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348 F.3d 16, 62 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 1032 
(Cite as: 348 F.3d 16) 
der appealed from, vacate the contempt 
citation, and remand to the district court for 
further proceedings not inconsistent here-
with. 
FN8. In view of the fact that the at-
torney-client privilege remains in-
tact, we need not address the work-
product doctrine. Nor do we need to 
reach the government's contention 
that the inadequate detail on the 
privilege logs resulted in a waiver. 
If this is a line of attack that the 
government wishes to pursue, the 
district court should consider it in 
the first instance. 
Reversed. 
C.A.1 (Mass.),2003. 
In re Keeper of Records (Grand Jury Sub-
poena Addressed to XYZ Corp.) 
348 F.3d 16, 62 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 1032 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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Page 1 of 27 
Westlaw. 
95 S.Ct. 2160 
422 U.S. 225, 95 S.Ct. 2160, 45 L.Ed.2d 141, 20 Fed.R.Serv.2d 547 
(Cite as: 422 U.S. 225, 95 S.O. 2160) 
Supreme Court of the United States 
Reversed. 
UNITED ST 
ES, Petitioner, 
Robert Lee NOBLES. 
No. 74-634. 
Argued April 23, 1975. 
Decided June 23, 1975. 
Defendant was convicted in the United 
States District Court for the Central Dis-
trict of California of bank robbery and the 
Court of Appeals, 501 F.2d 146, affumed 
in part, reversed in part, and remanded, and 
certiorari was granted. The Supreme Court, 
Mr. Justice Powell, held that refusal to per-
mit defense investigator to testify about his 
interviews 
with 
prosecution 
witnesses 
when defense counsel stated he did not in-
tend to produce investigator's report for 
submission to be prosecution for inspection 
at completion of the investigator's testi-
mony did not violate defendant's Fifth 
Amendment privilege against compulsory 
self-incrimination; that criminal discovery 
rule is addressed only to pretrial discovery 
and imposed no constraint on district 
court's power to condition impeachment 
testimony of defense witness on production 
of relevant portions of his report; that the 
qualified pnvilege derived from the attor-
ney work-product doctrine was waived 
with respect to matters covered in investig-
ator's testimony and was not available to 
prevent disclosure of the report; and that it 
was within the court's discretion to assure 
that jury would hear the full testimony of 
the investigator rather than a truncated por-
tion favorable to defendant, and court's 
preclusion sanction did not deprive defend-
ant of rights to compulsory process and 
cross-examination. 
Page 1 
Mr. Justice White and Mr. Justice 
Rehnquist joined in parts of the court's 
opinion. 
Opinion following reversal, 522 F.2d 
1274. 
Mr. Justice White filed an opinion con-
curring in the judgment and in parts of the 
court's opinion, in which Mr. Justice 
Rehnquist joined. 
Mr. Justice Douglas took no part in the 
decision of the case. 
West Headnotes 
111 Criminal Law 110 C=1028 
110 Criminal Law 
110XXIV Review 
110XXIV(E) Presentation and Re-
servation in Lower Court of Grounds of 
Review 
110XXIV(E)1 In General 
110k1028 k. Presentation of 
Questions in General. Most Cited Cases 
That testimony of defense investigator 
regarding statements previously obtained 
from prosecution witnesses would not have 
constituted an impeachment of statements 
of one witness within contemplation of tri-
al court's order precluding investigator's 
testimony unless copy of investigator's re-
port was submitted to prosecution for in-
spection at completion of investigator's 
testimony could not be urged as ground for 
reversal of trial court's order where defense 
counsel failed to develop at trial the issue 
whether the testimony constituted impeach-
ment. 
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EFTA00178008

95 S.Ct. 2160 
422 U.S. 225, 95 S.Ct. 2160, 45 L.Ed.2d 141, 20 Fed.R.Serv.2d 547 
(Cite as: 422 U.S. 225, 95 S.Ct. 2160) 
compulsory self-incrimination is a personal 
one and adheres basically to the person, not 
to information that may incrimmate him. 
U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 5. 
[7] Witnesses 410 C=297(1) 
410 Witnesses 
41011I Examination 
410111(D) Privilege of Witness 
410 97 Self-Incrimination 
410k297(1) 
k. 
In 
General. 
Most Cited Cases 
Constitutional guarantee against self-
incrimination protects only against forced 
individual disclosure of a testimonial or 
communicative character. U.S.C.A.Const. 
Amend. 5. 
181 Criminal Law 110 €393(1) 
110 Criminal Law 
1103CV11 Evidence 
110XVII(I) Competency in General 
110k393 
Compelling 
Self-
Incrimination 
110k393(1) 
k. 
In 
General. 
Most Cited Cases 
Fact that statements of key prosecution 
witnesses were elicited by a defense invest-
igator on defendant's behalf did not convert 
statements into defendant's personal com-
munications, and Fifth Amendment priv-
ilege against self-incrimination was not vi-
olated by 'order excluding testimony of the 
investigator as to statements obtained from 
the witnesses unless investigator's contem-
poraneous report was submitted to prosecu-
tion for inspection at completion of the in-
vestigator's 
testimony. 
Fed.Rules 
Crim.Proc. 
rule 
16, 
18 
U.S.C.A.; 
U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 5. 
191 Criminal Law 110 C=393(1) 
Page 3 of 27 
Page 3 
110 Criminal Law 
110XV11 Evidence 
110XVII(1) Competency in General 
110k393 
Compelling 
Self-
Incrimination 
110k393(1) 
k. 
In 
General. 
Most Cited Cases 
Fifth 
Amendment privilege against 
compulsory self-incrimination, being per-
sonal to the defendant, does not extend to 
the testimony or statements of third parties 
called as witnesses at trial. U.S.C.A.Const. 
Amend. 5. 
(10) Criminal Law 110 C:=661 
110 Criminal Law 
110X3C Trial 
110XX(C) Reception of Evidence 
1101(661 k. Necessity and Scope 
of Proof. Most Cited Cases 
Fact that provision in criminal discov-
ery rule, imposing duty to notify opposing 
counsel or court of additional materials 
previously requested or inspected that are 
subject to discovery or inspection under the 
rule, may have some effect on parties' con-
duct during trial does not convert rule into 
a general limitation on court's inherent 
power to control evidentiary matters. 
Fed.Rules Crim.Proc. rules 16, 16(a)(2), (b, 
c, g), 18 U.S.C.A. 
1111 Criminal Law 110 €=.661 
110 Criminal Law 
110XX Trial 
110XX(C) Reception of Evidence 
1101(661 k. Necessity and Scope 
of Proof. Most Cited Cases 
The incorporation of the Jencks Act 
limitation on pretrial right of discovery 
provided by cnminal rule does not convert 
the rule into a general limitation on the trial 
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EFTA00178009

95 S.Ct. 2160 
422 U.S. 225, 95 S.Ct. 2160, 45 L.Ed.2d 141, 20 Fed.R.Serv.2d 547 
(Cite as: 422 U.S. 225, 95 S.Ct. 2160) 
110XX Trial 
110XX(A) Preliminary Proceedings 
110k627.5 Discovery Prior to and 
Incident to Trial 
110k627.5(6) 
k. 
Work 
Product. Most Cited Cases 
Privilege 
derived 
from 
the 
work 
product doctrine is not absolute but may be 
waived. Fed.Rules Crim.Proc. rule 16(b, c), 
18 U.S.C.A.; Fed.Rules Civ.Proc. rule 
26(bX3), 28 U.S.C.A. 
1181 Criminal Law 110 €=627.5(6) 
110 Criminal Law 
110XX Trial 
110XX(A) Preliminary Proceedings 
1101(627.5 Discovery Prior to and 
Incident to Trial 
110k627.5(6) 
k. 
Work 
Product. Most Cited Cases 
Defense counsel, by electing to present 
as a witness investigator who had inter-
viewed key prosecution witnesses, waived 
work product privilege with respect to mat-
ters covered in investigator's testimony. 
Fed.Rules Crim.Proc. rule 16(b, c), 18 
U.S.C.A.; 
Fed.Rules 
Civ.Proc. 
rule 
26(bX3), 28 U.S.C.A. 
[19] Criminal Law 110 €=.627.5(6) 
110 Criminal Law 
110XX Trial 
110XX(A) Preliminary Proceedings 
110k627.5 Discovery Prior to and 
Incident to Trial 
110k627.5(6) 
k. 
Work 
Product. Most Cited Cases 
Witnesses 410 C=271(1) 
410 Witnesses 
4101I1 Examination 
410III(B) Cross-Examination 
Page 5 of 27 
Page 5 
410k271 Cross-Examination as to 
Writings 
410k271(1) 
k. 
In 
General. 
Most Cited Cases 
When counsel necessarily makes use 
throughout trial of notes, documents and 
other internal materials prepared to present 
adequately his client's case and relies on 
the matenals in examining witnesses, there 
normally is no waiver of work product 
privilege, but where counsel attempts to 
make a testimonial use of these materials 
the normal rules of evidence come into 
play with respect to cross-examination and 
production 
of 
documents. 
Fed.Rules 
Crim.Proc. rule 16(b, c), 18 U.S.C.A.; 
Fed.Rules Civ.Proc. rule 26(b)(3), 28 
U.S.C.A. 
[20] Criminal Law 110 €=.627.5(6) 
110 Criminal Law 
110XX Trial 
110XX(A) Preliminary Proceedings 
1101(627.5 Discovery Prior to and 
Incident to Trial 
110k627.5(6) 
k. 
Work 
Product. Most Cited Cases 
Defendant can no more advance work 
product doctrine to sustain a unilateral 
testimonial use of work product materials 
than he could elect to testify in his own be-
half and thereafter assert his Fifth Amend-
ment privilege to resist cross-examination 
on matters reasonably related to those 
brought 
out 
in 
direct 
examination. 
U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 5. 
[21] Criminal Law 110 4>=1852 
110 Criminal Law 
110XXX1 Counsel 
110XXXI(B) Right of Defendant to 
Counsel 
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Page 7 of 27 
95 S.Ct. 2160 
422 U.S. 225, 95 S.Ct. 2160, 45 L.Ed.2d 141, 20 Fed.R.Serv.2d 547 
(Cite as: 422 U.S. 225, 95 S.Ct. 2160) 
of investigator's testimony was proper 
method of assuring compliance with order 
and did not deprive defendant of rights to 
compulsory process and cross-examination. 
U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 6. 
124] Witnesses 410 ti>=2(1) 
410 Witnesses 
4101 In General 
410k2 Right of Accused to Compuls-
ory Process 
410k2(I) k. In General. Most 
Cited Cases 
Sixth Amendment right to compulsory 
process does not confer right to present 
testimony free from the legitimate demands 
of the adversarial system and is not a justi-
fication for presentation of what might 
have been a half-truth. U.S.C.A.Const. 
Amend. 6. 
1251 Witnesses 410 €=,391 
410 Witnesses 
410IV Credibility and Impeachment 
410IV(D) Inconsistent Statements by 
Witness 
410k390 Competency of Evid-
ence of Inconsistent Statements in General 
410k391 k. Oral Statements, 
and Examination of Impeaching Witnesses. 
Most Cited Cases 
Fact that trial court excluded testimony 
of defense investigator in advance when 
defense counsel stated he would not make 
investigator's report available for inspec-
tion at conclusion of investigator's testi-
mony, rather than receive the investigator's 
testimony and thereafter charge jury to dis-
regard it when counsel refused to produce 
the report, had no constitutional signific-
ance. 
1261 Criminal Law 110 4
483 
Page 7 
110 Criminal Law 
110XVII Evidence 
110XVIIM Opinion Evidence 
110k482 Examination of Experts 
110k483 k. In General. Most 
Cited Cases 
Criminal Law 110 €=,1152.19(7) 
110 Criminal Law 
110)CCIV Review 
110XXIV(N) Discretion of Lower 
Court 
110k1152 Conduct of Trial in 
General 
110k1152.19 Counsel 
110k1152.19(7) 
k. 
Argu-
ments and Statements by Counsel. Most 
Cited Cases 
(Formerly 110k1154) 
Criminal Law 110 C=.1153.12(3) 
110 Criminal Law 
110XXIV Review 
110XXIV(N) Discretion of Lower 
Court 
110k1153 Reception and Admiss-
ibility of Evidence 
110k1153.12 
Opinion 
Evid-
ence 
110k1153.12(3) k. Admiss-
ibility. Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 110k1153(1)) 
Criminal Law 110 4
,2063 
110 Criminal Law 
110XXXI Counsel 
110XXXI(F) Arguments and State-
ments by Counsel 
110k2061 Control of Argument 
by Court 
110k2063 
k. 
Discretion of 
Court in Controlling Argument. Most Cited 
Cases 
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EFTA00178011

95 S.Ct. 2160 
422 U.S. 225, 95 S.Ct. 2160, 45 L.Ed.2d 141, 20 Fed.R.Serv.2d 547 
(Cite as: 422 U.S. 225, 95 S.Ct. 2160) 
ness, waived the privilege with respect to 
matters covered in his testimony. Pp. 
2169-2171. 
5. It was within the District Court's dis-
cretion to assure that the jury would hear 
the investigator's full testimony rather than 
a truncated portion favorable to respond-
ent, and the court's ruling, contrary to re-
spondent's contention, did not deprive him 
of the Sixth Amendment rights to compuls-
ory process and cross-examination. That 
Amendment does not confer the right to 
present testimony free from the legitimate 
demands of the adversarial system and can-
not be invoked as a justification for 
presenting what might have been a half-
truth. Pp. 2171-2172. 
501 F.2d 146, reversed. 
Paul L. Friedman; Washington, D.C., for 
petitioner. 
Nicholas R. Allis, Los Angeles, Cal., for 
respondent. 
*227 Mr. Justice POWELL delivered the 
opinion of the Court. 
In a criminal trial, defense counsel 
sought to impeach the credibility of key 
prosecution witnesses by testimony of a 
defense investigator regarding statements 
previously obtained from the witnesses by 
the investigator. The question presented 
here is whether in these circumstances a 
federal trial court may compel the defense 
to reveal the relevant portions of the in-
vestigator's report for the prosecution's use 
in cross-examining him. The United States 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit con-
cluded that it cannot. 501 F.2d 146. We 
w! anted certiorari, 419 U.S. 1120 95 S.Ct. 
801, 42 L.Ed.2d 819 (1975), and now re-
verse. 
Page 9 of 27 
Page 9 
I 
Respondent was tried and convicted on 
charges arising from an armed robbery of a 
federally insured bank. The only signific-
ant evidence linking him to the crime was 
the identification testimony of two wit-
nesses, a bank teller and a salesman who 
was in the bank during_ the robbery.Thl 
Respondent offered an alibi but, as the 
Court of Appeals recognized, 501 F.2d, at 
150, his strongest defense centered around 
attempts to discredit these eyewitnesses. 
Defense efforts to impeach them gave rise 
to the events that led to this decision. 
FN1. The only other evidence intro-
duced against respondent was a 
statement made at the time of arrest 
in which he denied that he was 
Robert Nobles and subsequently 
stated that he knew that the FBI had 
been looking for him. 
**2165 In the course of preparing re-
spondent's defense, an investigator for the 
defense interviewed both witnesses and 
preserved the essence of those conversa-
tions in a written report. When the wit-
nesses testified for the prosecution, re-
spondent's counsel relied on the report in 
conducting their cross-examination. Coun-
sel asked the bank *228 teller whether he 
recalled having told the investigator that he 
had seen only the back of the man he iden-
tified as respondent. The witness replied 
that he did not remember making such a 
statement. He was allowed, despite defense 
counsel's initial objection, to refresh his re-
collection by referring to a portion of the 
investigator's report. The prosecutor also 
was allowed to see briefly the relevant por-
tion of the reportna The witness there-
after testified that although the report in-
dicated that he told the investigator he had 
seen only respondent's back, he in fact had 
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95 S.Ct. 2160 
422 U.S. 225, 95 S.Ct. 2160, 45 L.Ed.2d 141, 20 Fed.R.Serv.2d 547 
(Cite as: 422 U.S. 225, 95 S.Ct. 2160) 
ent does not, and in view of the fail-
ure to develop the issue at trial 
could not, urge this as a ground for 
reversal. Nor does respondent main-
tain that the initial disclosure of the 
bank teller's statement sufficed to 
satisfy the court's order. We there-
fore consider each of the two al-
leged statements in the report to be 
impeaching statements that would 
have been subject to disclosure if 
the investigator had testified about 
them. 
**2166 The Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit while acknowledging that the 
trial court's ruling constituted a `very lim-
ited and seemingly judicious restriction,' 
501 F.2d, at 151, nevertheless considered it 
versible *230 error. Citing United States 
Wright, 160 U.S.App.D.C. 57, 68, 489 
.2d 1181, 1192 (1973), the court found 
that the Fifth Amendment prohibited the 
disclosure condition imposed in this case. 
The court further held that Fed.Rule 
Crim.Proc. 16, while framed exclusively in 
terms of pretrial discovery, precluded pro-
secutorial discovery at trial as well. 5
F.2d, at 157; accord, United States ff. 
Wright, supra, at 66-67, 489 F.2d, at 
1190-1191. In each respect, we think the 
court erred. 
II 
The dual aim of our criminal justice 
system is `that guilt shallt of escape or in-
nocence suffer,' Berger . United States, 
295 U.S. 78, 88, 55 S. t. 629, 633, 79 
L.Ed. 1314 (1935). To this end, we have 
placed our confidence in the adversary sys-
tem, entrusting to it the primary responsib-
ility for developing relevant facts on which 
a determination of guilt or Xmocence can 
be made. See United States I. Nixon, 418 
U.S. 683, 709, 94 S.Ct. 3090, 3108, 41 
Page 11 
L.Ed.2d 1039 O974); Williams /. Florida, 
399 U.S. 78, 82, 90 S.Ct. 189)1896, 26 
L.Ed.2d 446 (1970); Elkins 
. United 
States, 364 U.S. 206, 234, 80 .Ct. 1437, 
1454, 4 L.Ed.2d 1669 (1960) (Frankfurter, 
J., dissenting). 
[2][3][4] While the adversary system 
depends pnmarily on the parties for the 
presentation and exploration of relevant 
facts, the judiciary is not limited to the role 
of a reference or supervisor. Its compulsory 
processes stand available to require the 
presentation of evidence hucourt or before 
a grand jwy. United States R. Nixon, supra; 
Kastigar R. United States, 406 U.S 441, 
443444.
 S.Ct. 1653, 1f5-1616, 32 
L.Ed.2d 
(1972); Murphy . Waterfront 
Comm'n, 
8 U.S. 52, 93- 4, 84 S.Ct. 
1594, 1610-1611, 12 L.Ed.2d 678 (1964) 
(White, .J., concurring). 
we recently ob-
served in United StatesAs, Nixon, supra, 
418 U.S., at 709, 94 S.Ct., at 3108: 
'We have elected to employ, an ad-
versary system of criminal justice in which 
the parties contest all issues before a court 
of law. The need to develop all relevant 
facts in the adversary system is both *231 
fundamental and comprehensive. The ends 
of criminal justice would be defeated if 
judgments were to be founded on a partial 
or speculative presentation of the facts. The 
very integrity of the judicial system and 
public confidence in the system depend on 
full disclosure of all the facts, within the 
framework of the rules of evidence. To en-
sure that ?justice is done, it is imperative to 
the function of courts that compulsory pro-
cess be available for the production of 
evidence needed either by the prosecution 
or by the defense.' 
Decisions of this Court repeatedly have 
recognized the federal judiciary's inherent 
power to require the prosecution to pro-
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95 S.Ct. 2160 
422 U.S. 225, 95 S.Ct. 2160, 45 L.Ed.2d 141, 20 Fed.R.Serv.2d 547 
(Cite as: 422 U.S. 225, 95 S.Ct. 2160) 
case. 
*233 III 
A 
The Court of Appeals concluded that 
the Fifth Amendment renders criminal dis-
covery 'basically a one-way street.' 501 
F.2d at 154. Like many generalizations in 
constitutional law, this one is too broad. 
The relationship between the accused's 
Fifth Amendment rights and the prosecu-
tion's ability to discover materials at trial 
must be identified in a more discriminating 
manner. 
[6][7] The Fifth Amendment privilege 
against compulsory self-incrimination is an 
'intimate and personal one,' which protects 
'a private inner sanctum of individual feel-
ing and thought and proscribes state intru-
ion to extract self-condemnation.' Couch 
United States, 409 U.S. 322, 327, 93 
.Ct. 611: 415, 34 L.Ed.2d 548 (1973); see 
alio Bella 
United States, 417 US. 85, 
90-91, 94 S.Ct. 2179 
2184-2185, 
L.Ed.2d 678 (1974); United States r. 
White, 322 U.S. 694, 698, 64 S.Ct. 1248, 
1251, 88 L.Ed. 1542 (1944). As we noted 
in Couch, supra, 409 U.S., at 328, 93 5.0., 
at 616, the 'privilege is a personal priv-
ilege: it adheres basically to the person, not 
to information that may incriminate him.' FM
FN7. 'The purpose of the relevant 
part of the Fifth Amendment is to 
prevent 
compelled 
self-in-
crimination, not to protect private 
information. Testimony demanded 
of a witness may be very private in-
deed, but unless it is incriminating 
and protected by the Amendment or 
unless protected by one of the evid-
entiary privileges,"  must be dis-
closed.' Maness 
. Meyers, 419 
U.S. 449, 473-47444, 95 S.Ct. 584, 
Page 13 
598, 42 L.Ed.2d 574 (1975) (White, 
1, concurring in result). Moreover, 
the constitutional guarantee protects 
only against forced individual dis-
closure of a 'testimonial or tommu-
nicative nature' Schmerber . Cali-
fornia, 384 U.S. 757, 761, 6 S.Ct. 
1826, 1830, 16 L.Ed.24 908 (1966); 
see also United States'. Wade, 388 
U.S. 218, 222, 87 S.Ct. 1926 191, 
18 L.Ed.2d 1149 (1967); Gilbert . 
California, 388 U.S. 263, 87 S. . 
1951, 18 L.Ed.2d 1178 (1967). 
**2168 [8] In this instance disclosure 
of the relevant portions of the defense in-
vestigator's report would not impinge on 
the fundamental values protected by the 
Fifth Amendment. The court's order was 
limited to statements *234 allegedly made 
by third parties who were available as wit-
nesses to both the prosecution and the de-
fense. Respondent did not prepare the re-
port: and there is no suggestion that the 
portions subject to the disclosure order re-
flected any information that he conveyed to 
the investigator. The fact that these state-
ments of third parties were elicited by a de-
fense investigator on respondent's behalf 
does not convert them into respondent's 
personal communications. Requiring their 
production from the investigator therefore 
would not in any sense compel respondent 
to be a witness against himself or extort 
communications from him. 
[9] We thus conclude that the Fifth 
Amendment privilege against compulsory 
self-incrimination, being personal to the 
defendant, does not extend to the testimony 
or statements of third parties called as wit-
nesses at trial. The Court of Appeals' reli-
ance on this constitutional guarantee as a 
bar to the disclosure here ordered was mis-
placed. 
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Page 15 of 27 
95 S.Ct. 2160 
422 U.S. 225, 95 S.Ct. 2160, 45 L.Ed.2d 141, 20 Fed.R.Serv.2d 547 
(Cite as: 422 U.S. 225, 95 S.Ct. 2160) 
express a contrary intent. It only restricts 
the defendant's right of pretrial discovery 
in a manner that reconciles that provision 
with the Jencks Act limitation on the trial 
court's discretion over evidentiary matters. 
It certainly does not convert Rule 16 into a 
general limitation on the trial court's broad 
discretion as t evidentiary questions at tri-
al. Cf. Giles I. Maryland, 386 U.S. 66, 
101, 87 S.Ct. 793, 810, 17 L.Ed.2d 737 
(1967) (Fortes, J., concurring in judgment). 
?to We conclude, therefore, that Rule 16 
imposes no constraint on the District 
Court's power to condition the impeach-
ment testimony of respondent's witness on 
the production of the relevant portions of 
his investigative report. In extending the 
Rule into the trial context, the Court of Ap-
peals erred. 
FNIO. We note also that the com-
mentators 
who 
have 
considered 
Rule 16 have not suggested that it is 
directed to the court's control of 
evidentiary questions arising at tri-
al. See, e.g., Nakell, Crimmal Dis-
covery for the Defense and the Pro-
secution-the Developing Constitu-
tional 
Considerations, 
50 
N.C.L.Rev. 437, 494-514 (1972); 
Rezneck The New Federal Rules of 
Criminal' Procedure, 54 Geo.L.J. 
1276, 1279, 1282 n. 19 (1966); 
Note, Prosecutorial Discovery Un-
der 
Proposed 
Rule 
16, 
85 
Harv.L.Rev. 994 (1972). 
IV 
[13] Respondent contends further that 
the work-product doctrine exempts the in-
vestigator's report from disclosure at trial. 
While we agree that this doctrine applies to 
criminal litigation as well as civil, we find 
its protection unavailable in this case. 
Page 15 
nized by this Court of Hickman /. Taylor, 
329 U.S. 495, 67 S.Ct. 385, 91 .Ed. 451 
(1947), reflects the strong 'public policy 
underlying the orderly prosecution *237 
and defense of legal claims.' Id., at 510, 67 
S.Ct., at 393; see also id., at 514515? 67 
S.Ct., at 395-396 (Jackson, J., concumng). 
As the Court there observed: 
'Historically, a lawyer is an officer of 
the court and is bound to work for the ad-
vancement of justice while faithfully pro-
tecting the rightful interests of his clients. 
In performing his various duties, however, 
it is essential that a lawyer work with a cer-
tain degree of privacy, free from unneces-
sary intrusion by opposing parties and their 
counsel. 
r  .r
atiori of a cliegs 
case demands tliiflriTgs'etnbtr-irionna-
tionsdtsytathe-considers to be the relev-
arelevant4acts,._prcparnhis 
le a t 
cLplan his strategy without 
un ue and needless interference._
the —historicaLand_thenecc
aynt 
whit  ji lawyers act wi 
the framewcu'r6f
our system
note 
justice and to protect 
I 
t
 their cients 
erests. 
This work is reflected, of wino., in inter-
views, statements, memoranda, corres-
pondence, briefs, mental impressions, per-. 
sonal beliefs, and countless other tangible 
and intangible ways-aptly though roughly 
telrmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals in 
this case as the 'Work product of the law-
yer.' Were such materials open to opposing 
counsel on mere demand, much of what is 
now put down in writing would remain un-
written. An attorney's thoughts, heretofore 
inviolate, would not be his own. Ineffi-
ciency, unfairness and sharp practices 
would inevitably develop**2170 in the 
giving of legal advice and in the prepara-
tion of cases for trial. The effect on the leg-
al profession would be demoralizing. And 
the interests of the clients and the cause of 
[14] The work-product doctrine, recog-
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Page 17 of 27 
95 S.Ct. 2160 
422 U.S. 225, 95 S.Ct. 2160, 45 L.Ed.2d 141, 20 Fed.R.Serv.2d 547 
(Cite as: 422 U.S. 225, 95 S.Ct. 2160) 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
see Rule 26(b)(3), and in Rule 16 of 
the Criminal Rules as well, see 
Rules 16(b) and (c); cf. E. Cleary, 
McCormick. on Evidence 208 (2d 
ed. 1972). 
[17][18][19][20][21) Ths_privilege de-
rived from tile work-product doctrine is nqt 
abatitutictike other qualifierPrivilenk it 
try be
Mere respondent sought to 
Ir
n
Instimony of the investigator 
and contrast his recollection of the con-
tested statements with that of the prosecu-
tion's witnesses. Respondent, by electing to 
present the investigator as a witness, 
waived the privilege with respect to mat-
ters covered in his **2171 testimony.nai 
Respondent*240 can no more advance the 
work-product doctrine to sustain a unilater-
al testimonial use of work-product materi-
als than he could elect to testify in his own 
behalf and thereafter assert his Fifth 
Amendment privilege to resist cross-
examination on matters reasonably related 
ts
to those brought ou 'n direct examination. 
See, e.g., McGautha . California, 402 U.S. 
183, 215, 91 S.Ct. 1 54, 1471, 28 L.Ed.2d 
711 (1971).ms 
FN14. What constitutes a waiver 
with respect to work-product mater-
ials depends, of course, upon the 
circumstances. Counsel necessarily 
makes use throughout trial of the 
notes, documents, and other internal 
materials prepared to present ad-
equately his client's case, and often 
relies on them in examining wit-
nesses. When so used, there nor-
mally is no waiver. But where, as 
here, counsel attempts to make a 
testimonial use of these materials 
the normal rules of evidence come 
into play with respect to cross-
Page 17 
examination and production of doc-
uments. 
FN15. We cannot accept respond-
ents contention that the disclosure 
order violated his Sixth Amendment 
right to effective assistance of coun-
sel. This claim is predicated on the 
assumption that disclosure of a de-
fense investigator's notes in this and 
similar 
cases 
will 
compromise 
counsel's ability to investigate and 
[
epare 
the defense case thor-
ougNy. Respondent maintains that 
even the limited disclosure required 
in this case will impair the relation-
ship 
of 
trust 
and 
confidence 
between client and attorney and will 
inhibit 
other 
members 
of 
the 
`defense team' from gathering in-
formation essential to the effective 
preparation of the case. See Amer-
ican Bar Association Project on 
Standards for Criminal Justice, The 
fense 
Function 
s 
3.1(a) 
(App.Draft 1971). The short answer 
is that the disclosure order resulted 
from respondent's voluntary elec-
tion to make testimonial use of his 
investigator's 
report. 
Moreover, 
from this waiver, we think 
t the concern voiced by respond-
ent fails to recognize the limited 
and conditional nature of the court's 
rder. 
I 
122] Finally, our examination of the re-
cord persuades us that the District Court 
properly exercised its discretion in this in-
stance. The court authorized no general 
`fishing expedition' into the defense files 
ji
or indeed even into the defense 'nvestigat-
or's report. a. United States . Wright, 
160 U.S.App.D.C. 57, 489 
.2d 1181 
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Page 19 of 27 
95 S.Ct. 2160 
422 U.S. 225, 95 S.Ct. 2160, 45 L.Ed.2d 141, 20 Fed.R.Serv.2d 547 
(Cite as: 422 U.S. 225, 95 S.Ct. 2160) 
peals for the Ninth Circuit is therefore re-
versed. 
Judgment reversed. 
Mr. Justice DOUGLAS took no part in the 
consideration or decision of this case. 
Mr. Justice WHITE, with whom Mr. 
Justice REHNQUIST joins, concurring. 
I cons], in the judgment and in Farts II, 
III,. and 
of the opinion of the Court. I 
write only because of misgivings about the 
meaning of Part IV of the opinion. The 
Court appears to have held in Part IV of its 
opinion only that whatever protection the 
defense investigator's notes of his inter-
views with witnesses might otherwise have 
had, that protection would have been lost 
when the investigator testified about those 
interviews. With this I agree also. It seems 
to me more sensible, however, to decide 
what protection these notes had in the first 
place before reaching the `waiver' issue. 
Accordingly, and because I do not believe 
that the 
ork-product *243 doctrine of 
Hickman 
Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 67 S.Ct. 
385, 91 L. . 451 (1947), can be extended 
wholesale from its historic role as a limita-
tion on the nonevidentiary material which 
may be the subject of pretrial discovery to 
an unprecedented role as a limitation on the 
trial judge's power to compel production of 
evidentiary matter at trial, I add the follow-
ing. 
I 
Up until nr  the work-product doctrine 
of Hickman 
Taylor, supra, has been 
viewed almos exclusively as a limitation 
on the ability of a party to obtain pretrial 
discovery. It has not been viewed as a 
`limitation on the trial court's broad discre-
tion as to evidentiary questions at trial.' 
Ante, at 169. The problem discussed in 
Hickman I. Taylor arose precisely because, 
in addition to accelerating the time when a 
Page 19 
party could obtain evidentiary matter from 
his adversary,PNI the new Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure greatly expanded the 
nature of the material subject to pretrial 
disclosure/74 *244 Under the Rules, a 
**2173 party was, for the first time, en-
titled to know in advance his opponent's 
evidence and was entitled to obtain from 
his opponent nonprivileged `information as 
to the existence or whereabouts of facts' 
relevant to a case even though the 
`informatio ' was not itself evidentiary. 
Hickman 
Taylor, suprai 329 U.S., at 
501, 67 S. 
at 389. Utilizing these Rules, 
the plaintiff m Hickman 1 Taylor sought 
discovery of statements Attained by de-
fense counsel from witnesses to the events 
relevant to the lawsuit, not for evidentiary 
use but only `to help prepare himself to ex-
amine witnesses and to make sure that he 
ha(d) overlooked nothing.' 329 U.S., at 
513, 67 S.Ct., at 395 (emphasis added). In 
concluding that these statements should not 
be produced, the Court treated the matter 
entirely as one involving the plaintiffs en-
titlement to pretrial discovery under the 
new Federal Rules, no and carefully lim-
ited its opinion accordingly. The relevant 
Rule in the Court's view, Rule 26, on its 
face required production of the witness 
statements unless they were privileged. 
Nonetheless, the Court expressly stated 
that the request for witness statements was 
to be denied `not because the subject mat-
ter is privileged' (although noting that a 
work-product `privilege' applies in Eng-
land, 329 U.S., at 510, 67 S.Ct., at 393) as 
that concept was used in the Rules, but be-
cause the request `falls outside the arena of 
discovery.' Id., at 510, 67 S.Ct., at 393 
(emphasis added). The Court stated that it 
is essential that a lawyer work with a cer-
tain degree of privacy, and concluded that 
the effect of giving one lawyer's work 
(particularly his strategy, legal theories, 
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Page 21 of 27 
95 S.Ct. 2160 
422 U.S. 225, 95 S.Ct. 2160, 45 L.Ed.2d 141, 20 Fed.R.Serv.2d 547 
(Cite as: 422 U.S. 225, 95 S.Ct. 2160) 
329 U.S., at 515, 67 5.O., at 395.PN4 
FN4. Mr. Justice Jackson also em-
phasized that the wi
 statements 
involved in Hickman 1 Taylor were 
neither evidence nor privileged. Id., 
at 516, 67 S.Ct., at 396. Indeed, 
most of the material described by 
the Court as falling under the work-
product umbrella does not qualify 
as evidence. A lawyer's mental im-
pressions are almost never evidence 
and out-of-court statements of wit-
nesses are generally inadmissible 
hearsay. Such statements become 
evidence only when the witness 
testifies at trial, and are then usually 
impeachment evidence only. This 
case, of course, involves a situation 
in which the relevant witness was to 
testify and thus presents the qu
tion-not involved in Hickman 
Taylor-whether 
prior 
statemen 
should be disclosed under the trial 
judge's power over evidentiary mat-
ters at trial. 
*246 **2174 Since Hickman t Taylor, 
supra, Congress, the cases, and 
e com-
mentators have uniformly continued to 
view the 'work product' doctrine solely as 
a limitation on pretrial discovery and not as 
a qualified evidentiary privilege. In 1970, 
Congress became involved with the prob-
lem for the first time in the civil area. It did 
so solely by accepting a proposed amend-
ment to Fed.Rule Civ.Proc. 26, which in-
coiwrate‘much of what the Court held in 
Hickman 1. Taylor, supra, with respect to 
pretrial discovery. See Advisory Commit-
tee's explanatory statement, 28 U.S.C. 
App., p. 7778; 48 F.R.D. 487. In the crim-
inal area, Congress has enacted 18 U.S.C. s 
3500 and accepted Fed.Rule Crim.Proc. 
16(c). The former prevents pretrial discov-
Page 21 
ery of witness statements from the Govern-
ment; the latter prevents pretrial discovery 
of witness statements from the defense. 
Neither limits the power of the trial court 
to order production as evidence of prior 
statements of witnesses who have testified 
at trial.ms 
FNS. In n. 13 of its opinion, the 
Court cites Fed.Rule 
Crim.Proc. 
16(c), as containing the work-
product rule. In n. 10 the Court cor-
rectly notes that Rule 16(c) is not 
'directed to the court's control of 
evidentiary questions arising at tri-
al.' It seems to me that this supplies 
a better ground for the Courfs de-
cision that 'waiver.' 
With the exception of materials of the 
type discussed in Part II: infra, research has 
uncovered no application of the work-
product rule in the lower courts since Hick-
man to prevent production of evidence-
impeaching or *247 otherwise-at trials 
and there are several examples of cases re-
jecting such an approach.nn 
FN6. The majority does cite one 
case, In re Terkeltoub: 256 F.Supp. 
683 (SDNY 1966), in which the 
court referred to the work-product 
doctrine in preventing the Govern-
ment from inquiring of a lawyer be-
fore the grand jury whether he had 
participated in suborning perjury of 
a prospective witness while prepar-
ing a criminal case for trial. In any 
event, a grand jury investigation is 
in some respects similar to pretrial 
discovery. Compare In I 
Grand 
Jury Proceedings 
. United 
States), 473 F.2d 40 (C 
1973), 
with Schwinuner 
United States, 
232 F.2d 855 (C 
), cert. denied, 
352 U.S. 833, 77 S.Ct. 48, 1' 
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95 S.Ct. 2160 
422 U.S. 225, 95 S.Ct. 2160, 45 L.Ed.2d 141, 20 Fed.R.Serv.2d 547 
(Cite as: 422 U.S. 225, 95 S.Ct. 2160) 
made by its witnesses on the same subject 
matter as their testimony. The Govern-
mentargued, *249 inter alia, that produc-
tion would violate the "legitimate interest 
that each party-including the Government-
has in safeguarding the rivacy of its files." 
353 U.S., at 670, 77 S.Ct., at 1014. The 
Court held against the Government. The 
Court said that to deny disclosure of prior 
statements which might be used to impeach 
the witnesses was to 'deny the accused 
evidence relevant and material to his de-
fense,' id., at 667, 77 S.Ct., at 1013 
(emphasis added). Also rejected as unreal-
istic was any rule which would require the 
defendant to demonstrate the impeachment 
value of the prior statements before dis-
closure, n a and the Court held that enti-
tlement to disclosure for use in cross-
examination is 'established when the re-
ports are shown to relate to the testimony 
of the witness.' Id., at 669, 77 S.Ct., at 
1014. Thus, not only did the Court reject 
the notion that there was a 'work product' 
limitation on the trial judge's discretion to 
order production of evidentiary matter at 
trial, but it was affirmatively held that prior 
statements of a witness on the subject of 
his testimony are the kind of evidentiary 
matter to which an adversary is entitled. 
F198. The Court in Jencks quoted 
the language of Mr. Clgef Justice 
Marshall in United State Burr, 25 
Fed.Cas., No. 14,694, pp. 187, 191 
(Va. 1807): 
"Now, if a paper be in possession of 
the opposite party, what statement 
of its contents or applicability can 
be expected from the person who 
claims its production, he not pre-
cisely knowing its contents?" 353 
U.S., at 668 n. 12, 77 S.Ct, at 1013. 
Page 23 of 27 
Page 23 
area in which the work-product rule does 
apply, work-product notions have been 
thought insufficient to prevent discovery of 
evidenfiari and impeachment material. In 
Hickman 
Taylor, 329 U.S., at 511, 67 
S.Ct., at 3 , the Court stated: 
'We do not mean to say that all written 
materials obtained or prepared by an ad-
versary's counsel with an eye toward litiga-
tion are necessarily free from discovery in 
all cases. Where relevant and nonpriv-
ileged*250 **2176 facts remain hidden in 
an attorney's file and where production of 
those facts is essential to the preparation of 
one's case, discovery may properly be had. 
Such written statements and documents 
might, under certain circumstances, be ad-
missible in evidence or give clues as to the 
existence or location of relevant facts. Or 
they might be useful for purposes of im-
peachment or corroboration. 
(Emphasis 
added.) 
Mr. Justice Jackson, in concurring, was 
even more explicit on this point. See supra, 
at 2173. Pursuant to this language, the 
lower courts have ordered evidence to be 
turned over pretrial even when it came into 
being as a result of the adversary's efforts 
in preparation for trial!1i4 A member of a 
defense team who witnesses an out-
of-court statement of someone who later 
testifies at trial in a contradictory fashion 
becomes at that moment a witnesss to a rel-
evant and admissible even; and the cases 
cited above would dictate disclosure of any 
reports he *251 may have written about the 
event. nil°  Since prior statements are in-
admissible hearsay until the witness testi-
fies, there is no occasion for ordering re-
ports of such statements produced as evid-
ence pretrial. However, some courts have 
ordered witness statements produced pre-
trial in the likelihood that they will become 
Indeed, even in the pretrial discovery 
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95 S.Ct. 2160 
422 U.S. 225, 95 S.Ct. 2160, 45 L.Ed.2d 141, 20 Fed.R.Serv.2d 547 
(ate as: 422 U.S. 225, 95 S.Ct. 2160) 
of his case. We need not, however, under-
take here to delineate the scope of the doc-
trine at trial, for in this instance it is clear 
that the defense waived such right as may 
have existed to invoke its protections.' 
Ante, at 2170. 
As noted above, the important ques-
tion is not when the document in is-
sue is created or even when it is to 
be produced. The important ques-
tion is whether the document is 
sought for evidentiary or impeach-
ment purposes or whether it is 
sought 
for 
preparation 
purposes 
only. Of course, a party should not 
be able to discover his opponent's 
legal memoranda or statements of 
witnesses not called whether his re-
quest is at trial or before trial. Inso-
far as such a request is made under 
the applicable discovery rules, it  
within the rule of Hickman
Taylor even though made at tria. 
Insofar as the request seeks to in-
voke the trial judge's discretion over 
evidentiary matters at trial, the rule 
of Hickman I. Taylor is unneces-
sary, since no one could ever sug-
gest 
that 
legal 
memoranda 
or 
hearsay statements are evidence. If 
this is all the majority means by the 
above-quoted language, I agree. 
*252 **2177 II 
Iikone of its aspects, the rule of Hick-
man . Taylor, supra, has application to 
evide iary requests at trial. Both the ma-
jority 
d the concurring opinions in Hick-
man I. Taylor were at pains to distinguish 
between production of statements written 
by the witness and in the possession of the 
lawyer, and those statements which were 
made orally by the witness and written 
down by the lawyer. Production and use of 
Page 25 of 27 
Page 25 
oral statements written down by the lawyer 
would create a substantial risk that the law-
yer would have to testifyymi The major-
ity said that this would 'make the attorney 
much less an officer *253 of the court and 
much more an ordinary witness.' 329 U.S. 
at 513, 67 S.Ct., at 394. Mr. Justice Jack-
son, in concurring, stated: 
FN13. If the witness does not ac-
knowledge making an inconsistent 
statement to the lawyer-even though 
the lawyer recorded it-the cross-
examiner may not offer the docu-
ment in evidence without at least 
calling the lawyer as a witness to 
authenticate the document and oth-
erwise testify to the prior statement. 
'Every lawyer dislikes to take the wit-
ness stand and will do so only for grave 
reasons. This is partly because is is not his 
role; he is almost invariably a poor witness. 
But he steps out of professional character 
to do it. He regrets it; the profession dis-
courages it But the practice advocated here 
is one which would force him to be a wit-
ness, not as to what he has seen or done but 
as to other witnesses' stories, and not be-
cause he wants to do so but in self-de-
fense.' Id., at 517, 67 S.Ct., at 396. 
The lower courts, too, have frowned on 
any practice under which an attorney who 
tries a case also testifies as a witness, and 
trial attorneys have been permitted to testi-
fy only in certain circumstances.niii 
FN14. United States I. Porter, 139 
U.S.App.D.C. 19, 4 9 F.2d 203 
(1970 ; United States & Fiorillo, 
376 
.2d 180 (CA2 19 
; Gajew-
sld
ii
. United States, 321 F.2d 261 
(CA 
1963), cert. den., 375 U.S. 
(1964); United States i . 
968, 84 S.Ct 486, 11 . 
476 F.2d 733 (CA3 1 3 ; 
rave - 
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EFTA00178020

95 S.Ct. 2160 
422 U.S. 225, 95 S.Ct. 2160, 45 L.Ed.2d 141, 20 Fed.R.Serv.2d 547 
(Cite as: 422 U.S. 225, 95 S.O. 2160) 
sensible to treat preparation by an 
attorney and an investigator alike. 
However, the policy against lawyers 
testifying applies only to the lawyer 
who tries the case. 
U.S. I. 1975. 
U.S. 
Nobles 
422 
.S. 225, 95 S.Ct. 2160, 45 L.Ed.2d 
141, 20 Fed.R.Serv.2d 547 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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EFTA00178021

FD-302 (Rev. 104-95) 
-1-
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION 
Date of transcription 
08/14/2007
COURTNEY WILD was interviewed in West Palm Beach, 
Florida, regarding a federal investigation involving the sexual 
exploitation of minors. After being advised of the identity of the 
interviewing agents and the nature of the interview, WILD provided 
the following information: 
In 2003 or 2004 WILD was introduced to JEFFREY EPSTEIN 
for the purpose of providing him with personal massages. WILD was 
approached at a party by a female she believoi was named CHARLISE. 
She described the female as 
female was later "-
WILD and WILD's 
providing massag 
provide the mass 
fifteen years ol( 
when she first me 
with EPSTEIN, she 
ANDRIAN 
Beach by taxi. A. 
residence, ANDRIA1 
wearing only a rot 
ANDRIANO and WILD 
and WILD had remov 
underwear. EPSTEI; 
EPSTEIN began to ME 
EPSTEIN climaxed tl 
4
,4CLA4N4Yle,Ir
kL —
had mentioned 
curing 
was still very surpai wncn he masturbated. 
$200.00. EPSTEIN did not touch WILD during that massage. WILD 
departed EPSTEIN's residence with two men that worked for EPSTEIN. 
They drove WILD to a Shell Gas Station located near Okeechobee 
Boulevard and the Florida Turnpike. 
and taller. The 
R). 
ANDRIANO told 
y could make money by 
WILD that she could 
E. WILD, who was 
to turning sixteen 
:LD's first contact 
rued eighteen. 
s residence in Palm 
ne. Once at the 
7 entered the room 
he robe, both 
e. Both ANDRIANO 
only in their 
:e alone with WILD, 
dole. 
After 
_eved that ANDRIANO 
the massage but she 
EPSTEIN paid WILD 
Prior to departing the residence, WILD provided her 
telephone number to one of EPSTEIN's assistants, ELEJANDRA 
(PHONETIC). WILD described her as a very pretty Hispanic female in 
her early twenties, with long brown hair, and approximately 5'5" to 
5'6" tall. WILD stated that SARAH KELLEN, another of EPSTEIN's 
assistants, or EPSTEIN would usually contact her. KELLEN would 
telephone and ask if she was available or if she had any other 
Investigation on 
08/07/2007 
a: 
West Palm Beach, Florida 
Rica 31E-MM-108062 
SA E. Nes itt Kuyr en a 
by 
SA Jason R. Richards 
Date dictated 08/07/2007 
This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; 
it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency. 
EFTA00178022

FD-302s (Rev. 10-6-95) 
31E-MM-108062 
Continuatione302d  
Courtney Wild 
 .0n08/07/2007  Jaw  
2 
girls she could bring. When EPSTEIN telephoned, he usually asked 
for WILD to come over. According to WILD, EPSTEIN's house 
telephone number began with the digits 655. She would call 
sometimes and leave a message. WILD stated that when they 
telephoned her they would inform her of when they would be coming 
back to town and if she might have anyone new. WILD did not 
believe that EPSTEIN ever really liked her. 
WILD traveled to the EPSTEIN's residence during 2003 and 
2004 over twenty five times. WILD believed that she provided 
EPSTEIN with approximately 10-15 massages. EPSTEIN initially 
started out touching WILD's breasts but gradually the massages 
became more sexual. EPSTEIN would instruct WILD on how and what to 
do during the massages. He would request WILD to rub his chest and 
nipples. WILD stated that on approximately two occasions, EPSTEIN 
asked that WILD remove her underwear and provide the massage nude. 
WILD complied. WILD stated that EPSTEIN would make her feel that 
she had the option to do what she wanted. 
During one massage, WILD stated that she had been giving 
EPSTEIN a massage for approximately 30-40 minutes when instead of 
EPSTEIN turning over to masturbate, EPSTEIN brought another female 
into the massage area. WILD described the female as a beautiful 
blonde girl, a "Cameron Diaz" type, 19 years of age, bright blue 
eyes, and speaking with an accent. EPSTEIN had WILD straddle the 
female on the massage table. EPSTEIN wanted WILD to touch the 
females breast. According to WILD, EPSTEIN "pleasured" the female 
while WILD was straddled on top of the female. WILD stated she 
could hear what she believed to be a vibrator. WILD said for 
EPSTEIN it was all about pleasuring the female. After the female 
climaxed, EPSTEIN patted WILD on the shoulder and she removed 
herself from the table. The female got up from the table and went 
into the spa/sauna. EPSTEIN commented to WILD that in a few 
minutes the female would realize what had just happened to her. 
WILD received $200.00. 
WILD advised the interviewing agents that EPSTEIN had 
used a back massager on her vagina. EPSTEIN asked her first if he 
could use the massager on her. WILD stated that she had held her 
breath when EPSTEIN used the back massager on her. WILD stated 
that at no time during any of the massages had EPSTEIN caused her 
to climax. 
During another massage, WILD believed by this time she 
was seventeen, EPSTEIN placed his hand on WILD's vagina, touching , 
EFTA00178023

FD-302a (Rev. 104-95) 
31E-MM-108062 
OwinmkmdFID-Mad  
Courtney Wild 
 ,On  08/07/2007  ,Pap  
3 
WILD's clitoris. WILD was uncomfortable and told him to stop. 
EPSTEIN complied. WILD stated th4t the incident freaked her out. 
WILD stated that EPSTEIN was upset because she was upset. WILD 
never return to the residence. WILD stated that she did not deal 
with EPSTEIN anymore after that incident. 
EPSTEIN gave both WILD and MILLER each a book entitled 
"Massage for Dummies". They received the books on the same visit. 
EPSTEIN also commented how strong WILD's hands were when it came to 
her providing his massages. 
On another occasion, WILD mentioned to EPSTEIN that she 
was looking at a car, a Toyota Corolla. EPSTEIN provided WILD with 
$600.00 - $700.00. WILD stated that EPSTEIN gave her the money 
after the incident with the other female. 
According to WILD, EPSTEIN would ask her to bring him 
other girls. WILD, who started dancing at strip clubs when she was 
16, brought girls from the club as well as from other sources. 
WILD stated she brought girls from fifteen years of age to twenty-
five years of age. WILD stated that EPSTEIN would get frustrated 
with her if she did not have new females for him. On one instance, 
EPSTEIN hung up on her because she could not provide him with 
anyone new. WILD stated that EPSTEIN's preference was short, 
little, white girls. WILD stated that EPSTEIN was upset when one 
of the other girls brought a black girl. WILD stated that EPSTEIN 
did not want black girls or girls with tatoos. 
WILD stated that one of the girls she stayed with on 
occasion, AMY FOREMAN, also started providing EPSTEIN with 
massages. A telephone number for FOREMAN was (561)718-1924. WILD 
said that her family resides in Wellington, Florida, possibly 
Crestwood. WILD also stayed with JACLYN REGOLI during this same 
time period. However, REGOLI never went to EPSTEIN's house or 
provided him with massages. REGOLI has a Yacht Club address. 
Another girl that WILD had taken to EPSTEIN's residence 
was LAUREN Last Name Unknown(LNU). According to WILD, EPSTEIN 
liked LAUREN LNU a lot. WILD said that she was never a favorite of 
EPSTEIN. EPSTEIN offered WILD $300.00 to bring LAUREN LNU. LAUREN 
LNU was a couple years younger than WILD. WILD believed that she 
was either 16 or 17 when she first went to EPSTEIN's residence. 
WILD said that LAUREN LNU went 2-3 times but that she did not want 
any part of it after that. WILD believes she could identify LAUREN 
LNU if she saw her photograph. ,WILD also stated that LAUREN LNU at 
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Courtney Wild 
MI108/07/2007  Page  
4 
one time attended PALM BEACH CENTRAL HIGH SCHOOL. WILD also 
believed that they had met through a group of friends while 
attending PACE - a dropout prevention school. 
WILD mentioned another girl by the name of COURTNEY 
LANGLEY. EPSTEIN distinguished the two "COURTNEYS" by referring to 
LANGLEY as COURTNEY ICE CREAM. LANGLEY worked at an ice cream 
shop. WILD stated that she did not like LANGLEY and that LANGLEY 
was a storyteller and a bad liar. WILD stated that LANGLEY never 
really wanted to go to EPSTEIN's residence but she went anyway. 
WILD said that she had not taken a good look at EPSTEIN's 
penis. WILD explained that it seemed like he would always try and 
hide his penis. WILD stated that EPSTEIN never asked her for sex. 
WILD started dancing when she was sixteen at PLATINUM 
SHOWGIRLS. The owner, MATT BARROW, let her dance. WILD has also 
worked at CURVES CABARET located off of Old Boynton in Boynton 
Beach, Florida. 
WILD used illegal drugs during the years she provided 
EPSTEIN with massages. WILD said that EPSTEIN tried to provide her 
with advice regarding controlled substances. 
WILD stated that she met with EPSTEIN's attorneys, BOB 
MEYERS and a unidentified female(UF), at the ALE HOUSE RESTAURANT. 
WILD met with them after she contacted KELLEN, who confirmed that 
they were really working for EPSTEIN. WILD stated that KELLEN also 
talked of her twin boys and stated that she was living in 
Manhattan. WILD found out that MEYERS and the OF are employed by 
RHM INVESTIGATIONS. They asked a lot of questions. They 
specifically asked about LANGLEY and a GINA LNU. WILD reiterated 
her dislike for LANGLEY. 
WILD also informed the interviewing agents that she had 
spoken to MILLER she believed before the fourth of July. MILLER 
told WILD that she had met with investigators and that they had 
videoed her. 
WILD confirmed her association to the following telephone 
numbers: 
Old cellular number - (561)856-2617 
Possibly an old cellular number - (561)503-0858 
REGOLI's telephone number - (561)202-0188 
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