EFTA00229916

Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 50 
Entered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 12 of 15 
On October 9, 2008, victims' counsel wrote to government counsel, pointing out that this 
declaration appeared to be (albeit inadvertently) false in two important respects. First, the quoted 
provision was not actually in the non-prosecution agreement. And second, if it was discussed 
with Jane Doe #1, for example, then that would have created false impression. Victims' counsel 
asked for a clarification to be filed with the Court about these two points. See Exhibit "A." 
In response, on December 22, 2008, the government filed a supplemental declaration. 
Doc. #35. The corrective supplemental declaration addressed the first point, agreeing that the 
information was false. The supplemental declaration, however, did not address the second 
question of whether this false information had previously been discussed with the crime victims. 
Moreover, the supplemental declaration raised additional question about Epstein's role in the 
false information. The supplemental declaration states the Epstein's attorney's approved the 
transmission of false information to the victims on and about July 9, 2008. Doc. #35 at 2. But 
none of the underlying information regarding the approval of that false information is included in 
the supplemental declaration. 
Rather than have the government serving as the exclusive conduit for information to the 
Court about these subjects, it seem more consistent with the spirit of the ethical rules — and with 
the general obligations of disclosure discussed previously in this pleading — for the Government 
to make available to the victims all material and favorable information. For example, the 
Government could provide to the victim the underlying correspondence with Epstein's attorneys 
approving the transmission of this false information. This information will be highly relevant to 
the victims' position that the non-prosecution agreement should be set aside in view of violations 
12 
EFTA00230156

-, 
• 
A-
7 
Case 9.08-cv-80736-KAM Document 50 
Entered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 13 of 15 
of the victims' rights. The Court should accordingly order production of this and other similar 
favorable evidence to the victims. 
CERTIFICATE OF CONFERENCE 
As recounted above, counsel for Jane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2 have repeatedly requested 
that the U.S. Attorney's Office voluntarily stipulate to undisputed facts in this case and provide 
material information favorable to the victims case for more than two and a half years. The U.S. 
Attorney's Office, however, takes the position that the victims are not entitled to any such 
information. 
CONCLUSION 
For all the foregoing reasons, the Court should order the U.S. Attorney's Office to 
produce information favorable to the victims. A proposed order to that effect is attached. 
DATED: March 21.2011 
13 
Respectfully Submitted, 
s/ Bradley J. Edwards 
Bradley J. Edwards 
FARMER, JAFFE, WEISSING, 
EDWARDS, FISTOS & LEHRMAN, P.L. 
EFTA00230157

7  
v 
Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 50 Entered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 14 of 15 
Paul O. Cassell 
Pro Hac Vice 
Quinney College of Law at the 
University of Utah 
Attorneys for Jane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2 
14 
EFTA00230158

Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 50 Entered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 15 of 15 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The foregoing document was served on March 21, 2011, on the following using the Court's 
CMIECF system: 
Assistant U.S. Attorney 
ttorney or eGovernment 
Joseph L. Ackerman, Jr. 
Joseph Ackerman, Jr. 
(courtesy copy of pleading via U.S. mail) 
15 
EFTA00230159

Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Documer450,-)A wEptyppeop FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 1 of 2 
• aitadedataa% • 
AND ASSOCIATES 
October 9, 2008 
United States Attorney's Office 
99 N.E. 4th Street 
Miami, Florida 33132 
Re: 
Jane Doe # and Jane Doe #2 v. United States of America 
Case No.: 
08-80736-CIV-
Dear 
I am writing to call to your attention two potentially false statements that the Government 
made, albeit inadvertently, in a sworn declaration submitted to the Court in connection with the 
above-captioned case. I request that your office file a corrected declaration and accompanying 
explanation. 
The first statement is found at page 3 to 4 of the July 9th, 2008 declaration of 
a
There a provision in a plea agreement with Mr. Jeffrey Epstein is recounted. 
we
understand the Government's current position in this case, it is that this provision is not in fact 
part of the plea agreement in this case. If our understanding is correct, the 
as 
filed a false affidavit with the court, albeit inadvertently. We respectfidly reques 
e 
e a 
new affidavit that corrects this false information, along with all other information relevant to 
understanding how the false information came to be provided to the court — and to the victims in 
this case. This correction should, in my view, include more details about how Epstein and his 
attorneys approved a submission of false information to the victims as you stated on Page 5, n.2 
in your October 8, 2008 filing "Respondent's Opposition to Victims' Motion to Unseal Non-
Prosecution Agreement" — presumably knowing that litigation surrounding the victims' rights 
issues was on-going and that such false information might be ultimately presented to the court. 
Such information is highly relevant to what remedy the victims might ultimately choose to seek 
for violations of their rights in this case. 
The second statement may or may not be false, but may need some clarification. At page 
4 oa 
declaration, she states that lila October 2007, shortly after the agreement was 
signed, four victims [including C.W.J were contacted and these provisions were discussed' 
(emphasis added). Similarly at page 5, the declaration states: "After C.W. had been notified of 
the terms of the agreement 
" (emphasis added). I write to inquire whether, in view of the fact 
that the provision noted above is not in fact (according to the Government's current view) part of 
the plea, agreement, whether this was the.provision that the government. inaccuratelyi discussed 
with the victims. Put another way, I am wondering whether the Government will now stipulate 
that it, at most, discussed with the victims a provision in the plea agreement that never was 
actually part of the plea agreement. 
BROBRADEDWARDSLAW.COU 
EFTA00230160

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Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 50-1 Entered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 2 of 2 
United States Attorney's Office 
October 9, 2008 
Page Two 
I continue to be interested in working out a joint stipulation of proposed facts in this case 
with the Government. If you would like to proceed in that direction, please give me a call. If, 
however, the Government is not willing to work out a joint stipulation of facts, then 1 need to 
have the record be as clear as possible, and at a minimum would request that the Government 
correct the inaccurate information it has provided to the court and clarify precisely how such 
inaccurate information came to be made a part of the record and the extent to which Mr. Epstein, 
through his attorneys, was culpable. 
Sincirely, 
BE/sg 
Brad Edwards 
SECTS KADRDWARDSLAW 
COM 
EFTA00230161

Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 50-2 
Entered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 1 of 2 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA 
Case No. 0880736-Civ-Marra/Johnson 
JANE DOE #1 and JANE DOE #2 
v. 
UNITED STATES 
'PROPOSED' ORDER GRANTING JANE DOE #1 AND JANE DOE #2'S MOTION FOR 
ORDER DIRECTING THE U.S. ATTORNEY'S OFFICE NOT TO WITHHOLD 
RELEVANT EVIDENCE 
THIS CAUSE comes before the Court on Jane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2's Motion for Order 
Directing the U.S. Attorney's Office Not to Withhold Relevant Evidence, filed March 21, 2011. 
It is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Motion is GRANTED. 
1. The government shall reveal to the victims and permit inspection and copying of all 
information and material known to the government which may be "favorable" to the victims, see 
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (discussing evidence "favorable" to defendants); United 
States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976) (same), on issue of possible violations of their rights under 
CVRA and remedy for such violations, including any impeachment information under Giglio v. 
United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972). 
2. The parties shall make every possible effort in good faith to stipulate to all facts or points of 
law the truth and existence of which is not contested and the early resolution of which will 
expedite the proceedings. 
1 
EFTA00230162

a 
.. —...,. 
Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 50-2 
Entered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 2 of 2 
3. The parties shall make to each other the disclosures requited under Fed. R. Civ. P. 
26(eXI)(A). 
DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at West Palm Beach, Palm Beach County, Florida, 
this 
day of March, 2011. 
KENNETH A. MARRA 
United States District Judge 
2 
EFTA00230163

Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 59 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/07/2011 Page 1 of 9 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA 
CASE NO. 08-80736-CIV-MARRA/JOHNSON 
JANE DOE #1 and JANE DOE #2, 
Petitioners, 
vs. 
UNITED STATES, 
Respondent. 
UNITED STATES' RESPONSE TO JANE DOE #1 AND JANE DOE #2'S 
MOTION FOR ORDER DIRECTING THE U.S. ATTORNEY'S OFFICE NOT 
TO WITHHOLD RELEVANT EVIDENCE 
Respondent, United States of America, by and through its undersigned counsel, files its 
Response to Jane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2's Motion for Order Directing The U.S. Attorney's 
Office Not to Withhold Relevant Evidence, and states: 
L 
THE CRIME VICTIMS RIGHTS ACT CREATES NO LEGAL DUTY UPON 
THE U.S. ATTORNEY'S OFFICE TO PROVIDE RELEVANT EVIDENCE 
Petitioners maintain the U.S. Attorney's Office is "withholding" relevant evidence, which 
suggests there is a legal obligation to disclose such information to them. 
Petitioners contend 
the government has an obligation under 18 U.S.C. § 3771(c)(1) "to make their best efforts to see 
that crime victims are notified of, and accorded, the rights described in subsection (a)." 
Section 3771(cXl) is no authority to impose a duty upon the U.S. Attorney's Office to 
provide evidence to petitioners, or allow them a right of access to records maintained by the U.S. 
Attorney's Office. Petitioners do not point to any of the eight rights enumerated in section 
EFTA00230164

T" 
Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 59 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/07/2011 Page 2 of 9 
3771(a) that provides a right to access to information in the government's possession, either in 
the context of the criminal case in which the requesting individual is a crime victim under section 
3771(e), or in a motion for relief filed under section 3771(d)(3). 
Petitioners' attempt to engraft a right of access to government information to section 
3771(cXI) should be rejected. In Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39 (1987), the Supreme 
Court recognized that the Confrontation Clause grants a criminal defendant a trial right to cross-
examine a witness. It hastened to add, Itthe ability to question adverse witnesses, however, 
does not include the power to require the pretrial disclosure of any and all information that might 
be useful in contradicting unfavorable testimony." Id. at 52(footnote omitted). In the same vein, 
the obligation of the government to use its best efforts "to see that crime victims are notified of, 
and accorded, the rights described in subsection (a)," does not include a duty to provide 
information supporting whatever claim a victim may wish to assert in a motion for relief under 
section 3771(d)(3). 
In United States v. Rubin, 558 F.Supp.2d 411 (ED.N.Y. 2008), an alleged victim of a 
stock swindle claimed the right to confer in section 3771(aX5) included a right to obtain 
information to base his views to express to the court. This argument was rejected by the district 
court, which noted that "rainy information-gathering aspect of the right to confer is necessarily 
circumscribed, in the first instance, by its relevance to a victim's right to participate in the federal 
criminal proceedings at hand and to do so within the bounds demarked by the CVRA." Id. at 
425(eitation omitted). The court found the CVRA no more requires disclosure of the pre-
sentence report to meet its remedial goal of giving crime victims a voice in sentencing than it 
does disclosure of all discovery in a criminal case to promote the goal of giving victims a voice at 
2 
EFTA00230165

Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 59 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/07/2011 Page 3 of 9 
plea proceedings. 111, citing United States v. Ingrassia, 2005 WL 2875220 at •17 (B.D.N.Y. Sep. 
7, 2005). The district court concluded, "[t]he CVRA, therefore, does not authorize an unbridled 
gallop to any and all information in the government's files." 558 F.Supp.2d at 425. 
Similarly, in United States v. Coxton, 598 F.Supp.2d 737 (W.D.N.C. 2009), several crime 
victims invoked the. CVRA in at attempt to obtain portions of the pit-sentence investigation 
report (PSR). The victims argued that the CVRA granted them the implicit right to access to 
the request portions of the PSR in order to prepare for sentencing. Id. at 739. The district court 
rejected the victims' argument. The court first noted the confidential nature of a PSR, Id at 738-
39, and then found that a victim's right to be reasonably heard at sentencing did not grant a right 
of access to the PSR. The court relied upon In re Brock, 262 Fed.Appx. 510 (4" Cir. 2008), 
which held that a victim's right to be heard does not afford access to a PSR, since the victim had 
been provided ample information concerning the applicable Sentencing Guidelines and other 
issues related to the defendants' sentencing. The district court in Coxton found that the victims 
in that case were present during trial and continued to enjoy access to the United States 
Attorney's Office. Id. at 740. 
The district court also rejected the victim's argument that their right to restitution granted 
a right of access to the PSR. Id. The Coxton court relied upon United States v. Sacane 2007 
WL 951666 (D.Conn. Mar. 28, 2007), where the victim of a fraud sought access to the convicted 
defendant's financial status by invoking the CVRA. The Sacane court relied upon the caselaw 
finding a victim had no right to the defendant's PSR, and found that, "if the CVRA does not 
provide crime victims with a fight to disclosure of the presentence report, that a fortiori it would 
not provide crime victims with a right to obtain such disclosures directly from a defendant" 
3 
EFTA00230166

Case 9 08-cv-80736-KAM Document 59 
Entered on FLSD Docket 04/07/2011 Page 4 of 9 
2007 WL 951666 at '1. 
Other attempts to engraft discovery rights onto the CVRA have also been rejected. In 
United States v. Moussaoui, 483 F.3d 220 (41h Cir. 2007), several victims in the September 11, 
2001 terrorist attacks sought access to files and records provided by the government to defendant 
Moussaoui, in satisfaction of the government's criminal discovery obligations. The victims 
were plaintiffs in civil actions filed in the Southern District of New York, against private airlines, 
airports, and security services. Id. at 224. The victims sought non-public criminal discovery 
materials for use in their civil actions. 
In its opinion, the Fourth Circuit noted the victims had relied heavily upon the CVRA and 
the Air Transportation Safety and Stabilization Act (ATSSSA) in the district court, to support 
their claim of a right to access the criminal discovery information. Id. at 234. On appeal, 
however, the civil plaintiffs abandoned the argument that those two statutes provided the district 
court the authority to enter an order compelling the government to provide to the civil plaintiffs 
certain categories of information. The appellate court observed that, "[t]his was wise strategy, 
as nothing in those two statutes supports the district court's exercise of power." It 
As to the CVRA, the Fourth Circuit found "[t]he rights codified by the CVRA, however, 
are limited to the criminal justice process; the Act is therefore silent and unconcerned with 
victims' rights to file civil claims against their assailants." j4 at 234-35, 
In re Kenna 453 
F.3d 1136, 1137 (9" Cir. 2006). There is no criminal justice process in the instant case since no 
criminal charges have been filed. Even if the criminal justice process has been initiated by the 
filing of charges, courts have rejected claims by victims that one or more of the rights in section 
3771(a) create a right of access to information in the government's possession; Coxton (no right 
4 
EFTA00230167

Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 59 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/07/2011 Page 5 of 9 
to PSR); Kenna (same); and Sacane (no right to financial information from defendant). The 
CVRA imposes no duty on the U.S. Attorney's Office to provide evidence to petitioners to assist 
them in presenting their claims under the CVRA. 
TT. 
PETITIONERS HAVE NO DUE PROCESS RIGHTS UNDER THE CVRA 
Petitioners also contend they have a right to due process under the CVRA, and liken their 
situation to the rights enjoyed by criminal defendants. DE 50 at 5-9. This argument suffers 
from a fundamental defect, the absence of any protected life, liberty, or property interest, which 
would trigger the due process clause. 
"The necessary first step in evaluating any procedural due process claim is determining 
whether a constitutionally protected interest has been implicated." Tefel v. Reno 180 F.3d 1286, 
1299 (11th Cir. 1999), citing Economic Dev. Corp. v. Stierheitn, 782 F.2d 952, 954-55 (11th Cir. 
1986)("In accessing a claim based on an alleged denial of procedural due process a court must 
first decide whether the complaining party has been deprived of a constitutionally protected 
liberty or property interest. Absent such a deprivation, there can be no denial of due process."). 
Petitioners concede that "the victims in this case do not rely on a federal constitutional right to 
due process." DE 50 at 6(emphasis in original). 
However, they contend that section 3771(aX8), which provides that a crime victim should 
be treated with fairness and with respect for the victim's dignity and privacy, creates a statutory 
right. Petitioners argue that Congress intended to provide a substantive due process right to 
crime victims. DE 50 at 6. This argument is plainly incorrect. There is no life, liberty, or 
property interest implicated in the CVRA, and courts are hesitant to find that a substantive due 
process right has been created. 
See Collins v. City of Harker FIeights. Texas, 503 U.S. 115, 
5 
EFTA00230168

Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 59 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/07/2011 Page 6 of 9 
125 (1992X"As a general matter, the Court has always been reluctant to expand the concept of 
substantive due process because guideposts for responsible decisionmaldng in this uncharted area 
are scarce and open ended. (citation omitted). The doctrine of judicial self-restraint requires us to 
exercise the utmost care whenever we are asked to break new ground in this field."). This 
judicial reluctance would be particularly well-founded in the instant case, where petitioners are 
maintaining that Congress's use of the amorphous terms "fairness" and "respect for the victim's 
dignity and privacy" have created a substantive due process right. 
Similarly unavailing is petitioners' reliance upon Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), 
and other criminal law cases finding a due process obligation on the government's part to 
disclose exculpatory and impeachment information. 
Petitioners are charged with no crime, and 
they are in no jeopardy of losing their liberty. Consequently, the government has no due process 
obligation to provide information to petitioners. 
PETITIONERS HAVE NO RIGHT TO DISCOVERY UNDER THE FEDERAL 
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
Petitioners argue they arc entitled to discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, but they point to no particular rule, or case, which provides that such a discovery 
rights exists. Instead, petitioners seize upon the government's assertion that the right to confer 
under section 3771(aX5) only applied to the criminal case, not to a civil action filed to attempt to 
enforce rights under the CVRA. 
Petitioners filed their motion for relief under section 3771(d)(3). Such motions for relief 
are filed in the district court "in which a defendant is being prosecuted for the crime," or "if no 
prosecution is underway, in the district court in which the crime occurred." If a motion under 
• 
6 
EFTA00230169

.5-%%*.ev.r...— 
---1 
•.nnevAn 
9 
Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 59 
Entered on FLSD Docket 04/07/2011 Page 7 of 9 
section 3371(d)(3) is filed in the district court in which the defendant is being prosecuted, the 
motion is being entertained as part of the criminal case, not a civil action. In the instant case, 
petitioners filed their motion under the second provision. Presumably, because there was no 
criminal case, the Clerk's Office assigned the motion a civil case number. 
Congress created a procedure by which a putative victim could seek relief for alleged 
violations of CVRA rights, If a section 3771(d)(3) motion were filed in an existing criminal 
case, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure would not apply, since it is not a civil case. Under 
petitioners' theory, because of the happenstance that no criminal case was pending, and the 
Clerk's Office assigned the motion a civil case number, they are entitled to full discovery under 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Petitioner's theory is illogical because there is no basis for believing that Congress 
intended individuals seeking relief under section 3771(d)(3) to enjoy widely differing procedural 
rights, depending on whether there was a criminal case pending. If a putative victim filing a 
motion in an existing criminal case would be entitled to no discovery under the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, then none should exist where there is no existing criminal case. 
IV. 
THE GOVERNMENT ATTORNEYS' DUTY OF CANDOR DOES NOT 
CREATE A RIGHT OF ACCESS TO INFORMATION 
Petitioners argue that, because the government's attorneys owe a duty of candor to the 
Court, they are entitled to have access to government records in order to ensure the government 
attorneys are honoring their ethical obligations. DE 50 at 11-13. 
The government's attorneys arc well-aware of their obligations of candor to the Court. If 
the Court believes any attorney in the instant case has breached that ethical duty, it has the 
7 
EFTA00230170

Case 9:013-cv-80736-KAM Document 59 
Entered on FLSD Docket 04/07/2011 Page 8 of 
authority to take remedial action to factually determine whether the duty has been breached. 
However, the mere existence of an attorney's duty of candor to a court does not a right of access 
to information in the opposing party, to ensure the ethical duty is being met. 
CONCLUSION 
Petitioners' motion for order directing the U.S. Attorney's Office not to withhold relevant 
evidence should be denied. 
Respectfully submitted, 
WIFREDO A. FERRER 
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY 
By: 
Assistant U.S. Attorney 
Fla. Bar No. 0936693 
Attorney for Respondent 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on April 7, 2011, I electronically filed the foregoing document 
with the Clerk of the Court using CM/ECF. 
Assistant U.S. Attorney 
EFTA00230171

1 
P"
Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 59 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/0712011 Page 9 of 9 
SERVICE LIST 
lane Does 1 and 2 v. United States, 
Case No. 08-80736-CIV-MARRA/JOHNSON 
United States District Court, Southern District of Florida 
Bradley J. Edwards, Esq., 
Farmer, Jaffe, Weissing, Edwards, Fistos & Lehrman, P.L. 
Paul G. Cassell 
5.1. Quinney College of Law at the 
University of Utah 
Attorneys for Jane Doe # 1 and Jane Doe # 2 
EFTA00230172

Case 9:08•cv-80736-KAM Document 51 
Entered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 1 of 10 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA 
Case No. 08-80736-Civ-Marra/Johnson 
JANE DOE #1 and JANDE DOE #2 
v. 
UNITED STATES 
JANE DOE #1 AND JANE DOE #2'S MOTION TO USE CORRESPONDENCE TO 
PROVE VIOLATIONS OF THE CRIME VICTIMS' RIGHT ACT AND TO HAVE 
THEIR UNREDACTED PLEADINGS UNSEALED 
COME NOW Jane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2 (also referred to as "the victims"), by and 
through undersigned counsel, to move this Court to allow use of correspondence between the 
U.S. Attorney's Office and counsel for Jeffrey Epstein to prove violations of the Crime Victims' 
Rights Act. Because this Court has already ruled that the correspondence is not privileged — and 
because it is highly relevant to the victims' case — the motion should be granted. The victims' 
unredacted pleading quoting the correspondence should also be unsealed, particularly in light of 
the intense, international public interest in Epstein's controversial plea deal. 
BACKGROUND 
As the Court is aware, beginning 2008, Jane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2 pursued civil 
litigation against Jeffrey Epstein for sexually abusing them. During the course of that litigation, 
in June 2001, they obtained correspondence between the U.S. Attorney's Office and Jeffrey 
Epstein's legal counsel. Jane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2 ultimately settled their civil suits in July 
2010. During the settlement discussions, they informed Epstein's legal counsel that they would 
1 
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Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 51 Entered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 2 of 10 
be using the correspondence in this CVRA action. Epstein requested advance notice of such 
filing. Jane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2 saw no basis for any objection to their using the materials, 
but agreed to give advance notice to Epstein so that he could make whatever arguments he 
wished. Accordingly, as part of their settlement, the victims agreed with Epstein that they would 
file under seal the correspondence so that Epstein would have an opportunity to object if he so 
desired: 
Counsel for [Jane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2] have received, as part of discovery in 
this lawsuit, certain correspondence between Epstein's agents and federal 
prosecutors. 
[Jane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2] may desire to use this 
correspondence to prove a violation of [their] right to notice by the government 
and to be treated with fairness, dignity, and respect during criminal investigations 
and prosecutions under the Crime Victims' Rights Act (CVRA), 18 U.S.C. 
section 3771, and to seek remedies for any violation that [they] may prove. The 
parties agree that Epstein will receive at least seven days advance notice, in 
writing, of intent to so use the correspondence in any CVRA case . . . [Jane Doe 
#1 and Jane Doe #2] agree to . . . file the documents .. . under seal until a judge 
has ruled on any objection that Epstein may file." 
On August 26, 2010, Jane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2 provided the specified advance notice 
to Epstein of their intent to use the correspondence. The notice specifically covered this CVRA 
action: 
[AJs you know, there is currently pending before Judge Man a case filed under 
the Crime Victims' Rights Act (CVRA), 18 U.S.C. § 3771, in which two victims 
of sexual assault by [you] allege they were deprived of their rights under the Act. 
For example, the victims allege that there were deprived of notice of pending plea 
bargain arrangements and an opportunity to be heard as well as the right to 
meaningfully confer with prosecutors. The correspondence provided to us is 
compelling evidence in support of their claims, as it demonstrates that federal 
prosecutors were conducting plea discussions with Epstein months before they 
alerted the victims to any possible plea bargain. 
The correspondence also 
demonstrates a willful plan to- Itetkp the viotims—in_the_cladc. about the plea 
discussions. In light of these facts, we intend to make use of this correspondence 
in the [CVRA] . . .lawsuit[] 
EFTA00230174

Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 51 Entered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 3 of 10 
Letter from Bradley J. Edwards to Robert D. Critton, Jr., Case No. 9:08-CV-80893, Doc. #214 
(attachment 2). 
On September 2, 2010, Epstein filed a motion for a protective order, seeking to bar 
disclosure of the U.S. Attorney's correspondence in both a pending state court case and the 
CVRA case. Case No. 9:08-CV-80893, Doc. #214. 
On September 13, 2010, Jane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2's responded, explaining that 
Epstein had already litigated — and lost — the claim that the information was somehow protected. 
They also explained that Epstein could not object to use of the information in the CVRA ease 
unless he intervened in the CVRA case. Doc. #217. 
One day later, on September 14, 2010, the Court (Magistrate Judge Johnson) denied the 
motion for a protective order. Doc. #218. The Court explained that "[t]he Court agrees with 
[Jane Doe] . . . that if [Epstein] believes he has a valid basis for preventing disclosure of the 
subject documents in the subject state court proceeding, he should file a motion to that effect in 
the appropriate state court." 
On September 28, 2010, Epstein filed an appeal of the Magistrate Judge's order. Epstein 
argued that because the Magistrate Judge had ruled so rapidly, he had been precluded from filing 
a reply brief. 
On October 7, 2010, Jane Does' legal counsel filed a response (Doc. #221), explaining 
that no basis existed for barring use of the documents and that, in any event, Epstein needed to 
intervene in the CVRA case if he was going to have standing to object to use of the documents 
there. 
3 
EFTA00230175