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offense, or attempting to do so. See for e.g., U.S. v. Gagliardi, 506 F.3d 140, 150-51 (2d 
Cir. 2007). In Gagliardi, a defendant was convicted of violating §2422(b) where he 
initiated contact with girl he believed was a minor in an intemet chat room called "I Love 
Older Men," repeatedly made sexual advances toward girl and her "friend," asked them 
for their pictures, steered the conversation toward sexual activities, described the acts that 
he would engage in with them, tried to set up a meeting with both of them, and appeared 
for a meeting with condoms and a Viagra pill in his car. Thus, the Circuit court agreed 
had the requisite intent to violate § 2422(b). The Circuit Court determined that a 
reasonable juror could also have found that the defendant took a substantial step beyond 
mere preparation when he arrived at the meeting place with two condoms and a Viagra 
pill in his car. See also U.S. v. Munro, 394 F.3d 865, 870 (10th Cir.2005)(Defendant 
convicted of attempting to persuade a minor to engage in sexual acts by using computer 
connected to the internet, under §2422(b), where chat room communications included 
defendant asking "girl" about her sexual history, her virginity, her experience wit oral 
sex, and the possibility of making a movie together; defendant further told "girl" about 
his desire to perform oral sex on her.); U.S, v. Barlow 568 F.3d 215 (5th Cir. 2009). See 
also U.S. v. Kaye, 451 F.Supp.2d 775, supra, where defendant engaged in lengthy "chat 
room" communications of a sexual nature with individual he believed was a 13 year old 
boy, described what he was going to do with 13 year old, and traveled to the home of the 
13 year old. 
Thus, because the evidence (JD3's own sworn testimony) establishes that there 
was no violation of §2422(b), an essential element of Plaintiff's 18 U.S.0 §2255 claim 
asserted in Count III is missing. The claim fails as a matter of law and Defendant is 
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entitled to the entry of summary judgment on the claim. Summary judgment is proper 
under Rule 56(cX2), Fed.R.Civ.P, when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact 
and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex v. Catlett, 477 U.S. 
317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Pursuant to Rule 56(b), "a party 
against whom relief is sought may move, with or without supporting affidavits, for 
summary judgment on all or part of the claim." 
Thus, under the undisputed material facts and applicable law, EPSTEIN is entitled 
to summary judgment on Count 111 of Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint as a matter 
of law. JD3's own testimony establishes that EPSTEIN never used a facility or means of 
interstate commerce to knowingly persuade, induce, entice, or coerce her to engage in 
any sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal offense, or 
attempting to do so. 18 U.S.C. §2422(b). Under the undisputed material facts, JD3 
cannot show a violation of the enumerated predicate act, §2422(b) on which she relies, in 
order to prove her claim pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §2255; thus, an essential element of her 
§2255 cannot be established, entitling Defendant to the entry of summary judgment on 
Count III. 
Eff. The Version of 18 U.S.C. $ 2255 In Effect When The Predicate Acts 
Allegedly Were Committed Allowed Only "Minors" To File Suit. 
The Second Amended Complaint is predicated on conduct that occurred sometime 
in 2004 and 2005. JD3's date of birth is March 5, 1988. (See Statement Facts above). 
The original Complaint in this matter was filed on March 5, 2008. Thus, J133 was 20 
years old at the time this suit was filed and no longer a minor. (The age of majority 
under both federal and state law is 18 years old. See 18 U.S.C. §2256(1), defining a 
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"minor" as "any person under the age of eighteen years;" and §1.01, Definitions, Fla. 
Stat., defining "minor" to include "any person who has not attained the age of 18 years.") 
From 1999 to July 26, 2006, 18 U.S.C. § 2255(a) provided: 
Any minor who is a victim of a violation of [certain specified federal 
statutes] and who suffers personal injury as a result of such violation may 
sue in any appropriate United States District Court and shall recover the 
actual damages such minor sustains and the cost of the suit, including a 
reasonable attorney's fee. Any minor as described in the preceding 
sentence shall be deemed to have sustained damages of no less than 
$50,000 in value. 
It is well settled that in interpreting a statute, the court's inquiry begins with the 
text and structure of the law. CBS. Inc. v. Prime Time 24 Venture, 245 F.3d 1217, 1222 
(11th Cir. 2001) ("We begin our construction of [a statutory provision] where courts 
should always begin the process of legislative interpretation, and where they often should 
end it as well, which is with the words of the statutory provision.") (quoting Harris v. 
Garner, 216 F.3d 970, 972 (11th Cir. 2000) (en bane)) (first alteration omitted). In this 
case, the plain text of the 2003 statute is both clear and unmistakable. It allowed only 
minors (or the representative of a then-minor, see Fed R. Civ. P. 17(c)) to initiate suit 
under § 2255. It provided only that "any minor ... may sue" and that "any minor ... 
shall recover the actual damages such minor sustains" as a result of the predicate acts. 
Id. (emphasis added). The law's use of the present tense further underscored its limited 
scope: It spoke of "any minor who is a victim," provided that "such minor ... shall 
recover" damages arising from the underlying offense, and stated that "any minor ... 
shall be deemed" to have sustained at least $50,000 in damages. Id. (emphasis added). 
Where the statute's words are unambiguous—as the are here—the "judicial inquiry is 
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complete." Merritt v. Dillard Payer Co., 120 F.3d 1181, 1186 (11th Cir. 1997) (citation 
omitted)). Under the pre-July, 2006 version of the statute, only minors could initiate suit. 
The recent case of U.S. v. Baker, 2009 WL 4572785, *7-8 (E.D. Tx Dec. 7, 
2009), in discussing the restitution under 18 U.S.C. §2255 noted that when the statute 
was amended in 2006 — "Mastless Law increased the minimum damages amount from 
$50,000 to $150,000 and broadened the language of section 2255 to allow adults to 
recover for damages sustained while they were a minor." The plain reading of the statute 
makes clear that prior to the 2006 amendment, the remedy was created for the benefit of 
minors who suffered sexual exploitation as a result of violation of a statutorily 
enumerated criminal act(s). 
To the extent there is any ambiguity in the text—and there is none—the law's 
legislative history further underscores Congress's intent to limit the right of action to 
minors: "Current law provides for a civil remedy for personal injuries resulting from 
child pornography offenses. This section expands the number of sex offenses in which a 
minor may pursue a civil remedy for personal injuries resulting from the offense." H.R. 
Rep. 105-557, at 23 (1998), as reprinted in 1998 U.S.C.C.A.N. 678, 692. And perhaps 
most telling, Congress amended § 2255 in 2006—three years after the alleged 
misconduct in this case supposedly took place—to make the civil action available to 
persons who had turned 18 by the time they filed suit: 
(a) In general-Any person who, while a minor, was a victim of a 
violation of section 2241(c), 2242, 2243, 2251, 2251A, 2252, 2252A, 
2260, 2421, 2422, or 2423 of this title and who suffers personal injury as a 
result of such violation, regardless of whether the injury occurred while 
such person was a minor, may sue in any appropriate United States 
District Court and shall recover the actual damages such person sustains 
and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee. Any person 
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as described in the preceding sentence shall be deemed to have sustained 
damages of no less than $150,000 in value. 
18 U.S.C. § 2255 (2006) (emphasis added). 
The contrast between the prior and 2006 versions of § 2255 is stark. The 2006 
law replaces each of the prior law's uses of the term "minor" with the term "person." 
Where the 2006 law does refer to a "minor," it changes the prior law's present-tense 
references ("is") to past-tense references ("was"). And the 2006 law's new language now 
makes clear that, unlike the prior statute, those victimized while under the age of 18 may 
sue after they turn 18. Given that amendments must be interpreted "to have real and 
substantial effect," Stone v. I.N.S. 514 U.S. 386, 397 (1995), there can be no doubt that 
Congress recognized the prior statute's strict limitations and for the first time expanded 
the right of action to adults. 
Indeed, the history of the 2006 amendments clearly shows that Congress intended 
to change the law, not merely to clarify it. Those amendments were made by § 707 of the 
Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act, Pub. L. No. 109-248, 120 Stat. 587, 650 
(2006), and are known as "Masha's Law." As Senator Kerry—the author of Masha's 
Law—explained: 
What Masha's law does, and what is incorporated in here, is it changes 
"any minor" to "any person," so that if a minor is depicted in 
photographs pornographically that are distributed over the Internet, but 
by the time the abuser is caught, the minor is an adult, they can still 
recover. They cannot now, and that is ridiculous. It makes sure that 
recovery on the part of a minor can take place when they become an 
adult.... 
Although I don't think there is any price too high to cost an individual 
who would take advantage of a minor, I think it is only appropriate to ... 
make sure that reaching the age of adulthood does not exempt someone 
from recovery. It is a tribute to continuing to do what this bill does, and 
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that is look after the protection of minors and ensure that those who 
violate them are caught and punished and have to pay to the maximum 
extent. 
152 Cong. Rec. S8012-02 at 58016 (July 20, 2006) (statement of Sen. Kerry) (emphasis 
added). Courts typically give special weight to the statements of a bill's sponsor, Corley 
v. U.S„ 129 S.Ct. 1558, 1569 (Apr. 6, 2009) ("[A] sponsor's statement to the NI Senate 
carries considerable weight.") .4 There is no basis to depart from that rule here. 
It thus is no answer that the pre-amended statute's limitations clause provided that 
"in the case of a person under a legal disability, [the complaint may be filed) not later 
than three years after the disability," 18 U.S.C. § 2255(b) (2003), such that the 
unamended version of the law implicitly must have permitted victims to sue even after 
they turned 18. That interpretation not only would render Masha's Law superfluous; it 
would make Masha's Law's internally redundant, because Masha's Law retained the 
"legal disability" language from the prior version of § 2255(b). See 18 U.S.C. § 2255(b) 
(2006). In short, the retained "legal disability" language in § 2255(b) of the 2006 statute 
would be entirely redundant were it construed to do implicitly what the law elsewhere did 
expressly. 
In these circumstances, the traditional rules against surplusage and 
redundancy apply with double force. See, e.g., Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 
4 
Similarly, the official summary prepared by the Congressional Research Service rats, 
explained that Masha's Law "Nevises provisions allowing victims of certain sex-related crimes to seek 
civil remedies to: (I) allow adults as well as minors to sue for injuries; and (2) increase from $50,000 to 
$150,000 the minimum level of damages." Official Summary of Pub. Law No. 109-248 (July 27, 2006), as 
reprinted at http://thomas.loc.govicgi-bin/bdquery/ed109:1IR04472:@(a@)L&summ2am& (emphasis 
added) (last visited May 10, 2009). Courts have long consulted official CRS summaries to assess 
legislative intent, see, e.g., Rettig v. Pension Ben. Guar. Corp. 744 F.2d 133, 145 & n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1984); 
pIRECTV Inc. v. Civnarella, No. Civ.A 03-2384, 2005 WL 1252261 at *7 (D.N.J. May 24, 2005); 
Clohessy v. St. Francis Hosp. & Healthcare, No. 98-C-4818, 1999 WL 46898 *2-.3 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 28, 
1999), and there is good reason to do so. By design, CRS summaries are intended to "objectively 
describe' the measure's ... effect upon ... current law" so that Congress can make informed judgments 
about the impact of proposed bills. See The Library of Congress, About CRS Stununary, available at 
http://thomasloc.gov/bss/abt_dgst.html (last visited May 10, 2009). 
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(2001). The "legal disability" language in § 2255(b) should be interpreted to reference 
classic legal disabilities like insanity, mental disability, or imprisonment—not age. 
Indeed, that is precisely how Congress typically uses the term legal disability": 
most federal statutes that use the term make clear that it doesn't include age. See, e.g., 25 
U.S.C. § 590c ("A share or interest payable to enrollees less than eighteen years of age or 
under legal disability shall be paid ....") (emphasis added); id. § 783 ("Funds payable 
under sections 781 to 785 of this title to minors or to persons under legal disability shall 
be paid....") (emphasis added); it § 1128 ("Sums payable to enrollees ... who are less 
than eighteen years of age or who are under a legal disability shall be paid....") 
(emphasis added); id. § 1253 ("Sums payable ... to enrollees ... who are less than 
eighteen years of age or who are under a legal disability shall be paid....") (emphasis 
added); id. § 1273 (same); id. § 1283 (same); id. § 1295 (same); id. § 1300a-3 (same); id. 
§ 1300c-3 (same); id. § 1300d-7 (same); see also 38 U.S.C. § 3501. 
Needless to say, Congress would not have had to address age expressly in any of 
these statutes if the term "legal disability" necessarily included one's status as a minor; 
instead, Congress's mere use of the term "legal disability" already would account for a 
would-be plaintiff's minority status. Given the rule "against reading a text in a way that 
makes part of it redundant," Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 551 
U.S. 644 (2007) (citing TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001)), and the canon 
that "where words are employed in a statute which had at the time a well-known meaning 
... in the law of this country, they are presumed to have been used in that sense," 
Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 59 (1911), § 2255's reference to "legal 
disability" can only be interpreted as a reference to classic disabilities like insanity or 
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mental incapacity, but not age. 
Accordingly, Defendant is entitled to summary judgment determining that the 
applicable version of §2255 allows for a minor to pursue the remedy thereunder. JD3 
was 20 years old at the time she instituted this action, no longer a minor. 
Conclusion 
Thus, under the undisputed material facts and applicable law, Defendant is 
entitled to the entry of summary judgment determining that (1) the version of 18 U.S.C. 
§2255, effective 1999 to Jul. 26, 2006, the period of time during which EPSTEIN's 
alleged conduct occurred, applies to Plaintiff's claim brought pursuant to §2255; (2) 
JD3's own testimony establishes that EPSTEIN never used a facility or means of 
interstate commerce to knowingly persuade, induce, entice, or coerce her to engage in 
any sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal offense, or 
attempting to do so. 18 U.S.C. §2422(b). Her testimony and the allegations of the 
complaint also show that EPSTEIN never traveled interstate with the specific intent of 
engaging in sexual activity with her. 18 U.S.C. 2423(b) and (e). Under the undisputed 
material facts, JD3 cannot show a violation of the enumerated predicate acts on which 
she relies, in order to prove her claim pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §2255; thus, an essential 
element of her §2255 cannot be established, entitling Defendant to the entry of summary 
judgment on Count III; and (3) the version of 18 U.S.C. § 2255 in effect when the 
predicate acts allegedly were committed allow only "minors" to file suit; 
WHEREFORE, Defendant requests that this Court enter the summary judgments 
sought herein. Defendant further requests an award of his attorney's fees and costs in 
defending this claim. 
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By:  /s/ Robert D. Critton. Jr. 
ROBERT D. CRITTON, JR., ESQ. 
Florida Bar No. 224162 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true copy of the foregoing was electronically filed 
with the Clerk of the Court using CM/ECF. I also certify that the foregoing document is 
being served this day on all counsel of record identified on the following service list in 
the manner specified via transmission of Notices of Electronic Filing generated by 
CM/ECF on this Z
 day of  May, 2010: 
Stuart S. Mermelstein, Esq. 
Adam D. Horowitz, Esq. 
Mermelstein & Horowitz, P.A. 
18205 Biscayne Boulevard 
Suite 2218 
Miami FL 33160 
ounse or 
amtz 
Jack Alan Goldberger, Esq. 
Atterbury Goldberger & Weiss, P.A. 
250 Australian Avenue South 
Suite 1400 
ounse or De en ant Je i ey Epstein 
Respectfully submitted, 
By:  /s/ Robert D. Critton, Jr. 
ROBERT D. CRITTON, JR., ESQ. 
Florida Bar No. 224162 
1.1.11.11, 
Florida Bar #617296 
BURMAN, CRITTON, LUTTIER & 
COLEMAN 
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303 Banyan Blvd., Suite 400 
West Palm Beach, FL 33401 
(Co-Counsel for Defendant Jeffrey Epstein) 
1 18 USCA §2255 (effective 1999 to Jul. 26, 20061 
PART I--CRIMES 
CHAPTER 110-SEXUAL EXPLOITATION AND OTHER ABUSE OF CHILDREN 
§ 2255. Civil remedy for personal Injuries 
(a) Any minor who is a victim of a violation of section 2241(c), 2242 
2243, 2251, 2251A, 2252, 2252A, 2260 2421 2422 or 2423 of this title 
and who suffers personal injury as a result of such violation may sue in 
any appropriate United States District Court and shall recover the actual 
damages such minor sustains and the cost of the suit, including a 
reasonable attorney's fee. Any minor as described in the preceding 
sentence shall be deemed to have sustained damages of no less than 
$50,000 in value. 
(b) Any action commenced under this section shall be barred unless the 
complaint is filed within six years after the right of action first accrues or in 
the case of a person under a legal disability, not later than three years 
after the disability. 
CREDIT(S) 
(Added Pub.L. 99-500. Title I. 4 101(b)  [Title VII, § 703(a)j, Oct. 18, 1986, 
100 Stat. 1783-75, and amended Pub.L. 99-591, Title I, § 101(b)  [Title VII, 
§ 703(a)], Oct. 30, 1986, 100 Stat. 3341-75; Pub.L. 105-314, Title VI, § 
605 Oct. 30, 1998, 112 Stat. 2984.) 
18 U.S.C. §2255, as amended 2006 
Effective July 27, 2006 
PART I—CRIMES 
CHAPTER 110--SEXUAL EXPLOITATION AND OTHER ABUSE OF CHILDREN 
§ 2255. Civil remedy for personal injuries 
(a) In general.--Any person who, while a minor, was a victim of a violation of 
section 2241(O, 2242, 2243, 2251, 2251A, 2252, 2252A, 2260, 2421, 2422, 
or 2423 of this title and who suffers personal injury as a result of such 
violation, regardless of whether the injury occurred while such person was a 
minor, may sue in any appropriate United States District Court and shall 
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recover the actual damages such person sustains and the cost of the suit, 
including a reasonable attorney's fee. Any person as described in the 
preceding sentence shall be deemed to have sustained damages of no less 
than $150,000 in value. 
(b) Statute of Iimitations.--Any action commenced under this section shall 
be barred unless the complaint is filed within six years after the right of 
action first accrues or in the case of a person under a legal disability, not 
later than three years after the disability. 
CREDIT(S) 
(Added Pub.L. 99-500, Title I, 4 101(b) [Title VII, § 703(a)], Oct. 18, 1986, 
100 Stat. 1783-75, and amended Pub.L. 99-591. Title I, & 101(b) [Title VII, § 
703(a)], Oct. 30, 1986, 100 Stat. 3341-75; Pub.L. 105-314, Title VI, § 605 
Oct. 30, 1998, 112 Stat. 2984; Pub.L. 109-248, Title VII, § 707(b). (c), July 
27, 2006, 120 Stat. 650.) 
2 CHAPTER 117-TRANSPORTATION FOR ILLEGAL SEXUAL ACTIVITY AND 
RELATED CRIMES 
Current through P.L. 107-377 (End) approved 12-19-02 
§ 2422. Coercion and enticement 
(a) Whoever knowingly persuades, induces, entices, or coerces any individual to 
travel in interstate or foreign commerce, or in any Territory or Possession of the 
United States, to engage in prostitution, or in any sexual activity for which any 
person can be charged with a criminal offense, or attempts to do so, shall be fined 
under this title or imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both. 
(b) Whoever, using the mail or any facility or means of interstate or foreign 
commerce, or within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United 
States knowingly persuades, induces, entices, or coerces any individual who has 
not attained the age of 18 years, to engage in prostitution or any sexual activity for 
which any person can be charged with a criminal offense, or attempts to do so, 
shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 15 years, or both. 
As amended, Apr. 30, 2003. (In effect during 2004 - 2005). 
§ 2422. Coercion and enticement 
(a) Whoever knowingly persuades, induces, entices, or coerces any individual to 
travel in interstate or foreign commerce, or in any Territory or Possession of the 
United States, to engage in prostitution, or in any sexual activity for which any 
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person can be charged with a criminal offense, or attempts to do so, shall be fined 
under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both. 
(b) Whoever, using the mail or any facility or means of interstate or foreign 
commerce, or within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United 
States knowingly persuades, induces, entices, or coerces any individual who has 
not attained the age of 18 years, to engage in prostitution or any sexual activity for 
which any person can be charged with a criminal offense, or attempts to do so, 
shall be fined under this title and imprisoned not less than 5 years and not more 
than 30 years. 
Note: The amendment to the statute increased punishment that could be imposed 
for a violation thereof. 
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