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KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP 
ANO APIIL1AttO l'ARTROSHIPS 
To al 
June 19, 2008 
Principal Associate Deputy Attorney General 
Office of the Deputy Attorney General 
Dear Mr. Roth: 
Facsimile: 
O. Fis
.MM 
I again want to thank you for this opportunity to explain why we believe that a federal 
prosecution of Jeffrey Epstein is unwarranted. I appreciate your having informed us that you 
already have our May 19 and May 27 communications to the Deputy Attorney General, as well 
as our prior written submissions to CEOS and to the Southern District of Florida. 
In light of the significant volume of our prior submissions and to facilitate your review, 
we have drafted four supplemental submissions that will provide a roadmap for your 
investigation of this matter. Given the bulk of these documents and their appended supporting 
attachments, you will receive this packet by messenger tomorrow. A brief description of each of 
the four submissions follows. First, I have included a succinct summary of the facts, law and 
policy issues at hand. This document sets forth a basic overview of the issues and summarizes 
our principal contentions as to why federal prosecution of this matter is neither appropriate nor 
warranted. 
The three other submissions include: a summary of the irregularities and misconduct that 
occurred during the federal investigation; a letter from former CEOS attorney Stephanie Thacker 
that responds to CEOS's assessment of its limited review of Mr. E stein's case; and a point-by-
point rebuttal to First Assistant United States Attorney 
recent letter which we 
believe contains factual inaccuracies typical of our correspondence from the United States 
Attorney's Office in Miami (the "USAO"). Also, for your reference, the package you receive 
tomorrow will contain a binder including all documentation to which we refer in our 
submissions. Finally, we will be providing a detailed checklist of each submission or substantive 
communication to the USAO. Our intention is that you have copies of each such document to 
enhance your review. If there arc any that you have not received from the USAO or CEOS, 
please advise and we will fedex them to you without delay. 
Chicago 
Hong Kong 
London 
Munich 
Now York 
San Francisco 
Washington,. 
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As you are likely aware, the Department's prior review of this matter was incomplete 
and, by its own admission, not "dc novo." See Tab 38, May 15, 2008 Letter from 
Without considering the Non Prosecution Agreement that left this matter to be resolved in the 
State or any of the misconduct, CEOS reviewers, tasked with reviewing some of their own 
previously expressed opinions, assessed only whether the United States Attorney would "abuse 
[his] discretion" if he pursued this case. While we appreciate CEOS's willingness to examine 
these limited issues, its conclusion that a prosecution would not be an "abuse of discretion" rings 
particularly hollow in light of CEOS's admirably candid concessions that we have raised 
"compelling" objections and that a prosecution on these facts would require "novel" applications 
of federal law. Indeed, even a brief review of CEOS's own mission statement reveals how 
inapposite a federal prosecution is to the facts in this case. 
Importantly, we note that the CEOS review was conducted prior to the Supreme Court's 
very recent decisions in Santos and Cuellar, which we believe—illuminating as they do the 
Court's interpretive methodology when it comes to federal criminal law—powerfully 
demonstrate the substantive vulnerability of the USAO's unprecedented employment of three 
federal laws. That Office's interpretation would never pass muster under the Supreme Court's 
recent pronouncements and should not be countenanced. That is all the more true under the 
circumstances where the duly appointed U.S. Attorney opined that, in effect, the "unitary" 
Executive Branch was driving this prosecution. We now know that is not so. 
What I respectfully request, and what I hope you will provide, is a truly "de novo" 
review—that is, an independent assessment of whether federal prosecution of Mr. Epstein is both 
nertcruy and warranted in view of the legal and evidentiary hurdles that have been identified, 
the existence of a State felony plea and sentence that have been advocated by the State Attorney 
for Palm Beach County, and the many issues of prosecutorial misconduct and overzealousness 
that have permeated the investigation. i also request that you provide us with the opportunity 
during your review to meet with you in person to answer any questions you may have and to 
elucidate some of the issues in our submission. 
We believe that an independent review will confirm our strong belief that federal 
prosecutors would be required to stretch the plain meaning of each clement of the enumerated 
statutes, and then to combine these distorted elements in a tenuous chain, in order to convict Mr. 
Epstein. Indeed, just this week and after two years of federal involvement in this matter), 
Assistant United States Attorney 
re-initiated the federal grand jury investigation—in 
direct contravention of the parties' Non Prosecution Agreement— 
another 
subpoena seekin evidence in this 
' 
19, Subpoena to 
In the 
subpoena, 
directs 
to appear on July 1, 2008 to give testimony 
and produce documents to EGJ 07-103 West Palm Beach. The attachment to the subpoena seeks 
documents such as photographs, emails, telephone billing information, and contact information 
that relate to Mr. Epstein as well as specific other people who received protection from federal 
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un
J a 19, 2008 
Page 3 
prosecution as a result of Mr. Epstein's having entered into the September 24, 2007 Non 
Prosecution Agreement with the USAO. 
Notably, the Non Prosecution Agreement contains the following agreed condition: 
Further, upon execution of this agreement and a plea agreement with the State Attorney's Office, 
the federal Grand Jury investigation will be suspended and all pending federal Grand Jury 
subpoenas will be held in abeyance unless and until the defendant violates any term of this 
agreement. The defendant likewise agrees to withdraw his pending motion to intervene and to 
quash certain grand jury subpoenas. 
See Tab 2], September 24, 2007 Non Prosecution A 
ement. It alsoguarantees that persons 
identified in the Grand Jury subpoena such as 
, and Leslie Groff 
and others will not be prosecuted. The new Grand Jury subpoena clearly violates the Non-
Prosecution Agreement. 
Although Mr. Epstein has exercised his rights to appeal to the 
Department of Justice with the full consent and knowledge of the USAO, he has not breached the 
Agreement. The re-commencing of the Grand Jury is in violation of the Agreement. 
But further, the new investigation, which features a wide-ranging, fishing-expedition type 
to search in New York does nothing to satisfy the very essential elements of federal statutes that 
are lacking despite the intensity of an over two-year investigation in the Palm Beach area. 
Absent evidence of Internet luring, inducements while using the phone, travel for the purpose, 
fraud or coercion, the subject of the New York investigation is as lacking in the essential basis 
for converting a state case into a federal case as is the remainder of the Florida investigation. 
The reaching out to New York to fill the void emanating from the failures of the Florida 
investigation compellingly demonstrates the misuse of federal resources in an overzealous, over-
personalized, selective and extraordi 
attempt to expand federal law to where it is has never 
gone. This last-ditch attempt by 
na 
reinforces our belief that the L'SAO does not have 
facts that, without distortion, would justify a prosecution of Mr. Epstein. 
In view of the prosecution's often-verbalized desire to punish Mr. Epstein, we believe 
that the prosecution summary suffers from critical inaccuracies and aggregates the expected 
testimony of witnesses so as to reach a conclusion of guilt. Our contention is reinforced by the 
fact that key prosecution witnesses have provided evidence and testimony that directly 
undermines the prosecution's misleading and inaccurate summary of its case. Indeed, we now 
have received statements from three of the principal accuser 
(through a state 
criminal deposition 
through a federal FBI- 
sworn and transcribed 
interview), and 
(through a defense—generated sworn transcribed interview). 
Each of these witnesses categorically denies each essential element that the prosecution will have 
to prove in order to convert this quintessential state-law case into a federal matter. 
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It thus is especially troubling that the USAO has not provided us with the transcript of 
federal interview, nor the substance of the interviews with 
or M. 
nor any information generated by interviews with any of the approximately 40 alleged 
witnesses that the prosecution claims it has identified. Because the information provided by 
these women goes directly to the question of Mr. Epstein's guilt or innocence, it is classic Brady 
information. We understand that the U.S. Attorney might not want to disclose impeachment 
information about their witnesses prior to a charge or during plea negotiations. But we firmly 
believe that whcn the Government possesses information that goes directly to a target's factual 
guilt or innocence, the target should be informed about such heartland exculpatory evidence. 
Most importantly, aside from whether the Department believes Brady obligates 
disclosure to a target of a federal investigation prior to the target's formal accusation, no such 
limit should apply to a Department review. Accordingly, we request that you go beneath the face 
of any summary provided to you by the USAO and instead review the actual witness transcripts 
and FBI 302s, which arc essential for you to be able to make a truly independent assessment of 
the strength and wisdom of any federal prosecution. 
After careful consideration of the record, and as much as it pains me to say this, I simply 
do not believe federal prosecutors would have been involved at all in this matter if not for Mr. 
Epstein's personal wealth and publicly-reported ties to former President Bill Clinton. A simple 
Internet search on Mr. Epstein reveals myriad articles and news stories about the former 
President's personal relationship with Mr. Epstein, including multi-page stories in New York 
Magazine and Vanity Fair. Mr. Epstein, in fact, only came to the public's attention a few years 
ago when he and the former President traveled for a week to Africa (using Mr. Epstein's 
airplane)—a trip that received a great deal of press coverage. I cannot imagine that the USAO 
ever would have contemplated a prosecution in this case if Mr. Epstein lacked this type of 
notoriety. 
That belief has been reinforced by the significant prosecutorial impropriety and 
misconduct throughout the course of this matter. While we describe the majority of these 
irregularities in another submission, two instances arc particularly troubling. First, the USAO 
authorized the public disclosure of specific details of the open investigation to the New York 
Times—including descriptions of the prosecution's then 
of the case and specific terms of a plea 
negotiation between the parties. Second, 
attempted to enrich friends and close 
acquaintances by bringing thcm business in connection with this matter. Specifically, she 
attempted to appoint a close personal friend of her live-in boyfriend to serve as an attorney-
representative for the women involved in this case. 
It also bears mentioning that actions taken b 
present an appearance of 
impropriety that gives us cause for concern. 
former law partner is currently 
pursuing a handful of $50-million lawsuits against Mr. Epstein by some of the masseuses. 
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Finally, as you know, Mr. Epstein and the USAO entered into an agreement that deferred 
prosecution to the State. In this regard I sim I note that the manner in which this agreement 
was negotiated contrasts sharply with 
current representation that "IV he SDF1, 
indicated a willin ne 
fer to the State the length of incarceration . . . " See Tab 1 
a 1 
2008 Letter from 
p. 2. This statement is simply not true. Contrary to 
assertion, federal prosecutors refused to accept what the State believed to be appropriate as to 
Mr. Epstein's sentence and instead, insisted that Mr. Epstein be required serve a two-year term of 
imprisonment (which they later decreased to 18 months plus one year of house arrest). Federal 
prosecutors have not only involved themselves in what is quintessentially a state matter, but their 
actions have caused a critical appearance of impropriety that raises doubt as to their motivation 
for investigating and prosecuting Mr. Epstein in the first place. 
At bottom, we appreciate your willingness to review this matter with a fresh—and 
independent—set of eyes. To facilitate your review, I once again request the opportunity to 
make an oral presentation to supplement our written submissions, and we will promptly respond 
to any inquiries you may have. 
Y 
sine 
ly, 
cc: 
Deputy Attorney General 
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LAW OFFICES 
ALLEN GUTHRIN: MCHUGH & THOMAS, PLLC 
GEORGE 43.GUIRRE 
ROSERT e. PALEN 
RFJXCCA A. SETTS 
R. IERRAKE ROCOERS 
CANSO IS THOMAS 
ONES S. ARNO° 
DAVOS HARDY 
Mt SCOTT WCKLINE 
PANELS I. CANINO 
PAMELA C. CON 
PINUP .S 
STEPKOIETTHACKER 
DREAMT J. 
ANN 
TERESA K. INOWSON 
DEBRA C PINCE 
040ST OPI:ALANOlD 
CHRISTOPHER 
PENCE 
PETER O. 
rADEARY e. MoVEY 
CS COUNSEL 
DOWSE MOIJCH 
June 19, 2008 
Mr. 
Senior Associate Deputy Attorney General 
Office of the Deputy Attorney General 
United States Department of Justice 
Dear Mr. Roth: 
TELEPHONE 
FACSRA.MIMI 
WRITER'S DIRECT ORR 
1 write to offer my reaction to the May 15, 2008 correspondence from the United States 
Department of Justice Child Exploitation and Obscenity Section ("CEOS") regarding the federal 
investigation of Jeffrey Epstein by the United States Attorney's Office for the Southern District of 
Florida ("USAO").' I will refrain from recounting Mr. Epstein's arguments in detail here, but, 
rather, will highlight salient points responsive to the CEOS letter. 
In particular, I write from a background well familiar with child exploitation cases and 
victim/witness issues. As the CEOS letter points out (CEOS letter at p. 3), I was a member of 
CEOS. In fact, I served as a federal prosecutor for twelve years; five years as an Assistant United 
States Attorney for the Southern District of West Virginia, and seven years at CEOS. I began 
working as a trial attorney for CEOS in 1999, and was promoted to Deputy Chief for Litigation in 
2002, and ultimately to Principal Deputy Chief for the Section in 2004. 
As those who have worked with me know, I have a history of working diligently on behalf of 
victims of crime. While at the United States Attorney's Office for the Southern District of West 
Virginia, I was a part of the prosecution team that prosecuted the first case in the country under the 
federal Violence Against Women Act. United States v. Bailey, 112 F.3d 758 (4th Cir.), cert denied, 
522 U.S. 896 (1997). The case went to trial and the defendant was sentenced to life in prison. I also 
spearheaded the domestic violence and federal criminal child support prosecution efforts for that 
office, prosecuting some of the first cases in the country under the federal Child Support Recovery 
1 Citations to the May IS, 2008 correspondence will be referenced herein as "CEOS letter at p. 
." 
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Mr. 
June 19, 2008 
Page 2 
Act. Later, while at the Department of Justice, I co-authored the Department's Federal Child 
Support Prosecution Handbook. 
My work at CEOS permitted me to continue my efforts on behalf of vulnerable victims of 
crime. While there, for example, I was part of the prosecution team in United States v. Dwight York, 
428 F.3d 1325 (I I th Cir. 2005), cert denied, 548 U.S. 908 (2006). York was the leader of a pseudo 
religious organization, and systematically molested countless children, some as young as six years 
old. The case went to trial and York was sentenced to 135 years in prison. As part of that trial team, 
I was awarded the Attorney General's Award for Distinguished Service. Additionally, at CEOS I 
was one of the architects of the Innocence Lost Initiative, a nationwide initiative designed to combat 
child prostitution. For this, I was awarded an Assistant Attorney General's Award for Outstanding 
Victim/Witness Service. Likewise, I was awarded a subsequent Assistant Attorney General's Award 
for Special Initiative in connection with a nationwide sex tourism prosecution initiative I helped to 
develop. 
I say all this not for any boastful purpose, but, rather, to make clear that I am fully cognizant 
of victim issues, and that 1 am no pushover in terms of prosecution standards. I am also very well 
aware of the good work of CEOS, and the outstanding credentials of those who toil in that office. 
With all due respect to CEOS, however (and recognizing that their review of this case was 
quite limited), given the facts and circumstances of this investigation, a federal prosecution of Mr. 
Epstein simply should not be countenanced. In my view, such prosecution would be counter to the 
important mandate of the Department of Justice as emblazoned on its seal, "Qui Pro DominaJustitia 
Sequitur," referring to the Attorney General "who prosecutes on behalf of justice." 
As you well know, it is fundamental to that mandate that, as the representative of the people 
of the United States, the duty of a federal prosecutor is not simply to seek conviction as at any cost, 
but, rather, to seek justice. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935). ("The United States 
Attorney is the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose 
obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all.") While it is true 
that Berger was decided at the post-trial, as opposed to the pre-indictment, stage of the case, the 
bedrock principle contained in the above quote should transcend the entire investigation and 
prosecution process. Indeed, it is arguably most imperative at the investigation stage, at which point 
law enforcement is dealing with a presumptively innocent citizen. 
In summary, we understand the allegations against Mr. Epstein to be that Mr. Epstein paid 
individuals to find friends and acquaintances, certain of whom were under the age of IS, to provide 
topless massages to him at his Palm Beach home in exchange for money. Mr. Epstein's assistants 
allegedly scheduled these massages for him over the telephone at the direction of Mr. Epstein, 
allegedly including some scheduling calls to underage women. However, the evidence contradicts 
these allegations. First, Mr. Epstein did not ask that the masseuses be under the age of 18. To the 
contrary, he specifically asked that they be 18 or older. As one witness commented, "Maid 
tell 
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Mr. 
June I9, 2008 
Page 3 
them you're 18 because if you're not, he won't let you in his house." 
at 38-39. 
Second, Mr. Epstein himself did not schedule such appointments. Third, Mr. Epstein would not 
know who would be providing a massage at any particular time. Fourth, and importantly, Mr. 
Epstein's assistants were not directed to contact underage women, and were not aware of the true 
ages of the women they contacted. In fact, more often than not, the masseuses themselves, or the 
individuals who introduced the masseuses, made the initial contact. As a result, Mr. Epstein and his 
assistants were routinely unaware of the identities of many of these young women before they 
arrived. 
The allegations further include the assertion that Mr. Epstein engaged in unlawful sexual 
conduct with certain underage women who arrived at his house to provide a massage. At times, 
during these massages, Mr. Epstein masturbated, engaged in some sexual touching, and a small 
number of alleged acts of penetration. However, most of the women who perfonned massages on 
Mr. Epstein were over the age of 18. Many of the young women have sworn under oath that they, in 
fact, told Mr. Epstein that they were 18 or older, and that they did so because they knew that if they 
were not 18 years old, they would not be allowed into Mr. Epstein's home. In fact, Mr. Epstein has 
passed a polygra h examination to this effect relative to the government's primary, and youngest, 
alleged victim, 
Indeed, many of the women also worked at local massage parlors, 
which presumably had a requirement that the masseuse have reached the age of majority. To the 
extent there are allegations that Mr. Epstein should have been alerted to certain underage women 
based on conversations he allegedly had with them, those conversations would have taken place in 
person and at his home, thereby precluding any prior scheduling with knowledge of their true ages. 
As explained below, any factual allegations of repeat massages with such persons would lack 
necessary elements required for a federal nexus to such conduct. 
All of the alleged activity occurred in Mr. Epstein's home in Palm Beach, Florida. Manyof 
the massages allegedly involved conduct which, even if engaged in, is not proscribed by federal law, 
either because the masseuses were of age, or because conduct with underage masseuses only 
involved topless massages, massages in undergarments or naked massages. To the extent prohibited 
sexual activity occurred, any inducement, enticement, and/or persuasion used would have taken 
place during a face-to-face encounter—thus eliminating the possibility for the commission of a 
federal crime, which requires the existence of a communication through a facility of interstate 
commerce in which the defendant persuades or entices the minor to engage in illegal sexual activity. 
Furthermore, any prohibited sexual activity that did occur based on the facts on the record is best left 
to the state to address because the facts of this case do not fall comfortably within the federal 
domain. 
This is a case about purely local activity, involving local actors, and affecting local 
interests and thus, should be handled by local authorities. Nonetheless, the USAO has indicated 
its intent to prosecute Mr. Epstein for purported violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2422, 2423, and 
1591. However, as set forth in detail in prior submissions, the facts of this case fall squarely 
outside the heartland of those statutes — in fact, in law, and in congressional intent. As their plain 
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Mr. 
June 19, 2008 
Page 4 
text and history indicate, these statutes were designed to address problems that are truly national 
and international in scope: human trafficking in § 1591; telephone or Internet sexual predation in 
§ 2422; and sex tourism in § 2423. Unlike the alleged conduct at issue here, those problems 
unquestionably present multi jurisdictional obstacles that States and localities cannot confront 
effectively on their own. Mr. Epstcin's conduct was purely local in nature, and the State of 
Florida and Palm Beach County are effectively prosecuting and punishing that conduct. 
Although CEOS asserts, "that a prosecution of Mr. Epstein might not look precisely like the 
cases that came before it is not diapositive" (CEOS letter at p. 4), the fact is this case does not look 
awaking like those cases. The facts here do not carry any of the hallmarks that typify an appropriate 
federal prosecution for child exploitation as reflected in all such prior federal prosecutions. 
Specifically, the facts here do not can' the hallmarks for a sex trafficking or child prostitution 
prosecution. Mr. Epstein did not target minors. In fact, the evidence indicates just the opposite. 
There was no travel in interstate commerce for the purpose of engaging in illicit sexual activity. 
There was no prohibited use of a facility of interstate commerce. There was no commercial for profit 
sexual enterprise. There was no force. There was no violence. There was no use of drugs or 
alcohol. There was no child pornography. 
18 U.S.C. § 1591 is clearly designed to combat organized rings of individuals who engage in 
the business of human trafficking, involving both a commercial and coercive component. As 
President Bush has noted: 
generally speaking, trafficking in persons refers to actions, often including the use of 
force, fraud or coercion, to compel someone into a situation in which he or she will 
be exploited for sexual purposes, which could include prostitution or pornography, or 
for labor without compensation, which could include forced or bonded labor . . . 
trafficking in persons is often linked to organized crime, and the profits from 
trafficking enterprises help fund other illegal activities. The growth of vast 
transnational criminal networks supported in part by trafficking in persons fosters 
official corruption and threatens the rule of law.2
This in no way describes the case here. Yet the USAO has been unwavering in its single 
minded focus to stretch the limits of these federal statutes beyond their intended use, and beyond 
precedent, in order to prosecute Mr. Epstein. As the CEOS letter acknowledges, the legal theories 
the USAO intends to attempt to pursue against Mr. Epstein are "novel," having never before been 
sanctioned by federal law. They should not be sanctioned now. As the Supreme Court recently 
pronounced, when a statutory term in a criminal statute could support both a narrow or broad 
application of the federal criminal law, "the tie must go to the defendant." United States v. Santos, 
553 U.S. 
and Cuellar v. United States 553 U.S 
(June 2, 2008), Slip Op. at 6. 
2 February 25, 2003 Trafficking in Persons National Security Presidential Directive. 
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Mr. 
June 19, 2008 
Page 5 
A full and fair review of the facts here is critical to this analysis. Yet, it is clear that CEOS 
did not conduct such a review. In his recent letter to Jay Leflcowitz, First Assistant United States 
Attorney ("FAUSA") 
confirmed our understanding that the USAO was to have 
"facilitated" an "independent de novo review of the investigation" by the Department. (May 19, 
2008 
letter at p. 5). Yet, the CEOS review was not complete, and by its own terms not de 
now. 
As CEOS itself noted, "our review of this case is limited both factually and legally. We have 
not looked at the entire universe of facts in this case. It is not the role of the Criminal Division to 
conduct a complete factual inquiry from scratch." (CEOS letter at p. 1). Indeed, entire subject areas 
relevant to the inquiry were not considered at all by CEOS. In essence, CEOS was only in a position 
to make the most cursory possible review, an "abuse of discretion" review, without considering the 
facts at the necessary level of detail, and without taking into account the many and varied issues of 
misconduct we have raised in this case. As the CEOS letter indicates, "we did not review the facts, 
circumstances, or terms included in the plea offer nor any allegations that individuals involved in the 
investigation engaged in misconduct." (CEOS letter at p. 2). All of this begs the question — if it is 
not CEOS' role to "conduct a complete factual inquiry," and CEOS did not consider any of the 
allegations of misconduct here, which at the very least have created a strong appearance of 
impropriety, and, at worst evidence an intent and effort to unfairly prejudice Mr. Epstein to the 
financial benefit of the friends and colleagues of the prosecution team in the USAO, then where and 
when can justice ever hope to be served in this case? This is a prosecution burden that cannot, and 
should not, be brushed aside. 
We contend the limited nature of the CEOS review deeply affected its conclusions. For 
example, CEOS most likely did not review original documents, such as transcripts, and instead relied 
on the summaries of federal prosecutors and FBI agents, against whom we have raised serious 
concerns regarding misconduct. If the summary memos from the USAO are as flawed as other 
USAO communications have been, and which we have been able to show are misleading and 
inaccurate, the CEOS abuse of discretion review is likely flawed as well. Moreover, although the 
USAO expected, and personally promised to us, an independent review, FAUSA 
letter also 
makes clear that our pivotal legal challenge to the use of 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b) had already "been 
previously raised and thoroughly considered and rejected by .. . CEOS prior to" the recent CEOS 
review. (May 19, 2008 
letter at p. 5). The fact that CEOS had to evaluate its own decision 
with respect to some of the allegations against Mr. Epstein prevents its subsequent review and 
opinion from being truly independent. 
Following this most recent CEOS review "limited both factually and legally," and with no 
citation to any case law relative to the statutes in question, CEOS concludes merely, "federal 
prosecution in this case would not be improper or inappropriate (CEOS letter at p. 5);" in essence, 
that the United States Attorney could bring this case in the exercise of his federal discretion should 
he so choose ("we conclude that U.S. Attorney Acosta could properly use his discretion to authorize 
prosecution in this case."). (CEOS letter at p. 2). However, CEOS drew the conclusion that the 
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June 19, 2008 
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federal prosecution of Mr. Epstein would not be "improper or inappropriate" absent any review at all 
of the misconduct here, and absent a full review of the facts and law. The facts, the law, and the 
alleged misconduct are each necessarily inextricably intertwined with the question of whether or not 
this is a viable federal prosecution. These imposed limits flawed the review from the outset. In any 
event, CEOS concedes that the defense team makes "many compelling arguments." (CEO$ letter at 
p. 5). In the end, then, one is left with the impression that the CEOS review and opinion, although 
concluding that the USAO could push forward at its own discretion, is a much qualified one. 
The federal prosecution of Mr. Epstein has been a moving target from the inception. Each 
time the allegations, the witnesses or the applicable law is subject to a searching inquiry, we have 
found that the allegations have been misrepresented, the law does not apply to the actual facts here, 
and the USAO prosecution thcory falls apart. Yet, in the face of the voluminous evidence we have 
submitted in this regard, while acknowledging that the theories are "novel," and that our arguments 
against federal prosecution are "compelling," CEOS concluded, "Mr. Acosta could rightfully 
conclude that this federal issue is best resolved by a jury" and that "the USAO has a good faith basis 
to fully develop the facts on this issue and brief the law to permit a court to decide whether the law 
appropriately reaches such conduct." With all due respect, and recognizing that CEOS may be — and 
apparently was — limited in its authority, it should not be the prerogative of the prosecution arm of 
the United States government to simply roll the dice, and let the court system just sort it out when 
dealing with the life and liberty of a United States citizen. The Department of justice should not be 
so cavalier when labeling someone as a child molester. While it may be within the discretion of the 
USAO to do so, it is not in accord with the principles of justice. 
Indeed, as noted, just a few weeks ago, the Supreme Court underscored this point in Santos 
and Cuellar. The Court made clear that prosecutorial discretion does not provide the USAO cart 
blanche to expand criminal statutes as they seek to do here with complete disregard for congressional 
intent. The Court rejected speculation as a basis of determining the scope of a criminal statute; 
"probability is not a guide which a court, in construing a penal statute, can safely take." Slip op. at 7, 
quoting United States v. WiltberKer, 5 Wheat. 76,105 (1820). "We interpret ambiguous criminal 
statutes in favor of defendants, not prosecutors." Slip op. at 12. 
Based on my experience, I believe that the facts here do not warrant a federal child 
exploitation prosecution. At its core, this case is quintessentially a state concern as opposed to 
implicating any federal interest. Indeed, the Florida State Attorney's Office ("SAO"), led by the 
chief of the Scx Crimes Division, thoroughly investigated this matter, and presented it to the grand 
jury. The facts, as opposed to the deeply flawed press reports, were carefully assessed by 
experienced State prosecutors who aggressively enforce State criminal laws. Following an extensive 
15-month State investigation, Mr. Epstein was indicted by a State grand jury on a single felony count 
of solicitation of prostitution. 
During the investigation, the State prosecutor exhaustively reviewed the evidence, met face-
to-face with many of the alleged victims, considered their credibility — or lack thereof — and 
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considered the extent of exculpatory evidence, including a psychosexual evaluation of Mr. Epstein 
and a polygraph examination demonstrating that Mr. E stein genuinely believed at the time of the 
alleged conduct that the State's key witness 
) was over the age of IS. Then, after 
months of negotiations, the State reached what it believed was an appropriate resolution of the case. 
Importantly, this resolution was consistent with that of cases involving other defendants who had 
engaged in similar conduct. Implementation of the State resolution of the case was held in abeyance, 
however, due to the unexpected commencement of the successive federal criminal investigation. 
While it is true, as CEOS points out, (CEOS letter at p. 3) that many criminal prosecutions 
turn on issues of credibility of witnesses, to which many members of the defense team can attest 
(having had decades of federal criminal litigation experience among us), this does not serve to divest 
the prosecutor of his/her duty to make a searching inquiry of the facts before using the power of 
prosecution, and the weight of the United States government, to level serious accusations. CEOS 
likewise acknowledges as much, "the prosecutors are in the best position to assess the witnesses' 
credibility." (CEOS letter at p. 3). 
Since the CEOS letter also singles me out as someone who should be familiar with witness 
issues, I feel compelled to note that, of course, lam well aware that it is not uncommon for witnesses 
to give conflicting statements. I am also fully aware that the credibility of key government witnesses 
may be strongly impacted by the $50 million incentive provided via the civil lawsuits at play, and 
encouraged by the overnment here. 3 I have also read many of the conflicts between witness 
testimony and 
own rendition of that testimony in his reports and/or search 
warrant affidavit. 
apparently formed a view early on as to the purported 
criminality of Mr. Epstein's conduct regardless of the mountain of evidence to the contrary. For a 
prosecutor that has had an opportunity to review the full facts, and to meet with the witnesses, 
however, "conflicting statements" cross the line to a "lack of credibility" that simply can not sustain 
a prosecution. That is where an appropriate application of prosecutorial discretion must be brought 
to bear. 
Again, CEOS was not itself in the position to exercise such discretion. By its own admission, 
CEOS did not make a full review of the witness statements here, and CEOS certainly did not sit 
down across the table and speak to these witnesses. We understand that was apparently not its 
perceived role. But, CEOS should recognize that at least one prosecutor in this case — the Chief of 
the SAO Sex Crimes Division has done so. Lana Belohlavek not only met with and interviewed 
these witnesses during the course of the 15-month state investigation prior to any federal 
involvement, but she again sat across the table from many of them in connection with recent civil 
3 It is important to note here that this investi ation was launched not u n the complaint of an alle ed victim, but, 
rather, upon the complaint of 
father 
and her stepmother, 
More 
Hardly pillars of credibility. Yet, the USAO did not supply this information to the 
defense. Even more telling is the fact that 
filed a 
lawsuit purportedly on behalf of his 
daughter without her authority or knowledge. 
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0 
depositions in this matter. Ms. Helohlavek, and the SAO, is likewise well familiar with the breadth 
of the federal investigation, and has integrated that knowledge into the current enhanced state 
sentencing recommendation. The SAO remains firm in the position that the proposed state resolution 
is a sound one, and that there was no child exploitation here. Notably, however, not once during the 
pendency of the federal investigation has the USA° ever reached out to its state prosecutive 
counterpart that initiated this investigation in the first place to discuss the issues or to thoroughly 
ferret out the facts or the witness credibility issues. 
In the eight lines the CEOS letter accords to the topic of witness credibility CEOS asserts, 
"there are multiple mutually-corroborating witnesses," (CEOS letter at p. 3). However, the CEOS 
letter does not highlight a single one. In contrast, we have put forth numerous "mutually 
corroborating" witness statements. Far from supporting a federal prosecution, these statements 
instead corroborate that I) the alleged victims lied to Mr. Epstein about their age; 2) there was no use 
of a facility of interstate commerce by Mr. Epstein; 3) there was no inducement or coercion; 4) there 
was no commercial enterprise; and 5) there was no illicit sexual conduct. 
Indeed, Mr. Epstein took several steps to ensure that no minors entered his home most 
notably, by affirmatively asking the women whether they were actually 18. age., 
. At 
38-39. That fact — which many of the potential witnesses have confirmed in sworn interviews —
strongly indicates that Mr. Epstein specifically intended to preclude an ne under 18 from giving 
him a massage. That fact is confirmed by, among other things, 
testimony that "he 
likes the girls that are between the ages of like 18 and 20 . . . ." 
Tr. at 12. In fact, the 
evidence bears out that the majority of the women who came to Mr. Epstein's residence to provide a 
massage were over 18. 
Many of the young women who were aged 16 and 17 visited Mr. Epstein's residence only 
once or twice, and the evidence strong] shows that the lied to Mr. Epstein about their age. Two of 
these individuals, 
and 
, were 14 and 15 at the time the met Mr. 
Epstein. Given that each has brought a civil lawsuit against Mr. Epstein, with 
and her 
family seeking 
from Mr. Epstein, their testimony against Mr. Epstein is per se suspect. 
But, despite their obvious incentive to harm Mr. Epstein their testimony actually confirms his 
innocence. 
for instance, has testified that 
, who introduced her to Mr. 
Epstein, expressly told her to lie to Mr. Epstein about her age. 
Q: 
And 
told you that if you weren't 18 Epstein wouldn't let you into his house, 
right? 
A: 
That's — yes, yes. 
. (deposition) at 32. 
Q: 
You didn't want Mr. Epstein to know that you were lying about your age, right? 
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A: 
Correct. 
Q: 
You didn't want Mr. Epstein to know that you were not 18 yet, right? 
A: 
Correct. 
(deposition) at 36. 
In fact, 
told Mr. Epstein that she was 18 years old, and confirmed this fact with 
Palm Beach Police. Id. at 36. Beyond that, 
"swore on her mother's grave" that she 
and Mr. Epstein did not engage in sex of any kind. 
. (deposition) at 24. Shc further 
repeatedly explained that prior to the time she went to Mr. Epstcin's house (she went there only 
once), nobody ever tried to coerce her to en 
e in sexual activity with Mr. Epstein. Not over the 
telephone, not over the Internet, not at all. 
. (deposition) at 31.32. These arc not facts 
upon which a federal case can stand. 
age was also unknown to Mr 
stein when she went to his home. 
who was introduced to Mr. Epstein by 
, testified in her federal sworn interview 
that 
. 
told her to lie to Epstein. s$ce 
Tr. at 8 ("she just said make sure you're 18 
because Jeffrey doesn't want 
underage girls") (emphasis added). 
testimony 
strongly suggests that M. 
lied to Mr. Epstein about her own age as well.
also self represented that she worked at a local 
massage parlor that presumably required a 
minimum age. 
The conduct of 
is likewise illustrative of "mutuall y corroborating" testimon 
whi
 the fact that this is not an appropriate federal case. In the same way that 
was referred to Mr. r stein and brought to his home without having been introduced or 
acquainted in any manner, Ill. 
was referred by someone else, 
, who also told 
her to lie to Mr. Epstein about her age, which she did. MI Tr. at pp. 8-9). 
CEOS seeks to buttress the USAO prosecution by asserting "it is possible to satisfy that 
element [proof of specific intent as to the age of the alleged victims] with proof that the defendant 
was deliberately ignorant of facts which would suggest that the person was a minor." (CEOS letter 
at p. 2). Such assertion is counter to the law and to the facts. Reliance on a deliberate ignorance 
standard as to any of the three statutes in issue requires the factual predicate of an intent not to learn 
of an incriminating fact. This is the antithesis of the factual context of this case where there is 
repeated proof that the minors believed that they had to lie because Mr. Epstein had an actual 
practice of attempting to verify age, and would not let them in his house if they were under the age of 
18. See United States v. Kennard, 472 F.3d 851, 857-858 (1 3'Cir. 2006), quoting, United States v 
Puche, 350 F.3d t 137, 1149 (11th Cir. 2003) (An instruction on deliberate ignorance is appropriate 
only if it is shown [among other things] ... that the defendant purposely contrived to avoid learning 
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of all of the facts in order to have a defense in the event of a subsequent prosecution."). Thus, the 
facts preclude reliance on the concept of deliberate ignorance as a substitute for proof. 
The fact that the search warrant affidavit in this case is rife with mis-statements and 
omissions regarding the key element of age is critical. However, CEOS concludes with no apparent 
supporting analysis, "despite the numerous factual errors you describe, the U.S. Attorney's Office 
could still plausibly argue that the mistakes - whether inadvertent or intentional - were not material 
to the determination ... ." (CEOS letter at p. 3). Although, as CEOS notes, there are "numerous" 
such misrepresentations, through affirmative statement or intentional omission, a focus on but one of 
those mis 
resentations highlights that such misrepresentations were, in fact, material. The fact is 
that 
grossly misrepresented Mr. Epstein's intent as it related to the age of the 
women he permitted entry to his residence. 
In the search warrant affidavit, 
affirmed that 
claimed: 
(Mr. E stein told her the younger the better. 
And, 
stated she once tried to bring a 23 year old female and Epstein stated that the 
female was too old. 
What 
no doubt intentionally, omitted was I
furtherexplanation, 
which rendered Mr. Epstein's comments innocuous: 
A: 
Let me put it this way, he — I tried to bring him a woman who was 23 and he didn't 
really like it. 
Q: 
He didn't go for it? 
A: 
It's not that he didn't go for it. It's just that he didn't care for it. And he likes the 
girls that are between the ages of 18 and 20. 
Statement at 12) (emphasis 
added). 
Had that critical information, information that turns allegedly illegal conduct into more 
innocent conduct, been included, it would have seriously undermined the probable cause for the 
search warrant. 
Similarly, and equally problematic, 
did not include the many statements 
demonstrating that, when asked by Mr. Epstein, the women affirmatively misrepresented their ages 
as bem 18, and/or that Mr. E stein was not aware of their true ages. Indeed, although 
did note that 
told Mr. Epstein that she was 18, he omitted from the affidavit 
the key point as to why she lied: 
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said tell him you're 18 because if you're not, he won't let you in his house. 
So I said I was IS. As I was giving him a massage, he was like how old are you. 
And then I was like 18. But I kind of said it really fast because I didn't want to make 
it sound like I was lying or anything. 
. at 38-39. 
Thus, consistent with the guidance provided in Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978), the 
search warrant affidavit in this case reveals knowing and reckless falsehoods and omitted material 
information. This is precisely the type the United States Supreme Court sought to guard against. 
The age of the alleged victims, and of Mr. Epstein's intent in that regard, is an clement of the 
crimes that must be proven in order to sustain a conviction. In particular, § 2422(b) requires that the 
defendant specifically intended to target a minor. ke,ligh, United States v. Murrell, 368 F.3d 1286 
(11th Cir. 2004) ("[T]o prove an attempt the government must first prove that [defendant], using the 
Internet, acted with a specific intent to persuade, induce, entice, or coerce a minor to engage in 
unlawful sex.") (Emphasis added). Section 2422(b) expressly requires that the crime be committed 
"knowingly," and that requisite mental element applies as to each element of the crime. United 
Slates v, XCitement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 68.69 (1994); United States v. Meek, 366 F.3d 705, 
718 (9lh Cir. 2004); United States  v. Root, 296 F.3d 1222, 1227 (111h Cir. 2002); United States v. 
J3ailey 228 F.3d 637, 638-639 (6'h Cir. 2000). How, then, could the USAO "plausibly argue" that a 
misrepresentation about an element of the crime could be viewed as "not material"? If the elements 
of the alleged crime are not met, there is no probable cause to sustain the search warrant in the first 
instance. If the elements are not met, there is no federal crime. That is material. 
Moreover, it is clear from the plaint text of the statute that the statutorily proscribed act 
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §2422(b) is the actual use of a facility of interstate commerce to persuade, 
entice, induce, or coerce. "The underlying criminal conduct Congress expressly proscribed in passing 
§2422(b) is the persuasion, inducement, enticement, or coercion of the minor rather than the sex act 
itself. That is, if a person persuaded a minor to engage in sexual conduct (e.g., with himself or a third 
party) without then committing any sex act himself, he would nevertheless violate §2422(b)." United 
$tateAys_Murrgl1, 368 F.3d 1283, 1286 (11th Cir. 2004). See also, United States v. Bailey, 228 F.3d 
637, 639 (6`11 Cir. 2000) ("Congress has made a clear choice to criminalize persuasion and the 
attempt to persuade, not the performance of the sexual acts themselves."). Thus, if there has been 
sexual misconduct (which we deny) without the requisite persuasion, there is no violation of this 
federal law. 
The investigation and testimony in this case makes clear that Mr. Epstein did not use any 
facility of interstate commerce to commit any act forbidden by 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b)—to persuade, 
ind 
is coerce--nor did he direct any of his assistants to do so. Indeed, by way of example, 
was clear on this point at her deposition during which she repeatedly testified that 
nobody—not Mr. Epstein or any of his assistants—ever used th
phone in any way to try 
to persuade her to engage in sexual activity with Mr. Epstein. 
. (deposition) at 31.32. 
Nonetheless, even assuming, arguendo, that persuasion to engage in sexual conduct occurred over 
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the telephone (which we deny), it is black letter law that the mens rea must coincide with the actus 
reus. Thus, the government must prove that Mr. Epstein has the specific intent to target a known 
minor to engage in prohibited sexual activity as the time of the call. We have seen zero evidence of 
this. To the extent Mr. Epstein later may have persuaded a particular individual to engage in 
unlawful sexual activity during a massage, such persuasion occurred face to face, and can not work 
retroactively to render the earlier phone call an offense under the statute. 
As to the purported violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2423 for allegedly traveling in interstate 
commerce for the purpose of engaging in illicit sexual activity, CEOS does not deny that Mr. Epstein 
was returning to one of his residences when he traveled to Florida.° CEOS explicitly stated it "fully 
understand[s] our argument" (CEOS letter at p.2) that Mr. Epstein should not be charged under 
§ 2423(b) because the dominant purpose for his traveling to Palm Beach was not to engage in illegal 
sexual activity, but to simply return to one of his residences. Rather, this is apparently another 
"compelling" point of law which may be left to "a court to decide whether the law properly reaches 
such conduct." (CEOS letter at p. 2).5 Notably, implicit in this concession by CEOS is that the law 
has never before been so applied, that is, there is no precedent for a court to extend the statute as the 
USAO seeks to do here. In fact, the United States Supreme Court prohibited the criminalization of 
travel under identical circumstances over a half century ago. Sce, Mortenson v. United Stalo, 322 
U.S. 369,374 (1944) (intention to engage in proscribed conduct must "exist before the conclusion of 
the interstate journey and must be the dominate motive of such interstate movement." (Emphasis 
added.) 
Beyond an absence of proof regarding the travel element in connection with 18 U.S.C. §2423, 
the requisite age requirement for a violation of that statute is important. 18 U.S.C. §2423, by 
reference to Chapter 109A (18 U.S.C. §2423(f)(1)), specifically defines a minor for purposes of that 
statute as an individual who has not attained the age of 16. If an alleged victim is 16 years of age or 
older, a violation of this statute pursuant to 2423(0(1) can only occur if it can be proven that force, 
threat or drugs were involved. See, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2241 et seq. There are no such allegations here. As 
a result, in order to find a violation under 18 U.S.C. § 2423, the United States would have to prove 
that Mr. Epstein engaged in one of the sexual acts defined at 18 U.S.C. § 2246(2) with an individual 
under the age of 16, and that he formed the intent and dominant purpose to do soprior to the time he 
made a return trip to Florida. Again, there is no such evidence here. 
has specifically 
testified that I) she never engaged in sexual activity with Mr. Epstein; 2) she never even met or 
talked to Mr. Epstein prior to her arrival at his house; and 3) she lied about her age not only to Mr. 
Epstein, but, in fact, to the world on her MySpace page when she said that she was 18 years old. It is, 
then, also worth noting in this regard that 18 U.S.C. §§2243(c) provides an affirmative defense if 
proven by a preponderance of the evidence if Mr. Epstein reasonably believed that 
was 
4 In addition to his residence there, Mr. Epstein also has several businesses, and personal matters and contacts to which 
he attends in Florida. For example, beginning in 2002, Mr. Epstein visited his mother nearly every weekend in Palm 
Beach until she passed away in April, 2004. 
5 As previously set forth herein, and as more fully explained in other submissions related to this case, the recent 
Supreme Court decisions in &mos and gkellgi make this attempted stretch of the law improper. 
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had attained the requisite legal age. Finally, although 18 U.S.C. §2423(0(2) also defines "illicit 
sexual conduct" as any commercial sex act with a person under the age of IS, 18 U.S.C. §2423(g) 
also provides a specific affirmative defense as to that age element if proven by a preponderance of 
the evidence that Mr. Epstein reasonably believed that the young women had attained the requisite 
legal age. As we have demonstrated, time and again the women involved lied to Mr. Epstein as to 
their true age, representing that they were, in fact, over the age of 18. Many of them also represented 
that they worked at local massage parlors, which presumably would have imposed a legal age 
requirement. 
Lastly, in contrast to 18 U.S.C. §1591, Mr. Epstein's conduct did not involve trafficking of 
women or children in the sex industry, and was not part of any phenomenon that, in the aggregate, 
had an economic impact on interstate or foreign commerce. Additionally, Mr. Epstein did not 
benefit financially from the alleged conduct. Therefore, as the SAO determined, and still believes, 
Mr. Epstein was a customer, a "John" for whom prosecutions are best left to the State to address. 
Indeed, there is no reported precedent extending federal law to a local "John" who does not violate 
the child exploitation statutes. Indeed, CEOS does not point to a single case where federal 
prosecutors have used § 1591 in a case involving facts like these. Instead, every § 1591 prosecution 
has involved national or international sex trafficking and/or for-profit prostitution rings, involving 
the knowing use of minors and/or forcible coercion, or forcible rape, physical abuse or intimidation. 
These arc the elements required by the statute, and they are not met here. 
Although CEOS could, perhaps, point to United Slat% v. Evans, 476 F.3d 1176 (11°' Cir. 
2007) as a case that, standing alone, involved wholly intrastate conduct, the facts of that case are far 
different in key respects than this one. The Evans case involved both the commercial and coercive 
components that Congress, and administration policy statements intended in 18 U.S.C. § 1591 
prosecutions. Evans, and his co-conspirators (Madison and Yeasty) were not "Johns." They 
operated a for profit prostitution ring marked by control of, and extreme violence toward, the 
victims, who they knew were underage. Indeed, Evans forced one such victim, age 14 years old, to 
continue to work even after she had been hospitalized with AIDS. As part of their business, Evans 
and his co-conspirators provided the victims with cell phones, hotels, and condoms, and the victims 
were forced to give all of their money from this prostitution ring to Evans and his co-conspirators. 
None of this type of activity comes close to the facts regarding Mr. Epstein. Finally, but significantly, 
the prostitution ring in Evans was not, in fact, entirely intrastate as the companion cast of one of the 
Evans co-defendants makes clear. See, United States v. Madison, 477 F.3d 1312, 1313-1314 (11th
Cir. 2007) (Jane Doe 42 stated that she traveled to Atlanta, Georgia with Madison to work as a 
prostitute). 
Thus, courts, including the Eleventh Circuit in Evans, have underscored the point that § 1591 
simply is not intended to cover the kind of alleged conduct at issue here. "Section 1591 does not 
criminalize all acts of prostitution (a vice traditionally governed by state regulation). Rather, its 
reach is limited to sex trafficking that involves children or is accomplished by force, fraud, or 
coercion." United States v. Evans 476 F.3d at 1179 n. 1. Sec aho United States v, Sims, 171 Fed. 
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Appx. 849, 2006 WL 14581 at *3 (11t  Cir. 2006) (to establish Sims's guilt on the sex trafficking of 
a minor count, the government had to show that Sims benefited financially from Owen's sexual 
activity and that Sims knew that (a) force or cocrcion would be used to cause Owens to engage in a 
criminal sex act or (b) that Owens was under the age of 18.) (emphasis added). Again, none of these 
factors is present in this case. The Eleventh Circuit's interpretation of the statute makes perfect 
sense: were § 1591 not limited in this fashion, it would threaten to criminalize a host of localized 
behavior that has nothing to do with human trafficking, and, thus, is of no valid federal interest. 
In sum, to accord discretion to the USAO, albeit without benefit of the requested full de novo 
review, to exercise authority to pursue a prosecution which involves a "novel" application of three 
federal statutes in the face of numerous "compelling arguments" is not warranted, as it is not 
supported by the facts, the law, or justice. Echoing the admonition of the Supreme Court in the 
Berger decision, the Comment to Rule 3.8 of the Rules of Professional Conduct (Special 
Responsibilities of a Prosecutor), says it best "A prosecutor has the responsibility of a minister of 
justicc and not simply that of an advocate. This responsibility carries with it specific obligations to 
see that a defendant is accorded procedural justice and that guilt is decided upon the basis of 
sufficient evidence." This is a responsibility that can not be taken for granted. The government bears 
the burden of assuring that it possesses sufficient evidence to prove each element of a crime with 
respect to some specific victim before publicly branding Mr. Epstein a child molester. In this case, 
however, the USAO has not mct its burden for any victim for any of the crimes alleged. It is not 
enough to simply gloss over the required proof, and rely on the jury or the court to just sort it all out 
in the end. The stakes arc too high. As a result, the USAO should not be permitted to pursue an 
unfounded federal criminal case against Mr. Epstein under the guise of prosecutorial discretion. 
Such prosecution in this case necessarily would appear to be selective to Mr. Epstein. To be 
clear, our request that Mr. Epstein should not be prosecuted federally would not permit him to go 
completely unpunished, but, rather, would simply place him in the same prosecution position as 
others similarly situated. Therefore, we continue to believe that after a complete, de novo, and 
independent review, the only appropriate conclusion will be that this case is best left to the state to 
resolve. 
„5:Feiz
sz_
Very trul yours, 
STEPHANIE D. THACKER 
SDT/kdt 
Enclosures 
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