EFTA00104411

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK 
 x 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
v. 
GHISLAINE MAXWELL, 
Defendant. 
 x 
S2 20 Cr. 330 (AJN) 
OMNIBUS REPLY MEMORANDUM OF GHISLAINE MAXWELL 
IN SUPPORT OF HER SUPPLEMENTAL PRETRIAL MOTIONS 
RELATING TO THE S2 SUPERSEDING INDICTMENT 
Christian R. Everdell 
COHEN & GRESSER LLP 
800 Third Avenue 
New York, NY 10022 
Jeffrey S. Pagliuca 
Laura A. Menninger 
HADDON, MORGAN & FOREMAN P.C. 
150 East 10th Avenue 
Denver, Colorado 80203 
Bobbi C. Stemheim 
Law Offices of Bobbi C. Stemheim 
33 West 19th Street - 4th Floor 
New York, NY 10011 
Attorneys for Ghislaine Maxwell 
EFTA00104411

TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
ARGUMENT 
3 
I. 
The Court Should Not Apply the Annabi Rule and Instead Find that the NPA Bars 
Ms. Maxwell's Prosecution on Counts One, Three, Five, and Six 
3 
II. 
Prosecuting Ms. Maxwell on Counts Five and Six Would Violate the Double 
Jeopardy Clause's Protection Against Duplicative Punishments. 
 11 
III. 
The Government Should Immediately Produce Accuser-4's Prior Statements as 
Brady Material.  
 14 
IV. 
The Court Should Grant Ms. Maxwell's Other Requested Relief. 
 16 
CONCLUSION 
17 
i 
EFTA00104412

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Page(s) 
Cases 
Ex parte Lange, 
85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163 (1873) 
11 
Morris v. Reynolds, 
264 F.3d 38 (2d Cir. 2001) 
12 
North Carolina v. Pearce, 
395 U.S. 711 (1969) 
II, 12, 13 
United States v. Annabi, 
771 F.2d 670 (2d Cir. 1985) 
passim 
United States v. Cambindo Valencia, 
609 F.2d 603 (2d Cir. 1979) 
13, 14 
United States v. Carter, 
454 F.2d 426 (4th Cir. 1972) 
10 
United States v. Dionisio, 
503 F.3d 78 (2d Cir. 2007) 
12 
United States v. Gebbie, 
294 F.3d 540 (3d Cir. 2002) 
6, 7, 10 
United States v. Gonzalez, 
93 F. App'x 268 (2d Cir. 2004) 
7 
United States v. Korfant, 
771 F.2d 660 (2d Cir.1985) 
9 
United States v. Laskow, 
688 F. Supp. 851 (E.D.N.Y. 1988) 
8, 10 
United States v. Lopez, 
356 F.3d 463 (2d Cir. 2004) 
9, 11 
United States v. Prisco, 
391 F. App'x 920 (2d Cir. 2010) 
7 
United States v. Rivera, 
844 F.2d 916 (2d Cir. 1988) 
9 
ii 
EFTA00104413

United States v. Salamelz, 
152 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 1998) 
7 
United States v. Torres, 
719 F.2d 549 (2d Cir. 1983) 
15 
iii 
EFTA00104414

Ghislaine Maxwell respectfully submits this Omnibus Reply Memorandum in Support of 
her Supplemental Pretrial Motions Related to the S2 Superseding Indictment ("S2 Indictment"). 
At its core, the prosecution of Ms. Maxwell is a stunning example of prosecutorial 
overreach. It is no mystery what happened here. The Palm Beach FBI and the U.S. Attorney's 
Office for the Southern District of Florida ("USAO-SDFL") conducted a thorough investigation 
of Jeffrey Epstein from 2006-2008 (the "Florida Investigation"), but decided not to prosecute 
him or his "potential co-conspirators" and abandoned any potential federal charges against them 
pursuant to the terms of the Epstein Non-Prosecution Agreement ("NPA"). Over a decade later, 
the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York ("USAO-SDNY") decided that 
it was not satisfied with this outcome and is now seeking a "do-over." But Epstein died as a 
result of the government's own negligence before he could be brought to trial. The government 
has now targeted Ms. Maxwell as the next best substitute for Epstein and is trying by any means 
necessary to blame her for his crimes because Epstein is no longer here to answer for them. 
Consistent with this goal, the government is now trying to prosecute Ms. Maxwell for the 
exact same offenses that the Florida authorities investigated (but found no evidence of her 
involvement), and for which she received immunity under the NPA. The government concedes 
in its opposition ("Opp.") that the NPA covers Counts Five and Six, the new offenses added to 
the S2 Indictment. (Opp. at 7 n.3 ("[T]he scope of the NPA's coverage would appear to 
encompass Counts Five and Six.")). The government does not contest that the NPA immunizes 
Ms. Maxwell for these offenses as a "potential co-conspirator" of Epstein; nor could it. The 
Court ruled unequivocally that the NPA's co-conspirator provision covers "any involvement of 
[Ms.] Maxwell" in "the offenses covered by the NPA." (Dkt. 207 at 7). And the government 
does not even attempt to dispute that Counts Five and Six are the same offenses, based on the 
EFTA00104415

same allegations of Accuser-4,' that were already presented to the grand jury in the Southern 
District of Florida in connection with the Florida Investigation and then abandoned pursuant to 
the terms of the NPA. 
The government offers only one argument for why it should be permitted to prosecute 
Ms. Maxwell for these offenses. Relying on the Court's prior ruling and the Second Circuit's 
decision in United States v. Annabi, 771 F.2d 670 (2d Cir. 1985) (per curiam), the government 
asserts that the NPA does not bind the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New 
York ("USAO-SDNY") because it does not "affirmatively appear" to apply to this District. 
(Opp. at 2-7). But as we explained in our opening memorandum ("Mem."), Annabi is inapposite 
to the circumstances of this case. Annabi expressly stated that it was not addressing a situation, 
like the one here, where one federal district has agreed that "the United States" will not prosecute 
certain offenses as part of a negotiated agreement and then a second federal district later seeks to 
charge those very same offenses based on the exact same conduct. (Mem. at 11-17). Applying 
Annabi in this case would stretch Annabi too far and push it beyond the factual moorings that 
anchor its holding. It would also sanction a fundamentally unjust framework whereby any U.S. 
Attorney's Office with venue over a particular offense could re-prosecute a defendant for that 
same offense years later if it were unsatisfied with the plea bargain struck by a different office. 
The Court should not endorse this outcome and should instead hold the NPA binds the USAO-
SDNY as to Counts Five and Six of the S2 Indictment and that prosecuting Ms. Maxwell for 
those offenses would violate the NPA and the Double Jeopardy Clause. 
The overreach in this case is even more jarring when one considers the source of the new 
allegations. The government has added two new charges against Ms. Maxwell, and dramatically 
I Accuser-4 is identified in the S2 Indictment as Minor Victim-4. 
2 
EFTA00104416

expanded the scope of two existing charges, based on the testimony of a single witness who 
never once mentioned Ms. Maxwell when she first told her story to the FBI in 2007 in 
connection with the Florida Investigation. Indeed, Accuser-4 said it was someone else entirely-
-who performed the same functions in Epstein's crimes that she now claims Ms. 
Maxwell performed. To add insult to this injury, the government further asserts that Accuser-4's 
omission of Ms. Maxwell in her FBI interview is somehow not exculpatory Brady information, 
and therefore they do not need to produce her prior statements to the defense until much closer to 
trial. The government's inability to recognize obvious Brady material, and identify it as such, 
reflects a persistent and troubling disregard for its obligations which the Court should not permit. 
Accordingly, for these reasons set forth below and in our opening memorandum, the 
Court should (1) dismiss Counts One, Three, Five and Six of the S2 Indictment for breach of the 
NPA; (2) dismiss Counts Five and Six for violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause; (3) dismiss 
Counts Five and Six as time-barred under the statute of limitations; (4) dismiss Count Five and 
Either Count One or Count Three as multiplicitous; (5) dismiss the S2 Indictment for put-
indictment delay; (6) order a Bill of Particulars as to Counts Five and Six; and (7) order the 
government to produce Accuser-4's prior statements as Brady material. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
The Court Should Not Apply the Annabi Rule and Instead Find that the NPA Bars 
Ms. Maxwell's Prosecution on Counts One, Three, Five, and Six. 
The government concedes that if the NPA binds the USAO-SDNY, it cannot prosecute 
Ms. Maxwell for the offenses charged in Counts Five and Six of the S2 Indictment. The 
government instead relies on Annabi and its progeny to argue that the NPA does not bind the 
USAO-SDNY and that it is free to prosecute Ms. Maxwell for the same offenses for which she 
was immunized by the NPA. At its core, the government's argument is that the "affirmative 
3 
EFTA00104417

appearance" rule of Annabi is an immutable "universal principle" governing the interpretation of 
plea agreements (Opp. at 3), which can be divorced from its underlying facts and which the 
Court must blindly follow even when the facts presented in this case are meaningfully different 
and the application of the Annabi rule would lead to an entirely unjust result. No circuit 
precedent requires such an outcome, especially when this case presents the exact set of 
circumstances that the Second Circuit said it was not addressing in Annabi: where one federal 
district has agreed that "the United States" will abandon certain offenses as part of a negotiated 
agreement and then a second federal district later seeks to charge identical offenses based on the 
exact same conduct. See Annabi, 771 F.2d at 672. Annabi has already been stretched to its limit 
by subsequent opinions that have simply reaffirmed and applied its broad default rule without 
careful analysis of the underlying facts. Applying the Annabi rule in this case, however, would 
extend it beyond its boundaries to a set of circumstances that Annabi expressly left for another 
case to decide. The Court, therefore, is not limited by its previous ruling concerning the S 
Indictment and should not apply the Annabi rule in this context. The Court should instead find 
that the NPA bars Ms. Maxwell's prosecution on Counts Five and Six. 
The government's attempts to undercut Ms. Maxwell's argument are unavailing. The 
government asserts that Ms. Maxwell inappropriately relies on a portion of Annabi in which the 
court addressed whether the charges previously dismissed against the defendants in the Eastern 
District of New York were "identical" to the charges later brought in the Southern District of 
New York. (Opp. at 3-5 (discussing Annabi, 771 F.2d at 672)). The government acknowledges 
the court considered whether the charges were identical, but claims that this discussion did not 
qualify the general rule that "[a] plea agreement binds only the office of the United States 
Attorney for the district in which the plea is entered unless it affirmatively appears that the 
4 
EFTA00104418

agreement contemplates a broader restriction," and therefore has no bearing on the proper 
interpretation of the NPA. (Id. at 4; Annabi, 771 F.2d at 672). Instead, this portion of the 
opinion, according to the government, was "cabined to an analysis under the Double Jeopardy 
Clause" to rebut the Annabi defendants' claim that the Clause precluded their prosecution on the 
Southern District charges. (Opp. at 4). 
That is a misinterpretation of Annabi. The court stated at the beginning of its opinion that 
the defendants did not have a Double Jeopardy claim because they "were never in jeopardy with 
respect to the dismissed counts of the Eastern District indictment." Annabi, 771 F.2d at 671. 
The court was clear that the defendants' only claim on appeal was that the Southern District 
indictment "violate[d] the protection they allege they secured by virtue of the ... plea agreement 
in the Eastern District." (Id.). The Annabi defendants' argument was not that the Double 
Jeopardy Clause precluded their prosecution on the Southern District charges. It was that their 
prior plea agreement with the Eastern District should afford them "the same protection accorded 
by that Clause" and preclude the Southern District from prosecuting them for the same charges 
that had been dismissed in the Eastern District. Annabi, 771 F.2d at 672. In other words, when 
one federal district agrees that "the Government" will dismiss certain charges as part of a plea 
agreement, another federal district should not be permitted to bring identical charges against the 
defendant at a later time. Accordingly, this portion of Annabi was not an analysis of a Double 
Jeopardy claim; it was an analysis of the preclusive effect of the plea agreement, which the 
defendants analogized to a Double Jeopardy claim. As such, this section of Annabi bears 
directly on whether the NPA precludes Ms. Maxwell's prosecution for the charges in Counts 
Five and Six. 
5 
EFTA00104419

The court ultimately concluded that the Southern District charges were not identical to 
the dismissed charges in the Eastern District and, as a result, the new charges were "sufficiently 
distinct at least to warrant application of the ... rule concerning construction of plea 
agreements." Id. (emphasis added). But the court left unadjudicated whether it would be proper 
to apply the Annabi rule in a case exactly like this one, where the new charges are the same as 
the dismissed charges.' These exact circumstances are now before the Court with respect to 
Counts Five and Six. The Third Circuit directly addressed these same facts in United States v. 
Gebbie, 294 F.3d 540, 544-52 (3d Cir. 2002), holding that "when a United States Attorney 
negotiates and contracts on behalf of `the United States' or 'the Government' in a plea agreement 
for specific crimes, that attorney speaks for and binds all of his or her fellow United States 
Attorneys with respect to those same crimes and those same defendants." Id. at 550 (emphasis 
added). The Court should decline to apply Annabi in these circumstances and instead follow the 
Third Circuit's reasoning in Gebbie to find that the NPA bars Ms. Maxwell's prosecution on 
Counts Five and Six. (See Mem. 14-17). 
As discussed in our opening memorandum, this result is consistent with the terms and the 
drafting history of the NPA. (See Mem. at 16). One of Epstein's principal goals in negotiating 
the NPA was to "resolve globally his state and federal criminal liability." (Id., Ex. B at 2 of 7). 
Accordingly, Epstein sought the broadest possible protection for himself and his "potential co-
conspirators." The use of the phrase "the United States" in the co-conspirator immunity 
provision reflects Epstein's desire to ensure that that he would not become embroiled in 
subsequent prosecutions of his "potential co-conspirators" in any other districts. (Id. at 16). 
Indeed, Epstein insisted on the inclusion of this language as a condition of signing the NPA, and 
2 Indeed, it is telling that the government omits this final, critical sentence from the long block quote it cites in its 
opposition. (See Opp. at 4). 
6 
EFTA00104420

the USAO-SDFL agreed to it. (See Mem., Ex. A, OPR Report at 167) (Epstein wanted "to make 
sure that he's the only one who takes the blame for what happened").3
The government further asserts that Ms. Maxwell's position is not supported by 
subsequent Second Circuit cases that apply Annabi. (Opp. 5-6). But this argument simply begs 
the question. Although courts in this Circuit have applied Annabi to evaluate whether one 
district is bound by a prior plea agreement with another district, none of these cases involved the 
same factual circumstances presented here, which were specifically carved out in Annabi. The 
cases that the government cites in its opposition highlight this point. Among other things, they 
involved plea agreements that explicitly stated the agreement applied only to the district that 
negotiated it and not to any other district. See United States v. Prisco, 391 F. App'x 920, 921 (2d 
Cir. 2010) (summary order) (plea agreement explicitly stated that "[the] agreement is limited to 
the United States Attorney's Office for the District of New Jersey and cannot bind other federal, 
state, or local authorities"); United States v. Gonzalez, 93 F. App'x 268, 270 (2d Cir. 2004) (plea 
agreement explicitly stated that "the agreement binds only the United States Attorney's Office 
for the District of New Mexico"); United States v. Salameh, 152 F.3d 88, 119 (2d Cir. 1998) 
(plea agreement explicitly stated "[t]his agreement is limited to the United States Attorney's 
Office for the Eastern District of New York and cannot bind other federal, state or local 
prosecuting authorities"). Gebbie, itself, recognized that such "express contractual limitations" 
can limit the application of a plea agreement to the district that negotiated it, even when the 
agreement purports to make promises on behalf of the "the Government." Gebbie, 294 F.3d at 
550. But this limiting language does not appear anywhere in the NPA, although it could easily 
3 Moreover, to the extent the phrase "the United States" in the co-conspirator immunity provision conflicts with the 
more restrictive language in Epstein's immunity provision, which is limited to the Southern District of Florida, that 
discrepancy, at most, creates an ambiguity that must be construed "strictly against the government" under well-
established principles of contract law and interpretation of plea agreements. See Dkt. 223 at 8.11; accord Gebbie, 
294 F.3d at 551-52. 
7 
EFTA00104421

have been included if that had, in fact, been the intention of the parties. It was not. These cases 
are therefore inapposite. 
Moreover, the other case cited by the government, United States v. Laskow, 688 F. Supp. 
851 (E.D.N.Y. 1988), aff'd, 867 F.2d 1425 (2d Cir. 1988), affirmatively supports Ms. Maxwell's 
argument. In Laskow, the court conducted an analysis to determine whether the charges brought 
in the Eastern District of New York were "sufficiently distinct" from the charges previously 
dismissed pursuant to a plea agreement with the Central District of California to permit the 
Eastern District to prosecute the defendant on the new charges. Laskow, 688 F. Supp. at 855-56. 
The court ultimately concluded that the new charges were "sufficiently distinct" from the 
dismissed charges that it was "not a violation of the plea agreement to pursue prosecution" under 
Annabi. Id. at 855-56 (citing Annabi, 771 F.2d at 672). 
The government asserts that this portion of Laskow was "unnecessary" to its holding 
because the court had already determined that the plea agreement did not apply to the Eastern 
District. (Opp. at 6 (citing Laskow, 688 F. Supp. at 853-56)). However, this was only because 
the defendants did not "specifically address" on appeal the issue of the similarity of the charges 
under Annabi; the court therefore considered it sua sponte after addressing the arguments the 
defendants did raise. Laskow, 688 F. Supp. at 855. The implication of the court's analysis is 
clear: if the charges in the Eastern District had been the same as the charges dismissed under the 
prior plea agreement—which prohibited "the government" from bringing additional charges 
related to the crimes charged in the Central District—the Eastern District would have been 
precluded from prosecuting the defendants on the new charges. See id. at 855-56 (it would be "a 
violation of the plea agreement" for the Eastern District to prosecute the defendants for "the 
8 
EFTA00104422

same crime as that for which the Central District granted defendants immunity"). The Court 
should apply the same analysis here. 
The government also argues unpersuasively that the framework Ms. Maxwell proposes 
would create a "confusing" rule of interpretation that would be "complicated" to administer and 
which lacks "a mode of analysis" for the courts to evaluate the similarity of charges. (Opp. at 4-
6 & n.1). Not so. Courts routinely evaluate the similarity of charged offenses when analyzing 
Double Jeopardy claims. For example, as discussed in our opening memorandum, courts in the 
Second Circuit assess whether successive conspiracy prosecutions are distinct from one another 
for Double Jeopardy purposes by evaluating the eight Korfant factors. See United States v. 
Lopez, 356 F.3d 463, 468 (2d Cir. 2004) (citing United States v. Kotfant, 771 F.2d 660, 662 (2d 
Cir.1985) (per curiant)); see also Mem. at 19. Courts can readily apply this same analysis to 
determine whether a newly charged conspiracy is "sufficiently distinct" from a conspiracy that 
was dismissed under a prior plea agreement to permit prosecution. Indeed, the Second Circuit 
has already applied this "mode of analysis" in this very context in a case that the government 
cites in its own opposition brief. See United States v. Rivera, 844 F.2d 916, 922-25 (2d Cir. 
1988) (analyzing the Kofant factors to determine that a conspiracy charged in the Southern 
District of New York was "sufficiently distinct" from a conspiracy previously dismissed 
pursuant to a plea agreement with the same District that the prosecution was permissible under 
Annabi). Hence, contrary to the government's assertion, the framework of analysis that Ms. 
Maxwell proposes is straightforward, easy to apply, and has already been adopted by the Second 
Circuit. 
In this case, the government cannot argue that Counts Five and Six of the S2 Indictment 
are distinct from the offenses that were presented to the grand jury in the Southern District of 
9 
EFTA00104423

Florida and then abandoned pursuant to the NPA. Indeed, the government does not even attempt 
to do so. As we set forth extensively in our opening memorandum, the crimes alleged in Counts 
Five and Six are the same offenses based on the same allegations of Accuser-4. (See Mem. at 7-
I I). Accordingly, the NPA bars Ms. Maxwell's prosecution on Counts Five and Six. 
This result is not only consistent with Second Circuit precedent because Annabi did not 
address the circumstances of this case; it is also consistent with fundamental fairness. As the 
Third Circuit cautioned in Gebbie, individual U.S. Attorney's Offices should not view 
themselves as "sovereigns of autonomous fiefdoms" with the ability to charge a defendant with 
the same crimes that another U.S. Attorney's Office had dismissed under a plea agreement, when 
the agreement promised that "the United States" would not prosecute the defendant further for 
those crimes. Gebbie, 294 F.3d at 550; see also United States v. Caner, 454 F.2d 426, 427-28 
(4th Cir. 1972) (federally prosecuting defendant a second time for the same charges previously 
resolved by a plea agreement with a different federal district puts at stake "the honor of the 
government[,] public confidence in the fair administration of justice, and the efficient 
administration of justice in a federal scheme of government"). 
This case perfectly illustrates the validity of that concern. This is not a case where the 
USAO-SDNY conducted an independent investigation at the same time as the Florida 
Investigation, and inadvertently charged Ms. Maxwell with some of the same crimes. See 
Laskow, 688 F. Supp. at 855 ("[I]n determining whether a criminal prosecution is precluded by a 
plea agreement in a sister district, the Second Circuit has also attached great significance to the 
degree of independence with which that prosecution has developed." (collecting cases)). On the 
contrary, the Florida Investigation preceded the Southern District investigation by over ten years 
and the USAO-SDNY knew full well what crimes the USAO-SDFL had considered charging, 
10 
EFTA00104424

but ultimately abandoned as part of the NPA. The USAO-SDNY has now charged Ms. Maxwell 
over a decade later with the same crimes for which she was immunized under the NPA for one 
simple reason: it did not like that result. The Court should not countenance this abuse of 
prosecutorial power, nor is it required to under the controlling case law. 
For these reasons and the reasons stated in our opening memorandum, the NPA bars Ms. 
Maxwell's prosecution for the offenses charged in Counts Five and Six of the S2 Indictment. 
They must therefore be dismissed. And for the reasons stated in our opening memorandum, 
Counts One and Three must also be dismissed. (See Mem. at 17-18). 
H. 
Prosecuting Ms. Maxwell on Counts Five and Six Would Violate the Double 
Jeopardy Clause's Protection Against Duplicative Punishments. 
Prosecuting Ms. Maxwell on Counts Five and Six also violates her rights under the 
Double Jeopardy Clause. The government asserts that the Double Jeopardy Clause does not 
preclude Ms. Maxwell's prosecution on Counts Five and Six because she never pled guilty to 
those crimes (indeed, the USAO-SDFL never charged her or Epstein with those crimes) and the 
NPA did not include a factual adjudication of the merits of those offenses; jeopardy therefore 
never attached. (Opp. at 7-11). The government's argument misses the mark because it focuses 
on only one protection guaranteed by the Clause — the protection against "a second prosecution 
for the same offense after conviction." Lopez, 356 F.3d at 467 (quoting North Carolina v. 
Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969) overruled on other grounds by Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 
794 (1989)). Ms. Maxwell does not dispute that she and Epstein were never previously 
convicted of the crimes charged in Counts Five and Six. She invokes a different protection of the 
Double Jeopardy Clause and asserts that Epstein was already punished for those offenses and 
that she cannot be punished again for those same offenses. See Pearce, 395 U.S. at 717-18 
(quoting Ex pane Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163, 168 (1873) ("[T]he Constitution was designed 
11 
EFTA00104425

as much to prevent the criminal from being twice punished for the same offense as from being 
twice tried for it." (emphasis added)). The government does not contest that Epstein was 
punished for the offenses covered by the NPA; nor could it. Accordingly, the government 
cannot now seek duplicative punishment from Ms. Maxwell for those same offenses. 
The government relies primarily on the Second Circuit's opinion in United States v. 
Dionisio, 503 F.3d 78 (2d Cir. 2007), which addressed an issue of first impression for the Circuit 
under the Double Jeopardy Clause: "whether jeopardy attaches when a charge is dismissed with 
prejudice pursuant to a plea agreement." Dionisio, 503 F.3d at 82. The court conducted a 
lengthy analysis of the controlling case law and concluded that the defendant needed to have 
faced "the risk of a determination of guilt"—Le., through a process by which there was "[an] 
adjudication of some facts that go to the merits of [the] charge"—for the protections of the 
Double Jeopardy Clause to apply. Id. at 83-84 (emphasis in original). But as the court's analysis 
makes clear, Dionisio was focused on whether the defendant faced a "risk of conviction" for the 
dismissed charge that was sufficient to trigger the Clause's protection against prosecuting a 
defendant twice for the same offense after conviction. See id. at 83. It did not address the 
Clause's protection against duplicative punishments for the same offense, and is therefore 
inapposite. 
This case presents circumstances different from those at issue in Dionisio. In the plea 
agreement context addressed in Dionisio, the defendant typically agrees to plead guilty to one or 
more charged offenses, while other offenses are dismissed. Jeopardy attaches to the charges to 
which the defendant pled guilty, Morris v. Reynolds, 264 F.3d 38, 49 (2d Cir. 2001), and to any 
dismissed charges for which there was a factual adjudication of the merits of the offense. 
Dionisio, 503 F.3d at 83-84. Here, by contrast, the USAO-SDFL never charged Epstein or Ms. 
12 
EFTA00104426

Maxwell with any offenses and there never was a plea agreement, nor any dismissed charges. 
Instead, the USAO-SDFL abandoned their anticipated charges prior to indictment pursuant to the 
NPA. Accordingly, there was no conviction or "risk of conviction" that would trigger the 
Double Jeopardy Clause. 
However, there can be no serious dispute that Epstein was punished for the offenses 
covered by the NPA. As discussed in our opening memorandum, in order to "resolve globally 
his state and federal criminal liability" as to all crimes covered by the NPA, including the 
offenses based on the allegations of Accuser-4, Epstein was required to (1) plead guilty in 
Florida state court to one count of solicitation of prostitution and one count of solicitation of 
minors to engage in prostitution, (2) register as a sex offender, (3) pay for an attorney to 
represent his victims to sue him for personal injuries, and (4) waive his right to contest any 
damages awarded in those lawsuits up to an agreed-upon amount. (Mem. at 16, 18-19 & Ex. B 
at 2-5 of 7). Epstein fully performed these conditions and paid over $12.5 million in settlements 
to multiple alleged victims, including $446,000 to the person we believe to be Accuser-4 and her 
attorneys. (Id. at 19 & Exs. H, I). The government cannot now seek duplicative punishment for 
those same offenses almost fifteen years after they were resolved through the NPA.4
Accordingly, prosecuting Epstein for Counts Five and Six would violate the Double 
Jeopardy Clause. And as discussed in our opening memorandum, because Epstein negotiated 
immunity for Ms. Maxwell and any other "potential co-conspirators" as part of the terms of the 
NPA, Ms. Maxwell cannot be prosecuted for those crimes either. See Mem. at 20; United States 
v. Cambindo Valencia, 609 F.2d 603, 637 (2d Cir. 1979) ("If [the defendant's] earlier plea is 
° If that were permissible (and Epstein were still alive) the USAO-SDFL could theoretically prosecute Epstein for 
the offenses charged in Counts Five and Six without violating the Double Jeopardy Clause because, according to the 
government's theory, jeopardy never attached to those charges. Such a prosecution would, no doubt, violate the 
terms of the NPA. But it would also violate the Double Jeopardy Clause's protection against "multiple punishments 
for the same offense." See Pearce, 395 U.S. at 717-18. 
13 
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found to bar prosecution of him because of double jeopardy, since concededly the plea included 
an agreement to drop the charges against [his wife], the instant prosecution of [his wife] will also 
be barred.").5 Counts Five and Six of the S2 Indictment must therefore be dismissed. 
III. 
The Government Should Immediately Produce Accuser-4's Prior Statements as 
Brady Material. 
The government's assertion that it can withhold production of Accuser-4's prior 
statements because they are merely impeachment material under Giglio, and do not rise to the 
level of exculpatory material under Brady, is unsupported and flatly incorrect. (Opp. 20-22). 
The government admits that Accuser-4 never mentioned Ms. Maxwell when she was first 
interviewed by the Palm Beach FBI in or around 2007 in connection with the Florida 
Investigation. (Id. at 21). But the government unilaterally characterizes this omission, without 
any supporting authority, as "classic impeachment material" under Giglio, and therefore 
contends that it is not obligated to produce Accuser-4's statements to the defense until much 
closer to trial. (Id. at 20-21). 
The government is completely off-base. This is not a situation where a government 
witness, for example, misremembered a particular detail of the alleged crime or confused the 
timeline of events. Accuser-4 is the single, key eye witness upon whom the government must 
rely to prove Counts Five and Six. Those counts are based on her allegations; hence, their 
viability rests almost entirely on the strength and accuracy of her testimony. The fact that 
Accuser-4 never mentioned Ms. Maxwell when she first gave an account of her alleged abuse to 
the FBI, at a time when the events were most fresh in her mind, is extraordinarily significant. It 
5 The government argues that Cambindo Valencia is inapposite because it contends that the charges against the 
defendant's wife were dismissed because her prosecution violated the defendant's plea agreement, not the Double 
Jeopardy Clause. (Opp. at 10-11). This argument is unpersuasive. The defendant's wife argued on appeal both that 
the Double Jeopardy Clause and the plea agreement precluded her prosecution. Cambindo Valencia, 609 F.2d at 
637. The relevant language of the court's opinion is not restricted to her plea agreement claim. 
14 
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is significant not just because the omission calls into question the accuracy of her memory and 
may therefore be used to impeach her credibility. It is also significant because it strongly 
indicates that Ms. Maxwell was not involved in the crimes alleged in Counts Five and Six. In 
other words, it is exculpatory information under Brady. See, e.g., United States v. Torres, 719 
F.2d 549, 550-51 (2d Cir. 1983) (eye witness's inability to recognize defendant as a participant 
in bank robbery shortly after crime took place was exculpatory under Brady). 
The government attempts to mitigate the exculpatory significance of these statements by 
noting two points: (I) the FBI did not ask Accuser-4 any questions about Ms. Maxwell during 
her 2007 interview, and (2) when Accuser-4 testified at a civil deposition sometime after her FBI 
interview, she referenced Ms. Maxwell. (Opp. at 21). The first point simply highlights the 
government's persistent inability—or worse, stubborn unwillingness—to recognize and identify 
Brady material squarely in its possession. Presumably, under the government's logic, it would 
only be obligated to disclose Accuser-4's prior statements if the FBI had specifically asked her 
about Ms. Maxwell and she had denied that Ms. Maxwell played any role in her alleged abuse. 
The Court should not interpret the government's Brady obligations so narrowly and the 
government has cited no case holding that it must.' 
The second point does nothing to blunt the exculpatory significance of Accuser-4's 
omission; in fact, it underscores it. It is clear from the grand jury testimony of Special Agent 
Kuyrkendall that the FBI specifically asked Accuser-4 who scheduled her massage appointments 
6 The government has provided only two quasi-Brady disclosures in this case, although it made certain to point out 
in each case that it did not view the information as Brady material and the disclosure was only being made "in an 
abundance of caution." On November 9, 2020, the government disclosed that a witness told the Palm Beach Police 
Department in 2005 that E 
" 
Is that are between the ages of 18 and 20." On February 26, 2021, the 
government disclosed that 
Id the FBI in 2006 that there was a "rumor is that [Epstein] is gay." It is 
unfathomable that the gov 
iew these disclosures as potential Brady material, but not the very first 
statement given by the critical eye witness at the center of Counts Five and Six, in which she never mentioned Ms. 
Maxwell. 
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and reviewed phone records with her to determine which people she had spoken to on the phone 
about those appointments. (See Mem. at 9-10 & Ex. Cat 25:1-6, 56:20-25). At that time, 
Accuser-4 identified on 
appointments. (Id.). Haa ms. Maxwell, 
of Ms. Maxwell, as the person who scheduled her 
n fact, scheduled massage appointments, Accuser-4 
would certainly have mentioned that to the FBI even without being asked directly about Ms. 
Maxwell. Moreover, at the time of her later deposition, Accuser-4 was represented by an 
attorney who also represented several other alleged victims who were suing Epstein for money 
and actively seeking to implicate Ms. Maxwell and others to increase the damages. Hence, the 
fact that Accuser-4 suddenly remembered Ms. Maxwell some years later as someone who 
allegedly made some phone calls only bolsters the exculpatory nature of her original omission. 
Accordingly, Accuser-4's prior statements to the FBI, and any other prior statements in 
which she did not mention Ms. Maxwell, are exculpatory Brady material that the government 
must immediately produce to the defense pursuant to the Court's prior order: 
The Government must disclose to the defense all information `favorable to an 
accused' that is `material either to guilt or to punishment' and that is known to the 
Government. . . The Government shall disclose such information to the defense 
promptly after its existence becomes known to the Government so that the defense 
may make effective use of the information in the preparation of its case. 
(Dkt. 68 at 1) (emphasis added). 
IV. 
The Court Should Grant Ms. Maxwell's Other Requested Relief. 
With respect to the other relief requested in her supplemental pretrial motions, Ms. 
Maxwell relies on the arguments raised in her opening memorandum and her initial pretrial 
motions related to the S 1 Indictment. For the reasons set forth in those submissions, the Court 
should (I) dismiss Counts Five and Six as time-barred, (2) dismiss Count Five and either Count 
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