, state or federal 
prosecutors investigating your sexual activities with minors. 
Request No. 10: 
All correspondence between you and your attorneys and 
state or federal law enforcement or prosecutors (includes, but not limited to, 
letters to and from the State Attorney's office or any agents thereof). 
Response to Request Numbers 7, 9 and 10: Defendant is asserting specific 
legal objections to the production request as well as his U.S. constitutional 
privileges. I intend to produce all relevant documents regarding this lawsuit, 
however, my attorneys have counseled me that at the present time I cannot select, 
authenticate, and produce documents relevant to this lawsuit and I must accept 
this advice or risk losing my Sixth Amendment right to effective representation. 
Accordingly, I assert my federal constitutional rights under the Fifth, Sixth, and 
Fourteenth Amendments as guaranteed by the United States Constitution. 
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Doe v. Epstein 08-CV80119 
Page No. 5 
Drawing an adverse inference under these circumstances would unconstitutionally 
burden my exercise of my constitutional rights, would be unreasonable, and 
would therefore violate the Constitution. In addition to and without waiving his 
constitutional privileges, the information sought is privileged and confidential, 
and inadmissible pursuant to the terms of the deferred prosecution agreement, 
Fed. Rule of Evidence 410 and 408, and §90.410, Fla. Stat. Further, the request 
may include information subject to work product or an attorney-client privilege. 
It appears there is now a direct conflict with what Jane Doe requests (m Lg., DE 354, p. 
3). In short, Plaintiff is fast and loose in her argument regarding what she seeks (i.e., she states in 
no uncertain terms (DE 354, p.3) that she seeks information that the Federal government gave to 
Epstein. However, in her Reply to the Response in Opposition, she now seeks everything that the 
government gave to Epstein's lawyers and what his lawyers gave to the Federal government (i.e., 
the full breadth of the requests). The far broader ambit of the requests implicates whether the 
Plaintiff is seeking just the communications provided by USAO to Epstein's counsel or all 
Epstein's counsel's communications with, g., the USAO, the State Attorneys' Office or any 
other local, state or Federal law enforcement. If Jane Doe seeks "all" communications, it deeply 
implicates the work product of Epstein's lawyers. If Plaintiff seeks just the communication 
provided by the USAO or the State Attorney, it deeply implicates the work product of the USAO 
and the State Attorney negotiating and communicating with Epstein's counsel which include, but 
are not limited to, information that resulted in a plea and information that did NOT result in a 
plea and information that may have resulted in the entering of the Non-Prosecution Agreement 
("NPA"). Either way, the requests deeply implicate the protections and policies of FRE 408, 410 
and 502 as more fully set forth infra. 
Before this limitation was made by Plaintiff, Epstein argued in his response in opposition 
(DE 339, p.7-8) that these requests are the same type requests the court found subject to the Fifth 
Amendment. With the limitation made by Plaintiff and her counsel in the Reply, the court ruled 
"(t)hat the earlier requests referenced by Epstein were significantly broader than the narrow 
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Doe v. Epstein 08-CV80119 
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requests at issue here, including for example, a request for all documents 'relating to' the federal 
non—prosecution agreement, and all documents 'relating to' either the federal or state criminal 
investigations. These requests would have required Epstein to pick and choose which documents 
were responsive and in this way force Epstein to use to effectively make 'use of the content his 
mind,' an action that would undeniably implicate the Fifth Amendment." (DE 462, p.9) Clearly 
the instant requests are exactly the same type of broad requests this court has already ruled upon. 
Had the Plaintiff not limited the scope of the requests in her Reply (DE 354, p.3), the court 
would not have labeled these requests as "narrow" because these requests now seek all 
information related to the federal non—prosecution agreement and all documents relating to either 
the federal or state criminal investigations, which clearly require Epstein to effectively make use 
of the content his mind to determine what is and what is not responsive to these broad requests. 
As a result of the limitation made by Plaintiff in her Reply (DE 354) and as a result of 
this court's Order (DE 462), Epstein responded - "[a]s to Request Number 7, Epstein and his 
attorneys do not have any "discovery information" provided to them by the federal government 
and [a]s to Request Number 9, Epstein has not been given any evidentiary materials or 
evidentiary documents by the federal government." (DE 477) Certainly, these responses were 
not intended to "gild the lily" as Plaintiff contends nor are they misleading. Despite what the 
interrogatory sought, Plaintff chose to limit same in her Reply to only what the Federal 
Government gave Epstein, and that is exactly how the Magistrate interpreted same. The 
responses were made based upon Plaintiff's limitation in what she sought from Epstein and 
because this court entered an Order based upon that limitation. Had the limitation not been 
made, neither this court nor Epstein would have been misled down this primrose path. 
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Doe v. Epstein 08-CV80119 
Page No. 7 
Nonetheless, Plaintiff now seeks to obtain the full breadth of information sought under 
request numbers 7, 9 and 10. However, that argument shall meet a short death in that Plaintiff 
herself limited the scope of the requests in her Reply and failed to timely file her own Rule 4 
Appeal after the court entered its order at DE 462, which adopted Plaintiff `s limited scope of the 
requests (which Plaintiff now wishes to change). See S.D. Fla., Rule 4(a)(1), Mag. J. 2009. If 
the court made a mistake in adopting the limited scope of the requests (which it did not), Plaintiff 
should have timely appealed, which she did not. As such, Plaintiff's requested relief in this 
regard should be denied. 
Next, the Magistrate's order as to Request No.: 10 must be reversed because it contravenes 
critical public policy of encouraging resolution of criminal prosecutions without trial and the 
concomitant understanding that defendants will be considerably more likely to engage in full and 
frank discussions with the government if they need not fear that statements they or their counsel 
make to government prosecutors will be used against them to their detriment. The policies 
behind FRE 408, 410 and 502 provide this court with a basis for sustaining Epstein's objections 
to Request No.: 10. For instance, the critical importance of plea bargaining to the criminal 
justice system has long been recognized. "[W]hatever might be the situation in an ideal world, 
the fact is that the guilty plea and the often concomitant plea bargain are important components 
of this country's criminal justice system. Properly administered, they can benefit all concerned." 
Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 361-62 (1978), quoting Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 
63, 71 (1977). To encourage defendants to participate in the plea negotiation process, rules have 
developed to prohibit admission into evidence against the defendant of any and all statements he 
or his counsel acting on his behalf makes to government prosecutors during the plea negotiation 
process. This confidentiality protection is embodied in both Fed, R. Evid. 410 and Fed. R. Critn. 
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Doe v. Epstein 08-CV80119 
Page No. 8 
P. 11(f). While these rules by their express terms refer only to admissibility of evidence, the 
purposes and policies underlying these rules is instructive in this context, in which a civil 
plaintiff seeks discovery of documents falling within the scope of these two rules. 
Rule 410 was created to promote active plea negotiations and plea bargains, which our 
Supreme Court has acknowledged are "important components of this country's criminal 
justice system.". . . Our Court of Appeals has held that "in order for plea bargaining to 
work effectively and fairly, a defendant must be free to negotiate without fear that this 
statements will later be used against him.". . . Indeed, absent the protection of Rule 410, 
"the possibility of self-incrimination would discourage defendants from being completely 
candid and open during plea negotiations." 
S.E.C. v. Johnson, 534 F.Supp.2d 63, 66-67 (D.D.C. 2008), quoting United States v. Davis, 617 
F.2d 677, 683 (D.C.Cir. 1980). See, 
United States v. MezzanattQ, 513 U.S. 196, 205, 207 
(1995)(purpose of the rules is to encourage plea bargaining, and rules "creat[e], in effect, a 
privilege of the defendant," quoting 2 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Weinstein's Evidence 1410[05] 
at 410-43 (1994)); United States v. Barrow, 400 F.3d 109, 116 (2d Cir. 2005X"The underlying 
purpose of Rule 410 is to promote plea negotiations by permitting defendants to talk to 
prosecutors without sacrificing their ability to defend themselves if no disposition agreement is 
reached"); Fed. R. Crim. P. 11, Advisory Committee Notes, 1979 Amendment ("the purpose of 
Fed. R. Ev. 410 and Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(eX6) [now Rule 11(f)] is to promote the unrestrained 
candor which produces effective plea discussions")) 
Additional illustration of the high degree of confidentially accorded settlement 
negotiations is found in Fed. R. Evid. 408, which precludes the introduction into evidence 
2 FRE 410(4) is particularly directed to communications in matters which, like Epstein's, did not result in a plea of 
guilty to any federal charge. Fla. Stat. §90.410 provides parallel protections in slate criminal matters. Epstein pled 
guilty to Fla. Stat. 796.07(2)(1), Unlawful to Solicit, Induce, Entice, or Procure Another to Commit Prostitution, 
Lewdness or Assignation, and Fla. Stat. 796.03, Procuring Person Under Age of 18 For Prostitution. Therefore, in 
the event this court orders production of said correspondence, then it must first hold an in camera inspection to 
determine what, if any, documents aro related to the foregoing pleas and what documents are not. Along those same 
lines, an in camera inspection must be had in an effort to redact any information that may violate third-party privacy 
rights or information that would implicate Epstein's Fifth Amendment rights. 
infra. 
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Doe v. Epstein 08-CV80119 
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communications made during settlement negotiations. The purposes underlying Rule 408 are 
essentially the same as those underlying Fed. R. Crim, P. 11(f) and 410: "to encourage non-
litigious solutions to disputes." Reichenbach v. Smith, 528 F.2d 1072, 1074 (11th Cir. 1976). 
ee ug. Stockman v. Oakcrest Dental Center P.C., 480 F.3d 791, 805 (6th Cir. 2007)("the 
purpose underlying Rule 408 . . . is the promotion of the public policy favoring the compromise 
and settlement of disputes that would otherwise be discouraged with the admission of such 
evidence"); Bankcard America, Inc. v. Universal Bancard Systems. Inc., 203 F.3d 477, 483 (7th 
Cir. 2000)("Because settlement talks might be chilled if such discussions could later be used as 
admissions of liability at trial, the rule's purpose is to encourage settlements"); In re A.H. Robins 
Co.. Inc., 197 B.R. 568, 572 (E.D.Va. 1994)("Rule 408 aims to foster settlement discussions in 
an individual lawsuit, and therefore insulates the particular parties to a settlement discussion 
from possible adverse consequences of their frank and open statements"). So crucial is this 
policy of confidentiality to the functioning of our federal court system that some courts have held 
that communications falling within the parameters of Rule 408 are covered by a settlement 
privilege which insulates them not just from admission into evidence but from discovery as well. 
aLL, tl,g Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Chiles Power Stumlva Inc., 332 F.3d 976, 979-983 (6th 
Cir. 2003). 
Given the powerful and long-standing policy of according confidentiality to settlement 
negotiations in both the civil and criminal context, civil plaintiffs should, at a minimum, be 
required to demonstrate real and concrete need for the material. They should not be permitted to 
rummage through such sensitive documents based on nothing more than a vague and contentless 
statement that the materials are "likely to lead to the discovery of other admissible evidence." 
Motion to Compel at 12 n.3, which is all that plaintiff offers as to Request No. 10. This is 
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Doe v. Epstein 08-CV80119 
Page No. 10 
particularly so given the reality that parties often take positions or offer potential compromise 
solutions during plea negotiations which are inconsistent with the litigation strategy they will 
pursue if the case goes to trial. As one court has explained in the civil context: 
There exists a strong public interest in favor of secrecy of matters discussed by parties 
during settlement negotiations. . . . The ability to negotiate and settle a case without trial 
fosters a more efficient, more cost-effective, and significantly less burdened judicial 
system. . . . Parties must be able to abandon their adversarial tendencies to some degree. 
They must be able to make hypothetical concessions, offer creative quid pro quos, and 
generally make statements that would otherwise belie their litigation efforts. 
Goodyear Tire, 332 F.3d at 980. The same is no less true in the plea negotiation context 
particularly where a central component of the discussions and negotiations between counsel for 
Epstein and counsel for the USAO was to reach an agreement on conditions relating to 18 USC 
2255 including certain waivers and other obligations of Epstein's NPA. The plaintiffs have 
contended that such provisions relating to 2255 are civil in nature, thus squarely implicating FRE 
408 protections. The free availability in discovery to civil plaintiffs of communications made 
during the plea negotiation process has profound potential to chill frank and open 
communications during that process so crucial to the functioning of the criminal justice system in 
any criminal case which has potential to become a civil or regulatory matter as well. Such 
defendants will be loath to be fully forthcoming during plea discussions or communications and 
indeed, if the potential civil or regulatory consequences are sufficiently severe, may decline to 
enter into plea negotiations at all, if they must fear that their communications will be made 
available to civil plaintiffs in discovery, thus entirely defeating both the purpose and spirit of 
Rules 410 and 11(f). 
In addition, the communications made during the plea negotiation process contain fact 
and opinion attorney work product of both Mr. Epstein's attorneys and government attorneys. 
Particularly given the strong public policy in favor of confidentiality of plea/settlement 
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Doe v. Epstein 08-CV80119 
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negotiations, the disclosure of such information should be treated as falling within the selective 
waiver provisions of Fed. R. Evid. 502 and not be treated as an open-ended waiver of the 
attorney-client and work product privileges, and, if the discovery order is upheld as to request 10 
a request for an order pursuant to FRE 502(d) mandating that the communications that led to the 
execution of a Non-Prosecution Agreement and communications regarding its implementation 
should be, to the extent they involve fact or opinion work product, not disclosed to third parties 
in civil litigation outside the criminal proceedings to which they relate. FRE 502(D) provides: ". 
. . a Federal court may order that the privilege or protection is not waived by disclosure 
connected with the litigation pending before the court - -in which event disclosure is also not a 
waiver in any other Federal or State proceeding." 
The correspondence in question contained what would constitute paradigm opinion work 
product with the single caveat that the opinions of each counsel, Epstein's and the United States 
Attorney's were exchanged with each other pursuant to the overall expectation that they were 
safeguarded from disclosure by the policies of confidentiality that protect communications 
during settlement and plea negotiations. The requested communications include the views of 
Epstein's counsel in the criminal case regarding why a federal prosecution was inappropriate, 
why the federal statutes did not fit the alleged offense conduct, why certain of the alleged victims 
were not credible. It also includes Epstein's counsel's views on the limits and inapplicability of 
certain elements of 18 U.S.C. §2255, one of the principal causes of action in the Jane Doe cases. 
This opinion work-product should not be disclosed when it was incorporated into heartland plea 
negotiations that are accorded protection under the federal rules of evidence. It is the disclosure 
of such legal opinions — and not just their admissibility — that should be protected from a civil 
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Doe v. Epstein 08-CV80119 
Page No. 12 
discovery request that lacked any statement as to why this information was even necessary to the 
fair litigation of the civil cases. 
Concomitantly, to the extent that the request is now limited to communications from the 
Government to Epstein, see DE 54, pgs 3 and 8, the narrowed request implicates the same 
concerns for the opinions, the work product, and the expectation of privacy of the United States 
Attorney or Assistant United States Attorney who authored the many letters received by counsel 
for Epstein. As such, to the extent that the Court is considering affirming any part of the 
Magistrate-Judge's opinion allowing request 10 that would result in the required disclosure of 
communications from the Government counsel to Epstein, that notice be provided to the United 
States Attorney so they may intervene to protect their opinion work product, assert their rights to 
confidentiality under FRE 408 and 410, and assert where appropriate their interests in grand jury 
secrecy and in the privacy rights of their witness who in at least one document are identified. 
The defendant requests that if the Court were considering allowing the disclosure of any portion 
of the communications sent by Epstein to the Government which are within the original request 
for production but apparently not plaintiffs latest filing, DE 354, pg 3, the Court first consider 
permitting the defendant to provide a privilege log that would identify specific portions of the 
correspondence that contains the opinion work product of counsel for Epstein and permitting 
leave to seek an order under FRE 502(d) that would protect such communications from 
disclosure to third parties such as requested in this matter. 
If the USAO cannot be compelled to release its investigation(s) and related work-product 
directly due to the protections of Fed. R. Crim. Pro. 6, Epstein cannot be compelled to disclose 
same in violation of his constitutional rights? 
He cannot Rules 408, and 410 all counsel 
strongly against the discoverability of such documents. The court is requested to reverse the 
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Doe v. Epstein 08-CV80119 
Page No. 13 
Magistrate-Judge's order as to paragraph 10. Alternatively, the Court is requested to permit a 
privilege log that would be filed by Epstein's counsel — and if they so desire the Government — 
particularizing the prejudice to their work product and to the values otherwise protected by FRE 
408 and 410 on a document by document basis. 
Epstein also continues to maintain that the requested correspondence is protected under 
the Fifth Amendment, as it could furnish a link in the chain of evidence needed to prosecute him 
for a crime or provide the federal government with information that provides a lead or clue to 
evidence having a tendency to incriminate Epstein. 
infra; Hoffman v. United States, 341 
U.S. at 486; United States v. Neff, 315 F.2d at 1239; Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. at 159; and 
SEC v Leach, 156 F.Supp.2d at 494. 
As this court has recognized, the threat of criminal prosecution is real and present as 
Epstein remains under the scrutiny of the USAO, which is explained and/or acknowledged in the 
Court's Orders (DE 242, p.4 and 462, p.2). As this Court knows, Epstein entered into a Non-
Prosecution Agreement ("NPA") with the USAO for the Federal Southern District of Florida . 
However, the NPA does not provide Epstein with any protection from criminal investigation or 
prosecution other than in the Southern District of Florida. As the court has acknowledged in its 
orders (e.g., DE 462), complaints in these related matters allege that Epstein both resided in and 
allegedly engaged in illegal sexual conduct in districts outside the Southern District of Florida, 
and that he allegedly lured economically disadvantaged girls to homes other than in Palm Beach. 
Thus, the fact that there exists a NPA does not mean that Epstein is free from a reasonable fear of 
future criminal prosecution. In fact, this court acknowledged that "[t]he danger Epstein faces by 
being forced to testify in this case is substantial and real, and not merely trifling or imaginary as 
required." (DE 242, p. 10). 
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Doe v. Epstein 08-CV80119 
Page No. 14 
As such, in the event Epstein is required to produce information provided to him by the 
federal government — or provided by Epstein to the Government - that information could provide 
a link in the chain of evidence needed to prosecute Epstein of a crime outside the protections of 
the NPA. Given the nature of the allegations, to wit, a scheme and plan of sexual misconduct, 
this court should find it entirely reasonable for Epstein to assert his Fifth Amendment privilege 
as to request Number 10, especially since it is broad enough to encompass information that could 
violate Epstein's Fifth Amendment Privileges. Hubbell, supra. In responding to the request, 
Epstein would be compelled admit that such documents exist, admit that the documents were in 
his possession or control, and further admit that the documents produced were authentic. In 
other words, the very act of production of the category of documents requested would implicitly 
communicate "statements of fact." as well as authenticate the letters as genuine examples of 
communications that include disclosures made by Epstein's attorney i.e., his agent on his behalf, 
Hubbell, supra; Hama, supra. 
The defendant requests that the Court order that the documents in question are protected by 
FRE 408 and 410, that if not they should be subject to a "selective waiver" order under FRE 
502(d) given their inclusion of attorney opinion and fact work product that was only disclosed in 
reasonable expectation they would be solely used to further plea and settlement discussions. o 
the extent this court orders production of any of the requested materials, the information should 
first be produced in camera to determine what portions of the materials should be redacted to 
protect the attorneys' mental impressions and to assist the Court in making further 
determinations as to what information , should be protected by Federal Rules 408, 410, and 502. 
See supra. Again, as set forth in the Reply attached hereto as Exhibit "B", the USAO and the 
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Doe v. Epstein 08-CV80119 
Page No. 15 
Palm Beach State Attorneys' Office should be put on notice that their underlying files are being 
requested by and through backdoor methods. 
(b) 
Plaintiffs' Attorneys Already Have Much Of The Information They Seek 
Pursuant To This Improver Motion Practice And Have No Demonstrable Need For More 
Several depositions have occurred over the last 4 weeks wherein it appears Mr. Edwards 
already has the information he seeks responsive to these requests, which is likely the reason Mr. 
Edwards has not filed any affidavits supporting the specious arguments set forth in Plaintiff's 
Motions. As such, there is no substance or factual representations made by Plaintiff to support 
her argument. Plaintiff is wasting attorney time and judicial resources in her effort to obtain 
what she already has in her possession. For example, at a deposition of Mr. Epstein on February 
17, 2010, the following exchange occurred: 
Mr. Edwards: 
The 87-page Palm Beach Police Department 
incident report where there are numerous underage females 
describing their interaction with Mr. Epstein at his house. I'm 
specifically reading from page 41 related to A.H., who was one of 
the victims he pled guilty to. 
Mr. Pike: 
Is that the same document that you're seeking 
production of, in this same exact case? 
Mr. Edwards: 
I don't know what you're talking about. 
This is something from the state attorneys' file. 
It is clear from Mr. Edwards's response above (attached as Exhibit "C") that he has the 
information from the Palm Beach Police Department and the information from the State 
Attorneys' file. This begs the question — if plaintiff already has the information she seeks, why 
is Plaintiff wasting valuable attorney time and judicial resources to obtain what is already in 
hand? Sic also Exhibits "D-1" and "D-2" and "E," a copy of the 89-page incident report 
marked as an Exhibit by Plaintiff's counsel at Detective Recarey's deposition as well as certain 
message pads Plaintiff claims was pulled from the residence at 358 Brillo Way. 
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Doe v. Epstein 08-CV80119 
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Moreover, at the deposition of AR on March 15, 2010, the following exchange occurred: 
Mr. Edwards: Well, at some point in time what's been marked as 
defense Exhibit "1", you received a grand jury investigation target 
letter, correct? 
sit 
Mr. Edwards: There's another message from 9/11/05 saying "I 
got a car for," and then the name is blotted out. The State 
Attorneys' Office blotted the names of minors out sometimes in 
their file.... 
sit 
Once again, Mr. Edwards's response above (attached as Exhibit "F") establishes that he 
has the information from both the Palm Beach Police Department and the State Attorneys' file. 
In fact, as argued infra, Mr. Edwards has certain information from the Palm Beach Police 
Department, which resulted from various alleged "trash pulls" from a residence on Palm Beach 
(e.g., certain notepads). 
Finally, at the deposition of Detective Recarey of the Palm Beach Police Department, on 
March 19, 2010, the following exchange occurred: 
Mr. Kuvin: Okay. And what were the dates of the surveillance? 
Witness: 
[Referencing his Report] It appears she met with 
members of the B.S.F. unit, Burglary Strike Force.... 
sss 
Mr. Kuvin: [Referencing the Report] If we go down to page 40 in 
your report, first let me back up... . 
Mr. Kuvin: Okay. So the chain of custody which we have marked 
as Exhibit 5 shows that all the evidence you had in this case was 
given to the FBI. . .. aeg Exhibit "G". 
The undersigned was at Detective Recarey's deposition. Mr. Kuvin and Mr. Edwards 
had copies of various reports and also had copies of various message pads claimed to be "pulled" 
from Epstein's trash by the Palm Beach Police Department. See infra. It is clear from the 
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deposition that opposing counsel has the information from the Palm Beach Police Department 
and the State Attorneys' file. 
also, /OA for additional argument. 
(i) 
Work-Product - Palm Beach State Attorneys' File 
Next, as to any information obtained from the State Attorney at any phase (request 
numbers 801), the State Attorney has not provided anything to Epstein or his attorneys. While 
the State Attorneys' file was made available for inspection, Jack Goldberger, Epstein's criminal 
lawyer, went over to the State Attorneys' Office and hand selected information from the file for 
copying, including certain witness interviews. Egg Exhibit "H" Affidavit of Jack Goldberger. 
Accordingly, the information hand selected by Mr. Goldberger falls under the work-product 
doctrine as production of same would reveal Mr. Goldberger's mental impressions, thought 
processes and strategy relative to the defense of Epstein. Smith v. Florida Power & Light 
Company 632 Sold 696, 698 (Fla. 3 rd DCA 1994Xeven if individual documents are not work-
product, "the selection process itself represents defense counsel's mental impressions and legal 
opinions as to how the evidence in the documents relates to the issues and the defenses in the 
litigation"). W. The information simply falls under the "highly protected category of opinion 
work-product." Id; see also Fla.R.Civ.Pro. 1.280. 
Also, Counsel for Jane Does 2-8 in the Federal companion cases apparently obtained a 
copy of the file retained by the Palm Beach State Attorneys' Office. It is reasonably believed 
that all Plaintiffs' attorneys in this action have extensive materials from the State Attorney and 
the Palm Beach Police Department pursuant to various public records requests. Certainly, Mr. 
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Edwards is able make such public records requests or can subpoena the requested information, 
neither of which would implicate the work product privilege as outlined above. 
Here, the standard is a showing of a need to obtain the information, and the inability to 
obtain the substantial equivalent without undue hardship. Metric Engineering, Inc. v. Small, 861 
So. 2d 1248, 1250 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003)(To show `need,' a party must present testimony or 
evidence demonstrating the material requested is critical to the theory of the requestor's case, or 
to some significant aspect of the case); Ashemimry v. Ba Nafa, 847 So.2d 603 (Fla. 5th DCA 
2003). In addition, Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.280(b)(3), does allow discovery of fact 
work product where the requesting party can show need and the inability to obtain the substantial 
equivalent by other means without undue hardship. Vesta Fire Ins. Corp. v. Figueroa, 821 So.2d 
1233. 1234 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002)(the showing of need and undue hardship necessary to overcome 
the work product immunity must include specific explanations and reasons). 
Again, Mr. 
Edwards fails to submit any affidavit or any other document meeting the above criteria. 
Additionally, this court should consider placing the Palm Beach State Attorney and the 
USAO on Notice that their investigative files are being requested. 
Since Plaintiff seeks 
information given by federal government and the state attorney to Epstein, including 
correspondence, Epstein reincorporates the arguments set out in his initial Rule 4 Appeal as that 
information is within the penumbra of the protections of Federal Rules of Evidence 408 and 410. 
Moreover, despite Plaintiffs contention, Federal Rule of Evidence 410 is applicable because 
negotiations did not end with a federal plea. Furthermore, Federal Rule of Evidence 408 is 
applicable given that 18 U.S.C. 2255 is quasi-civil remedy. Clearly, the information sought by 
Plaintiff has no evidentiary value - given that Plaintiffs have the raw materials and police reports 
and affidavits resulting from state investigation. Accordingly, there is a chance that the Palm 
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Beach State Attorney and the USAO may not want to disclose their files for one reason or 
another. 
(ii) 
Third Party Privacy Rights And Judge Jeffrey's Colbath's Order 
The Magistrate's Order does not consider the privacy rights of other alleged victims. As 
this Court knows, attached to the NPA is a list which delineates alleged victims. Once the NPA 
was made public, Judge Colbath, with the agreement of the Palm Beach Post, Brad Edwards, 
Esq. and Spencer Kuvin, Esq. agreed that the "list" would remain private. As such, Request for 
Production Numbers 7, 9 and 10 seeks information that may violate others third-party privacy 
rights in that certain names may be mentioned in correspondence, including those on the "list." 
As noted in Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 454, 92 S.Ct. 1029, 1038, at fn. 10 (1972): 
In 5tanley, 394 U.S., at 564, 89 S.Ct, at 1247, the Court stated:`(A)lso 
fundamental is the right to be free, except in very limited circumstances, from 
unwanted governmental intrusions into one's privacy." The makers of our 
Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable to the pursuit of happiness. 
They recognized the significance of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and of 
his intellect. They knew that only a part of the pain, pleasure and satisfactions of 
life are to be found in material things. They sought to protect Americans in their 
beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions, and their sensations. They conferred, as 
against the Government, the right to be let alone-the most comprehensive of rights 
and the right most valued by civilized man.' [Citations omitted]. 
The fundamental right of privacy is not only guaranteed under by the Fourteenth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution, but also under the Constitution of the State of 
Florida, Art. I, Sect. 23. As summarized by the Florida Supreme Court in Shalom/1 v. State 553 
So.2d 148, 150-51 (Fla. 1989): 
The right of privacy, assured to Florida's citizens, demands that individuals be 
free from uninvited observation of or interference in those aspects of their lives 
which fall within the ambit of this zone of privacy unless the intrusion is 
warranted by the necessity of a compelling state interest. In an opinion which 
predated the adoption of section 23, the First District aptly characterized the 
nature of this right. 
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A fundamental aspect of personhood's integrity is the power to control what we 
shall reveal about our intimate selves, to whom, and for what purpose. 
Bryon. Hatless. Schaffer. Reid & Assocs.. Inc. v. State ex rel. Schellenberg. 360 
So.2d 83, 92 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978), quashed and remanded on other grounds, 379 
So.2d 633 (Fla.1980). Because this power is exercised in varying degrees by 
differing individuals, the parameters of an individual's privacy can be dictated 
only by that individual, The central concern is the inviolability of one's own 
thought, person, and personal action. The inviolability of that right assures its 
preeminence over "majoritarian sentiment" and thus cannot be universally defined 
by consensus. 
(Es pbasis added). 
Clearly, the nature of the question would require Epstein to produce information that may 
identify third parties (including alleged victims), which would necessarily thwart such 
individuals' rights to assert their constitutional right of privacy as guaranteed under the United 
States and Florida Constitutions. &2e generally Eisenstadt v. Baird, supra at 454-455 (the right 
encompasses privacy in ones sexual matters and is not limited to the marital relationship). The 
Magistrate's Order did not address this issue. 
Federal law provides crime victims with rights similar to those afforded by the Florida 
constitution which includes, but is not limited to, "the right to reasonable, accurate, and timely 
notice of any pubic court. . .proceeding involving the crime. . . ," "the right not to be excluded 
from any public court proceeding. . . ," and "the right to be heard." 15 Fla. Jur.2d Crim.Proc. 
§1839; Fla. Stat. 960.0021. Based upon the foregoing, any alleged victim that may be identified 
in any of the requested information must first be notified, which means that this court must, at 
the very least, conduct an in camera inspection of any and all information to determine which 
alleged victim must be placed on notice that their identity may be revealed or redact their names 
in camera. Ste gt,%2 Fla. Stat. §794.03, §794.024 and §794.026. 
The right to privacy 
encompasses at least two different kinds of interests, the individual interests of disclosing 
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