EFTA00225378

and in a way contradicted by other witnesses and evidence. The hiring of Eisenberg, the insistence 
on 6001 immunity — something that I had never faced before or since for a child victim — and the 
false exculpatory statements — all showed me how the defense would be approaching this case. 
The subpoenas and interviews apparently concerned Epstein because soon after I began 
trying to set up Individual #28's testimony, Epstein hired former U.S. Attorney Guy Lewis, who 
began contacting me by phone and email, asking to meet with me. I declined to meet because it is 
my policy not to meet during the pendency of a child exploitation investigation. Mr. Lewis 
expressed his client's willingness to cooperate with the investigation. (Exhibit 10.) 
When Mr. Lewis was unable to set a meeting, Epstein hired Lilly Ann Sanchez, another 
former AUSA from the Miami USAO. Ms. Sanchez began calling and emailing me in early 
November 2006. (Exhibit 11). Ms. Sanchez also expressed Epstein's interest in "cooperating" 
with the investigation. I knew that feigned cooperation would be used to ask for pre-trial release, 
so I tested the veracity of the offer of cooperation by asking for documents that would disprove 
many of Epstein's defenses.13 Sure enough, Ms. Sanchez objected to the requests as "overbroad." 
I politely declined the request for a meeting and then delayed setting up the requested meeting so 
that I would have time to complete the investigation. My co-counsel, John McMillan, and I agreed 
that a meeting at this early stage offered no benefit for us and only benefitted the defense. 
When Ms. Sanchez could not set a meeting with me, she skipped my immediate supervisor 
and contacted MAUSA Andy Lourie whom she knew from their time together in Miami. MAUSA 
Lourie told AUSA McMillan and me that he had agreed to meet with Ms. Sanchez and Gerald 
Lefcourt. AUSA McMillan and I told MAUSA Lourie that we had made a conscious decision not 
to meet with Epstein's attorneys and that we were opposed to a meeting. It was the first of many 
disagreements between management and the line AUSAs. MAUSA Lourie told us that we were 
"non-strategic thinkers" (his words) and that the meeting would result in convincing Sanchez and 
Gerald Lefcourt to bring Epstein in for an interview. It was condescending and, in our opinion, 
showed a lack of understanding of sex offenders generally and a lack of knowledge of this case. 
Gerald Lefcourt has represented Martha Stewart — the last thing he would do is bring his client in 
to face a possible "perjury trap." 
In the middle of this period, which started in November 2006 and ran through January 
2007, USA Acosta and I traveled to Washington, DC at the beginning of December 2006 for the 
inaugural Project Safe Childhood Conference. Although I did not attach much significance to this 
at the time, in preparing this response, I began wondering whether the following event was 
orchestrated by Epstein and his counsel. During one of the first presentations at the conference, I 
was in a large auditorium and the speaker asked the audience a question. A man in the row in front 
of me introduced himself as the State Attorney from Palm Beach County (Barry Krischer) and 
answered the question. I had never met Mr. Krischer. After the seminar ended, USA Acosta came 
over and we all introduced ourselves. Mr. Krischer proceeded to deride PBPD Chief Reiter and 
the victims in the Epstein case — referring to them by name and talking about how some were paid 
thousands of dollars, used alcohol and drugs, and looked over 18. I tried to guide the two out of 
13 For example, Epstein claimed that the massages were legitimate "medical" massages, so 
I wanted to see if he was taking tax deductions for medical expenses and getting other 
complementary medical treatment. Epstein also claimed that he was traveling to Florida to visit 
family and to maintain Florida residency. I asked for calendars and other documentation. 
Page 16 of 58 
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the auditorium to a more private area because I did not think it was a conversation meant for public 
consumption but they would not move. As the PSC Coordinator, I had overseen the invitations 
for the law enforcement representatives from the S.D. Fla., and Mr. Krischer had not been on the 
list. So I now wonder whether this "random" meeting was staged by Epstein. 
As you will see from the timeline (Exhibit A-1), in late January 2007, I created a file folder 
entitled "Research re NPAs and 6001 immunity." (Exhibit 15.) This was not research related to 
Non-Prosecution Agreements in connection with resolving the case against Epstein. In November 
poenas were served on two other Epstein employees — Janusz Banasiak 
Both initially asked for immunity. After speaking with Banasiak's 
attorney, 
r. anasi 
was satisfied with a standard Kastigar letter, but Ms. Mucinska's attorney 
was insistent on formal immunity, and as noted above, so was Individual #28. I don't believe that, 
prior to this investigation, I had ever prepared a request for 6001 immunity, so I was researching 
the process. 
The meeting with Ms. Sanchez and Mr. Lefcourt was set for February 1, 2007. As noted 
above, despite Ms. Sanchez' statements of Epstein's willingness to cooperate, she complained that 
my document requests were "overbroad," so MAUSA Lourie and I drafted a more specific list 
(Exhibit 14).14 Ms. Sanchez also asserted that Epstein had hired attorneys for all of his current 
and prior employees, but refused to provide me with a list of those employees and attorneys, 
wanting me to give her essentially a roadmap of my investigation. I refused (Exhibits 14 and A-
1). Instead, the agents and I continued to press forward with our investigation and I continued my 
extensive legal research in preparation for the meeting with Sanchez and Lefcourt. 
Although materials were supposed to be provided in advance, the "talking points" for the 
meeting with Sanchez and Lefcourt did not arrive until the morning of the February 1, 2007 
meeting (Exhibit 14 at 8-32). The main themes were: 
1. the PBPD investigation was biased; 
2. the conduct at issue was "entirely local"; 
3. Epstein did not know the victims were under 18; 
4. none of the girls traveled in interstate commerce; 
5. Epstein's travel was not for the purposes of engaging in illegal sexual activity; 
6. victim and witness credibility issues weighed against filing charges; and 
7. the Petite policy precluded prosecution (id.). 
While the letter covered all of these topics, I recall the meeting was focused primarily on 
challenges to the victims' credibility (e.g., one victim's MySpace page showed her smoking 
marijuana and posing provocatively); allegations of police overreaching; and the lack of evidence 
that Epstein knew the victims were under the age of 18. 
MAUSA Lourie, AUSA McMillan, and I were unpersuaded by the letter and the 
presentation, but I agreed that I should carefully review transcripts of the recorded statements given 
to PBPD for Brady issues." Since witness credibility was clearly at the fore, I undertook efforts 
" The requested documents and items were never provided. 
15 As the investigation continued and we located and identified more victims, we eventually 
made a strategic decision that the initial indictment should exclude the group identified by the 
Page 17 of 58 
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to corroborate our victim statements and to undermine Epstein's potential defenses through 
subpoenas for a wide variety of documents (see Exhibit A-1). Subpoenas also were issued to some 
victims for photographs, gifts, and other records of direct or indirect contact with Epstein (see id). 
Presentation of background information to the grand jury began in February 2007 (Exhibits 17, 
18, and 20). 
I continued to research potential charges against Epstein. Again, knowing how Epstein's 
attorneys would likely approach any trial in this matter, I wanted to prepare both a strong offense 
— by including all relevant charges for jury consideration and possible plea negotiations — and a 
strong defense — by including charges that would allow the admission of the widest range of 
relevant evidence. With that mindset, I researched money laundering and racketeering offenses in 
Chapter 95 because I knew that prostitution was a racketeering offense (see Exhibit 56). In 
addition to the IRS, I conferred with an attorney at the Asset Forfeiture and Money Laundering 
Section in DC who opined that Epstein's conduct could be a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1960 and 2 
or another currency offense because he caused the interstate transmission of funds related to 
prostitution (see Exhibit 57).16
The investigation continued at a brisk pace with Epstein's attorneys frequently seeking 
reviews from Messrs. Lourie and Menchel (see, e.g., Exhibit 58). [NB: They completely excluded 
my immediate supervisor, Karen Atkinson, throughout the process.] Because of this, and because 
the grand jury was very interested in the case, I tried to keep the Miami office up to date on what 
was happening. There also had been little feedback from Miami to the proposed indictment that 
had been provided in late April/early May. So, for example, on May 14, 2007,1 emailed Menchel 
and Lourie about Epstein's travel and asked whether I would be permitted to present the indictment 
the following day or proceed by way of criminal complaint (Exhibit 26 at 1). Mr. Menchel made 
clear that neither would be allowed (id.). 
That Friday, May 18, 2007, I emailed Chief Menchel again, notifying him that we had 
learned that the computers missing from Epstein's home at the time of the execution of the state 
search warrant were removed by a private investigator working for attorney Roy Black. After 
conferring with CCIPS, the Witness Immunity Unit at OEO, and my immediate supervisor, I 
planned to issue a grand jury subpoena for the equipment (id. at 2). I explained why the request 
was different than a subpoena to an attorney and how I would avoid seeking privileged information 
(id). I specifically asked Mr. Menchel if he had any comments or concerns but received no 
response (id)17
On Monday, May 21, 2007, I wrote to Chief Menchel and FAUSA Sloman for "guidance" 
and "a sense of the direction where we are headed" (id. at 3). Again, no response. On that day, 
PBPD and save them for a superseding indictment, if needed. At this point, however, the 
investigation was focused mainly on the same group. 
16 I mention this because my efforts to collect financial documents to support potential 
money laundering charges —and also to corroborate victim statements — were later used as evidence 
of my "overreaching." 
17 Again, I mention this because it would later be used — by Epstein's counsel and Chief 
Menchel — as evidence of overreaching. 
Page 18 of 58 
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having heard nothing in response to my 5/18/2007 email, I issued the subpoena to the private 
investigator (Exhibit 59). 
The following day, May 22, 2007, Mr. Lefcourt sent a letter to MAUSA Lourie stating: 
I understand from you that in the next month or two a decision will be made by 
your office whether to seek an indictment of Mr. Epstein. This will confirm that, 
prior to any such decision being made, I and other attorneys on behalf of Mr. 
Epstein will be given an opportunity to meet with you. 
Additionally, . . . if our meeting does not resolve the matter, we would like an 
opportunity to make a presentation first to Matthew Menchel, Chief of the Criminal 
Division, and Jeffrey Sloman, First Assistant United States Attorney, and then, 
again, if no resolution is reached, the opportunity to meet with United States 
Attorney Alexander Acosta. 
(Exhibit 28.) 
AUSA McMillan and I were not part of the conversation where MAUSA Lourie disclosed 
the timeline to Mr. Lefcourt, so I was surprised by the letter, which sought multiple opportunities 
to meet with members of the Executive Division. Mr. Lourie responded, again, without meeting 
with AUSA McMillan or me, stating: "I think we are on the same page . . . I did say that if you 
want to meet with me again, I am ready to do so. The wording of your letter, however, suggests 
implicitly that I agreed to contact you before a decision is made to seek an indictment of Mr. 
Epstein. If that was your understanding, then please allow me to clarify. Our investigation is 
ongoing and if we decide to seek an indictment, we don't intend to call Mr. Epstein's 
representatives to let him know that. Of course, in the interim, if you would like to make a 
presentation to us, we are willing to listen. ..." (Id.). 
I strenuously objected and drafted an email setting forth the reasons why (id.). I shared it 
with my supervisor and she advised me not to send it. I orally advised MAUSA Lourie that I 
objected to meetings, delays, and strategic disclosures in a case like this one — a child exploitation 
case with a large number of victims. Nevertheless, the meeting was set for June 26, 2007. As I 
predicted, the defense asked Mr. Menchel for a list of our legal theories. I told him that I did not 
want to share them, and Mr. Menchel directed me to give the defense the list anyway. On June 
18, 2007, I sent a letter to Gerald Lefcourt listing all the charges under investigation (Exhibit 53). 
On June 14, 2007, I emailed the supervisory chain an addendum to the prosecution memo, 
asked about whether they wanted me to revise the indictment, and asked what materials they 
wanted prepared in advance of the June 26, 2007 meeting (Exhibit 31 at 1). I don't believe I 
received any responses. 
On June 21, 2007, I emailed Chief Menchel again asking who would be attending the June 
26, 2007 meeting and how I could best prepare (id. at 3-4). I noted that he had been communicating 
directly with Ms. Sanchez about the meeting (id.). 
On June 25, 2007, Gerald Lefcourt provided written arguments for why Epstein should not 
be charged federally (Exhibit 32). The following day, Alan Dershowitz, Roy Black, Gerald 
Lefcourt, and Lilly Ann Sanchez presented their arguments to FAUSA Sloman and Chief Menchel. 
S/A Kuyrkendall, her supervisor, and I also attended (Exhibit 5). At some point during the 
Pagc 19 of 58 
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meeting, Chief Menchel told the defense attorneys that they needn't address the money laundering 
statutes. I think he referred to them as "silly," without even having the benefit of my conversations 
with IRS and AFMLS and my legal research.18 
So Epstein's counsel focused on the child 
exploitation statutes. They falsely insisted that the use of the interne was needed for a 2422(b) 
charge and that some sort of force, fraud, or coercion was required for a 1591 charge because 16-
and 17-year-old girls were "adults." They stated that there was no federal law prohibiting sex with 
children and one would be unconstitutional. 
After the meeting, MAUSA Lourie and I analyzed the materials (Exhibit 32). We both 
concluded that the defense had overstated the strength of their position (id.). MAUSA Lourie felt 
that the 2422(b) charges were stronger than the 2423(b) charges because we would need proof that 
having a sexual massage was a motivation for Epstein's travel (id.). My research showed that 
different circuits had different standards of proof on the "purpose of travel" element (id). I never 
received any feedback from Chief Menchel or FAUSA Sloman regarding Lefcourt's written 
presentation, but after the June 26, 2007 meeting, I was left with the impression that we were 
continuing towards indictment. 
On July 3, 2007, at 6:26 a.m., I sent an email to Jeff Sloman, Matt Menchel, and Andy 
Lourie advising them about calls I had received from Lilly Ann Sanchez seeking to delay subpoena 
responses and their plans to present our Office with additional analysis as well as their planned 
resolution with the State Attorney's Office (Exhibit 3). I informed everyone of my proposed 
response regarding the subpoenas and that I intended to invite Lilly Ann Sanchez to call me to 
discuss a resolution of the federal investigation that could include concurrent time, i.e., a plea to a 
federal charge with a recommendation that the federal sentence would run concurrently with the 
state sentence (See id.) I asked whether anyone had had different conversations with any attorneys 
for Epstein so that there would not be any miscommunication. 
Later that afternoon, Matt Menchel sent me an email (using Jeff Sloman's Blackberry) that 
read, "I told Lily that a state plea with jail time and sex offender status may satisfy the usa. It was 
a non-starter for them Matt". (Id.) Because I was in trial, I did not see Mr. Menchel's email, so 
my proposed email to Ms. Sanchez went out on July 4's at 4:07p.m. (Id) After my email to Ms. 
Sanchez went out, I saw Mr. Menchel's email, and I responded with a vehement objection, telling 
him that I believed his plea offer was "completely unacceptable to the FBI, ICE, the victims, and 
me [and that these] plea negotiations violate the Ashcroft memo, the U.S. Attorney's Manual, and 
all of the various iterations of the victims' rights legislation." (Id) I asked for the opportunity to 
make a presentation addressing the strengths of the case and the points raised by Epstein's 
attorneys — I felt that it was unfair that Epstein had been given numerous opportunities to meet 
with the management of the USAO and the victims had never had a similar chance (Id) 
Mr. Menchel responded by reprimanding me, stating, "[a]s you well know, the US Attorney 
has not even decided whether to go forward with a prosecution in this matter, thus you should have 
respected his position before engaging in plea negotiations." (Id) I had not engaged in any plea 
negotiations, Mr. Menchel had. Mr. Menchel also wrote, directly contrary to what USA Acosta 
and FAUSA Sloman told me at the initial meeting in Miami, "it was made clear to you by the US 
Attorney and the First Assistant from the time when you were first authorized to investigate Mr. 
Epstein that the office had concerns about taking this case because of petit [sic] policy and a 
18 Epstein's lawyers seized on this later. 
Page 20 of 58 
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number of legal issues. Despite being told these things, you prepared a pros memo and indictment 
that included a definitive date for indictment." (Id.) Mr. Menchel also told me that my arguments 
that he had violated the Ashcroft memo, the USAM and other policies were not well taken because, 
as "Chief of the Criminal Division, I am the person designated by the US Attorney to exercise 
appropriate discretion in deciding whether certain pleas are appropriate and consistent with the 
Ashcroft memo and the USAM — not you." (Id.) Mr. Menchel also told me that I could not dictate 
a meeting. (Id.) 
On July 6, 2007, Gerald Lefcourt sent another letter further explaining why Epstein should 
not be charged with violations of § 2422(b) (Exhibit 33). Most of the letter raised policy arguments 
and the letter ended by expounding on Mr. Epstein's good works (id.). 
On July 13, 2007, after I finished my trial, I responded to Mr. Menchel's reprimand, noting 
my frustration over the Office's failure to provide me with any guidance on its position on the 
matter.19 I pointed out that I had handled this case the same as I had handled all of my other cases, 
by working with the agents to gather evidence and preparing an indictment package that 
established not just probable cause but proof beyond a reasonable doubt. I re-iterated that I was 
"asking to have the same courtesy that was extended to the defense attorneys extended to the FBI 
and an Assistant in the Office. ... [And,] my first and only concern in this case . . . is the victims. 
If our personality differences threaten their access to justice, then please put someone on the case 
whom you trust more, and who will also protect their rights." (Id.) Mr. Menchel never responded; 
nor did he allow me to make my requested presentation to USA Acosta. I do not know whether 
he shared my request with FAUSA Sloman or USA Acosta. 
Also on July 13, 2007, I received a letter from Roy Black complaining about the grand jury 
subpoena seeking Epstein's computer equipment (Exhibit 34). I shared the letter with MAUSA 
Lourie (his handwritten notes appear on the Exhibit) and together we drafted a letter in response 
(Exhibit 32 at 4). On July 16, 2007, Lilly Ann Sanchez sent my letter to Mr. Lourie, writing that 
"Gerald Lefcourt and I would like to speak to you further regarding [my letter] since we do not 
believe that Marie's letter was responsive to the issues raised by Roy Black." (Exhibit 32 at 1). 
Mr. Lourie and I had a conference call with Ms. Sanchez and Mr. Lefcourt and informed them that 
they would have to file a motion to quash the subpoena. We then advised Mr. Menchel of the 
history (Exhibit 62). 
On July 19, 2007, I sent an email to MAUSA Lourie and Chief Menchel asking for 
permission to serve target letters on three of Epstein's personal assistants and for guidance on 
language to be used in the target letters (Exhibit 63). Mr. Menchel responded that he was out of 
the District "but let's hold off on these until we decide what course of action we are going to take 
on epstein which should happen next week" (id.). 
19 For example, on May 21, 2007, I wrote to Chief Menchel and FAUSA Sloman: "I have 
time set aside with the grand jury tomorrow, and I am wondering if you have a sense of the 
direction where we are headed — i.e., approval of an indictment something like the current draft, a 
complaint to allow for pre-indictment negotiations, an indictment drastically different from the 
current draft? I am concerned about confusing the grand jury, which is never a good thing. Any 
guidance?" (Exhibit 54). I did not receive a response. 
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After these exchanges and being reprimanded by Criminal Chief Menchel for raising those 
objections, I was not consulted again about a pre-indictment plea. On July 26, 2007, agents and 
supervisory personnel from the FBI and I traveled to a scheduled meeting with Chief Menchel in 
Miami. That morning, before departing for Miami, I sent an email to Mr. Menchel and MAUSA 
Lotuie that read, "in advance of our meeting this afternoon, I wanted to let you know my thoughts 
about some of the recommended changes [to the indictment] that we had discussed the last time I 
was in Miami . . ." (Exhibit 64). The FBI agents, their supervisor, their ASAIC, and I met with 
Mr. Menchel. Criminal Chief Menchel entered the meeting and announced to us that "Alex 
[Acosta] has decided to offer a two-year state plea." We were not asked our opinions and the 
meeting ended soon thereafter (see Exhibit 5). I remember feeling stunned. I don't remember 
saying anything at the meeting. 
In an attempt to provide some benefits to the victims and protections to the public, I asked 
that two terms be added to this two-year deal: (1) that the victims be provided compensation via 
18 U.S.C. § 2255 as a substitute for restitution because Epstein was pleading to state charges; and 
(2) that Epstein be required to plead guilty to an offense requiring sex offender registration. The 
Office agreed to add these two terms. On July 31, 2007, I finalized a term sheet, entitled 
"CONFIDENTIAL PLEA NEGOTIATIONS: TERMS OF EPSTEIN NON-PROSECUTION 
AGREEMENT." (Exhibit 4.) On the same date, it was provided to counsel for Epstein. Present 
at the meeting for the government were FAUSA Jeff Sloman, Criminal Chief Matt Menchel, 
MAUSA Andy Lourie, S/A Nesbitt Kuyrkendall, S/A Jason Richards, and myself, and for Epstein 
were Roy Black, Gerald Lefcourt, and Lilly Ann Sanchez. (See Exhibit 5.) At the meeting, counsel 
for Epstein stated that their client would not consider a plea that required state jail time. During 
the meeting, Matt Menchel suggested a plea to a federal charge that would allow Epstein the 
opportunity to serve his sentence in a federal facility. 
I was told that USA Acosta did not want to do a federal plea that bound the court to a two-
year prison term, so I would have to find a charge or charges that resulted in a two-year statutory 
maximum. On August 1, 2007, Mr. Menchel advised that the counter-offer that Epstein's attorneys 
had promised did not arrive, and I told him that I had found a federal charge that could result in a 
2-1/2 year statutory maximum (Exhibit 65). 
On August 2, 2007, Lilly Ann Sanchez sent a counter-proposal directly to Criminal Chief 
Matt Menchel and, in her email, stated that a copy would also be hand-delivered to USA Acosta 
(Exhibit 8.) The counter-proposal essentially called for home confinement, no sex offender 
registration, and an agreement to pay damages via 18 U.S.C. § 2255 (Exhibit 40). Ms. Sanchez 
also asked for a meeting with the U.S. Attorney (id.). 
On August 3, 2007, Mr. Menchel sent a letter rejecting the counter-proposal, advising that 
a minimum of two years' imprisonment was needed to vindicate the federal interest, and that USA 
Acosta was not inclined to have a meeting (Exhibit 41). Mr. Menchel provided a deadline for 
August 17, 2007 to accept the plea offer (id). That was Mr. Menchel's last day of employment 
with the USAO before he entered private practice in New York. 
Mr. Epstein's attorneys were incensed that USA Acosta had set a deadline of August 17, 
2007 and would not meet with them, so they demanded a meeting with CEOS Chief Drew 
Oosterbaan (Exhibit 43). Mr. Oosterbaan agreed to travel to Florida to meet with USA Acosta and 
Epstein's attorneys (id.). Mr. Oosterbaan also traveled to West Palm Beach to meet with the agents 
and myself to go through the evidence and our analysis of the statutes (Exhibit 5). Before he came 
Page 22 of 58 
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to West Palm Beach, I advised Mr. Oosterbaan that I had worked with CEOS Trial Attorney 
Myesha Braden on some of the legal issues and that, if there were a trial, I was hoping she might 
be able to assist (Exhibit 43). 
In preparation for the planned meeting on September 7, 2007, FAUSA Sloman emailed me 
to ask what the status of the plea negotiations were. I wrote: 
Here is the term sheet and guidelines calculation that we provided at the last 
meeting. You and Matt and I had also discussed a possible federal plea to an 
Information charging a 371 conspiracy, with a Rule 11 plea with a two-year cap, 
but I think Matt must have asked Alex about it and it was nixed. Just to be prepared 
for tomorrow, I was just starting to draft a Rule 11 Plea agreement in case Alex 
changes his mind and a formal non-prosecution agreement containing the state plea 
terms. . . . There are three concerns that I hope we can address tomorrow. . . . 
[including] that the agents and I have not reached out to the victims to get their 
approval, which as Drew politely reminded me, is required under the law. 
(Exhibit 44). 
On September 7, 2007, USA Acosta, FAUSA Sloman, CEOS Chief Oosterbaan, AUSA 
McMillan, and I met with Kenneth Starr, Jay Lefkowitz, and Lilly Ann Sanchez (Exhibit 5). At 
the meeting, Mr. Starr focused primarily on federalism/policy arguments, and Mr. Epstein's 
background. I remember Mr. Starr thanking me for bringing § 2255 to their attention and that it 
would allow a state resolution that still provided the equivalent of federal restitution. 
Following the meeting, there were communications between Gerald Lefcourt, USA 
Acosta, and MAUSA Lourie that I was not privy to. The fact of the conversations was mentioned 
in later emails. Based upon those communications, on September 10, 2007, I was asked to send 
Mr. Lefcourt an office response to Lefcourt's counterproposal (see Exhibit 47 ("Gerry: As per 
your discussion with U.S. Attorney Acosta, I have attached the Office's written 
counterproposal.")). I sent Mr. Lefcourt a Non-Prosecution Agreement that required Epstein, inter 
alia, to: 
(1) plead guilty to three state felony offenses, including lewd and lascivious battery on a 
child; solicitation of minors to engage in prostitution; and engaging in sexual activity 
with minors at least sixteen years of age; 
(2) make a binding recommendation (with the State Attorney's Office) for the Court to 
impose a thirty-month sentence consisting of 20 months in prison followed by 10 
months of community control; 
(3) waive his right to appeal his conviction and sentence; 
(4) concede that victims identified by the United States were victims for purposes of 18 
U.S.C. § 2255; and 
(5) plead guilty by September 28, 2007 and be sentenced by October 15, 2007. 
(Exhibit 66). 
The following day, FAUSA Sloman forwarded to me USA Acosta's email with USA 
Acosta's revisions to the NPA (Exhibit 46). At FAUSA Sloman's request, I incorporated the 
changes and sent the new version to Mr. Lefcourt (Exhibits 47 and 67). On September 12, 2007, 
MAUSA Lourie, Rolando Garcia, and I met at the State Attorney's Office with State Attorney 
Page 23 of 58 
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Krischer, ASA Belohlavek, Jay Lefkowitz, Gerry Lefcourt, and Jack Goldberger (Exhibit 5). The 
purpose of the meeting was to finalize and coordinate the terms of the state and federal agreements. 
Mr. Lefkowitz still expressed some interest in having Epstein serve his time in a federal facility, 
rather than a state one, and I remember Mr. Goldberger saying that because Mr. Epstein's home 
was on Palm Beach Island and touching the Intracoastal Waterway, it was somehow in 
"international waters" and federal jurisdiction. Other items that were discussed were: (1) that the 
state crime that Epstein agreed to plead guilty to was one requiring sex offender registration; and 
(2) that Epstein would be incarcerated 24-7 during the 20-month period of imprisonment. We left 
the meeting with an understanding that Epstein's counsel would contact us about whether Epstein 
wanted to plead to federal charges pursuant to a plea agreement or proceed with the Non-
Prosecution Agreement. With that in mind, on September 13, 2007, I sent an email to USA Acosta, 
FAUSA Sloman, MAUSA Lourie, Rolando Garcia, and Karen Atkinson advising them that I had 
researched three potential federal charges that could be used for Epstein, but they would all result 
in a 24-month maximum. If Epstein's counsel rejected those charges because of the 24-month 
exposure, I recommended reconsidering a binding Rule 11 plea "rather than try to create violations 
out of whole cloth" (Exhibit 46 at 19). I provided a proposed plea agreement and information 
containing two counts of violations of 18 U.S.C. § 403. 
Mr. Lourie wrote to me later on September 13, 2007, "He is going to give us an assault on 
the plane or we can do conspiracy"20 (Exhibit 46 at 21). I responded, "It would still have to be a 
conspiracy to commit an assault on a plane. I just want to make sure that we have something that 
is factually accurate. Just trying to plan ahead" (id). At Jay Lefkowitz's request, MAUSA Lourie 
and I scheduled a conference call with him for early on the morning of September 14, 2007 (id. at 
25). Mr. Lourie did not attend the conference call, and on the call, Jay Lefkowitz asked me to 
consider allowing Epstein to plead to charges that required only 12 months' imprisonment. I 
recommended 24 months' imprisonment. Lefkowitz said his client would plead to obstruction of 
a witness and one count of assault on an airplane (id. at 29). Despite Mr. Lourie's earlier agreement 
to the assault on an airplane charge, he then decided that the "assault sounds like a stretch and 
factually sort of silly" (id. at 31). 
I then went back to Mr. Lefkowitz with four options: (1) a plea only to state charges with 
18 months' imprisonment; (2) federal and state pleas with a recommendation for concurrent time 
so that Epstein could serve his time in a federal facility; (3) a § 371 plea with a binding 
recommendation of 20 months' imprisonment (if USA Acosta approved it); or (4) an agreement 
that had a plea to one federal charge followed by one state charge (id. at 33). We continued to 
negotiate issues about how to provide restitution to the victims, and each iteration of the 
agreements seemed to move us further apart. As shown in Exhibit 46, each time Mr. Lefkowitz 
tried to reduce the period of incarceration; he tried to replace the state charge with one that did not 
require sex offender registration; and he kept changing the damages/restitution provisions to make 
it more difficult for the victims to obtain compensation; he removed the appeal waiver; he included 
an agreement that we would recommend an incorrect calculation of the guidelines. It was simply 
bad faith negotiations. I would point out how terms that were specifically rejected were re-
inserted, and the Office would just send me back to the table. 
2° This somehow resulted in 18 months' imprisonment. I do not recall how the prison term 
was decreased from 20 months on September 11, 2007 to 18 months on September 13, 2007. 
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The agreement was finally completed and signed on September 24, 2007. 
4. Explain fully the process and circumstances leading to the development of the 
following terms of the non-prosecution agreement: 
a. an 18-month period of incarceration in a state facility, including the 
basis for the determination that it sufficiently satisfied the federal 
interest in the case; 
As noted above, the only information that I received was from Mr. Menchel's 
announcement that USA Acosta had decided to offer a two-year state deal. I do not know how 
Messrs. Menchel and Acosta determined that two years' incarceration sufficiently satisfied the 
federal interest in the case. During one meeting, Epstein's attorneys raised the possibility of a 
state-court plea with home confinement. USA Acosta specifically rejected the suggestion, noting 
that confinement in Mr. Epstein's home was not equivalent to incarceration. As discussed above, 
the 24-month term was reduced to 20 months and then, finally, to 18 months. 
b. victim restitution, including why and how to address victims' rights 
through 18 U.S.C. § 2255; 
The federal crimes that were under investigation all called for mandatory or discretionary 
restitution under 18 U.S.C. §§ 3663 and 3663A.2' 
Gelber and Drew Oosterbaan from 
CEOS are experts in this area, but as PSC Coordinator, 
ew that restitution in child exploitation 
cases was a hot-button issue at the time. 
The District of Alaska USAO had a multi-victim child exploitation case with a wealthy 
defendant (Boehm) where they had set up a trust fund with a bank and a trustee. With Drew 
Oosterbaan's help, I explored setting up a similar situation in the Epstein case (Exhibit 48), in 
connection with using a guardian ad litem ("GAL") for the victims,22 if there had been a plea to 
federal charges. In cases like the Epstein cases, using a GAL seemed the most prudent course 
because, to the extent that the victims' interests ever diverged from the government's, the GAL 
could advocate on behalf of the victims. Thus, there are several emails between myself and Jay 
Lefkowitz about the appointment of a GAL and the possibility of a restitution trust fund similar to 
the Boehm case out of Alaska. I obtained the trust fund agreement and spoke with the AUSA in 
21 Mandatory restitution under § 3663A requires a conviction for a "crime of violence, as 
defined in [18 U.S.C. §1 16." At the time, these cases would have been considered crimes of 
violence because sex trafficking, even via fraud or coercion, would likely be considered to 
"involve() a substantial risk that physical force against the person . . . or another may be used in 
t
the course of committing the offense." 18 U.S.C. § 16(b). Post-Johnson v. United Sta , 
U.S. 
135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015), a court might decide differently. See, e.g., Menendez 
Whitaker, 
908 F.3d 467 (9'b Cir. 2018). Even if not a crime of violence, a Court has the author; to impose 
an order of restitution when sentencing a defendant convicted of any offense under title 18 for any 
losses sustained by a victim as a result of the offense. 18 U.S.C. § 3663(aX1)(A), (B)(i)(I). And 
the court also can order restitution to persons other than the victim of the charged offense if the 
parties so agree. 18 U.S.C. § 3663(a)(1)(A). 
22 I had been the first prosecutor in the S.D. Fla. to apply to the court for guardians ad litem 
for victims in child exploitation cases, so I was familiar with the procedure. 
Page 25 of 58 
EFTA00225507

Alaska. The trust fund agreement was very complex and required a bank to agree to serve as the 
holder of the corpus and a trustee to oversee the administration of the trust, as well as the Court to 
enter an order setting up the trust and a mechanism for resolving disputes amongst beneficiaries 
or between a beneficiary and the trustee. 
In light of the amount of details and the number of victims involved, and the simple fact 
that, if there was only a state plea, there would be no federal judge to undertake the process, I knew 
that there was no way to accomplish a trust fund like Boehm within the confines of the NPA. In 
the Boehm case, there was a much smaller number of victims and, if I remember correctly, the 
victims were younger. The Alaska AUSA was able to confer with Boehm's victims and obtain 
their consent to the trust agreement procedure in advance of entering into the plea agreement. The 
Alaska AUSA also obtained the defendant's agreement to proceed ex pane. Our situation was 
quite different. There were more victims with disparate interests. In my emails, I made it clear 
that I could not bind the victims to such a procedure because I did not represent them. For example, 
how would the USAO decide on the size of the corpus of the trust? Would the USAO hire expert 
psychologists to evaluate the victims and economists to quantify their losses? If the USAO picked 
a number, would that preclude a victim from bringing a state tort claim? Would every victim 
receive the same amount? This is not how criminal restitution works — normally after a guilty 
plea, the Court's Probation Office works with victims to calculate losses, and issues are litigated 
at sentencing or within 90 days after sentencing. Lefkowitz was asking the USAO to pick a number 
virtually out of thin air to use as the corpus of the trust for a group of victims who were not clients 
of the USAO. We also would have to locate an independent bank to serve as the hold of the corpus. 
Given how difficult negotiating simple plea terms had been, I believed that creating an agreement 
of this sort was legally and logistically impossible. 
When Epstein's attorneys approached USA Acosta in December 2007 and suggested that 
I rejected the Trust proposal for nefarious reasons, I outlined all of the concerns that I had 
previously expressed to Mr. Lefkowitz (Exhibit 55). 
Once I was instructed that Epstein would be allowed to plead to state charges, I wanted to 
do what I could to place the victims and the community in the same position where they would 
have been in Epstein had pled to a federal offense. If Epstein had pled to one of the federal offenses 
under investigation, he would have been required to register as a sex offender and pay restitution 
to all victims of the federal offense. With regard to the restitution piece, I knew that the state 
investigation had not included all of the girls and young women whom we had identified and I was 
concerned that Epstein would avoid his restitution obligations if not forced to pay.23
As part of my duties as PSC Coordinator, on September 26, 2006, I had prepared a memo 
to management summarizing the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006 (the 
"Adam Walsh Act") (Exhibit 16). One of the provisions of the Adam Walsh Act that I noted was 
an amendment to 18 U.S.C. § 2255: "Section 2255 has been expanded to allow a person who, 
while a minor, was a victim of various child exploitation offenses, to pursue a civil action for 
personal injury damages — regardless of when the personal injury occurred. It also raises the 
presumptive damage amount to $150,000." (Id. at 7.) Although this was an amendment, I was 
unaware of § 2255 prior to preparing this September 2006 memo. The first few times I brought it 
23 In fact, the State Attorney's Office did not seek or obtain restitution for any victims in 
the state case, not even the two victims that were the basis of the state charges. 
Page 26 of 58 
EFTA00225508

to the attention of others, they thought I was mis-citing 28 U.S.C. § 2255 and I had to explain that 
there actually was an 18 U.S.C. § 2255, which was a civil provision within the criminal code. 
I do not know when I first discussed the possibility of using § 2255 as a replacement for 
the victims' lost restitution benefits, but I know that I conducted research on § 2255 cases on July 
27, 2007 (Exhibit 37). That was the day after the meeting where Criminal Chief Menchel had 
announced that USA Acosta had decided to offer Epstein a two-year state plea (Exhibit 5). 
Language regarding § 2255 was included in the plea agreement term sheet provided to 
Epstein's counsel on July 31, 2007 (Exhibit 38). The issue must have been raised in advance of 
the meeting, because that was the first meeting attended by Ken Starr, and he specifically thanked 
me for bringing § 2255 to their attention. On August 2, 2007, Lilly Ann Sanchez sent a letter to 
Criminal Chief Menchel making a series of counterproposals including: "Application of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2255" (Exhibit 40 at 2). Ms. Sanchez went on to explain: 
18 U.S.C. 2255 provides that any minor who suffers injury as a result of the 
commission of certain offenses shall recover actual damages and the cost of any 
suit. It is important to note that Mr. Epstein is prepared to fully fund the identified 
group of victims which are the focus of the Office — that is, the 12 individuals noted 
at the meeting on July 31, 2007. This would allow the victims to be able to 
promptly put this behind them and go forward with their lives. If given the 
opportunity to opine as to the appropriateness of Mr. Epstein's proposal, in my 
extensive experience in these types of cases, the victims prefer a quick resolution 
with compensation for damages and will always support any disposition that 
eliminates the need for trial (id. at n.1). 
Thus, the use of § 2255 as a replacement for restitution was not controversial — it was 
promoted by Epstein's own attorneys, including Mr. Starr. At one point during negotiations, Mr. 
Lefkowitz started advocating for a trust fluid like the one used in Boehm, mostly, I believe, to try 
to place a cap on his damages exposure. I offered some potential solutions, including asking the 
federal court to appoint a guardian ad litem who could work with Epstein's counsel to see if the 
victims would be willing to agree to a Trust Fund, and I would facilitate those efforts, but I simply 
would not agree to something that I legally could not promise — a binding resolution for victims 
whom I did not represent. 
Eventually, Mr. Lefkowitz made some changes to the § 2255 language but it remained 
quite close to the original proposal contained in the July 31, 2007 term sheet. 
c. immunity for co-conspirators, including unidentified co-conspirators; 
and 
In looking through the drafts of the agreements, the immunity provision does not appear in 
any of the federal plea agreements that I drafted. Its first appearance is in a version of the NPA 
proposed by Jay Lefkowitz along with a proposed promise that the government would not seek 
immigration sanctions against any of the co-conspirators. It was initially rejected, and then after 
several iterations, Lefkowitz revised it to the language that appeared in the final NPA. 
The final language was: "In consideration of Epstein's agreement to plead guilty and to 
provide compensation in the manner described above, if Epstein successfully fulfills all of the 
terms and conditions of this agreement, the United States also agrees that it will not institute any 
Page 27 of 58 
EFTA00225509

ges against an 
co 
, 
em, including but not limited to 
Adriana Ross, 
or 
" (Exhibit 52 at 5). To the extent 
that there was a "criminal organization," the Office and the investigators considered Epstein to be 
the head of that organization. He was certainly the most culpable individual, and we did not 
foresee any scenario where we would defer prosecution against Epstein but proceed to prosecute 
his subordinates. Also, while the agreement included the language "including but not limited to," 
at the time that the NPA was signed, with the possible exception of Ghislaine Maxwell, the 
investigation had not disclosed any co-conspirators other than those listed. 
I recall that there was extensive discussion of Lefkowitz's proposed immigration language, 
but I do not recall much discussion of this language for the reasons stated above. 
d. the October 2007 addendum, including its purpose. 
During the negotiation of the NPA, I had been admitted to the hospital for surgery. After 
the surgery, I returned to the office almost immediately to try to complete the negotiations. When 
the NPA was signed, I sought permission to take a leave of absence to address my health concerns. 
While I was away, the Addendum was negotiated. While I conducted some of the drafting, I 
believe that FAUSA Sloman handled the bulk of the negotiations and drafting. 
My understanding was that the USAO wanted to formally assign its right to select the 
attorney representative for the victims to a Special Master. The NPA stated that the USAO would 
select the attorney representative in consultation with and subject to the good faith approval of 
Epstein's counsel. I had provided Epstein's counsel with a list of attorneys, none of whom I had 
ever met, that I had culled from consulting with one of the district judges24 and some AUSAs, 
including Mr. Yen, who I was dating at the time. After getting that list of names, I did my own 
research to determine who would be good fits for the type of litigation that I expected they would 
face — both in terms of the tactics of Epstein's lawyers and the special challenges of dealing with 
emotionally fragile victims. I provided that culled list to Jay Lefkowitz and disclosed that, 
although I had no financial interest, the list included a friend of a good friend of mine (I did not 
describe Mr. Yera as my "boyfriend"). Even with that disclosure, Mr. Lefkowitz selected Mr. 
Yera's friend. Before the matter went any further, FAUSA Sloman decided that the Office should 
use a Special Master to make the selection, rather than pick anyone — even a panel of attorneys 
leaving the final selection to Epstein's counsel. Despite that, Mr. Lefkowitz and Guy Lewis — who 
knew both Mr. Yera and his friend — claimed that there was a financial interest and that I had tried 
to create the procedure for financial gain.25
24 Epstein's lawyers suggested that I had ex parte communications with a judge. I simply 
asked for recommendations from a judge that I was friendly with; I did not disclose anything about 
the background of the case. 
25 Mr. Lewis knew that Mr. Yera also was an AUSA and, therefore, was not partners with 
another lawyer. When that was patently obvious, Epstein's lawyers falsely claimed that they were 
"law school roommates." Both had graduated from law school more than fifteen years before, and 
had not been roommates. Ironically, one of the reasons why Epstein's legal team approved the 
selection of Robert Josefsberg was that Josefsberg and Alan Dershowitz were law school 
classmates — somehow there was no "financial interest" attributed to them. 
Page 28 of 58 
EFTA00225510

Rather than simply elect to use a Special Master to exercise its right to make the attorney 
representative selection, the USA() believed that it should formalize the assignment in writing. 
5. To the extent not evidenced in e-mails or other correspondence, identify and 
describe all interactions with defense counsel — such as phone conversations, 
meetings, or communications by private e-mail — that you or any other 
member of the government had regarding the investigation, potential 
prosecution, or negotiation of a resolution of this case. If at any point you 
became concerned about the nature of any member of the government's 
interaction with defense counsel, describe the interaction and explain when 
and why you became concerned. 
My communications with opposing counsel occurred primarily via email. Most of those 
communications were via office email, and some were from my home email. All of my home 
emails were collected and produced as part of the Jane Doe litigation. Negotiations were occurring 
at nights, on weekend, and while I was recuperating from surgery, and this occurred during a time 
when out of office access to email was very limited. I believe that only supervisors had Blackberry 
devices at that time. 
The meetings that I attended are catalogued on the meeting timeline (Exhibit 5). I believe 
there was one other meeting soon after Epstein entered his guilty plea, when I went to Jack 
Goldberger's office and met with him and Mike Tein (Guy Lewis' law partner) about the victim 
list. Other than that, I do not recall any in-person meetings. 
I had a couple of telephone conversations with Lilly Ann Sanchez and Guy Lewis at the 
start of the investigation that were very brief. Jeff Sloman and/or Andy Lourie was on some of 
these. I had telephone conversations later during the investigation with Lilly Ann Sanchez, Gerry 
Lefcourt, Roy Black, and Nate Dershowitz about subpoena responses. Karen Atkinson and Andy 
Lourie were on some of those calls. I had telephone conversations with Jay Lefkowitz about plea 
negotiations and scheduling meetings. Andy Lourie, Rolando Garcia, and Jeff Sloman were on 
some of those calls. I had numerous calls with Roy Black and Jack Goldberger about breaches of 
the NPA. Karen Atkinson was on most of those telephone calls. 
From emails and conversations, I know that Messrs. Acosta, Sloman, Menchel, and Lourie 
had numerous emails and conversations (mostly via telephone and possibly some in person) with 
members of the defense team. USA Acosta had contact with Ken Starr, Jay Lefkowitz, Gerry 
Lefcourt, and Alan Dershowitz. FAUSA Sloman had contact with Alan Dershowitz, Gerry 
Lefcourt, and Lilly Ann Sanchez. Criminal Chief Menchel had contact with Lilly Ann Sanchez 
and Gerry Lefcourt. There may have been other meetings that I was unaware of. I was concerned 
about the level of contact and the lack of consideration of the sanctity of the investigation. It was 
imperative to keep the investigation confidential to protect not just the victims' privacy rights, but 
to keep them from the harassment of overly aggressive lawyers. I felt that there were leaks of 
case-related facts and strategy, as well as personal matters that undermined my ability to deal with 
the defense and that ultimately was used by the defense to defame me and Mr. Sloman with senior 
members of the Department of Justice. 
Page 29 of 58 
EFTA00225511

6. Provide a detailed description of all settlement negotiations conducted in this 
matter in which you took part or of which you were otherwise aware, including 
all terms of settlement that were discussed, considered, and rejected during 
the negotiations. 
Identify all individuals who participated in those 
negotiations, including government personnel and defense counsel. In each 
case, identify all participants and describe the discussions that occurred. 
Please see my response to Question A.3. 
7. Describe the interactions by you, or anyone else within the USAO, with any 
employees of the Palm Beach County State Attorney's Office concerning the 
federal or state investigation of Mr. Epstein, the terms of a proposed resolution 
of the case, and the terms of the federal non-prosecution agreement, including 
the terms of Mr. Epstein's incarceration. 
As noted above, my first interaction with anyone from the Palm Beach County State 
Attorney's Office about the Epstein case was at the Project Safe Childhood Conference in 
Washington, DC, when State Attorney Barry Krischer introduced himself to USA Acosta and me 
and started railing against the victims and the case. 
My next interaction was with ASA Lanna Belohlavek at some later date. I was in her 
office, I believe on another matter, and I mentioned the case. She said that she "hated" the case 
and that she "hated" prostitution cases. She stated that some of the girls were not really victims 
because they had been paid "thousands of dollars." I was a bit taken aback because Ms. Belohlavek 
was the supervisor of the division charged with prosecuting child sex offenses, including child 
prostitution cases and, by definition, child prostitutes receive money. 
Although not personal interactions, I also had collected and reviewed the state grand jury 
transcript, indictment, and the state investigative materials. I had conferred with former ASAs 
about the use of the grand jury in the case, which was very unusual. In Florida, only capital cases 
need to be presented to a grand jury — all other cases can proceed by Information — and one ASA 
in Palm Beach County handles the presentation of all of the cases to the grand jury. This case was 
unusual because it was presented to a grand jury unnecessarily and it was not presented by the 
regular grand jury ASA. The State Attorney also had told the press that a variety of charges had 
been presented to the grand jury and the jurors had selected the lowest charge of solicitation of 
prostitution (with no designation of age). The transcript gave no indication that multiple charging 
options were presented, and the jurors were only provided with evidence about one victim, not all 
of the victims who had been the subjects of the investigation. 
I believe that the next interaction was on September 12, 2007, when I attended a meeting 
at the State Attorney's Office with Andy Lourie and Rolando Garcia. Jay Lefkowitz, Gerald 
Lefcourt, and Jack Goldberger attended on behalf of Mr. Epstein, and State Attorney Krischer and 
ASA Lanna Behlolavek were present. At some point in the past, one of Epstein's attorneys had 
falsely told State Attorney Krischer that a person from the USAO had referred to the SAO as "a 
joke." Messrs. Lourie and Garcia and I had to spend the first several minutes of the meeting 
convincing State Attorney Krischer that no one had ever said such a thing. After crossing that 
hurdle, we got to the core of the meeting, which was whether the SAO was in agreement with 
filing charges and seeking a sentence consisting with the terms of the NPA — that is, a plea to an 
Page 30 of 58 
EFTA00225512

offense that required sex offender registration — namely, procuring a minor for prostitution in 
violation of Fl. Stat. 796.03; and a sentence totaling 18 or 20 months' imprisonment.26 I recall 
that either Mr. Lourie or I asked Ms. Behlolavek to confirm that § 796.03 required sex offender 
registration, and she said that it did. Epstein's attorneys also said that it did. We also specifically 
discussed that Epstein would be confined for the term of imprisonment. State Attorney Krischer 
said that a term of imprisonment of longer than one year usually required placement in a state 
penitentiary, but there was a way to structure the sentence as a split sentence so that Epstein would 
be housed at the Palm Beach County Jail. And we again confirmed that Epstein would remain in 
custody at the jail, not home confinement or any other type of release and we were told that he 
would be in jail. We also discussed wrapping the matter up quickly because of the extensive 
delays. 
On September 23, 2007, Jay Lefkowitz sent an email to Alex Acosta essentially admitting 
that, during the meeting on September 12, 2007, Epstein's attorneys and Ms. Behlolavek all 
believed that a conviction for Fl. Stat. 796.03, procurement of minors for prostitution, did not 
require sex offender registration — despite our specific inquiries (see Exhibit 51 ("I write to follow 
up on our conversation on Friday and to ask you to reconsider your decision to require that Mr. 
Epstein plead guilty to a registerable state charge. It appears that there was a misunderstanding at 
the meeting I had with Messrs. Laurie, Krischer, Goldberger, Lefcourt, Ms. Villafana and Ms. 
Belohlavek. . . . Before the meeting, Mr. Krischer, and Ms. Belohlavek, a sex prosecutor for 13 
years, told us that solicitation of a minor, under 796.03, is not a registerable offense. However, as 
it turned out, 796.03 is a registerable offense and our discussion at the meeting was based on a 
mistaken assumption." (emphasis added)). 
On December 6, 2007, ASA Behlolavek contacted me to draft a factual proffer and advised 
that Epstein would be entering a guilty plea on December 21, 2007 (Exhibit 73). I did some 
research on 796.03 and prepared a draft that I shared with FAUSA Sloman, but he decided not to 
share the information with Ms. Behlolavek (see id). 
While drafting this response, I searched my electronic files for Mr. ICrischer's name and 
discovered a document entitled "071214 Acosta Ltr to Krischer.wpd" (Exhibit 69). I do not recall 
drafting this letter, although I located a cover email stating that I drafted this and two other letters 
for USA Acosta's signature that were directed to the State Attorney's Office (Exhibit 75). I do 
not know if any of the letters were ever sent to Mr. Krischer. 
In May 2008, Rolando Garcia had a discussion with State Attorney Krischer and Krischer 
advised that he and Jack Goldberger had reached a new agreement for Epstein of 90 days in jail 
(Exhibit B-39). 
On June 17, 2008, Karen Atkinson and I spoke with State Attorney Krischer. He 
complained that we had not been communicating with him, and we told him that Epstein's counsel 
had blocked the channels of communication (Exhibit 78). Krischer said that he and Jack 
Goldberger had reached a new agreement where Epstein would plead guilty to "attempted lewd 
conduct" and be sentenced to 60 days in the County Jail followed by two years of community 
confinement (id.). 
26 As noted above, I do not recall the exact date when USA Acosta agreed that 18 months' 
imprisonment was sufficient. 
Page 31 of 58 
EFTA00225513

On June 19, 2008, I sent an email to State Attorney Krischer advising him that we had 
spoken with Roy Black about wrapping up both the state and federal /times (Exhibit 68). I reminded 
State Attorney Krischer that the signed NPA required a plea to the current state indictment and to 
an information charging an offense that requires sex offender registration, namely procuring 
minors to engage in prostitution, with a sentence of at least 18 months' imprisonment (id.). 
I attended the change of plea on June 30, 2008 but did not have any contact with any 
member of the SAO that day. Later, when the issue arose regarding whether or not Epstein was 
taking the position that the NPA included USA Acosta's December 2007 letter, I contacted Ms. 
Behlolavek and SA Krischer to obtain a copy of what Epstein's counsel had filed in state court. 
In September 2008, I had communications with Mr. Krischer about a suit filed in state court 
to unseal the NPA (Exhibit 70). 
At some point, Mr. Krischer sent me an email about wanting to buy me a cup of coffee. I 
was not able to find the email while preparing this response, but with additional time, I can 
probably locate it. I don't believe I ever answered Mr. Krischer. I know I never met him for 
coffee. 
I recall that in many of Epstein's letters to the Justice Department, there were complaints 
of a lack of coordination between the USAO and the SAO. That lack of coordination was not 
caused by the government agencies, but, rather, by the tactics of Epstein's counsel. For example, 
Epstein's counsel insisted that I should conduct a completely independent review of the evidence 
so that I would not be tainted by bias from the PBPD or the SAO. When I did so and reached a 
conclusion that they did not like, Epstein's attorneys insisted that Criminal Chief Senior and that 
CEOS conduct similarly sterile reviews free from the "taint" of me and the federal agents. If Ms. 
Atkinson and I or the agents and I reached out to the SAO to discuss how the NPA should be 
worded to insure that we were getting correct information from Epstein's attorneys, we were 
accused of "infringing on the SAO's discretion." Yet, that "lack of coordination" that Epstein's 
attorneys caused, was later held up to the DAAG, the AAG, and DAG, as violations of the Petite 
policy's state-federal coordination requirement. 
8. Describe any research conducted by you, or anyone else within the USAO, into 
law or policy regarding any of the following issues: 
a. The propriety of permitting a person to plead guilty to state court 
charges in exchange for an agreement by the USAO to refrain from 
federal prosecution. In your response, you should identify any USAO 
or Department policies that were considered by the USAO, and any 
effort by the USAO to obtain guidance or approval from the 
Department to use a non-prosecution agreement to resolve this case. 
I did not do any research on this point. I do not know whether USA Acosta or Criminal 
Chief Menchel conducted any research or obtained any guidance or approval from the Department. 
Page 32 of 58 
EFTA00225514

b. The propriety of including in a non-prosecution agreement with Mr. 
Epstein a provision that the federal government would forgo 
prosecution of any potential co-conspirators of Mr. Epstein, including 
unidentified co-conspirators. 
I do not recall doing any research on this particular point, other than discussing with 
MAUSA Lourie that we would not pursue an investigation into Epstein's subordinates after closing 
the investigation of Epstein. 
c. The propriety of including in the non-prosecution agreement a 
provision incorporating 18 U.S.C. § 2255. 
As noted above, I became familiar with § 2255 through my work as the PSC Coordinator. 
I also was aware, as set forth in the victim notification letters that I prepared, that, under the CVRA, 
I was obligated to use my "best efforts" to protect the victims' rights to "full and timely restitution 
as provided in law." 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(6). As I discussed above, restitution in child exploitation 
cases was an issue of growing concern, so I was mindful that this plea mechanism that Criminal 
Chief Menchel had devised with Lilly Ann Sanchez would extinguish, the victims' right to 
restitution. That was one of the reasons why, on July 4, 2007, I wrote to Mr. Menchel that I 
believed the plea proposal violated the victims' rights legislation. 
When Mr. Menchel announced in late July that USA Acosta was going forward with the 
two-year state plea offer despite those concerns, I undertook my best efforts to still afford those 
restitution rights to the victims identified through the federal investigation. Immediately after the 
meeting where Mr. Menchel announced to me and the investigative team that USA Acosta 
intended to offer a state plea, I delved further into the requirements for claims under § 2255 
(Exhibit 37). While § 2255 is a civil damages statute, not a criminal restitution provision, the 
criminal restitution statutory scheme recognizes that there is some overlap. See 18 U.S.C. § 
3664(j)(2)(A), (1). Section 2255 also provides for attorneys' fees, just as courts can use court funds 
to appoint guardians ad litem for minor victims in criminal cases who can advocate for restitution 
for the victims. My review of the legislative history led me to conclude that the inclusion of a 
provision under § 2255 would be the best way to protect the victims' right to restitution. CEOS 
Chief Oosterbaan described the agreement as "a very significant result that will serve the victims 
well" (Exhibit 71). 
I should note that a plea to one of the federal crimes under investigation — with a 24-month 
binding sentencing recommendation — would have achieved USA Acosta's desired outcomes (24 
months' imprisonment" and sex offender registration); would have provided federally mandated 
restitution for the victims; and would have provided victims with court-funded representation via 
the guardian ad litem program for those who needed it. All of these contortions were brought 
about by the decision to use a state plea to resolve a federal investigation. 
27 As noted above, I was never told the source of the 24-month figure. In my opinion, a 
straight § 371 plea, with a five-year statutory maximum, was a significant concession. 
Page 33 of 58 
EFTA00225515

d. How the Florida state judicial system would address issues pertaining 
to the terms of Mr. Epstein's incarceration, including designation of an 
appropriate facility, the availability of work release (or any similar 
release condition), and the availability of other privileges. Identify 
whether such research was conducted before or after the non-
prosecution agreement was signed, and whether it was conducted 
before or after Mr. Epstein entered his state court plea. Describe any 
communications you or other USAO personnel had with 
representatives of the Palm Beach County State Attorney's Office, 
other law enforcement, or local corrections officials regarding these 
matters. 
One of my concerns about using a state forum to resolve this case was that it left our Office 
with no control over the process. We also did not have any members of our team who had 
experience with the Palm Beach County state courts — Criminal Chief Menchel had been a state 
prosecutor in New York before joining the USAO; I had been in private practice. Similarly, no 
one else involved in the process had been an ASA or even a criminal defense attorney in Palm 
Beach County. The defense team, on the other hand, included Roy Black and Jack Goldberger, 
who had extensive state court criminal experience in Palm Beach County. Any litigator will tell 
you that knowing the Court is a key component of success, so we were placed at a distinct 
disadvantage. It was exacerbated by defense counsel's tactics of prohibiting coordination between 
the USAO and the SAO — which somehow was successful.28 It also required the USAO to place 
an inordinate amount of trust in the SAO, when one of the reasons for opening the federal 
investigation was the concerns that undue influence had been brought to bear on the State 
Attorney.29
The loss of control did not just end with the Court proceedings, it included how the sentence 
would be executed. Federal sentences are executed by the U.S. Marshals and the Bureau of 
Prisons. All are housed within the Department of Justice and have clearly written rules and 
regulations. BOP is used to housing wealthy, politically-connected offenders and would be less 
likely to be unduly influenced by Epstein. 
I attempted to build some certainty back into the agreement through several provisions. 
First, I selected the state statutes that Epstein would have to plead guilty to and conducted my own 
research to confirm that they required sex offender registration. Second, I included language that 
28 Epstein's team was equally successful in DC, where they dictated who could and could 
not participate in the "independent review" at CEOS. For example, Myesha Braden, who had not 
yet joined the Leap Year team, was excluded from consideration because she had disagreed with 
Lilly Ann Sanchez about the handling of an obscenity case while Ms. Sanchez was an AUSA. 
29 According to PBPD Chief Reiter, the State Attorney initially planned to file no charges 
against Epstein. Following complaints, the SAO planned to charge Epstein with a misdemeanor 
solicitation of adult prostitution charge. Then, after the police chief complained further, the State 
Attorney assertedly presented "multiple charges" to the grand jury, and they "elected" to return an 
indictment charging one felony count of soliciting adult prostitution. The State Attorney did not 
intend to charge an offense requiring sex offender registration and was only seeking a sentence of 
probation. 
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he would have to plead guilty, not nolo contendere. Third, I researched different terms that Florida 
courts would use that appeared to impose a term of incarceration, but really imposed something 
else, and prohibited those sentences ("Epstein shall be sentenced to consecutive terms of twelve 
(12) months and six (6) months in county jail for all charges, without any opportunity for 
withholding adjudication or sentencing, and without probation or community control is lieu of 
imprisonment" (Exhibit 52 at 3 (emphasis added)). Fourth, I included a waiver of the right to 
challenge the Information and an appeal waiver. Fifth, I included a requirement that Epstein would 
have to provide the USA° with a copy of his plea agreement with the SAO before he signed it. 
Sixth, I required Epstein to use his best efforts to enter his guilty plea within approximately 30 
days and an agreement that that term (like all others) was material. Seventh, I included an 
agreement that Epstein would not be afforded any gain time benefits different from any other 
inmate, and that he would provide an accounting of gain time if asked. Finally, "breach of any 
one of these conditions allows the United States to elect to terminate the agreement and to 
investigate and prosecute Epstein and any other individual or entity for any and all federal 
offenses" (id. at 6). 
In addition to the terms of the NPA, the agents and I also did our best to make sure that 
Epstein would be serving jail time like anyone else. Prior to the September 12, 2007 meeting at 
the State Attorney's Office, I spoke with Andy Lourie and emailed Jeff Sloman about research I 
had conducted on Florida sentencing practices to avoid "trucks up the sleeves of the defense" 
(Exhibit 46 at I.) Normally a defendant who is sentenced to a term of prison in excess of 12 
months must go to a state prison. The Office did not object to "splitting" Epstein's sentence into 
two pieces — 12 months followed by 6 months — so that he would be eligible to be housed at the 
Palm Beach County Jail. All of us were, however, insistent that Mr. Epstein would actually serve 
out his term at the jail like any other prisoner. At the September 12, 2007 meeting with the State 
Attorney's Office, this issue was specifically addressed, and State Attorney Krischer assured us 
that Epstein would be at the Palm Beach County Jail (it is referred to as "Gun Club" because it is 
located on Gun Club Road). I remember that they discussed that Epstein would be kept in solitary 
confinement "for his own safety." 
After that meeting, the case agents went to meet with the jail about the issue of work 
release. I do not recall the exact date. On November 14, 2007, I sought FAUSA Sloman's 
permission to meet with State Attorney Krischer after ASA Behlolavek stood up the agents a few 
times. 
The purpose of my meeting was "to clear up the issue regarding sex offender 
registration/work release and also should be able to tell us whether a plea and sentencing can be 
scheduled this month" (Exhibit 72). FAUSA Sloman and Acting MAUSA Rolando Garcia had 
conversations with the State Attorney and Jay Lefkowitz who both confirmed that Epstein would 
"be a sex offender and he'll be treated like any other sex offender" (Exhibit 76 at 2). On November 
16, 2007, the case agents met with ASA Belohlavek who said that Epstein would be housed at the 
Palm Beach County Jail, so the Palm Beach Sheriff's Office would be in charge of whether Epstein 
would be eligible for work release (id. at I). Special Agent Richards confirmed on November 16, 
2007 that Epstein would not qualify for work release as a sex offender unless the judge specially 
ordered it (id.). 
As noted above, when we learned that Epstein's attorneys were negotiating a new deal with 
the State Attorney's Office, Karen Atkinson and I firmly informed Epstein's attorneys and the 
State Attorney's Office that there was a signed agreement. While they were free to negotiate 
whatever they wanted, the terms they were discussing violated the NPA. 
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