EFTA00183935

privileged."). 
Under Florida law, closure of judicial records is warranted only under very 
limited circumstances. In particular, the party seeking closure must demonstrate 
that: 
1. 
restricting public access is necessary to prevent a serious and 
imminent threat to the administration of justice; 
2. 
no alternatives, other than a change of venue, would protect the 
defendant's right to a fair trial; and 
3. 
closure would be effective in protecting the rights of the accused, 
without being broader than necessary to accomplish this purpose. 
Miami Herald Publ'g Co.'. Lewis, 426 So. 2d 1, 6 (Fla. 1982). This test, as well 
as the standard announced in Barron'. Florida Freedom Newspapers, Inc., 531 So. 
2d 113 (Fla. 1988), was essentially codified in former Rule of Judicial 
Administration 2.051, now 2.420, which was applicable in both criminal and civil 
cases. Sarasota-Herald Tribune, 924 So. 2d at 11. 
In April 2007, the Florida Supreme Court adopted emergency amendments 
to Rule 2.420 in response to Florida media reports of hidden cases and secret 
dockets, a process that has come to be known as "super-sealing." In re 
Amendments to Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.420, 954 So. 2d 16 (Fla. 
2007). In adopting the interim rule, the Florida Supreme Court confirmed its 
commitment to safeguarding the public's constitutional right of access to court 
10 
EFTA00183975

records, which the Court held "must remain inviolate." Id. at 17. By its terms, 
Rule 2.420 does not apply to criminal cases; however, later this year the Supreme 
Court will consider amendments to the rule that essentially seek to apply the 
standards applicable in civil cases to criminal ones. See In re Amendments to 
Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.420, Case No. 07-2050 (Fla. 2007). In 
the circuit below, however, the new Rule 2.420 procedures have been in effect 
since September 29, 2008. (Supp.A.-2.) In addition, the sealing of the NPA 
violated principles of Florida law established long before the amendments to Rule 
2.420. Consequently, the unsealing of these documents was proper. 
1. Closure of the Non-Prosecution Agreement Improperly 
Occurred without a Motion, Notice, Hearing, or a Proper 
Order. 
The non-prosecution agreement was sealed pursuant to an agreed order 
dated July 2, 2008 (A-9.) At the time, Fifteenth Judicial Circuit Administrative 
Order 2.032 applied to requests for closure of court records in the lower court. 
(Supp.A.-3.) The order requires a motion, notice, and a hearing, none of which 
occurred in this case. (Id. at ¶¶ 1 — 3.) The order further provides that closure is 
proper only upon showing that the factors set forth in Lewis have been met (Id. at 
4) and that "[t]tle reasons supporting sealing the file must be stated with specificity 
in the order sealing the court record" (IA at ¶ 5), neither of which occurred in this 
11 
EFTA00183976

case. 
Contrary to Petitioner's assertion (Petition at 13) neither this rule, nor the 
common law of Florida, nor the Florida constitution contemplates sua sponte 
closure of court records upon simple request of the Court or any party. Nor was 
the closure, in fact, sua sponte, as Epstein himself requested closure (A-7 at p. 40, 
II. 7-9.) and admittedly filed the NPA in the court file under seal pursuant to an 
agreed order (A-18 at p. 11, II. 22-23). The agreed order (A-9) contains none of 
the findings required by Lewis or paragraph 5 of the Administrative Order. The 
closure order is invalid and was properly vacated. 
2. Closure of the Addendum Improperly Occurred without any 
Procedures to Protect the Right of Access at all. 
With respect to the sealing of the addendum to the non-prosecution 
agreement, no procedures were put in place at all. The original non-prosecution 
agreement was attached to the July 2, 2008 agreed order, which allowed to be filed 
under seal the "attached document" only. (A-9.) It appears from the record that 
the addendum — which was not attached to the July 2, 2008 order but was filed six 
weeks later — was simply filed and accepted under seal without any order allowing 
for closure. Closure of the addendum was thus improper on that basis as well. The 
trial court properly unsealed these documents. 
12 
EFTA00183977

B. 
No Basis Exists for Current Closure of the Non-prosecution 
Agreement or Its Addendum. 
After the Post intervened, at a June 10, 2009 hearing on the issue of closure, 
the trial court asked Epstein's counsel about the Post's motion (A-11) specifically. 
Epstein's counsel replied: 
If the Post's position is the public has a right to acc — access this then 
there is a procedure in place and ultimately the Court has to conduct a 
hearing and do a balancing test where you look at whether there is 
some compelling government interest and that's going to require an 
evidentiary hearing. So I have no great objection to filing the Request 
for Closure and then having a hearing in front of the Court. 
(Supp.A.-1 at p. 3,1. 22 — p. 4,1. 5.) Importantly, Petitioner's counsel did not 
assert that he had complied with these requirements, but that he would. The Court 
reset the hearing for June 25, 2009. 
Petitioner filed a Motion to Make Court Records Confidential (A-13) on 
June 11, 2009. In it, Epstein cited four reasons the NPA should remain under seal: 
1. to prevent a serious and imminent threat to the administration ofjustices; 2. to 
protect a compelling government interest; 3. to avoid substantial injury to innocent 
8 This assertion apparently has been abandoned by Petitioner, because his 
petition asserts that he has asserted three bases for confidentiality, and does not 
include this basis. Accordingly, it will not be addressed, except to make note of 
the fact that Epstein has not at any point in this proceeding identified a threat to the 
administration of justice, much less a serious and imminent threat. 
13 
EFTA00183978

third parties; and 4. to avoid substantial injury to a party by disclosure of matters 
protected by a common law and privacy right, not generally inherent in these 
specific type of proceedings sought to be closed. (A-13 at ¶ 5.) The motion failed 
to explain how these interests were implicated, failed to address alternatives to 
closure, and failed to explain how closure would protect the interests. (A-13.) 
The lower court heard argument on June 25, 2009. The United States 
Attorneys' Office was provided notice of the hearing, but chose not to appear. (A-
18 at p. 7, 11. 10-14.) In fact, the U.S. Attorney's Office has taken no position on 
this matter throughout the lower court proceedings and specifically informed 
counsel fore. that it had no position (A-18 at p. 7,11. 10-14.) At that hearing, 
the Court found that the proper procedures to initially seal the records were not 
followed and then heard argument from Epstein's counsel on his June 11, 2009 
motion (A-13). Epstein's counsel consented to that procedure. (A-18 at p. 9,11. 16 
-18.) The Judge held that neither the State, nor the U.S. Government, nor Epstein 
had shown why the NPA ought to remain confidential and ordered the records 
unsealed.9 (A-16.) 
It is important to note that the State Attorney's Office appeared at the hearing 
for the limited purpose of objecting to the release of minor victim's names, which 
turned out to be a non-issue because the Court, having reviewed the documents in 
camera, determined that no victim's names were included in the documents (A-19 
at p. 21,11. 14-19.) The federal government, as mentioned above, took no position 
(Footnote continued on next page) 
14 
EFTA00183979

The trial court did not depart from the essential requirements of law in 
unsealing the NPA. Administrative Order of the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit 2.303 
applies to Petitioner's June 11, 2009 request to seal the records in this case. 
(Supp.A.-2.) That administrative order — consistent with Lewis and its progeny — 
applies Rule 2.420's standards to requests for closure of records in criminal 
proceedings in the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit. Any order authorizing closure must 
contain findings that one of the interests set forth in Rule of Judicial 
Administration 2.420(c)(9)(A) is met and that closure is no broader than necessary 
to protect that interest. (Supp.A.-2 at ¶ 4.); see also Lewis, 426 So. 2d at 3. 
Motions seeking closure must include a "signed certification by the party making 
the request that the motion is being made in good faith and is supported by a sound 
factual and legal basis." (Supp.A.-2 at11 1.) Epstein's initial oral request for 
closure failed to comply with the requirements of then-applicable law, and he has 
never presented a sound factual or legal basis for present closure. Consequently, 
unsealing the documents was fully consistent with the essential requirements of 
law. 
and did not appear at any of the hearings on this matter. Nor has either agency 
appealed the lower court's decision. 
15 
EFTA00183980

I. Petitioner Cannot Identify a Rule 2.420(c)(9) Interest that 
Warrants Closure. 
Though Epstein's belated written motion identified four interests set forth in 
Rule 2.420(c)(9) that purportedly warrant closure, he failed to explain — either in 
his motion or at the hearing — how any of them applied. Instead, Petitioner 
asserted closure was proper because these broad interests would be served by 
closure, principles of comity require closure, and because the records contain 
information protected from disclosure by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6. 
Even though Petitioner now attempts to craft his arguments around the interests set 
forth in Rule 2.420(c)(9), the trial court cannot be said to have departed from the 
essential requirements of the law in holding that Epstein's burden had not been 
met. 
Epstein's petition asserts that closure is necessary to protect a compelling 
government interest because, he claims, the U.S. Attorneys' Office — who has been 
notified of these proceedings and has taken no position whatsoever — has a 
compelling interest in having the confidentiality provision of its contract with Mr. 
Epstein honored. See Petition at 15. Assuming such a provision exists (the Post 
has not seen the document), Petitioner is in no position to assert a compelling 
interest on the government's behalf, given its decision to take no position on the 
matter. If such an interest exists, the U.S. government is the party to assert it, and 
16 
EFTA00183981

it has specifically failed to do so. The trial court did not depart from the essential 
requirements of law in holding that Petitioner failed to demonstrate a compelling 
interest in closure. 
Epstein next asserts that closure is warranted to protect the interest of 
"innocent third parties" and identifies those third parties as Mr. Epstein's co-
conspirators. (Petition at 15). Again, Mr. Epstein lacks standing to assert the 
interests of third parties. Dol. Museum of Science and History of Jacksonville, 
Inc., Case No. 92-32567, 1994 WL 741009 (Fla. 7th Jud. Cir. June 8, 1994) 
(plaintiff lacks standing to assert privacy interest of third party, minor victims of 
sexual assault by defendant's former employee, who had been convicted) (copy 
attached at Supp.A.-4). In addition, even if the third parties Mr. Epstein identifies 
— his purported co-conspirators — were before the Court, they would have no 
privacy interest in matters pertaining to their criminal conduct. Post-Newsweek 
Stations, Florida, Inc.,. Doe, 612 So. 2d 549 (Fla. 1992) (Does, whose names 
were implicated in criminal prostitution scheme, had no right to privacy by virtue 
of their participation in a crime and thus their names could not be redacted from 
records provided to the public). Thus, the trial judge did not depart from the 
essential requirements of law in finding insufficient third-party interests to justify 
closure. 
17 
EFTA00183982

The third interest Epstein seeks to invoke is his own right to privacy. See 
Petition at 15. While Epstein actually does have standing to assert his own right to 
privacy, Florida law is clear that closure is only proper to protect a "substantial 
injury to a party by disclosure of matters protected by a common law or privacy 
right not generally inherent in the specific type of proceeding sought to be closed." 
Fla. R. Jud. Admin. 2.420(c)(9)(A)(vi) (emphasis added). Epstein argues 
disclosure of a plea agreement is not generally inherent in a state court plea hearing 
See Petition at 16. That argument is absurd. Of course Epstein's plea agreement is 
generally inherent in his criminal prosecution. It is the very reason that 
prosecution ended, and as the lower court recognized in accepting the plea, it was a 
"significant inducement" to Petitioner to take the state's deal. (A-7 at p. 39, II. 19-
21.; p. 40,11. 10-13.) 
Moreover, Florida's constitutional right to privacy is expressly subordinate 
to the rights of Floridians to access the records of their government. To wit, 
Article I, § 23, which sets forth the right to privacy, further provides: "[t]his 
section shall not be construed to limit the public's right of access to public records 
and meetings as provided by law." Fla. Const. Art. I, § 23. As the Florida 
Supreme Court has recognized, the privacy amendment has not been construed to 
protect names and addresses contained in public records. Post Newsweek, 612 So. 
18 
EFTA00183983

2d at 552. The trial court, having reviewed the NPA in camera, certainly had an 
opportunity to assess whether a privacy interest not inherent in his criminal 
prosecution for felony solicitation of children for prostitution is implicated by the 
NPA. It cannot in good faith be argued that the trial court departed from the 
essential requirements of law in determining that no such privacy interest was 
implicated. 
2. The Federal Court's Decisions in Case No. 08-80736 
(S.D. Fla. 2008) Did Not Preclude the Lower Court's 
Orders Unsealing the NPA.1°
Nor did the trial court's rejection of Petitioner's comity argument depart 
from the essential requirements of law. In the Southern District of Florida, one of 
the minor victims of Epstein filed a Petition for Enforcement of Crime Victim's 
Rights Acts (A-1)." The victim also asked the federal court to allow her to share 
the NPA with third parties (A-3). Judge Marra denied the motion, finding — as the 
U.S. Government had argued (A-4) — that the NPA was not a record of the federal 
court. (A-6) ("First, as respondent points out, the Agreement was not filed in this 
10 The Post adopts and incorporates M.'s arguments and analysis on this issue 
in addition to the arguments it sets forth herein. 
" The Post notes that A-3 through A-5 were not part of the record below. If the 
Court is inclined to consider these federal court pleadings, then in fairness it must 
consider those related pleadings which are attached hereto as Supp.A.-5 through 
Supp.A.-7 of the Post's Supplemental Appendix. 
19 
EFTA00183984

case, under seal or otherwise."). The federal court also declined to provide any 
relief from restrictions on the parties' use and dissemination of the discovery 
document without prejudice. (A-6 at p.2.) 
Petitioner argues that the Post should be required to seek relief in Judge 
Marra's court. He mischaracterizes the nature of the proceedings there. There is 
no document to unseal in Judge Marra's court. The NPA is not a record of that 
court, and thus any effort by the Post to obtain access to the NPA there would be 
futile, and any order requiring it be unsealed by the lower court herein does not 
conflict with any decision of the federal court. (A-16 at p.3.) 
In fact, when Judge Marra has been asked to seal records of his court that 
quote the NPA, he has refused to do so, and has required such records to be filed in 
the public court file (Supp.A.-5 through Supp.A.-7)'2 Thus, though the NPA is not 
a record of the federal court, the federal court has rejected attempts to file portions 
of it under seal. As a result, portions of the NPA appear in the public court file in 
12 Page 4 of Supp.A.-5 and paragraph 5 of Supp.A.-6, both publicly on file in the 
federal court, quote from the NPA. In addition, Epstein's own lawyers quoted 
extensively from the NPA in seeking to stay one of the civil suits against him. (A-
11 at ¶ 6; A-18, p. 35,1. 18 - p. 36,arporating 
by reference Supp.A.-5 
through Supp.A-6 and Supp.A.-7 
I. Epstein, Case No. 08-cv-80811 (S.D. 
Fla. 2008) at Dkt. 33 pp. 2-5)).) 
20 
EFTA00183985

the federal civil litigation against Epstein. (Supp.A-5 at p. 4; Supp.A.-6 at ¶ 5; 
Supp.A.-7 at pp. 2-5.) The proverbial cat is already out of the bag. 
Notwithstanding, the NPA is a record of this lower court. The lower court 
did not enter an order conflicting with Judge Marra's rulings (A-16 at p. 3 — 
expressly noting lack of conflict with Judge Marra's orders) and did not depart 
from the essential requirements of law in unsealing the NPA. 
3. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6 Did Not Preclude 
the Lower Court's Orders Unsealing the NPA.13
Finally, unsealing the NPA did not conflict with federal law. Records 
available under state law are sealed by federal law only when federal law 
absolutely conflicts with state law and requires confidentiality of the records. The 
Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, Art. VI, U.S. Const., comes 
into play only when federal law clearly requires the records to be closed, and the 
state is clearly subject to its provisions. E.g., Wallace I. Guzman, 687 So. 2d 
1351, 1353 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997) (exemptions to federal Freedom of Information 
Act do not apply to state agencies); Hous. Auth. of the City of Daytona Beach'. 
Gomillion, 639 So. 2d 117 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994) (Federal Privacy Act does not 
exempt from disclosure records of housing authority which are open for inspection 
13 The Post adopts and incorporates 
's arguments and analysis on this issue 
in addition to the arguments it sets forth herein. 
21 
EFTA00183986

under Florida Public Records Act); Fla. Sugar Cane League, Inc. I Fla. Dept. of 
Envtl. Reg., Case No. 91-2108 (Fla. 2d Jud. Cir. Sept. 20, 1991), per curiam 
affirmed, 606 So. 2d 1267 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992 (documents received by state 
agency in course of settlement negotiations to resolve federal lawsuit and 
confidential settlement agreement with U.S. Department of Justice open to 
inspection because federal law did not clearly require confidentiality) (Supp.A.-8.) 
Federal law imposes no such preemption of the Florida constitution and common 
law in this case. 
In particular, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e) does not restrict 
access to the NPA. Federal Rule 6(e) restrains grand jurors, court reporters, 
government attorneys, interpreters and the like from disclosing matters occurring 
before the grand jury. Petitioner — apparently the former target of the grand jury — 
is none of these persons. His actions in filing the NPA under seal do not implicate 
Rule 6(e) no matter what information the NPA contains. The lower court's actions 
in unsealing the NPA likewise do not implicate Rule 6, because the lower court 
also is not restrained by Rule 6(e). 
Moreover, the information contained in the NPA does not constitute 
"matters occurring before the grand jury" within the meaning of Rule 6. The 
secrecy rule is limited to such matters for the purpose of "preventing targets of an 
22 
EFTA00183987

investigation from fleeing or tampering with witnesses or grand jurors, 
encouraging witnesses to appear voluntarily and speak fully and frankly, avoiding 
damage to the reputation of subjects or targets of the investigation who are not 
indicted, and encouraging grand jurors to investigate suspected crimes without 
inhibition and engage in unrestricted deliberations." Lockhead Martin Corp... 
Boeing Co., 393 F. Supp. 2d 1276, 1279 (M.D. Ha. 2005). The rule aims to 
"prevent disclosure of the way in which information was presented to the grand 
jury, the specific questions and inquiries of the grand jury, the deliberations and 
vote of the grand jury, the targets upon which the grand jury's suspicion focuses, 
and specific details of what took place before the grand jury." In re Grand Jury 
Investigation of Ven-Fuel, 441 F. Supp. 1299, 1302-03 (M.D. Fla. 1977). In other 
words, Rule 6 is implicated if disclosure would reveal secret inner workings of the 
grand jury. U.S. . Rosen, 471 F. Supp. 2d 651, 654 (E.D. Va. 2007). 
Disclosure of details of a government investigation that is independent of a 
parallel grand jury proceeding does not violate Rule 6. Id. Statements by a 
prosecutor's office about its own investigation, therefore, are not covered by the 
secrecy rule. Id. at 655. Likewise, the mere mention of other targets of an 
investigation does not implicate the grand jury secrecy rule. E.Q., In re Interested 
Party, 530 F. Supp. 2d 136,140-42 (D.D.C. 2008) (government not prohibited by 
23 
EFTA00183988

Rule 6 from disclosing plea agreement and other materials); Doe f . Hammond, 502 
F. Supp. 2d 94, 99-101(D.D.C. 2007) (same). Moreover, "when the fact or 
document is sought for itself, independently, rather than because it was stated 
before or displayed to the grand jury, there is no bar of secrecy." In re Grand Jury 
Investigation of Ven-Fuel, 441 F. Supp. at 1304. Here, the Post seeks to review 
the NPA for its own intrinsic value, and not for the purpose of discerning what 
transpired before the grand jury now more than a year ago. It is clearly well within 
the public's right and interest to review the NPA, given the circumstances 
surrounding the investigation and prosecution of Petitioner as well as the civil 
claims by women who say Epstein sought to make them his child prostitutes. 
These facts clearly constitute a proper basis for unsealing these improperly sealed 
documents. 
Finally, and even assuming for a moment that the NPA contains grand jury 
information — which the Post doubts — when the grand jury's work has concluded, 
and the accused apprehended, the veil of secrecy no longer is necessary and safely 
may be lifted. In re Grand Jury Investigation of Ven-Fuel, 441 F. Supp. at 1303. 
Ilere, Petitioner has been convicted, and nothing in the record suggests the grand 
jury's work is ongoing. Consequently, no basis exists for finding that the trial 
court departed from the essential requirements of law. 
24 
EFTA00183989

CONCLUSION 
The trial court was correct in unsealing the non-prosecution agreement and 
its addendum. These materials were not properly sealed in the first instance. 
Moreover, Epstein has not and cannot provide any basis for closure at this juncture. 
The trial court did not depart from the essential requirements of law in unsealing 
the NPA. Its order should be affirmed, and the Post should be awarded its fees and 
costs and such other further relief as this Court deems proper. 
Respectfully submitted, 
THOMAS 
oCICERO & BRALO , PL 
D nna K. Shullman 
lorida Bar No.: 
James B. Lake 
Florida Bar No.: 
101 N.E. Third Avenue, Suite 1500 
Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301 
Telephone: 
Facsimile: 
Attorneys for The Palm Beach Post 
25 
EFTA00183990

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing has been 
furnished via U.S. Mail to: Hon. Jeffrey Colbath, Palm Beach County 
Courthouse, 205 N. Dixie Highway, Room 11F, West Palm Beach, FL 33401; R. 
Alexander Acosta, United States Attorney's Office - Southern District, 500 S. 
Australian Ave., Ste. 400, West Palm Beach, FL 33401; Barbara Burns, Esq., 
State Attorney's Office - West Palm Beach, 401 North Dixie Highway, West Palm 
Beach, FL 33401; Jack Alan Goldberger, Esq., Atterbury Goldberger, et al., 250 
S. Australian Ave., Ste. 1400, West Palm Beach, FL 33401; Robert D. Critton, 
Esq., Burman, Critton, Luther & Coleman, 515 N. Flagler Drive, Suite 400, West 
Palm Beach, FL 33401; 
Esq., 501 S. Flagler Drive, Suite 
503, West Palm Beach, FL 33401-5913; Spencer T. Kuvin, Esq., Leopold-Kuvin, 
P.A., 2925 PGA Boulevard, Suite 200, Palm Beach Gardens, FL 33410; and 
Bradley J. Edwards, Esq. and William J. Berger, Esq., Rothstein Rosenfeldt 
Adler, 401 East Las Olas Blvd., Suite 1650, Fort Lauderdale, FL 33394 on this 10th
day of July, 2009. 
Att 
ey 
26 
EFTA00183991

CERTIFICATE OF TYPE. SIZE AND STYLE 
Counsel for Petitioners certifies that this Petition is typed in 14 point 
(proportionately spaced) Times New Roman. 
, 
27 
EFTA00183992

- Not an Official Document 
Page 1 of II 
ReporLSeJection Criteria 
Case ID: 
Docket Start Date: 
Docket Ending Date: 
Case Description 
Case ID: 
Case Caption: 
Division: 
Filing Date: 
Court: 
Location: 
Jury: 
Type: 
Status: 
502008CF009381AXXXMB 
502008CF009381AXXXMB 
EPSTEIN, JEFFREY E 
W - COLBATH 
Thursday , June 26th, 2008 
CF -FELONY 
MB - MAIN BRANCH 
N-Non Jury 
CF -FELONY 
CLSD - CLOSED CASE 
Related Cases 
No related cases were found. 
Case Event Schedule 
No case events were found. 
Case Parties 
Seq Assoc Expn 
Date 
Type 
ID 
Name 
JUDGE 
DEFENDANT 
COLBATH, JUDGE 
JEFFREY 
GOLDBERGER , ESQ, 
JACK A 
3 30-JUN-
2008 
ATTORNEY 
Aliases: 
Aliases: 
Aliases: 
none 
none 
none 
Docket Entries
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EFTA00183993

- Not an Official Document 
Page 2 of I I 
Docket 
Number 
Docket Type 
Book and Page No. 
Attached Ti:-. 11
0000C - 
RPT 
CASE INITIATED TIMELINESS 
Filing Date: 
26-JUN-2008 
Filing Party: 
Disposition Amount: 
Docket Text: 
none. 
1 
INFO - INFORMATION SHEET 
Filing Date: 
26-JUN-2008 
Filing Party: 
EPSTEIN, JEFFREY E 
Disposition Amount: 
Docket Text: 
ARISES FROM 2006CF009454AXX 
1 A 
AREC - ARREST RECORD 
Filing Date: 
J 26-JUN-2008 
Filing Party: 
EPSTEIN, JEFFREY E 
Disposition Amount: 
Docket Text: 
none. 
i 
1 B 
TEXT - SEE 
DESCRIPTION 
DOCUMENT 
Filing Date: 
26-JUN-2008 
Filing Party: 
EPSTEIN, JEFFREY E 
Disposition Amount: 
Docket Text: 
ROUGH ARREST - NO PROBABLE CAUSE FILED 
1 C 
WOAR - WAIVER OF ARRAIGNMENT 
Filing Date: 
26-JUN-2008 
Filing Party: 
EPSTEIN, JEFFREY E 
Disposition Amount: 
Docket Text: 
FILED BY JACK GOLDBERG 
EVSCH 
SCHEDULED 
- HEARING EVENT 
Filing Date: 
27-JUN-2008 
Filing Party: 
!Disposition Amount: 
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EFTA00183994