EFTA00234517

Memorandum 
Subject 
Re: Operation Leap Year 
Date 
May 1, 2007 
(Revised 9/13/07) 
(2nd Revision 2/19/08)' 
To 
From 
R. Alexander Acosta, United States Attorney 
First Assistant United States Attorney 
Chief, Criminal Division 
MAUSA, Northern Region 
, Chief, Northern Region 
I. Introduction 
This memorandum seeks approval for the attached indictment char in Jeffrey 
Epstein, Min 
a/k/a' 
JEGE 
Inc., and Hyperion Air, Inc. The proposed indictment contains 60 counts and seeks the 
forfeiture of Epstein's Palm Beach home and two airplanes? 
The FBI has information regarding Epstein's whereabouts on May 16th and May 
19th and they would like to arrest him on one of those dates. Epstein is considered an 
extremely high flight risk' and, from information we have received, a continued danger 
'The second revision amends the Jane Doe numbering system to correspond with the most 
recent indictment. It also removes the references to the overt acts and substantive allegations related 
to each Jane Doe because the indictment has been revised to group the overt acts related to each Jane 
Doe. 
'Each of the airplanes is held in a separate "shell corporation," JEGE, Inc., and Hyperion Air, 
Inc. Epstein is the sole shareholder in both of these corporations and they serve no purpose other 
than to hold and maintain the airplanes for Epstein's personal use. Because these assets are not held 
as personal property in Epstein's name, I have indicted the two corporations, which will be named 
as co-conspirators and as aiders and abettors in the relevant offenses. 
3Epstein's resources are virtually limitless. In addition to the two airplanes, one of which cost 
$42,000,000, he has homes around the world, and a fortune estimated to exceed $1 billion. 
EFTA00234517

to the community based upon his continued enticement of underage girls. For these 
reasons, we would like to present a sealed indictment to the Grand Jury on May 15, 
2007, and we would like the presentation of that indictment and the status of the 
investigation to remain confidential. Epstein's crimes are considered crimes of violence 
and negotiation with his attorneys may undermine our arguments for pretrial 
detention. 
The investigation initially was undertaken by the City of Palm Beach Police 
Department in response to a complaint received from the parents of a 14-year-old girl,' 
IP, from Royal Palm Beach. When 
and another girl began arguing at school 
because the other girl accusedlingi of being a prostitute, one of the school principals 
intervened. The principal search 
purse and found $300 cash. The principal asked 
gal where the money came from. 
initiall claimed that she earned the money 
working at "Chik-Fil-A," which no one believed. 
en claimed that she made the 
money selling drugs; no one believed that either. 
finally admitted that she had been 
paid $300 to give a massage to a man on Palm Beach Islands'', parents approached the 
Palm Beach Police Department ("PBPD") about pressing charges. 
PBPD be an investigating the recipient of the massage, Jeffrey Epstein, and two of 
his assistants, 
and 
. PBPD identified approximately 27 girls 
who went to Epstein's house to perform "sexual massages" (not including one licensed 
massage therapist) or who recruited girls to do the same. The girls' ages ranged from 14 
years' old to 23 years' old. Some girls saw Epstein only once and some saw him dozens of 
times. The "sexual massages" performed also varied. Some girls were fully clothed while 
they massaged Epstein; some wore only their underwear; and some were fully nude. During 
all of these massages, Epstein masturbated himself and he would touch the girl performing 
the massage, usually fondling their breasts and touching their vaginas - either over their 
clothing or on their bare skin. Epstein often used a vibrator to masturbate the girls and 
digitally penetrated a number of them. For the girls who saw him more often, Epstein 
dusted to oral sex and vaginal sex. Epstein sometimes brought his assistant/girlfriend, 
into the sexual activity. 
On October 18, 2005, PBPD obtained a search warrant with the assistance of the Palm 
Beach County State Attorney's Office ("PBSAO"). By this time, PBSAO had already been 
contacted by Epstein's cadre of lawyers. When PBPD arrived at Epstein's home two days 
later (10/20/05) to execute the search warrant, they found several items conspicuously 
missing. For example, computer monitors and keyboards were found, but the CPUs were 
2 
EFTA00234518

gone.° Similarly, surveillance cameras were found, but they were disconnected and the 
videotapes were gone. Nonetheless, the search did recover some evidence of value, 
including message pads showing messages from many girls over a two-year span. The 
messages showgirls 
rnin 
hone calls to confirm ap intments to "work." Messages 
were taken by 
r 
and 
s The search also 
recovered numerous photos of Epstein sifting with naked girls whose ages are undetermined. 
Photographs taken inside the home show that the girls' descriptions of the layout of 
the home and master bedroom/bathroom area are accurate. PBPD also found massage tables 
and oils, the high school transcript of one of the girls, and sex toys. 
In sum, the PBPD investigation showed that girls from a local high school6 would be 
contacted by one of Epstein's assistants to make an appointment to "work." Up to three 
appointments each day would be made. The girls would travel to Epstein's home in Palm 
Beach where they would meet Epstein's chef and Epstein's assistant—usually an 
the 
kitchen. The assistant normally would escort the girls upstairs to the master 
bedroom/bathroom area and set up the massage table and massage oils. The assistant would 
leave and Epstein would enter the room wearing a robe or a towel. He would remove the 
clothing and lie face down and nude on the massage table. Epstein would then instruct the 
girl on what to do and would ask her to remove her clothing. After some time, Epstein would 
turn over, so that he was lying face up. Epstein would masturbate himself and fondle the girl 
performing the massage. When Epstein climaxed, the massage was over. The girl was 
instructed to get dressed and to go downstairs to the kitchen while Epstein showered. Epstein 
would pay the girl—usually $200—and if it was a "new" girl, would ask for the girl's phone 
'During a meeting, Epstein's current attorneys, Gerald Lefcourt and Lilly Ann Sanchez, 
admitted that attorney Roy Black instructed Epstein to have the CPUs removed, but they insisted that 
those instructions were given well in advance of the execution of the search warrant — not in 
response to a "leak." 
maiden name was ' 
" which was the name she used during the 
relevant period. 
'Of the 12 underage girls who are the subject of the indictment, 9 attended 
High School, 1 attended' 
High School, 1 attendedetligh 
School, 1 
attendedinSHigh 
School, and 1 was home schooled. There are ten other girls whose 
telephone records are still being analyzed, some of whom will probably be the subject of a 
superseding indictment. Some of those girls came forward following the press coverage of the state 
investigation. We anticipate that more girls will come forward after Epstein's arrest. 
3 
EFTA00234519

number to contact her in the future.' Girls were encouraged to find other girls to bring with 
them. If a girl brought another girl to perform a "massage," each girl would receive $200. 
The PBPD investigation consists primarily of sworn taped statements from the girls. 
When PBPD began having problems with PBSAO, they approached the FBI. The 
investigation was formally presented to FBI and to me after PBSAO "presented" the case to 
a state grand jury and that grand jury returned an indictment charging Epstein with three 
counts of solicitation of prostitution.' 
Once I determined that there were federal statutes violated, FBI, ICE, and I opened 
files. The federal investigation has focused on the interstate nexus required for all of the 
federal violations, so a number of grand jury subpoenas were issued for telephone records, 
flight manifests, and credit card records. The federal agents also re-interviewed some of the 
girls, but limited their questions to "new" topics, such as the specific means of contact, to 
avoid creating inconsistent Jencks materials. The agents also delved into Epstein's history 
and interviewed others and obtained records to corroborate the girls' stories. FBI also 
interviewed girls who came forward after the PBSAO indictment was reported in the papers, 
and additional girls identified through those interviews. 
I will first address the different crimes with which Epstein can be charged, setting 
forth the elements of those offenses and the types of evidence that I intend to use to satisfy 
those elements. Second, I will summarize the evidence related to each girl who has been 
identified as a potential victim in this case. 
Following the discussion of the girls' statements and evidence, there is a discussion 
of the evidence from other witnesses, including corroborating evidence and information 
related to Epstein's background. The last section discusses forfeiture. 
'Usually Epstein made the payment and asked for the phone number, but sometimes it was 
the assistant. 
(t1 
'The presentation consisted almost entirely of cross-examination of the girls who testified 
and 
Jane Doe #16) using the materials presented by Epstein's attorneys (discussed below). 
We were unable to obtain the tape of the State Attorney's instructions on the law and presentation 
of the indictment, so we do not know whether the grand jury was told that lack of knowledge of age 
only heard 
in not a defense under Florida
about the two girls who testified. An indictment was returned charging Epstein with three counts
law or the charges that they chose from. The grand jury 
of solicitation of prostitution - two are misdemeanors, a third conviction (even simultaneously) is 
a felony. Our information is that Epstein is negotiation a misdemeanor plea. 
4
......!. r 
EFTA00234520

II. The Law of the Offenses Charged' 
Epstein's conduct violates a number of federal statutes, all of which are discussed 
herein. None of the statutes or their penalties changed during the time period charged (early 
2004 through mid-2005), although many have changed since then. I use the language of the 
statutes as they appeared while Epstein was committing the offenses. 
In addition to conspiracy charges, there are five statutes related to sexual activity that 
have been violated. First, Epstein traveled in interstate commerce with the intent to engage 
in illicit sexual conduct, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b). Second, Epstein and his 
assistants used a facility of interstate commerce to induce or entice minors to engage in 
prostitution and sexual activity for which anperson can be charged, in violation of 18 
U.S.C. § 2 
ird, Epstein transported 
in interstate commerce with the 
intent that 
engage in sexual activity for which a person can be charged, in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2421. For these three offenses, knowledge of the victim's age does 
not need to be proven, although a reasonable belief that a person is over 18 is an affirmative 
defense to a limited portion of § 2423(b).1° 
In those instances where Epstein and/or the assistants knew the ages of the girls (or 
had reason to know their ages but willfully blinded themselves to that knowledge), they can 
S
iar ed with sex trafficlthiSolation of 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)(1). In such instances, 
, 
and 
also can be charged with benefitting from their 
participation in a venture engaged in human sex trafficking, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 
1591(a)(2). 
'Attached as Appendix A are materials received from counsel for Epstein, including their 
legal analysis. The points they raise are addressed in this memo. 
'Section 2421 was originally referred to as the Mann Act. Sections 2422 and 2423 are more 
recent additions, which focus on children. All three sections are sometimes jointly referred to as the 
Mann Act. 
5 
EFTA00234521

A. 
Violations of the Mann Act: 18 U.S.C. 8§ 2421-2423 
1. 
Knowledge of Age Is Not Required. 
The Mann Act criminalizes traveling in interstate commerce to engage in "illicit 
sexual conduct," (§ 2423(b)), using a facility of interstate commerce to entice a minor to 
engage in sexual activity or prostitution (§ 2422(b)), and transporting a person to engage in 
sexual activity (§ 2421). Sections 2423(b) and 2422(b) require a minor victim, but they do 
not require that the defendant know that the victim is a minor. 
For example, in December, the Fourth Circuit issued its opinion in United States. 
Jones, 471 F.3d 535 (4th Cir. 2006). Jones was charged with transporting a minor across 
state lines for sexual purposes, in violation of Section 2423(a), which reads: 
A person who knowingly transports an individual who has not attained the age 
of 18 years in interstate or foreign commerce ... with intent that the individual 
engage in prostitution, or in any sexual activity for which any person can be 
charged with a criminal offense, shall be fined under this title and imprisoned 
not less than 5 years and not more than 30 years. 
Jones argued that the term "knowingly" in that section required the Government to prove that 
Jones knew the age of the victim. The Fourth Circuit soundly rejected the argument, citing 
the other circuits reaching the same conclusion. Jones, 471 F.3d at 538-39 (citing United 
States I. Griffith, 284 F.3d 338, 351 (2d Cir. 2002); United States, Taylor, 239 F.3d 994, 
997 (9th Cir. 2001); United States I Scisum, 32 F.3d 1479, 1485-86 (10th Cir. 1994); United 
States Hamilton, 456 F.2d 171, 173 (3d Cir. 1982)). Instead, the court concluded that the 
Government need only prove that the defendant "knowingly transported" someone. The 
Government must also prove that the person transported was, in fact, a minor, but need not 
prove that the defendant was aware of her minority. In conducting its analysis, the Jones 
Court relied upon cases interpreting sections of Title 21 relating to the distribution of drugs 
to a minor. See Jones at 540. Those cases have held that the Government must prove only 
that the defendant knowingly distributed the narcotics to someone who happened to be 
underage. 
While the Eleventh Circuit has not addressed the question posed by Jones, it has 
addressed 21 U.S.C. § 861(a)(3) and has reached the same conclusion in approving the 
district court's instructions to the juty: 
6 
EFTA00234522

Section 845 of 21 U.S.C.A. provides that anyone who knowingly or 
intentionally distributes controlled substances to a person under twenty-one is 
subject to enhanced penalties. . . . [T]he court instructed the jury that it is not 
an essential element of the crime that the person who distributes be 
knowledgeable that the person to whom he distributes is under twenty-one 
years old; it is the distribution that must be knowing, although it is an essential 
element that the person to whom the distribution is made is under twenty-one. 
United Stalest Pruitt, 763 F.2d 1256, 1261 (11th Cir. 1985). In reaching this decision, the 
Eleventh Circuit relied upon the Third Circuit's Hamilton decision, supra: 
There is, however, a precise analogue to this statute, 18 U.S.C.A. § 2421 et 
seq. (White Slave Traffic Act), which prohibits the interstate transportation of 
persons in order to engage in immoral practices including prostitution, and 
which provides enhanced penalties for the knowing transportation of persons 
under the age of eighteen years. Under this statute, knowledge of the victim's 
age is not an element of the crime; the "knowing" component applies to the 
transportation itself. 
Id. at 1262 (citing Hamilton). See also United States'. Williams, 922 F.2d 737, 739 (11th 
Cir. 1991) (using same rationale to decide that Government need not prove knowledge of age 
for a charge of knowingly employing, using, persuading, inducing, enticing, or coercing a 
person under eighteen years of age in the commission of a drug offense). 
In United States. Taylor, 239 F.3d 994 (9th Cir. 2001), the Ninth Circuit addressed 
a defendant's assertion that knowledge of minority is required to convict him of transporting 
a minor for purposes of prostitution. The Ninth Circuit held that the "more natural reading 
of the statute, however, is that the requirement of knowledge applies to the defendant's 
conduct of transporting the person rather than to the age of the person transported." Id. at 
997. In Taylor, the defendant argued that the court should analogize the statute to the 
transportation of hazardous waste, which requires a showing that the defendant knew the 
waste was hazardous. The Ninth Circuit rejected that suggestion: 
in contrast, the transportation of any individual for purposes of prostitution or 
other criminal sexual activity is already unlawful under federal law. 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2421. Under 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a), the fact that the individual being 
transported is a minor creates a more serious crime in order to provide 
heightened protection against sexual exploitation of minors. As Congress 
7 
EFTA00234523

intended, the age of the victim simply subjects the defendant to a more severe 
penalty in light of Congress' concern about the sexual exploitation of minors. 
Cf. United States I. Figueroa, 165 F.3d 111, 115 (2d Cir. 1998) (noting that, 
if a criminal statute's language is unclear, its scienter requirement is presumed 
to be met once an individual forms the requisite intent to commit some type of 
crime). 
• 
• 
• 
.. . Ignorance of the victim's age provides no safe harbor from the penalties 
in 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a). If someone knowingly transports a person for the 
purposes of prostitution or another sex offense, the transporter assumes the risk 
that the victim is a minor, regardless of what the victim says or how the victim 
appears. 
Id. (emphasis added; additional internal citations omitted). Cf. United States'. Wild, 143 
Fed. Appx. 938, 942 (4th Cir. 2005) (the parties agreed that, to prove a violation of § 
2423(a), the United States had to show that (1) the defendant transported the victim in 
interstate commerce; (2) the defendant did so knowingly and with the intent that the victim 
engage in prostitution; and (3) the victim was under the age of 18 at the time she was 
transported). 
This reading finds additional support in the Mann Act itself using the doctrine of 
"expressio unius est exclusio alterius" (to express or include one thing implies the exclusion 
of the other). Section 2423(g) creates an affirmative defense to one portion of a violation of 
Section 2423(b). For purposes of that subsection alone, a defendant may raise an affirmative 
defense, which he must prove, that the defendant "reasonably believed that the person with 
whom the defendant engaged in the commercial sex act had attained the age of 18 years." 
18 U.S.C. § 2423(g). The inclusion of that affirmative defense shows that Congress 
considered the issue and decided that the United States does not have to make an initial 
showing of knowledge of age for violations of 2423(b). Congress likewise considered the 
same issue for the other portions of the Mann Act and reached the same conclusion. If 
Congress had intended to place the burden of proving age on the United States — or if it had 
decided that it should create an affirmative defense to those charges — it could have done so. 
Congress' use of similar offense language for the other sections of the Mann Act shows that 
Congress likewise did not intend to require proof of knowledge of age to violate those 
sections either. See Gustafson" Alloyd Co., Inc., 513 U.S. 561, 570 (1995) (noting the 
"normal rule of statutory construction" that "identical words used in different parts of the 
8 
EFTA00234524

same act are intended to have the same meaning"). 
In United States I. Scott, 999 F.2d 541, 1993 WL 280323 (6th Cir. 1993), the 
defendant argued that the Mann Act was unconstitutional for failing to include a requirement 
that the Government prove the defendant's knowledge of the age of the minor. The Sixth 
Circuit rejected the argument. First, it found that "[k]nowledge that a girl is under 18 years 
of age when transported interstate is not part of the proof required of the government in order 
to sustain a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 2423. The government proved, as it must, that [the 
victim] was in fact a minor at the time of the interstate transportation ... The Mann Act does 
not require more." Id., 1993 WL 280323 at *6 (citation omitted). The Sixth Circuit then 
stated: 
it does not offend due process for Congress to draft a statute that does not 
require the prosecution to show that a defendant believed the victim to be 
under the age of 18 when she was transported interstate, because the law has 
traditionally afforded minors substantial protection from others.... Similarly, 
the Constitution does not require that a defendant be provided a defense of 
mistake of age when accused of a Mann Act violation involving a minor. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
This approach is consistent with the law of statutory rape, which generally holds that 
a defendant's good faith mistake as to the victim's age is no defense. In United States'. 
Ransom, 942 F.2d 775 (10th Cir. 1991), the Tenth Circuit addressed a federal statutory rape 
provision, which provides: "Whoever, in the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of 
the United States or in a Federal prison, knowingly engages in a sexual act with another 
person who has not attained the age of 12 years, or attempts to do so, shall be fined under this 
title, imprisoned for any term of years or life, or both." Id. at 775 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 
2241(c)). The defendant asserted that a "reasonable mistake as to age defense" should be 
read into the statute or, alternatively, that the statute was unconstitutional for failing to 
include such a defense. The Tenth Circuit rejected the arguments, noting that "the majority 
of courts that have considered the issue have rejected the reasonable mistake of age defense 
to statutory rape absent some express legislative directive." Id. (citations omitted). Further, 
the "Supreme Court has recognized that the legislature's authority to define an offense 
includes the power 12 exclude elements of knowledge and diligence from its definition." 
Id. (quoting Lambert. California, 355 U.S. 225, 228 (1957)). The Tenth Circuit also agreed 
with the legislative history, finding that the statute "protects children from sexual abuse by 
placing the risk of mistake as to a child's age on an older, more mature person who chooses 
9 
EFTA00234525

to engage in sexual activity with one who may be young enough to fall within the statute's 
purview." Id. at 777 (citing Nelson" Moriarty, 484 F.2d 1034, 1035 (1st Cir. 1973)). The 
Ninth Circuit addressed similar arguments in United States'. Juvenile Male, 211 F.3d 1169 
(9th Cir. 2000), and reached the same conclusions. 
As discussed in Ransom, Epstein and his assistants were the "older, more mature 
person[s]" who chose to engage in sexual activity and prostitution with young girls. The risk 
of mistake regarding the ages of those victims should lie with the targets. 
2. 
Coercion and Enticement: 18 
§ 2422 Wounts 5 to 161 
Whoever, using the mail or any facility or means of interstate . . . commerce, 
... knowingly persuades, induces, [or] entices ... any individual who has not 
attained the age of 18 years, to engage in prostitution or any sexual activity for 
which any person can be charged with a criminal offense, or attempts to do so, 
shall be fined under this title and imprisoned not less than 5 years and not more 
than 30 years. 
18 U.S.C. § 2422(b). 
The United States must show either: 
Ekt 
That the Defendant knowingly used a facility of interstate commerce to 
persuade, induce, or entice a person to engage in prostitution; and 
Second: 
That the person so persuaded was under the age of 18; 
or 
First: 
That the Defendant knowingly used a facility of interstate commerce to 
persuade, induce, or entice a person to engage in sexual activity; 
Second: 
That the person so persuaded was under the age of 18; and 
Dug 
That the Defendant could have been charged with a criminal offense 
10 
EFTA00234526

under the law of Florida based upon the sexual activity." 
The statute does not define "facility or means of interstate commerce" or 
"prostitution." 
a. 
A telephone is a "facility of interstate commerce." 
The Eleventh Circuit has ruled that evidence of the use of a telethone satisfies the 
element of using a facility or means of interstate commerce. United States.. Drury, 396 F.3d 
1303, 1311 (11th Cir. 2005) (the term "facility of interstate commerce ... establishes federal 
jurisdiction whenever any "facility of interstate commerce" is used in the commission of 
[the] offense, regardless of whether the use is interstate in nature (Le., the telephone call was 
between states) or purely intrastate in nature (Le., the telephone call was made to another 
telephone within the same state)."). In Drury, the defendant used his land-line telephone to 
call an undercover agent's cellular telephone. Although both the defendant and the agent 
were in Georgia, the signals to the agent's cell phone had to pass through VoiceStream's 
Jacksonville, Florida switching center. The defendant argued that he did not know or intend 
that the call pass in interstate commerce. The Eleventh Circuit was unpersuaded: 
The calls were not accidentally or incidentally placed, but rather were made 
knowingly to further a scheme. . . . Accordingly, whether Drury knew or 
intended that they would travel across state lines is immaterial. 
Id. at 1313. In Drury, the Eleventh Circuit did not address whether the district court erred 
by instructing the jury that telephones are "facilities in interstate commerce." In an 
unpublished decision from last year, the Eleventh Circuit wrote, in dicta, that there was no 
error in instruging a jury that "the telephone system was a facility of interstate commerce." 
United States'. Roberts, 2006 WL 827293 n.1 (11th Cir. Mar. 30, 2006). See also United 
"Note that there is an Eleventh Circuit Pattern Jury Instruction for attempted enticement of 
a minor. In that instruction, the Eleventh Circuit included a willfulness requirement — including a 
requirement that the defendant believe that the individual was under eighteen. Those additional 
requirements apply to a charge of attempted enticement because attempt is a specific intent offense 
that requires the United States to prove that the defendant "knowingly and willfully intended to 
commit the offense" — i.e., that he intended to commit the crime. 11th Cir. Pattern Jury Instr., 
Special Instr. 11 ("Attempt(s)") (2003). Where, as here, the offense is completed, the statutory 
language requires only that the defendant knowingly persuade, induce, or entice someone to engage 
in prostitution or criminal sexual activity. 
11 
EFTA00234527

States'. Strevell, 2006 WL 1697529, *3 (11th Cir. June 20, 2006) (finding that a defendant's 
placing of "numerous phone calls from Philadelphia to Miami in order to arrange his sexual 
encounter" was sufficient to prove the use of a facility and means of interstate and foreign 
commerce). 
Earlier this year, the Eleventh Circuit found that the United States adequately proved 
the jurisdictional element of § 2422(b) when evidence was introduced that the defendant used 
both a cellular telephone and a land-line telephone to entice a minor to engage in prostitution, 
even though no evidence was introduced that the calls were routed through interstate 
channels. United States I. Evans, 476 F.3d 1176, 1180 (11th Cir. 2007). The Eleventh 
Circuit then held: 
Telephones and cellular telephones are instrumentalities of interstate 
commerce. Evans's use of these instrumentalities of interstate commerce 
alone, even without evidence that the calls he made were routed through an 
interstate system, is sufficient to satisfy § 2422(b)'s interstate-commerce 
element. 
Id. at 1180-81 (citations omitted). 
b. 
"Prostitution" 
As noted above and discussed more thoroughly below, almost none of the girls 
engaged in traditional sexual intercourse with Epstein. The common activity included 
allowing Epstein to fondle the girl while he masturbated himself, Epstein's digital 
penetration of the girl, and Epstein's use of a vibrator on the girl while he masturbated 
himself. It is clear that this activity was done in exchange for money, but the defense will 
likely argue that some of the activity was not "sexual enough" to qualify as "prostitution." 
Title 18 carries no definition of "prostitution." In United States I. Prince, the Fifth 
Circuit approved of the generic definition "sexual intercourse for hire". Prince, 515 F.2d 
564, 566 (5th Cir. 1975).12 In 1946, the Supreme Court defined prostitution as the "offering 
of the body to indiscriminate lewdness for hire." Cleveland'. United States, 329 U.S. 14, 
17 (1946). Black's Law Dictionary contains several definitions of prostitution: 
'=In Bonner'. City of Prichard, 661 F. 2d 1206 (1 1 th Cir. 1981), the Eleventh Circuit 
adopted as binding precedent all Fifth Circuit decisions rendered prior to October 1, 1981. 
12 
EFTA00234528

Prostitution: Act of performing, or offering or agreeing to perform a sexual 
act for hire. Engaging in or agreeing or offering to engage in sexual conduct 
with another person under a fee arrangement with that person or any other 
person. 
Includes any lewd act between persons for money or other 
consideration. Within meaning of statute proscribing prostitution, comprises 
conduct of all male and female persons who engage in sexual activity as a 
business. 
Black's Law Dictionary (6th Ed. 1990) at 1222. The term "lewd" is especially broad, and 
probably covers all of the acts described below. 
The district court may decide to limit the term to the definition contained in Florida 
law. The Florida Statutes define prostitution as "the giving or receiving of the body for 
sexual activity for hire ..." Fl. Stat. § 796.07(1)(a) (2004).'3 Sexual activity, in turn, means 
"oral, anal, or vaginal penetration by, or union with, the sexual organ of another, anal or 
vaginal penetration of another by any other object; or the handling or fondling of the sexual 
organ of another for the purpose of masturbation . . ." Fl. Stat. § 796.07(1)(d). If this 
definition is used, those instances where the girls remained clothed and where Epstein did 
not fondle the girls' vaginas would probably fall outside the definition of "prostitution."' 
In light of the Mann Act's legislative history, the broadest definition should apply, and I have 
used that in my charging decisions.15
c. 
"Any sexual activity for which any person can be charged 
with a criminal offense" 
Section 2422 outlaws both the use of a facility of interstate commerce to entice a 
minor to engage in prostitution and the use of that facility to entice a minor to engage in "any 
13I have used the Florida Statutes in effect at the time that the offenses occurred. They have 
not changed since then although, as shown below, amendments are currently pending. 
"There currently is legislation pending before the Florida Legislature increasing the penalties 
related to child prostitution. The section defining "prostitution" has been renumbered but the 
language remains the same. That chapter also has an offense of obtaining a person for "lewdness," 
(Proposed Fl. Stat. 796.07), which is defined as "any indecent or obscene act." (Proposed Fl. Stat. 
796.011(4)) 
13If we restricted charges to instances where Epstein stroked a girl's vagina or digitally 
penetrated her, we would need to drop the counts related to Jane Doe #5 and Jane Doe #6. 
13 
EFTA00234529

sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal offense." According to 
the Eleventh Circuit Pattern Jury Instruction, the determination of what sexual activity is 
criminal is governed by Florida law. 
Florida law bars a person from procuring anyone under the age of 18 to engage in 
prostitution or to cause a minor to be prostituted. Fl. Stat. § 796.03 (2004). Florida also 
defines four categories of lewd or lascivious offenses that criminalize behavior between 
adults and children under the age of 16: 
1. 
"Lewd or lascivious battery" occurs when an adult "[e]ngages in sexual 
activity16 with a person 12 years of age or older but less than 16 years of age." 
Fl. Stat. § 800.04(4)(a) (2004). 
2. 
"Lewd or lascivious molestation" occurs when an adult "intentionally touches 
in a lewd or lascivious manner the breasts, genitals, genital area, or buttocks, 
or the clothing covering them, of a person less than 16 years of age, or forces 
or entices a person under 16 years of age to so touch the perpetrator." Fl. Stat. 
§ 800.04(5Xa) (2004). 
3. 
"Lewd or lascivious conduct" occurs when a person intentionally touches a 
person under 16 years of age in a lewd or lascivious manner or solicits a 
person under the age of 16 to commit a lewd or lascivious act. Fl. Stat. § 
800.04(6)(a) (2004). 
4. 
"Lewd or lascivious exhibition" occurs when a person intentionally 
masturbates or exposes his genitals in a lewd or lascivious manner in the 
presence of a victim who is less than 16 years of age. Fl. Stat. § 800.04(7)(a) 
(2004)." 
'Sexual activity" is defined as "the oral, anal, or vaginal penetration by, or union with, the 
sexual organ of another or the anal or vaginal penetration of another by any other object; however, 
sexual activity does not include an act done for a bona fide medical purpose." Fl. Stat. 
§ 800.04(1)(a). The only girl under 16, Saige, was digitally penetrated, which satisfies this 
definition. 
"The Florida Legislature currently is amending § 800.04(7) making it a second-degree felony 
to commit lewd or lascivious exhibition in front of any victim, regardless of the victim's age. 
14 
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All of these offenses are classified as second degree felonies when perpetrated by an adult. 
Fl. Stat. §§ 800.04, 800.04(5)(c)(2), 800.04(6)(b), 800.04(7)(c) (2004). 
Section 800.04 affirmatively bars two defenses to these charges. First, "[n]either the 
victim's lack of chastity nor the victim's consent is a defense to the crimes proscribed by this 
section." Fl. Stat. § 800.04(2) (2004). Second, the "perpetrator's ignorance of the victim's 
age, the victim's misrepresentation of his or her age, or the perpetrator's bona fide belief of 
the victim's age cannot be raised as a defense in a prosecution under this section." Fl. Stat. 
§ 800.04(3) (2004). 
Florida law also bars "sexual activity" between adults over the age of 24 and minors 
who are 16 or 17 years' old. Fl. Stat. § 794.05(1) (2004). In those cases, "sexual activity" 
is defined as "oral, anal, or vaginal penetration by, or union with, the sexual organ of 
another." Id. With this offense, ignorance of the victim's age, misrepresentation of the 
victim's age, and a bona fide belief that the victim is over the age of 17 are not defenses. Fl. 
Stat. § 794.021 (2004). 
d. 
Charging Decisions 
All of the girls were enticed into committing prostitution and some were also enticed 
into engaging in criminal sexual activity. I have charged the defendants with enticing each 
girl into prostitution or criminal sexual activity. 
e. 
Conspiracy to Violate Section 2422(b) (Count II 
Unlike most of the other statutes discussed herein, Section 2422(b) does not include 
its own conspiracy prohibition. Accordingly, a conspiracy to violate Section 2422(b) 
requires the allegation of a Section 371 conspiracy. While, generally speaking, it is nice to 
avoid the trouble of alleging a 371 conspiracy, in this case it actually may work to our 
benefit. First, it allows us to set forth in the indictment, in painstaking detail, the scope of 
the conspiracy. Second, it allows us to allege as "overt acts," items that might otherwise be 
excluded pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 404(b). For example, if Epstein and his assistants 
engaged the services of an eighteen-year-old girl ("A") to perform a sexual massage on 
Epstein, that could not be charged as a substantive offense. But, if A was asked to bring 
additional girls and A later brought Epstein girls who were under eighteen, then the activities 
15 
EFTA00234531

with A were overt acts in the conspiracy.18
1. 
Penalties and Forfeiture 
The charged offenses occurred before the enactment of the Adam Walsh Act, so each 
count carries a sentence of 5 to 30 years in prison, supervised release of up to life, and a 
$250,000 fine. 
The current version of 18 U.S.C. § 2428 states that the Court, in imposing sentence, 
"shall order, in addition to any other sentence imposed . . . that such person shall forfeit to 
the United States — (1) such person's interest in any property, real or personal, that was used 
or intended to be used to commit or to facilitate the commission of such violation[.]" 
Applying this language, Epstein's Palm Beach home and the two airplanes that he used to 
travel to West Palm Beach are subject to forfeiture. 
Section 2428 went into effect on January 10, 2006, so unless we can show activity 
continuing past that date, it will not apply. For the relevant time period (2004 to late 2005), 
criminal forfeiture was governed by 18 U.S.C. § 2253(a), which states: 
[a] person . . . who is convicted of an offense under section 2421, 2422, or 
2423 of chapter 117, shall forfeit to the United States such person's interest in 
— ... (3) any property, real or personal, used or intended to be used to commit 
or to promote the commission of such offense. 
This language also should apply to Epstein's Palm Beach home and the two airplanes. 
The charge of conspiracy to violate Section 2422 carries a penalty of only 5 years in 
prison because it must be charged as a Section 371 conspiracy. Forfeiture of the relevant 
property is still available through enabling provisions. 
3. 
Traveling with Intent to Engage in Illicit Sexual Conduct: 18 
U.S.C. § 2423(b) [Counts 17 to 50] 
A person who travels in interstate commerce ... for the purpose of engaging 
"'An 'overt act' is any transaction or event, even one which may be entirely innocent when 
considered alone, but which is knowingly committed by a conspirator in an effort to accomplish 
some object of the conspiracy." 11th Cir. Pattern Jury Instr., Offense Instr. 13.1 (2003). 
16 
EFTA00234532

in any illicit sexual conduct with another person shall be fined under this title 
or imprisoned not more than 30 years, or both. 
18 U.S.C. § 2423(b). 
Thus, the United States must prove that Epstein knowingly traveled in interstate 
commerce and that he did so for the purpose of engaging in illicit sexual conduct, as defined 
below. 
a. 
Proof of intent to travel 
In apparent anticipation of this charge, In Appendix A, Epstein's attorneys assert that 
Epstein's trips to Florida were not undertaken for the sole purpose of engaging in illicit 
sexual conduct—he traveled just to visit his home and attend meetings, etc.— and, therefore, 
he lacked the requisite intent to violate Section 2423(6). 
The Eleventh Circuit has held that, in order to be convicted of violating Section 
2423(b), the United States must prove that the defendant "had formed the intent to engage 
in sexual activity with a minor19 when he crossed state lines." United States' Hersh, 297 
F.3d 1233, 1246 (11th Cir. 2002). See also United States I Han, 230 F.3d 560 (2d Cir. 
2000) (defendant could be convicted of violating Section 2423(b) even though no sexual 
activity occurred and "minor" was really an undercover officer because the defendant had 
formed the necessary intent by developing a plan to cross state lines to engage in sexual acts 
with the minor); United States I Root, 296 F.3d 1222, 1231-32 (11th Cir. 2002). 
Just a few weeks ago, the Eleventh Circuit addressed for the first time the issue of a 
"combined motive" for traveling, and approved the following instruction: 
the Government [] does not have to show that engaging in criminal sexual 
activity with a minor was the Defendant's only purpose, or even his primary 
purpose, but the Government must show it was one of the purposes for 
transporting the minor or for the travel. In other words, the Government must 
show that the Defendant's criminal purpose was not merely incidental to the 
travel. 
19Although Hersh specifically mentions "sexual activity with a minor," knowledge of age is 
not required, as discussed above. 
17 
EFTA00234533

United States  Hoschouer, 
F.3d 
2007 WL 979931, *1 (11th Cir. Apr. 3, 2007). 
The decision of the Eleventh Circuit was consistent with every other circuit that has 
addressed the issue: 
It is not necessary for the government to prove that the illegal sexual activity 
was the sole purpose for the transportation. A person may have several 
different purposes or motives for such travel, and each may prompt in varying 
degrees the act of making the journey. The government must prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt, however, that a significant or motivating purpose of the 
travel across state or foreign boundaries was to have the individual transported 
engage in illegal sexual activity. In other words, the illegal sexual activity 
must have not been merely incidental to the trip. 
United States I. Hayward, 359 F.3d 631, 637-38 (3d Cir. 2004). See also United States
Garcia-Lopez, 234 F.3d 217, 220 (5th Cir. 2000) (The district court did not err in instructing 
the jury that "it was sufficient for the Government to prove that one of the [the defendant's] 
motives in traveling was to engage in a sexual act with a minor."); United States 
Yang, 128 
F.3d 1065, 1072 (7th Ci/.1997); United States 1. Meacham, 115 F.3d 14882.1495 (10th 
Cir.1997); United States Sirois, 87 F.3d 34, 39 (2d Cir.1996); United States' Campbell, 
49 F.3d 1079, 1082-83 (5th Cir.1995) ("[I]t is not necessary to a conviction under the [Mann] 
Act that the sole and single purpose of the trans rtation of a female in interstate commerce 
was such immoral practices."); United States 
Ellis, 935 F.2d 385, 389-90 (1st Cir.1991) 
(jury could consider that defendant's personal motive for bringing minor on interstate family 
vacations and business trips was to have her available for sexual abuse even though there 
were other purses for the trips); United States. Snow, 507 F.2d 22, 24 (7th Cir.1974); 
United States 
Harris, 480 F.2d 601, 602 (6th Cir.1973); United States. Cole, 262 F.3d 
704, 709 (8th Cir. 2001) ("The illicit behavior must be one of the purposes motivating the 
interstate transportation, but need not be the dominant purpose," and a defendant's intent may 
be inferred from all of the circumstances) (citations omitted). 
For each substantive count of violating § 2423(b), we have evidence that Epstein or 
one of his assistants called a girl a day or two before traveling to Florida, and called again 
while he was in Florida. The evidence consists of cell phone records from the assistants and 
the girls, the message pads recovered from the search of Epstein's home and from trash pulls, 
the flight manifests from Epstein's private lanes, and testimony from the girls about how 
the appointments were made. So, if 
called Jane Doe #8 to make an appointment on 
January 1st; Epstein traveled to Florida on January 2nd; and 
called Jane Doe #12 on 
18 
EFTA00234534

January 3rd (when they were already in Florida) to make an appointment, I have charged a 
travel count but have listed only Jane Doe #8 as the victim of that offense.2°
b. 
Illicit Sexual Conduct 
The United States must prove that one of the purposes of the defendant's travel was 
to engage in "illicit sexual conduct" "Illicit sexual conduct" means: 
(1) a sexual act (as defined in section 2246) with a person under 18 years of 
age that would be in violation of chapter 109A if the sexual act occurred in the 
special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States; or (2) any 
commercial sex act (as defined in section 1591) with a person under 18 years 
of age. 
18 U.S.C. § 2423(f). 
(I) 
A "sexual act" 
Title 18, United States Code, Section 2246(2) defines "sexual act" as: 
(A) contact between the penis and the vulva or the penis and the anus, and for 
purposes of this subparagraph contact involving the penis occurs upon 
penetration, however, slight; 
(B) contact between the mouth and the penis, the mouth and the vulva, or the 
mouth and the anus; 
(C) the penetration, however slight, of the anal or genital opening of another 
by a hand or finger or by any object, with an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, 
degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person; or 
(D) the intentional touching, not through the clothing, of the genitalia of 
another person who has not attained the age of 16 years with an intent to 
abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any 
person. 
'Based on this scenario, both Jane Doe #6 and Jane Doe #7 would still be victims of 
enticement and sex trafficking. 
19 
EFTA00234535

And Chapter 109A states: "Whoever, in the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of 
the United States or in a Federal prison, knowingly engages in a sexual act with another 
person who — (1) has attained the age of 12 years but has not attained the age of 16 years; and 
(2) is at least four years younger than the person so engaging; or attempts to do so" has 
committed a federal offense. 
This definition is limited to activity witle 
(the 14-year-old), who also engaged 
in a commercial sex act. 
(ii) 
A "commercial sex act" 
"The term `commercial sex act' means any sex act, on account of which anything of 
value is given to or received by any person." 18 U.S.C. § 1591(cX 1 ). The statute does not 
go on to define "sex act," but the legislative history of this statute makes clear that the term 
is to be read very broadly. The term "commercial sex act" replaced the term "prostitution" 
in an earlier version of the statute. 
Section 1591 was enacted as part of the "Victims of Trafficking and Violence 
Protection Act of 2000." Pub. L. 106-384, 114 Stat. 1464. In drafting that legislation, 
Congress noted: "The sex industry has rapidly expanded over the past several decades. It 
involves sexual exploitation of persons, predominantly women and girls, involving activities 
related to prostitution, pornography, sex tourism, and other commercial sexual services." 
Id. at § 102(b)(2). The highlighted language shows that "commercial sexual services" is a 
broader term than "prostitution," and is meant to include prostitution, the creation of 
pornography, and other [undefined] acts. 
When the Sentencing Commission amended the Sentencing Guidelines to correspond 
with this new legislation, it replaced the term "prostitution" with "commercial sex acts" in 
the heading of part G of Section 2 and throughout that section 2' The Commission gave a 
stated reason for the amendment: 
This amendment ensures that appropriately severe sentences for sex trafficking 
crimes apply to commercial sex acts such as production of child pornography, 
in addition to prostitution . . . It proposes several changes to § 2G1.1 . . . to 
address more adequately the portion of section 112(b) of the Victims of 
21Part G contains the guidelines for calculating the offense levels for "Offenses Involving 
Commercial Sex Acts, Sexual Exploitation of Minors and Obscenity." 
20 
EFTA00234536