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From: Office of Terje Rod-Larsen < 
Subject: IPI Regional Insights - December 2012 
Date: Wed, 19 Dec 2012 18:37:57 +0000 
INTERNATIONAL PEACE INSTITUTE 
IPI Regional Insights 
December 2012 
The International Peace Institute's (IPI) Regional Insights covers select regional and thematic developments based on 
information from a variety of sources. It draws on the research of IPI experts and is provided exclusively to major 
donors and members. Each monthly issue covers challenges and opportunities related to international peace, security, 
and development. 
Africa 
Mali: As expected, in a December 5th meeting the UN Secretary-General recommended an international military 
intervention to the Security Council as a last resort to assist the Malian armed forces to recover the occupied territories in 
the north. The Secretary-General strongly preferred national dialogue and endorsed military intervention only "to deal 
with the most hard-line extremist and criminal elements in the north." On the critical issue of funding, however, the 
report stipulated that funding come from voluntary and not assessed contributions. The Malian transitional authorities 
(under stress—see below), ECOWAS, and the African Union were disappointed by the lack of outright support for a 
military mission. 
Instability in the interim government in Bamako is impeding regional and international efforts to reunite the divided 
country. On December 10th, the interim Prime Minister Cheick Modibo Diarra was arrested by members of the army and 
forced to resign. The swift appointment of the new interim Prime Minister Diango Cissoko, the country's former 
ombudsman, will facilitate the pursuit of talks initiated by the ECOWAS mediator Blaise Compaor4 with the Tuareg rebels 
of MNLA and the Islamist Ansar Dine. However, the conditions of the previous prime minister's departure, as well as the 
presence of the armed forces in the new government, are worrying and likely to slow down the hoped-for orderly return 
to an elected government. The interwoven security, political, economic, and social challenges facing Mali, the involvement 
of state and nonstate actors, and the interplay of regional states advancing their disparate interests all call for a multi-
pronged response. At this time, however, the Secretary-General's report, recognizing the challenges, the need for careful 
planning and the political situation in Bamako, cautiously sees a future for a multidimensional UN mission. Thus, for the 
foreseeable future there will be ongoing political dialogue with those willing to talk, continued planning for an 
international military intervention, and political space for both progress toward a resolution and a worsening of the 
situation. The latter may well include the entrenchment of the regional franchise of Al Qaeda—Al Qaeda in the Islamic 
Maghreb—in a new safe haven in northern Mali. 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC): On December 9th negotiations finally started in Kampala between the M23 
rebel group and the government of the DRC. President Joseph Kabila had long resisted negotiating directly with the rebel 
group created in March 2012. The fall of Goma on November 20th to the M23 rebels in spite of the presence of UN 
peacekeepers was a game changer. It precipitated a declaration by the leaders of the International Conference on the 
Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) at the November 24th Kampala summit calling on the M23 to withdraw from Goma, but also 
on "the DRC government to listen, evaluate and resolve the legitimate grievances of M23." The African Union endorsed 
the declaration on November 25th. 
While the negotiations started badly with mutual recriminations, the talks continue in Kampala. There are a number of 
unresolved issues at stake, including questions relating to military ranks, salaries of M23 officers previously integrated into 
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the Congolese army (FARDC), and political integration from the previous agreement between M23's earlier incarnation 
CNDP and Kinshasa on March 23, 2009. The M23 has in recent weeks tried to appeal to a broader Congolese base by 
seeking to discuss last year's contested national elections and issues related to the constitution (the implementation of 
decentralization measures), but without much success. The Congolese political opposition actually refused to take part in 
the Kampala negotiations as they were only offered observer status. It also criticized the secrecy of the agreement on 
March 23, 2009, which was never approved by parliament. Experts fear that this new round of negotiations will again not 
address the root causes of the cyclical conflict—regional competition for control of land and natural resources in eastern 
DRC, a weak government that lacks legitimacy, and poor governance (including the need for decentralization and real 
defense-sector reform). Concerns are that the talks will instead produce another temporary fix. 
Middle East 
Egypt: In the first day of voting in a two-part election on December 15th, 30 percent of eligible voters turned out to vote 
on a new constitution. Unofficial results indicate that 57 percent of those who cast a ballot voted in favor of the new 
document. Voters in the remaining districts will cast their ballots on December zed, when a similar showing and result is 
expected. The low level of turnout and small margin of support reflects the current political mood in Egypt. President 
Morsi's November 21st decree and subsequent actions, which effectively accelerated the finalization of the draft 
constitution and forced a quick popular vote on it, continue to draw supporters and protestors to the streets of Cairo. 
Demonstrations by both sides reached a climax on December 4th and 5th, when clashes outside of the presidential palace 
in Cairo left five dead and more than 600 injured. President Morsi's slow and limited reaction to the violence and minimal 
response to the opposition's concerns have been compared to Mubarak's attitude and actions during the January 2011 
uprising. Of note, the new constitution ensures the military retains its powerful position in the government. Overall, the 
actions and events of the last few weeks have weakened the position of President Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood. 
The political crisis has also slowed down steps to jump-start Egypt's ailing economy. The government delayed a request for 
the $4.8 billion loan from the International Monetary Fund, when on December 9th it first announced and then cancelled 
a tax hike within a ten hour period, probably for fear of inciting further demonstrations. It seems likely that the IMF loan is 
on hold until after the referendum or perhaps even after the subsequent parliamentary election, due in two months time. 
The IMF—as well as the international community at large—has been caught off guard by Morsi's mixed signals. 
Libya: The reshaping of Libya's political landscape is slowly progressing. On December 11th Minister of Interior Ashur 
Shwail, whose appointment was delayed until an appeals court cleared him of the Integrity Commission's finding that he 
had been closely associated with the Qaddafi government, took his oath in front the Libyan General National Congress 
(GNC). His appointment comes at a critical time for Libyan national security: his first priority will be to round up weapons 
and galvanize a deeply shaken security apparatus. The new minister will also need to address the security vacuum that 
has allowed rogue elements to thrive in several parts of the country. Recent press reports speculate that al-Qaida in the 
Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) is hoping to forge links with Libya's Ansar al-Sharia and other Islamist groups in Libya. 
At the end of November, members of Libya's National Oil Corporation (NOC) met with oil corporations in Istanbul to 
secure $50 billion dollars worth of oil contracts. Oil production has returned to pre-revolution levels (1.6 million barrels 
per day); yet, in the current market, interest in Libyan "sweet" high-quality crude oil is less strong this year, given a ready 
supply of the sweet crude resulting from US shale oil production and a shrinking market for the sweet variety in Europe. 
Tunisia: Tensions between the ruling Ennanda party and the half-million-strong General Union of Tunisian Workers (UGTT) 
reached a climax in the past few weeks. After a violent episode on November 27th between police and disenchanted 
youths in the southwestern town of Siliana, strikes broke out in various regions, including Sidi Bouzid—the epicenter of 
the Tunisian uprising in late 2012. While a nationwide general strike was originally called by the UGTT for December 13th, 
it was averted on December 12th when a deal was reached with the government (the terms of which remain undisclosed). 
The strike would have been the third of its kind since the union was established in the 1940s and days shy of the second 
anniversary of the uprising. The episode sheds light on the troubled Tunisian economy and a growing disillusionment with 
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the lack of economic opportunities, while revealing the shifting role of the UGTT from protector of workers' rights to a 
potent political opposition force capable of challenging the government. 
Syria: As rebels in Syria continue to score more offensives against the regime, the government has retaliated with more 
force, most recently by launching Scud missiles from Damascus into northern Syria on December 12th, according to press 
reports. On December 17th the long-time Syrian Vice President told the press that neither side can win the fight militarily. 
On the diplomatic front, the United States and other states formally recognized the National Coalition for Syrian 
Revolutionary and Opposition Forces as the legitimate representative of the Syrian people at a December 12th Friends of 
Syria meeting in Marrakech. 
Lebanon: Spillover from Syria reached a climax on December 10th when several days of clashes between Sunni Muslims 
and Alawites left 19 people dead in the northern city of Tripoli. The second-largest city in Lebanon is a historic site of 
sectarian conflict and home to a large population of Sunnis who have been actively engaged alongside the Sunni-led 
opposition in Syria. The incident came days after Syrian warplanes launched a heavy attack on Damascus, where rebel 
forces tried to make advances on Bashar al-Assad's center of power. 
Jordan: At a recent visit to the University of Jordan, King Abdullah II urged youth to participate in the upcoming January 
23rd elections and to take a leading role in the country's reform process, a move that reinforces his reaching out to the 
largest and potentially most vocal segment of the population. Press speculation however seems to suggest that, due to 
civil unrest over the past four weeks, King Abdullah is considering postponing the elections—or at least making 
amendments to the already controversial electoral law—if the political climate becomes increasingly unstable. His biggest 
challenge is the Islamic Action Front—Jordan's "Muslim Brotherhood" and most important opposition group—who made 
it clear as early as July that they would boycott the upcoming parliamentary elections. According to press reports, King 
Abdullah has recently been in talks with various nationalist and leftist groups from the opposition with the hope of 
nurturing new alliances to neutralize the influential position of the Muslim Brotherhood. 
Kuwait: Emir Sheikh Sabah Al-Ahmad Al-Sabah swore in a new 16-member cabinet on December 12th. Ten ministers from 
the last cabinet are re-assuming their roles in government, including Prime Minister Jaber AI-Mubarak Al-Hamad Al-
Sabah. There are two women (one more than the previous government) in the cabinet. Press reports indicate that the 
opposition is unhappy with the result. The opposition also plans to protest the newly elected National Assembly 
(parliament) in court. A group of lawyers has called on the Constitutional Court to declare the election illegal and dissolve 
the parliament on the premise that the electoral constituency law issued by the emir in October was unconstitutional. 
Palestinians: After an estimated 45 years of exile from Palestinian territories, Hamas political chief Khaled Meshaal visited 
the Gaza Strip and spoke of a new era of Palestinian independence. The speech took place at a rally celebrating the 25th
anniversary of the founding of Hamas and was a tour de force of political theater marked by tough rhetoric and radical 
political gestures. The day was also characterized by a unique display of Hamas-Fatah solidarity, as flags from both camps 
were visible among the crowds while Meshaal referred to Palestinian unity in his speech. There has been much press 
speculation around the issue of a potential Hamas-Fatah reconciliation with various commentators suggesting that the 
prime objective of Meshaal's visit was to secure a mandate for the rapprochement from the seemingly less-interested 
Hamas leadership in Gaza. The visit also was another indication of increasing cooperation between Hamas and the Morsi 
government in Egypt. Meshaal entered Gaza through Egypt's Rafah border crossing (a logistical impossibility under the 
Mubarak regime). 
I 
Central and South Asia 
Afghanistan: Following a recent visit by US Secretary of Defense Panetta, President Karzai told the press that he will travel 
to Washington early in 2013 to discuss the possibility of US forces remaining in Afghanistan after the 2014 NATO 
International Security Assistance Forces drawdown. A major stumbling block in any continuing US military presence 
involves the terms of a status of forces agreement. Karzai told the press that while he respects the US insistence that its 
troops have immunity from Afghan law, he will discuss the issue and others that impinge on Afghan sovereignty during the 
upcoming visit. Among other developments, the Foundation for Strategic Research, a French think tank, is hosting an 
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intra-Afghan meeting on the future of Afghanistan this month, where Karzai government, Taliban, Hizb-i-Islami, and other 
Afghans will be present. 
Pakistan: Interior Minister Rehman Malik visited India from December 14-16th where he signed a bilateral visa 
agreement, which will ease visa formalities for citizens of both countries. It is a significant development, occurring just 
over four years after the terrorist attack in Mumbai, whose origins have been traced to Pakistan. Of note, Interior Minister 
Malik's visit comes approximately one month after the execution of one perpetrator in the Mumbai attack, who survived 
the attack and had been convicted in India for his role in it. When asked, Malik told the press that Pakistan would arrest 
Saeed Hafeez, considered the mastermind of the Mumbai attacks and living openly in Pakistan, if India or any other party 
presented evidence that would hold up in court. Hafeez has been released after previous arrests owing to lack of 
evidence. 
For more information please contact: 
Maureen Quinn at 
or 
Camilla Relcsten-Monsen at 
or 
•The International Peace Institute  (IPI) is an independent, not-for-profit thin 
an wi 
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ff representing more than 20 nationalities with offices in New York 
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