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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK 
United States of America, 
—v—
Ghislaine Maxwell, 
Defendant. 
USDC SDNY 
DOCUMENT 
ELECTRONICALLY FILED 
DOC //: 
DATE FILED: 4/29/22 
20-CR-330 (MN) 
OPINION & ORDER 
ALISON J. NATHAN, Circuit Judge, sitting by designation: 
In 2020, the Defendant Ghislaine Maxwell was indicted for her participation in a scheme 
to entice, transport, and traffic underage girls for sexual abuse by and with Jeffrey Epstein, her 
longtime companion. The Government at trial presented extensive witness testimony from 
multiple victim witnesses and others, as well as corroborating documentary and physical 
evidence. The testimony and other trial evidence established the Defendant's role in grooming 
and recruiting underage girls and using the cover of massage to perpetrate sexual abuse. 
Following the thirteen-day trial, the Court submitted to the jury the six counts in the 
Indictment. The jury deliberated for over five days and returned a verdict of guilty on five of the 
six counts. Two of these counts of conviction charged the Defendant with substantive violations 
of federal statutes that target sexual abuse of minors—the Mann Act as to Count Four and the 
Trafficking Victims Protection Act as to Count Six. The other three counts of conviction, 
Counts One, Three, and Five, charged the Defendant with conspiring with Jeffrey Epstein to 
violate those same statutes from 1994 to 2004. 
Before the Court are the Defendant's post-trial motions making four alternative 
arguments for vacating some or all of her five counts of conviction. First, the Defendant argues 
that judgment may be imposed on only one of the three conspiracy counts (i.e., Counts One, 
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Three, and Five) because they are "multiplicitous"—meaning that they all charge the same 
offense—and therefore entry of judgment on all three counts would violate the Fifth 
Amendment's Double Jeopardy Clause. Second, she requests under Rule 29 of the Federal Rules 
of Criminal Procedure that the Court acquit her of all counts because there is insufficient 
evidence for any rational juror to find her guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Third, the 
Defendant moves to vacate Counts One, Three, and Four under Rule 33 because, she claims, the 
convictions were based on a constructive amendment of, or variance from, the Indictment. And 
fourth, she requests that the Court vacate all five convictions because the Government 
intentionally and prejudicially delayed its prosecution. 
With one exception, the motions are denied. The Rule 29 motion challenging all counts 
of conviction is denied because the jury's guilty verdicts were readily supported by the extensive 
witness testimony and documentary evidence admitted at trial. Further, those counts of 
conviction matched the core of criminality charged in the Indictment, presented by the 
Government at trial, and on which the jury was accurately instructed. The Defendant's contrary 
claim of a constructive amendment of or variance from the Indictment rests on an implausible 
and speculative interpretation of a single ambiguous jury note. In addition, the Court concludes 
that the Government did not intentionally delay its prosecution and, in any event, the 
Defendant's ability to prepare a defense was not prejudiced by any delay. 
The Court does conclude, however, that the three conspiracy counts charge the same 
offense, and, accordingly, are multiplicitous. The Government concedes that Count One is 
multiplicitous with Count Three but argues that Count Three and Count Five nevertheless 
involve distinct conspiracies. The Court concludes that Count Five, like Counts One and Three, 
charges the Defendant's participation in the same decade-long unlawful agreement with the 
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Defendant's continuous coconspirator, Jeffrey Epstein. The overarching conspiracy—which, as 
the Government argued and proved at trial, employed a single "playback" to groom and sexually 
abuse underage girls—constitutes a single conspiracy offense with multiple victims. Because the 
Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits the Court from imposing multiple punishments for the same 
offense, the Court will enter judgment on Count Three alone among the conspiracy counts. This 
legal conclusion in no way calls into question the factual findings made by the July. Rather, it 
underscores that the jury unanimously found—three times over—that the Defendant is guilty of 
conspiring with Epstein to entice, transport, and traffic underage girls for sexual abuse. 
I. 
The Court grants the Defendant's multiplicity claim. 
The Defendant was indicted on six counts: (I) conspiracy to entice individuals under the 
age of seventeen to travel in interstate commerce with intent to engage in sexual activity illegal 
under New York law, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371; (2) enticement of individuals under the 
age of seventeen to travel in interstate commerce with intent to engage in sexual activity illegal 
under New York law, and aiding and abetting the same, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2422, 2; (3) 
conspiracy to transport individuals under the age of seventeen to travel in interstate commerce 
with intent to engage in sexual activity illegal under New York law, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 371; (4) transportation of an individual under the age of seventeen with intent to engage in 
sexual activity illegal under New York law, and aiding and abetting the same, in violation of 18 
U.S.C. §§ 2423(a), 2; (5) conspiracy to commit sex trafficking of individuals under the age of 
eighteen, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371; and (6) sex trafficking of an individual under the age of 
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eighteen, and aiding and abetting the same, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1591, 2. S2 Indictment, 
Dkt. No. 187.' 
In two prior pretrial motions, the Defendant requested that the Court dismiss two of the 
three conspiracy counts—that is, Counts One, Three, and Five—as multiplicitous, given that all 
three were premised on the Defendant's participation in a single criminal conspiracy with 
Epstein. To punish her for all three counts, she argued, would violate the Double Jeopardy 
Clause. In opinions dated April 16, 2021, and August 13, 2021, the Court denied those motions 
as premature because the Double Jeopardy Clause would prohibit only multiple punishments for 
the same offense, but not indictments for the same offense. United States v. Maxwell, 534 F. 
Supp. 3d 299, 322 (S.D.N.Y. 2021) (citing United States v. Josephberg, 459 F.3d 350, 355 (2d 
Cir. 2006)); United States v. Maxwell, No. 20-CR-330 (AJN), 2021 WL 3591801, at *5 
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 2021). 
Because the jury convicted the Defendant on all three conspiracy counts, the Defendant 
now requests that the Court impose judgment on only one of these counts. Maxwell Br. at 19, 
Dkt. No. 600. The Government concedes that Counts One and Three are multiplicitous and 
agrees that the Court should not impose judgment on Count One, but it argues that Counts Three 
and Five are distinct offenses premised on distinct criminal conspiracies, and so the Court should 
impose judgment on both. Gov. Br. at 24, Dkt. No. 621. 
On consent of both parties, the Court will not impose judgment on Count One because it 
is multiplicitous. For the reasons that follow, the Court further grants the Defendant's motion to 
also not enter judgment on Count Count Five because it is also multiplicitous with Count Three. 
I The original and S2 Indictments also included two counts of perjury. See S2 Indictment II 28-31. The Court 
granted the Defendant's motion to sever those counts for a separate trial. United States v. Maxwell, 534 F. Supp. 3d 
299, 321 (S.D.N.Y. 2021). 
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A. Applicable law 
The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment guarantees that no person shall "be 
subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." U.S. Const. amend. V. 
That guarantee "serves principally as a restraint on courts and prosecutors," ensuring that a court 
does not "exceed its legislative authorization by imposing multiple punishments for the same 
offense." Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 165 (1977); see also Morris v. Reynolds, 264 F.3d 38, 
48 (2d Cir. 2001). An indictment is multiplicitous, and therefore implicates double jeopardy, 
"when it charges a single offense as an offense multiple times, in separate counts, when, in law 
and fact, only one crime has been committed." Maxwell, 534 F. Supp. 3d at 322 (quoting United 
States v. Chacko, 169 F.3d 140, 145 (2d Cir. 1999)). "A claim of multiplicity cannot succeed, 
however, 'unless the charged offenses are the same in fact and in law.'" United States v. Jones, 
482 F.3d 60, 72 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting United States v. Estrada, 320 F.3d 173, 180 (2d Cir. 
2003)). 
If the two offenses at issue are both conspiracies charged under the same statute, then the 
multiplicity inquiry turns on whether the two conspiracies are the same "in fact," meaning they 
involve the same agreement. United States v. Araujo, No. 17-CR-438 (VEC), 2018 WL 
3222527, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July 2, 2018) (citing United States v. Ansaldi, 372 F.3d 118, 124-25 
(2d Cir. 2004)); United States v. Gaskin, 364 F.3d 438, 454 (2d Cir. 2004) ("[T]o survive a 
double jeopardy attack, the government would have to show that the two schemes involved 
'distinct' agreements."). Yet "whether the evidence shows a single conspiracy or more than one 
conspiracy is often not determinable as a matter of law or subject to bright-line formulations." 
Jones, 482 F.3d at 72. Rather, the parties agree that the Court's inquiry is guided by the Second 
Circuit's Kmfant factors. See, e.g., United States v. Diallo, 507 F. App'x 89, 91 (2d Cir. 2013) 
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(summary order) (citing United States v. Korfant, 771 F.2d 660, 662 (2d Cir. 1985) (per 
curiam)); United States v. Villa, 744 F. App'x 716, 720 (2d Cir. 2018) (summary order). Those 
factors include: 
(1) the criminal offenses charged in successive indictments; (2) the overlap of 
participants; (3) the overlap of time; (4) similarity of operation; (5) the existence 
of common overt acts; (6) the geographic scope of the alleged conspiracies or 
location where overt acts occurred; (7) common objectives; and (8) the degree of 
interdependence between alleged distinct conspiracies. 
United States v. Macchia, 35 F.3d 662, 667 (2d Cir. 1994) (quoting Korfant, 771 F.2d at 662). In 
applying the Korfant factors, "no dominant factor or single touchstone" determines whether two 
allegedly distinct conspiracies "'appear in fact and in law the same." Id. at 668 (quoting United 
States v. Reiter, 848 F.2d 336, 340 (2d Cir. 1988)). Moreover, "the Korfant list is not 
exhaustive, and every case must be assessed on its own terms . . . based on the entire record." 
United States v. Maslin, 356 F.3d 191, 196 (2d Cir. 2004). 
In assessing the evidence, the Second Circuit applies a burden-shifting framework. The 
defendant carries the initial burden of making a non-frivolous showing that the two counts in fact 
charge only one conspiracy. If met, the burden then shifts to the Government to show, "by a 
preponderance of the evidence, that there are in fact two distinct conspiracies and that the 
defendant is not being placed in jeopardy twice for the same crime." United States v. Lopez, 356 
F.3d 463, 467 (2d Cir. 2004) (per curiam) (citing United States v. Del Vecchio, 800 F.2d 21, 22 
(2d Cir. 1986)); see also United States v. Mallah, 503 F.2d 971, 986 (2d Cir. 1974) (applying this 
burden-shifting approach post-conviction); United States v. Hernandez, No. 09-CR-625 (HB), 
2009 WL 3169226, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 1, 2009). 
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B. Analysis 
A further summary of the two counts at issue is required. As briefly outlined above, 
Count Three of the Indictment charged the Defendant under 18 U.S.C. § 371, the general federal 
conspiracy statute, with conspiring to violate 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a) (the Mann Act), by 
transporting minors across state lines with the intent to engage in sexual activity criminalized by 
state law. S2 Indictment ¶¶ 16-18. In this case, the relevant state offense was New York Penal 
Law Section 130.55, which criminalizes sexual contact with an individual known to be under the 
age of seventeen. Trial Tr. 3034-35. The Count Three conspiracy spanned from 1994 to 2004. 
S2 Indictment 1 17. As the Government explained in its summation, the jury could convict the 
Defendant under Count Three based on evidence related ta 
three victims who testified at trial. Trial Tr. at 2895.2
Count Five of the Indictment also charged the Defendant under 18 U.S.C. § 371, but for 
conspiring to violate 18 U.S.C. §§ 1591(a) & (b) (the Trafficking Victims Protection Act), by 
trafficking individuals under the age of eighteen for commercial sex acts that affect interstate 
commerce. S2 Indictment 9¶ 22-24. Count Five's conspiracy spanned from 2001 to 2004. Id. 
123. The Government explained to the jury that it could convict the Defendant on Count Five 
based on evidence related to 
Trial Tr. at 2896. 
The Defendant primarily contends that Count Five is a subset of, is subsumed in, or is 
otherwise too similar to Count Three under the Korfant factors. The Court agrees. Although 
some Korfant factors favor the Government, the weight of the factors-supplemented by a 
review of the Government's case presented at trial—demonstrates that the Government has not 
2 The Court permitted certain victim witnesses to testify using a pseudonym or first name. See Nov. I, 2021 Tr. at 
6-7. 
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met its burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the counts are not 
multiplicitous. 
The offenses charged and common objectives. Both Counts Three and Five are charged 
under the same statute, 18 U.S.C. § 371, for conspiracy to commit an offense against the United 
States. But going beyond this "general level" of similarity, the statutory objectives of the two 
counts differ. Macchia, 35 F.3d at 669. Count Three is a conspiracy to violate § 2423(a) and 
Count Five a conspiracy to violate § 1591. These differing statutory objectives entail legal 
differences. Count Three, for example, charges unlawful sexual activity (defined as sexual 
touching of a minor) while Count Five charges commercial sexual activity with a minor. And 
each provision defines "minor" differently: under seventeen years old for Count Three but under 
eighteen years old for Count Five. Further, Count Three requires an agreement with intent to 
transport across state lines, while Count Five's agreement requires only intent of sexual activity 
that affects interstate commerce. These differences push the first Korfant factor in the 
Government's favor. See Estrada, 320 F.3d at 182 (distinguishing between a conspiracy to 
distribute cocaine and one to distribute crack); United States v. Villa, No. 3:12-CR-40 (JBA), 
2014 WL 252013, at *4 (D. Conn. Jan. 22, 2014), aff'd, 744 F. App'x 716 (2d Cir. 2018) 
(summary order) (distinguishing between a § 371 conspiracy to "commit theft from an interstate 
shipment and to transport stolen property across state lines" and one to "sell stolen property"). 
The Government, however, ens in suggesting that this factor alone is "fatal" to the 
Defendant's multiplicity claim. Gov. Br. at 29. To the contrary, no single Koifant factor is 
dominant or dispositive. Macchia, 35 F.3d at 668. And courts in this district have found two 
conspiracy counts to be the same offense even when they have different statutory objectives 
because both counts can arise from the same agreement. E.g., Hernandez, 2009 WL 3169226, at 
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*11 (concluding that conspiracies to defraud the United States and to commit mail and wire 
fraud were the same conspiracy as earlier conspiracy to use or transfer false IDs). After all, "[a] 
single agreement to commit several crimes constitutes one conspiracy." United States v. Broce, 
488 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1989). The Government implicitly conceded this point of law when it 
agreed that Counts One and Three were multiplicitous. Count One charges a conspiracy to 
entice minors to travel across state lines in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2422 while Count Three 
charges a conspiracy to transport minors across state lines in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a). 
Despite distinct statutory predicates for these two § 371 conspiracies, the Government did not 
contest that they were the same offense. Though Count Five is unquestionably less similar to 
Count Three than is Count One, the difference in statutory predicates does not end the matter. It 
is well established that a single conspiracy can contain multiple objectives, particularly if the 
objectives share important similarities, as they do here. United States v. Salameh, 152 F.3d 88, 
148 (2d Cir. 1998) (citing United States v. 4/Irani, 968 F.2d 1512, 1518 (2d Cir. 1992)). 
Overlap of participants. The participants in the two conspiracies in Counts Three and 
Five substantially overlap with one another. Of course, the defendant will always overlap 
between two allegedly multiplicitous conspiracies, so their participation in both conspiracies has 
negligible significance. Villa, 2014 WL 252013, at *5. More importantly here, Epstein was the 
Defendant's primary coconspirator in both conspiracies, and the Government argued that in both 
conspiracies the Defendant played the same role of acquiring underage girls for Epstein to 
sexually abuse. They were, the Government explained, "partners in crime" over the decade 
alleged in the Indictment. E.g., Trial Tr. at 34, 2842, 2885; see also id. at 41 ("For a decade, the 
defendant played an essential role in this scheme."). This overlap in key participants, and in core 
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roles played by those participants, significantly favors the Defendant as to the second Korfant 
factor. See Macchia, 35 F.3d at 669; Hernandez, 2009 WL 3169226, at *II. 
The Government responds that the Count Five conspiracy included 
who 
was not involved in Count Three. Yet 
received far less attention than other conspirators 
in the Government's case, being mentioned only briefly in the Government's opening statement 
and closing arguments. E.g., Trial Tr. at 2876 (noting, "and sometimes 
would call, 
too"). Conspiracies often change membership without forming a new, distinct conspiracy, 
particularly if key members of the conspiracy remain over the course of a decade. See United 
States v. Eppolito, 543 F.3d 25, 48 (2d Cir. 2008). 
participation beginning in 2001 
therefore does not shift the import of the second Korfant factor. 
Overlap of time. The time periods of the two counts overlap completely. Namely, Count 
Five's period of 2001 to 2004 is "wholly within the time frame" of Count Three from 1994 to 
2004, which substantially favors the Defendant on this Korfant factor. United States v. 
Calderone, 982 F.2d 42, 47 (2d Cir. 1992). The Government's attempt to minimize this factor 
by noting that most overt acts for Count Three occurred in the 1990s is simply not reflected in 
this circuit's case law. See, e.g., Macchia, 35 F.3d at 669 (focusing on the overlap in time frame 
alleged in the indictment). The overlap in time here raises the inference that one conspiracy 
wholly encompasses the other, and that inference tips in the Defendant's favor. See Araujo, 
2018 WL 3222527, at *6. 
Similarity of operations. Counts Three and Five involve significant similarities in 
operations. The methods by which the Defendant groomed and facilitated the sexual abuse of 
minor victims was a central focus of both parties' cases at trial. The Government called as an 
expert witness Dr. Lisa Rocchio, who identified the typical steps in sexual abusers' grooming of 
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minors for sexual abuse. Trial Tr. at 714-19. Applying that expert testimony to the witnesses' 
testimony, the Government argued that the Defendant's conduct as to each victim followed a 
uniform "playbook." E.g., id. at 2184 ("She ran the same playbook again and again and again. 
She manipulated her victims and she groomed them for sexual abuse."), 2853 ("The patterns you 
saw throughout this trial, the playbook that Maxwell ran for years, is just one of the many ways 
that you know that Maxwell is guilty."). And the Government emphasized the many similarities 
in the Defendant's conduct as recounted by all four witnesses. Id. at 2848 ("The similarities 
between what happened to 
e incredibly powerful 
evidence of the defendant's guilt. So I want to talk to you about the playbook that Maxwell ran 
again and again and again."), 2901 ("Four women have testified at this trial about Maxwell. 
They all describe the same woman, the same playbook."). Carolyn was the only witness who 
testified regarding Count Five. The Government argued that her testimony "was corroborated by 
what Annie an 
old [the jury] about Maxwell and how she operated for years." 
Id. at 2880; see also id. at 2895-96 ("Maxwell groomed both 
as part of a 
broader agreement with Epstein to provide him with underage girls for abuse."). The 
Government, in short, argued that the Defendant engaged in substantially the same operations for 
a decade as to all victims under both Counts Three and Five. 
The Government responds that while the Defendant and Epstein continuously conspired 
to sexually abuse minor victims, their conduct beginning in 2001 evolved from developing one-
on-one relationships with their victims to include a "pyramid scheme of abuse," by which they 
acquired underage girls by paying them for so-called "massage" appointments. Gov. Br. at 32 
(quoting Trial Tr. at 40). To be sure, the Government in both its opening statement and its 
closing arguments explained that the Defendant and Epstein's abuse "evolved over the course of 
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a decade," having both the "earlier phase" and the later "pyramid scheme." Trial Tr. at 40; see 
also, e.g., id. at 2886 (describing 2001 as "the beginning of the pyramid scheme of abuse"). But 
a single conspiracy can enter "two or more phases or spheres of operation" without creating a 
discontinuity in the underlying unlawful agreement, particularly if the same people are serving 
the same roles in each phase. United States v. Pena, 846 F. App'x 49, 51 (2d Cir. 2021) 
(summary order) (quoting United States v. Berger, 224 F.3d 107, 114-15 (2d Cir. 2000)); see 
also United States v. Maldonado-Rivera, 922 F.2d 934, 963 (2d Cir. 1990). Notably, the 
Government, after distinguishing between earlier and later phases in the pattern of abuse, 
immediately emphasized that "[fJor a decade, the defendant played an essential role in this 
scheme," blurring any difference between the two phases. Trial Tr. at 41. 
Moreover, though these phases did involve some differing means to acquire minor 
victims, the differences presented at trial were not as great as the Government suggests in its 
brief. As to both counts, both before and after 2001, the Government emphasized that massage 
was a primary means by which the Defendant and Epstein normalized bodily contact and also the 
means by which the Defendant and Epstein commonly instigated instances of sexual abuse. 
Compare id. at 40 ("You will learn that in the 1990s, they used the cover of mentoring young 
girls ... to introduce massage . . . and that you will learn that they used these so called massages 
as a way to sexually abuse the victims."), with id. at 41 ("Under this pyramid scheme of abuse, 
the defendant could just call girls to schedule massage appointments and hand them cash 
afterwards ... ."); e.g., id. at 35 ("You will learn that the cover of massage was the primary way 
the defendant and Epstein lured girls into sexual abuse."), 2852 ("Again and again throughout 
this trial, you heard about how these girls were asked to perform sexualized massages on Jeffrey 
Epstein."). 
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Further, in both counts, the witnesses testified that they received financial gifts and 
payments as a means by which the Defendant and Epstein acquired their victims' trust and 
extended the period of sexual abuse. E.g., id. at 302 (Jane testified that she was given money 
"[a]lmost every visit" and that Epstein paid for things like voice lessons and clothes). The 
Government emphasized such financial gifts as one step in the Defendant's playbook of 
grooming. E.g., id. at 2851 ("Then came the next step in the playbook: Making these girls feel 
special, giving them gifts, making friends, giving them money, promising to help with their 
futures, promises like sending Annie on a trip to Thailand or helping to pay for Jane's voice 
lessons and tuition."), 2890 ("[Jane] told you that Epstein gave her money and gifts and paid for 
school. That money wasn't free .... That is inducement, that is enticement, that is coercion."). 
The financial quid pro quo may have become more explicit beginning in 2001, but that shift in 
approach is not nearly so dramatic as to suggest that the Defendant and Epstein at that time 
entered "a wholly new agreement" with a new "conspiratorial objective." Haji v. Miller, 584 F. 
Supp. 2d 498, 519 (E.D.N.Y. 2008). The similarity-of-operations factor therefore favors the 
Defendant. 
Overlap of geographic scope. There is some, albeit incomplete, geographic overlap 
between the two counts. Count Three focused on travel to New York because the ultimate 
objective of the conspiracy was to transport minors to New York to engage in criminal sexual 
activity in violation of New York law. Count Five, by contrast, focused on Epstein's residence 
in Florida, wher 
were paid to give Epstein sexualized massages. 
Nevertheless, some geographic overlap between the two counts remained. All four witnesses 
testified about sexual conduct by the Defendant or Epstein in locations other than New York, 
whether Florida, New Mexico, or London. The Court admitted such testimony concerning 
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sexual conduct outside of New York as relevant to Count Three because it tended to establish the 
existence of a conspiracy and of the Defendant and Epstein's intent to abuse the victims in New 
York. In sum, the same locations—particularly Florida—were part of the Government's case for 
both counts. And over time, a conspiracy's "shifting emphasis in the location of operations 
do[es] not necessarily require a finding of more than one conspiracy." Eppolito, 543 F.3d at 48 
(quoting Jones, 482 F.3d at 72). This factor therefore favors the Defendant or, at least, is neutral. 
Common overt acts. The Government correctly notes that the overt acts provided to the 
jury for Counts Three and Five are distinct. See Jury Charge, Dkt. No. 565 at 49-50. This factor 
therefore tips toward the Government—but only slightly. A number of the overt acts listed for 
Count Three could have been prosecuted under Count Five but for the fact that 18 U.S.C. § 1591, 
the Trafficking Victims Protection Act, was not enacted until 2000. See Gov. Br. at 28. That 
some identical overt acts were not listed for both conspiracies is therefore more a function of 
legal timing than an indication of two distinct conspiracies. Cf. Hernandez, 2009 WL 3169226, 
at *12. 
Interdependence. Counts Three and Five are not interdependent because the success or 
failure of one conspiracy is independent of the success or failure of the other. See Macchia, 35 
F.3d at 671. In other words, the success of the Defendant and Epstein's scheme to abuse Carolyn 
from 2001 to 2004 was not made more or less likely by the prior success or failure to abuse Jane, 
Annie, or any other underage girl. This factor, however, makes little difference in the final 
analysis if "what was ultimately proven was one common conspiracy." Maslin, 356 F.3d at 197. 
The Government's theory at trial. The Second Circuit has instructed district courts to 
consider not only the enumerated Kotfant factors but to consider the entire record. See id. at 
196; United States v. Olmeda, 461 F.3d 271, 282 (2d Cir. 2006). In Masan, the Second Circuit 
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first explained that applying the Korfant factors led to the conclusion that successive 
prosecutions for conspiracies to distribute marijuana were barred by double jeopardy, but then 
continued, stating that "several additional factors ... not directly addressed in Kolfant ... further 
point toward a finding of double jeopardy," namely, "the fact that the Government, in its opening 
and closing arguments, presented both cases to the jury as broad conspiracies of an essentially 
identical nature." 356 F.3d at 197. The same is true here. As explained above, the 
Government's opening statement and closing arguments presented a theory of a singular 
conspiracy, highlighting: The degree of similarity between each victim witness's experience 
over a decade; the common "playbook" that the Defendant ran "over and over and over again," 
Trial Tr. at 2848; and the tight partnership between the Defendant and Epstein. And each of 
those features was accompanied by references to a singular "scheme" to abuse all victim 
witnesses. Id. at 36, 2843, 2853. At bottom, the case presented to the jury by the Government 
was of a single decade-long conspiracy by the Defendant and Epstein to sexually abuse underage 
girls. Having pursued such a broad and encompassing conspiracy, the Government cannot now 
claim, and cannot carry its burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence, that Count 
Five was legally and factually distinct. See Maslin, 356 F.3d at 197. 
Because Count Three and Count Five are multiplicitous, the proper remedy is to enter 
judgment on only one of the counts. See Josephberg, 459 F.3d at 355 ("If the jury convicts on 
more than one multiplicitous count, the defendant's right not to suffer multiple punishments for 
the same offense will be protected by having the court enter judgment on only one of the 
multiplicitous counts." (citing Ball v. United States, 470 U.S. 856, 865 (1985))). Because Count 
Five is factually subsumed by Count Three, the Court will impose judgment only on Count 
Three. The Court emphasizes, however, that finding Count Five to be multiplicitous "does not 
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overturn any of the factual findings made by the jury" —it means only that, "as a matter of law, 
the jury found the same thing twice." Ansaldi, 372 F.3d at 125. Or, in this case, three times. 
II. 
The Court denies the Defendant's Rule 29 motion. 
The Defendant argues there was insufficient evidence to support any of her five counts of 
conviction, and, therefore, the Court should enter a judgment of acquittal as to all counts under 
Rule 29 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Rule 29 provides, in relevant part, that 
"[a]fter the government closes its evidence or after the close of all the evidence, the court on the 
defendant's motion must enter a judgment of acquittal of any offense for which the evidence is 
insufficient to sustain a conviction." Fed. R. Crim. P. 29(a); United States v. Pugh, 945 F.3d 9, 
19 (2d Cir. 2019). "[T]he critical inquiry on review of the sufficiency of the evidence to support 
a criminal conviction must be . . . to determine whether the record evidence could reasonably 
support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." Jackson v. Viiginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318 
(1979). "The court must make that determination with the evidence against a particular 
defendant, viewed in the light most favorable to the government, and with all reasonable 
inferences resolved in favor of the government." Pugh, 945 F.3d at 19 (cleaned up) (quoting 
Eppolito, 543 F.3d at 45). Under this inquiry, "the relevant question is whether, after viewing 
the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have 
found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319 
(citing Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 362 (1972)); United States v. Zhong, 26 F.4th 536, 
560 (2d Cir. 2022). 
At the close of the Government's case, the Defendant made her Rule 29 application "with 
respect to every count in the S2 indictment," but "confine[d] [her] comments to address 
specifically Counts One and Two." Trial Tr. at 2266. The Court denied the motion. Id. at 2274. 
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Following the close of the defense case, the Defendant renewed her previous Rule 29 
application. Id. at 2736. 
In her brief, the Defendant reiterates her request that the Court "enter a judgment of 
acquittal as to all counts." Maxwell Br. at 30. The Court has deemed Counts One and Five 
multiplicitous, see supra Part I, and therefore the Court will not enter judgment on those counts. 
And at trial, the jury found the Defendant not guilty on Count Two. Thus, the Court will 
consider the sufficiency of the evidence for the remaining counts: Three, Four, and Six. After 
considering the arguments and evidence, the Court denies the Defendant's Rule 29 motion. 
The Court first notes that the Defendant has not provided substantive argument on the 
sufficiency of the evidence—in either the oral application or the post-conviction briefing—for 
Counts Three, Four, or Six. Instead, for these remaining counts, the Defendant simply asserts 
that the Court should "enter a judgment of acquittal as to all counts under Rule 29 . . because 
the government failed to prove each element of the charges beyond a reasonable doubt." 
Maxwell Reply at 18, Dkt. No. 647; Maxwell Br. at 30. The Court disagrees. 
The Court first considers the substantive counts. Count Four charged the Defendant with 
the substantive count of transportation of an individual under the age of seventeen with intent to 
engage in sexual activity in violation of New York law. This count related only to Jane during 
the period 1994 to 1997. The Government was required to establish the following elements 
beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) that the Defendant knowingly transported an individual in 
interstate commerce, as alleged in the Indictment; (2) that the Defendant transported the 
individual with the intent that the individual would engage in sexual activity for which any 
person can be charged with a criminal offense under New York law, as alleged in the Indictment; 
and (3) that the Defendant knew that the individual was less than seventeen years old at the time 
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of the acts alleged in Count Four; or that the Defendant aided and abetted the same. Jury Charge 
at 26,37. 
The Court concludes that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find the Defendant 
guilty of Count Four beyond a reasonable doubt. Jane testified that Epstein first engaged in 
sexual activity with her in Palm Beach when she was fourteen years old. Trial Tr. at 305. She 
then began traveling from Palm Beach to New York with the Defendant and Epstein at that same 
age. Id. at 315-16. Jane explained that she traveled on commercial flights and Epstein's private 
jet. Id. at 316. She testified that the Defendant also traveled on some of these flights, and that 
the Defendant assisted her in making her travel arrangements to New York. Id. at 316-17. On 
one occasion when she was fifteen, Jane recounted, she had trouble getting on a commercial 
flight because she did not have proper identification. However, the Defendant "made it happen" 
for her by making a call and helping her get on the flight. Id. at 323-24. Jane also testified that 
the Defendant was present on some occasions when Epstein sexually abused Jane in New York 
when she was under the age of seventeen. Id. at 320. The Court concludes that this evidence, 
taken together, was sufficient for the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant 
knowingly transported Jane to New York with the intent to engage in sexual activity illegal 
under New York law, or at minimum, aided and abetted Epstein in doing so. 
Next, the Court concludes that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find the 
Defendant guilty of Count Six. Count Six charged the Defendant with the substantive count of 
sex trafficking of an individual under the age of eighteen. The Government was required to 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that: (1) the Defendant knowingly recruited, enticed, harbored, 
transported, provided, or obtained a person; (2) the Defendant knew that the person was under 
the age of eighteen; (3) the Defendant knew the person would be caused to engage in a 
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commercial sex act; and (4) the Defendant's acts were in or affecting interstate commerce; or 
that the Defendant aided and abetted the same. Jury Charge at 32, 37. Count Six applied solely 
to Carolyn during the period 2001 to 2004. Id. at 32. 
Carolyn testified that when she was under the age of eighteen, the Defendant would call 
her to set up appointments for Carolyn to perform sexualized massages on Epstein. Trial Tr. 
1527, 1530. Carolyn explained the sexual activities that occurred during the massages. Id. at 
1544-47. Carolyn testified that the Defendant saw her naked in the massage room and continued 
to call Carolyn to schedule appointments with Epstein. Id. at 1538. She recalled a specific 
incident when she was fourteen in which she was naked in the massage room and the Defendant 
touched her breasts and commented that Carolyn "had a great body for Mr. Epstein and his 
friends." Id. at 1536-38. Carolyn testified that the Defendant knew that she was under the age 
of eighteen and continued to call her to schedule appointments with Epstein after learning that 
fact. Id. at 1535. Carolyn further testified that she received money in exchange for performing 
sexualized massages on Epstein. E.g., id. 1523. She recalled that while money was often left on 
the sink outside of the massage room, the Defendant paid her directly after massages on one or 
two occasions. Id. at 1540-41. Carolyn's testimony was corroborated by 
boyfriend at the time, and physical evidence including phone message pads. This evidence was 
plainly sufficient for the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant committed 
sex trafficking of an individual under eighteen, or aided and abetted Epstein in doing so.3
3 If the Court were to conclude that Count Five is not multiplicitous, it would deny the Defendant's Rule 29 motion 
as to Count Five. Count Five charged the Defendant with participating in a conspiracy to commit sex trafficking of 
individuals under the age of eighteen from about 2001 to 2004. The evidence that supports the Defendant's 
conviction of Count Six, the substantive count, also 
t Five conspiracy conviction. Additionally, 
Juan Alessi testified that the Defendant approached 
n a parking lot and that he then saw her at 
Epstein's Palm Beach residence later that day. Tria 
ocumentary evidence, including flight records, 
established that Virginia was under the age of eighteen when she met the Defendant and Epstein. See, e.g., id. at 
1855 (December 2000 flight record including Epstein, the Defendant, and Virginia); see also GX-I4 (birth 
certificate). Carolyn testified that Virginia recruited her and that Virginia performed sexualized massages on 
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Finally, Count Three charged the Defendant with conspiracy to transport individuals 
under the age of seventeen to travel in interstate commerce with intent to engage in illegal sexual 
activity in violation of New York law. The Government was required to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt: (1) that two or more persons entered into the unlawful agreement charged; (2) 
the Defendant knowingly and willfully became a member of that conspiracy; (3) one of the 
members of the conspiracy knowingly committed at least one overt act; and (4) the overt act that 
the jury found to have been committed was committed in furtherance of that conspiracy. Jury 
Charge at 41. 
The Court concludes that the trial evidence supported a finding of guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt for each element of Count Three. The Government presented evidence that 
could lead a reasonable juror to conclude that the Defendant worked with Epstein between 1994 
and 2004 to groom minor victims in an effort to transport them to New York to engage in sexual 
activity illegal under New York law. As noted above,■testified in detail about her travel to 
New York with the Defendant and Epstein where she was sexually abused. Trial Tr. at 319-20. 
Jane also testified about the steps taken by the Defendant and Epstein to make her feel 
comfortable before they began engaging in sexual activity with her and inviting her to travel. Id. 
299-303; see also id. at 348 .testifying that their behavior toward her made her "feel 
special"). 
Other witnesses testified to similar conduct. Annie testified that after she met Epstein in 
New York, she was invited to travel with the Defendant and Epstein to New Mexico when she 
was sixteen. Id. at 2068-69,2075-77. She testified that on this trip, the Defendant and Epstein 
took her shopping and to the movies. Id. at 2080-81. She also testified that the Defendant 
Epstein in exchange for money. Trial Tr. 1518-24. The Court concludes that the evidence related to Carolyn and 
Virginia was sufficient for the jury to convict the Defendant on Count Five. 
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