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the same act are intended to have the same meaning.") (quotation and citation omitted). 
Two Mann Act cases are particularly apt. In Hansen', Half, 291 U.S. 559 (1934), the 
Government charged the defendant with violating the Mann Act after she returned to the country 
with a man with whom she was having "illicit relations." Id. at 561. Despite the fact that the 
woman intended to "continue her irregular and improper conduct [after] returning," the Court 
held that she had not violated the Act: "People not of good moral character like others, travel 
from place to place and change their residence. But to say that, because they indulge in illegal or 
immoral acts, they travel for that purpose, is to emphasize that which is incidental and ignore 
what is of primary significance." Id. at 562-63. Likewise, in Mortensen'. United States 322 
U.S. 369 (1944), defendants were convicted after two women they employed as prostitutes at 
their Nebraska brothel traveled to Utah and back, where they resumed their unlawful activities. 
Id. at 372. Again, the Supreme Court reversed: "An intention that the women or girls shall 
engage in the conduct outlawed by [the Mann Act] must be found to exist before the conclusion 
of the interstate journey and must be the dominant motive of such interstate movement. And the 
transportation must be designed to bring about such result." Id. at 374. 
The FAC does not remotely allege that Defendant's dominant motive for traveling to 
Palm Beach "in or about the spring of 2003" was to engage in unlawful sexual activity. FAC 
¶ 18. Instead, as the FAC makes clear, Defendant is a successful businessman who maintains 
homes and properties around the world. Id.1 8. Even if the FAC's fanciful allegations regarding 
Defendant's conduct while at those homes were true, the FAC does not remotely allege that his 
dominant motive for travel was to engage in illicit sexual acts (much less that he traveled with 
the dominant purpose of engaging in illicit activities with Plaintiff) or that his travel was 
specifically "designed to bring about such a result." Mortenson, 322 U.S. at 374. As Jabal and 
Twombly make clear, plaintiffs cannot withstand a motion to dismiss by baldy asserting that an 
offense occurred and holding out hope that they "might later establish some set of undisclosed 
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facts" to support the claim. Instead, each element must be supported by an adequate factual 
allegation. Twombly 550 U.S. at 561; see also iqbal, slip op. at 14 ("The plausibility standard 
... asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. Where a 
complaint pleads facts that are 'merely consistent with' a defendant's liability, it 'stops short of 
the line between possibility and plausibility of 'entitlement to relief.") (quoting Thvombly, 550 
U.S. at 557 (alteration in original)). 
Indeed Twombly itself supplies an excellent parallel. Plaintiffs there alleged that the 
defendants engaged in coordinated activities that violated the antitrust laws, and asserted that 
defendants thus must have agreed to restrain trade. As the Court observed, however, plaintiffs' 
otherwise specific allegations of parallel conduct were as likely innocent as they were consistent 
an agreement to restrain trade: 
[A]n allegation of parallel conduct and a bare assertion of conspiracy will not 
suffice. Without more, parallel conduct does not suggest conspiracy, and a 
conclusory allegation of agreement at some unidentified point does not supply 
facts adequate to show illegality. Hence, when allegations of parallel conduct are 
set out..., they must be placed in a context that raises a suggestion of a preceding 
agreement, not merely parallel conduct that could just as well be independent. 
Id. at 556.57. 
So too here. The mere fact that Defendant traveled between his residences and allegedly 
engaged in illicit conduct while at his homes hardly suggests that the dominant purpose of his 
travel was to engage in illicit sexual activity. Instead, Defendant's travel is equally consistent 
with the truth: that his vast business operations and charitable activities required frequent travel, 
and that any sexual activity—legal or not—that occurred was incidental to the legitimate 
purposes that motivated his trips. See, e.g., Hansen 291 U.S. at 562-63 ("[T]o say that, because 
[persons] indulge in illegal or immoral acts, they travel for that purpose, is to emphasize that 
which is incidental and ignore what is of primary significance."). Without more, the FAC thus 
fails to allege facts that, even if true, would establish that Defendant engaged in the sort of sex 
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Case No. 08-80736-CVNARRA 
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tourism that violates 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b), or that Plaintiff herself is the victim of such an 
offense. See Twomblv 550 U.S. at 557. Count U muse be dismissed. 
COUNT THREE MUST BE DISMISSED BECAUSE IT DOES NOT PLEAD A 
VIOLATION OF 18 U.S.C. § 2251. 
Count III of the FAC asserts a cause of action under 18 U.S.C. § 2255 predicated on 
allegations that Defendant violated 18 U.S.C. § 2251. Again, as set forth above, this Count is 
legally unsustainable for the simple reason that Defendant has never been convicted under 
§ 2251. Supra at § II. In the alternative, Count III still must be dismissed because the FAC does 
not make factual allegations that, even if true, would establish that Defendant violated 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2251 or that Plaintiff is the victim of such a violation. 
Yet again, Plaintiff's failure adequately to plead the dates on which the alleged predicate 
conduct occurred makes it impossible to determine which version of § 2251 applies in this case. 
Prior to April 30, 2003, § 2251 provided that: 
Any person who employs, uses, persuades, induces, entices, or coerces any minor 
to engage in ... any sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of producing any 
visual depiction of such conduct, shall be punished ... If such person knows or 
has reason to know that such visual depiction will be transported In interstate or 
foreign commerce or mailed, if that visual depiction was produced using 
materials that have been mailed, shipped, or transported in interstate or foreign 
commerce by any means, including by computer, or if such visual depiction has 
actually been transported in Interstate or foreign commerce or mailed. 
18 U.S.C. § 2251 (2002) (emphasis added). As with § 2423(b), however, Congress made 
significant changes to the statute when the PROTECT Act became effective on April 30, 2003: 
Any person who employs, uses, persuades, induces, entices, or coerces any minor 
to engage in ... any sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of producing any 
visual depiction of such conduct or for the purpose of transmitting a live visual 
depiction of such conduct shall be punished ... if such person knows or has 
reason to know that such visual depiction will be transported or transmitted 
using any means or facility of interstate or foreign commerce or in or affecting 
Interstate or foreign commerce or mailed, if that visual depiction was produced 
or transmitted using materials that have been mailed, shipped, or transported in or 
affecting interstate or foreign commerce by any means, including by computer, or 
if such visual depiction has actually been transported or transmitted using any 
means or facility of Interstate or foreign commerce or In or affecting interstate 
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or foreign commerce or mailed. 
18 U.S.C. § 2251 (2003) (emphasis added; underscored to denote amended text). 
Under either version, however, Count III must be dismissed because Plaintiff fails to 
plead that Defendant's dominant motive for enticing her to engage in sexual conduct was to 
produce images of that conduct; that Defendant actually produced an image of Plaintiff; or that 
Defendant either knew that the resulting images would be transported in interstate commerce or 
actually transported or transmitted those photographs in interstate commerce. Instead, the FAC 
alleges only that Defendant displayed photos of other women in his homes and on his computer, 
see FAC at ¶¶ 14 & 16, and "may have taken lewd photographs of Plaintiff ... and may have 
transported lewd photographs of Plaintiff ... to his other residences and elsewhere using a 
facility or means of interstate and/or foreign commerce." all 16 & 34 (emphasis added). 
Those speculative assertions are insufficient to sustain Plaintiff's burden at the pleading 
stage. In our legal system, defendants cannot properly be subjected to the burden and expense of 
discovery—and the accompanying pressure to settle—based on claims that they "may have" 
done something wrong. Instead, "the complaint's allegations must plausibly suggest that the 
plaintiff has a right to relief, raising that possibility above a speculative level; if they do not, the 
plaintiff's complaint should be dismissed." James River Ins. Co. I. Ground Down Ellett. Inc. 
540 F.3d 1270, 1274 (11th Cir. 2008) (citation and quotation omitted); see also jqbal, slip op. at 
15 (complaint must be dismissed "where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer 
more than the mere possibility of misconduct") (emphasis added); Bawa I. U.S. No. C 07-
00200 WHA, 2007 WL 1456040, *5 (N.D. Cal. May 17, 2007) (dismissing complaint alleging 
that defendant "may have played a substantial role" in the underlying crime). 
Plaintiff has not remotely alleged that a crime actually was committed, and if she could 
have done so in good faith, there is little doubt that she would have. Having failed to push her 
claims from the realm of the possible into the realm of the plausible, there is no basis for 
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allowing Plaintiff to proceed. Count III must be dismissed with prejudice. 
VI. 
COUNTS FOUR AND FIVE MUST BE DISMISSED BECAUSE THEY DO NOT 
PLEAD VIOLATIONS OF 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252(a)(1) OR 2252A(a)(1). 
Count IV of the FAC asserts a cause of action under 18 U.S.C. § 2255 predicated on 
allegations that Defendant violated 18 U.S.C. § 2252(aX1). Count, of the FAC asserts a cause 
of action under 18 U.S.C. § 2255 predicated on allegations that Defendant violated 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2252A(a)(I). Again, as set forth above, these Counts are legally unsustainable for the simple 
reason that Defendant has never been convicted under § 2252(a)(1) or § 2252A(a)(1). Supra at 
§ II. In the alternative, Counts IV and, still must be dismissed because the FAC does not make 
factual allegations that, even if true, would establish that Defendant violated either statute or that 
Plaintiff is a victim of such a violation. By its plain terms, § 2252(a)(1) provides: 
Any person who ... knowingly transports or ships using any means or facility of 
interstate or foreign commerce ... any visual depiction, if ... the producing of 
such visual depiction involves the use of a minor engaging in sexually explicit 
conduct and ... such visual depiction is of such conduct ... shall be punished as 
provided in subsection (b) of this section. 
18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(1) (2002 & 2003) (emphasis added). 
Similarly, the pre- and post-
PROTECT Act versions of § 2252A(aX I ) provide: 
Any person who ... knowingly malls, or transports or ships in interstate or 
foreign commerce by any means, Including by computer, any child pornography 
... shall be punished as provided [by law). 
18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(1) (2002 & 2003) (emphasis added). 
In turn, the term "child 
pornography" was defined both pre- and post-PROTECT Act, and in relevant part, as: 
any visual depiction, including any photograph, film, video, picture, or computer 
or computer-generated image or picture... of sexually explicit conduct, where ... 
the production of such visual depiction involves the use of a minor engaging in 
sexually explicit conduct. 
18 U.S.C. § 2256(8) (2002 & 2003). 
As with Count III, however, the FAC does not remotely allege that Plaintiff is a victim of 
a violation of §§ 2252(a)(1) or 2252A(aX1). Instead, the FAC alleges only that Defendant 
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displayed photos of other unidentified women in his homes and on his computer, see FAC at 
¶¶ 14 & 16, and "may have taken lewd photographs of Plaintiff ... with his hidden cameras and 
may have transported lewd photographs of Plaintiff ... to his other residences and elsewhere 
using a facility or means of interstate and/or foreign commerce." FAC ¶¶ 16, 38, 43 (emphasis 
added). Again, it simply is not enough to allege that Defendant "may have" done something 
wrong: "the complaint's allegations must plausibly suggest that the plaintiff has a right to relief, 
raising that possibility above a speculative level; if they do not, the plaintiff's complaint should 
be dismissed." James River Ins. Co., 540 F.3d at 1274 (citation and quotation omitted); see also 
lqbal, slip op. at 15 (holding the a complaint must be dismissed "where the well-pleaded facts do 
not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct") (emphasis added). 
Because the FAC only speculates that Defendant "may have" committed a crime, and because 
Plaintiff surely would have charged that Defendant actually committed a crime if she had a 
good-faith basis for doing so, Counts IV and, must be dismissed with prejudice. 
VII. COUNT SIX MUST BE DISMISSED BECAUSE 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(g) WAS NOT 
ENACTED UNTIL 2006. 
Count VI of the FAC asserts a cause of action under 18 U.S.C. § 2255 predicated on 
allegations that Defendant violated 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(g). Again, as set forth above, this Count 
is legally unsustainable for the simple reason that Defendant has never been convicted under 
§ 2251. Supra at § IL In the alternative, Count VI still must be dismissed because § 2252A(g) 
was not enacted until 2006—three years after the alleged conduct underlying this case took 
place. See Pub. L. 109-248, Title VII, § 701, July 27, 2006, 120 Stat. 614, 647. As set forth 
above, supra § I.B.2, the Ex Post Facto Clause flatly precludes the application of new statutes to 
conduct completed prior to the statute's enactment, and there is any event no indication that 
Congress intended to apply this provision of the Adam Walsh Act retroactively to completed 
conduct. See supra § I.B.1 (noting that Congress expressly made certain provisions of the Adam 
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Walsh Act retroactive, but not others). Thus, while Plaintiff has not adequately pleaded a 
violation of § 2252A(g) in the first place, there is no lawful basis under which she could assert a 
cause of action predicated on that statute. Count VI must be dismissed with prejudice. 
VIII. ANY SURVIVING COUNTS SHOULD BE MERGED INTO A SINGLE COUNT. 
While we respectfully submit that none of the FAC's counts are viable and that each 
should be dismissed with prejudice, this Court should require the merger of all claims into a 
single count to the extent it rejects the foregoing analysis and allows more than one count to 
proceed. Contrary to Plaintiff's attempt to multiply her recovery by asserting six separate 
counts, § 2255 creates a single cause of action with a single penalty for all violations of a 
predicate offense, not separate causes of action and separate recoveries on a "per violation" 
basis. We have not found a single precedent where a § 2255 plaintiff has been allowed to assert 
claims on a "per violation" basis—each of the prior cases (including the prior cases involving 
this defendant in this Court) involved a single count predicated on multiple alleged violations of 
predicate criminal statutes. See Tilton 
Playboy Entertainment Group. Inc., 554 F.3d 1371 
(I lth Cir. Jan. 15, 2009); Smith, 428 F. Supp. 2d at 432; Doe, 478 F. Supp. 2d at 754; poc No. 2 
I. Epstein 2009 WL 383332 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 12, 2009); Doe No. 3 1. Epstein 2009 WL 383330 
(S.D. Fla. Feb. 12, 2009); poe No. 41. Epstein, 2009 WL 383286 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 12, 2009); and 
Doe No. 5I, Epstein 2009 WL 383383 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 12, 2009). 
There is no basis for indulging Plaintiff's contrary approach. Instead, the plain language 
and structure of the statute foreclose Plaintiffs unprecedented approach. First, the order of the 
two sentences establishing the statutory penalty under § 2255(a) demonstrate that Congress did 
not mean to allow for a minimum mandatory recovery in the amount of 550,000 for each 
predicate violation. The first sentence provides that "(a]ny person who ... suffers personal injury 
as a result of such violation ... shall recover the actual damages such person sustains and the 
cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee." 18 U.S.C. § 2255(a) (emphasis added). 
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Then, in recognition of the fact that damages in these cases may be hard to prove, the second 
sentence provides for recovery of a minimum amount: "My minor as described in the preceding 
sentence shall be deemed to have sustained damages of no less than $50,000." Id. Together, 
these provisions indicate that Congress intended to provide restitution to victims—that is, to 
award them "actual damages"—but that where actual damages were less than $50,000 or 
otherwise impossible to prove, the statute would guarantee a lump-sum, make-whole penalty of 
$50,000 for all injuries sustained as a result of the predicate acts. 
Moreover, the fact that Congress did not expressly provide for damages on a "per 
violation" basis further underscores the fact that Congress sought to provide only a lump-sum 
recovery for all injuries sustained by a victim. After all, while Congress lmows exactly how to 
provide for damages on a "per violation" basis when it wants to, it did not do so here. See, e.g., 
18 U.S.C. § 216 (authorizing a "civil action ... against any person who engages in conduct 
constituting an offense under" specified sections of the bribery, graft, and conflicts of interest 
statutes, and authorizing "a civil penalty of not more than $50,000 for each violation or the 
amount of compensation which the person received or offered for the prohibited conduct, which 
ever amount is greater') (emphasis added); see also 18 U.S.C. § 49; 18 U.S.C. § 1034; 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2318. As the Eleventh Circuit repeatedly has explained, "where Congress knows how to say 
something but chooses not to, its silence is controlling." Delgado,. United States Att'y Gen. 
487 F.3d 855, 862 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting CBS, 245 F.3d at 1226 (itself quoting Griffith, 206 
F.3d at 1394 with citation and quotations omitted))) (alteration omitted). 
Because the statute provides a single cause of action with a single remedy, this Court 
should order Plaintiff to merge all surviving claims—if any—into a single count. 
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Certificate of Service 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true copy of the foregoing was electronically filed with the 
Clerk of the Court using CM/BCF. I also certify that the foregoing document is being served this 
day on all counsel of record identified on the following Service List in the manner specified by 
CM/BCF on this  26th  day of  
May 
 , 2009 
Robert C. Josefsbcrg, Esq. 
Katherine W. Ezell, Esq. 
Podhurst Orseck, P.A. 
25 West Flagler Street, Suite 800 
Miami, FL 33130 
305 358-2800 
Fax: 305 358-2382 
[email protected] 
kezell®podhurst.com 
Counsel for Plaintiff 
Jack Alan Goldberger, Esq. 
Atterbury Goldberger & Weiss, P.A. 
250 Australian Avenue South 
Suite 1400 
West Palm Beach, FL 33401-5012 
561-659-8300 
Fax: 561-835-8691 
[email protected] 
Counsel for Defendant Jeffrey Epstein 
Respectfully submitted: 
By: 
Robert D. ntton, ., Esq. 
Florida Bar No. 2 162 
[email protected] 
Michael J. Pike, Esq. 
Florida Bar No. 617296 
[email protected] 
Burman Critton Luther & Coleman, P.A. 
515 N. Flagler Drive, Suite 400 
West Palm Beach, FL 33401 
Telephone: 
(561) 842-2820 
Facsimile: 
(561)515-3148 
[email protected] 
Counsel for Defendant Jeffrey Epstein 
Case No. 08-80736-CV-MARRA 
P-011877 
EFTA00192923

U.S. Department of Justice 
United States Attorney 
Southern District of Florida 
5001 Australian Ave, Ste 400 
West Palm Reach, FL 33401 
(561) 820-8711 
Facsimile.• (561) 820.8777 
June 12, 2009 
DELIVERY BY HAND 
Jack A. Goldberger, Esq. 
Atterbury, Goldberger & Weiss, P.A. 
One Clearlake Centre, Suite 1400 
250 Australian Ave S. 
West Palm Beach, FL 33401-5015 
Re: 
Jeffrey Epstein 
Dear Mr. Goldberger: 
Pursuant to the terms of the Non-Prosecution Agreement, the United States Attorney's 
Office for the Southern District of Florida hereby provides you with notice that the United 
States Attorney has determined, based on reliable evidence, that Jeffrey Epstein has willfully 
violated one of the conditions of the Non-Prosecution Agreement. Specifically, on May 26, 
2009, Jeffrey Epstein, through his counsel, filed a "Motion to Dismiss the First Amended 
Complaipt or, in the Alternative, for a More Definite Statement," in the matter of Jane Doe 
No. 101 Jeffity Epstein, Court File No. 09-CV-80591-ICAM. "Jane Doe No. 101" was on 
the list provided to Mr. Epstein's attorneys of individuals whom the United States had 
identified as victims, as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2255, and "Jane Doe No. 101" has elected to 
proceed exclusively under 18 U.S.C. § 2255. By filing the Motion to Dismiss, Mr. Epstein 
is contesting liability and, therefore, has violated Term 8 of the Non-Prosecution Agreement. 
Gus! 
POI 187S 
EFTA00192924

JACK GOLDBERGER, ESQ. 
JUNE 12,2009 
PAGE 2 OF 2 
Based upon Mr. Epstein's breach of that term, the U.S. Attorney's Office has elected 
to terminate the Non-Prosecution Agreement and to investigate and prosecute Mr. Epstein 
and others for federal offenses. 
Sincerely, 
Jeffrey H. Sloman 
Acting United States Attorney 
By: 
A. Marie Villafana 
Assistant United States Attorney 
cc: 
Karen Atkinson, Chief, Northern Division 
Roy Black, Esq. (via electronic mail) 
Ca< Sta C4.$0736 CV-MARRA 
P-01379 
EFTA00192925

Dispoto, Mark (USAFLS) 
From: 
Sent: 
To: 
Cc: 
Subject: 
Carlton, Stephen (USAFLS) 
Wednesday, May 8, 2019 4:53 PM 
Acosta, Diana (USAFLS); 
Bella, Gabrielle (USAFLS); Cannon, Aileen (USAFLS); Coxless, Kelly (USAFLS); Funk 
Daniel (USAFLS); Gyires, Marton (USAFLS); Hem, Mara (USAFLS); Mazari, Jessica (USAFLS) [Contractor); Lineberger, 
Carmen (USAFLS); Porter, Michael (USAFLS) 
USAFLS-WPB 
Blue Cross contact 
A new Blue Cross rep. stopped by the office today, Omar Amador; here is his contact information. He is available to 
personally assist you 
on ANY problem you have with Blue Cross if you have a health issue that needs attention, or want to make sure your 
doctor is in network, etc.; 
he covers the area from Vero to Key West, and the sw coast of FLA also: He also reminded me that our coverage is 
nationwide, and he can help 
if you need to go out of state for any treatment for you or a family member. 
Florida Blue 41
In the pursuit of health 
Omar Amador 
Account Manager 
Federal Employee Program / Motors 
OmarAmaclor@bcbsfIcom 
8600 NW 36th Street 
Suite 800 
Miami, FL 33166 
Steve Carlton 
Chief, Ft. Pierce 
United States Attorney's Office 
S.D. Fla. 
(772) 293-0947 
Cell. (561) 398-7727 
C c44 
Tel 305.921.7023 
Toll Free 800.955.7635 
Ext. 17023 
Fax 904.301.1953 
EFTA00192926