EFTA00095067

United States v. Salerno, 
481 U.S. 739 (1987) 
104 
United States v. Salmonese, 
352 F.3d 608 (2d Cir. 2003) 
163, 164 
United States v. Sampson, 
385 F.3d 183 (2d Cir. 2004) 
140 
United States v. Sampson, 
898 F.3d 270 (2d Cir. 2018) 
135, 136 
United States v. Sampson, 
898 F.3d 287 (2d Cir. 2018) 
120, 125 
United States v. Samsonov, 
07 Cr. 1198 (CM), 2009 WL 176721 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 23, 2009) 
177 
United States v. Santiago, 
987 F. Supp. 2d 465 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) 
52 
United States v. Sarwari, 
669 F.3d 401 (4th Cir. 2012) 
120, 121 
United States v. Sattar, 
272 F. Supp. 2d 348 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) 
22 
United States v. Savage, 
970 F.3d 217 (3d Cir. 2020) 
210 
United States v. Scala, 
388 F. Supp. 2d 396 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) 
46, 47, 49 
United States v. Scaipa, 
897 F.2d 63 (2d Cir. 1990) 
48 
United States v. Scaipa, 
913 F.2d 993 (2d Cir. 1990) 
159, 160, 162, 164 
United States v. Scaipa, 
913 F.3d 993 (2d Cir. 1990) 
42 
United States v. Schaefer, 
No. 17 Cr. 400 (HZ), 2019 WL 267711 (D. Or. Jan. 17, 2019) 
86 
United States v. Schafrick, 
871 F.2d 300 (2d Cir. 1989) 
121 
United States v. Schmidt, 
105 F.3d 82 (2d Cir. 1997) 
105 
United States v. Schneider, 
801 F.3d 186 (3d Cir. 2015) 
37, 38, 39, 40 
United States v. Seabrook, 
10 Cr. 87 (DAB), 2010 WL 5174353 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 14, 2010) 
190 
United States v. Sensi, 
No. 08 Cr. 253, 2010 WL 2351484 (D. Conn. 2010) 
27, 38 
United States v. Sergentakis, 
05 Cr. 230 (JFK), 2005 WL 1994014 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 2005) 
183 
United States v. Shaw, 
260 F. Supp. 2d 567 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) 
112, 115 
xx 
EFTA00095087

United States v. Sliker, 
751 F.2d 477 (2d Cir. 1984) 
United States v. Smith, 
985 F. Supp. 2d 547 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) 
United States v. Smith, 
No. 05 Cr. 922 (DLC), 2007 WL 980431 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 3, 2007) 
United States v. Snyder, 
159, 160, 
167 
162 
139 
668 F.2d 686 (2d Cir. 1982) 
44, 53 
United States v. Soares, 
66 F. Supp. 2d 391 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) 
203 
United States v. Spears, 
159 F.3d 1081 (7th Cir. 1999) 
43, 45, 46 
United States v. Sprouts, 
282 F.3d 1037 (8th Cir. 2002) 
44 
United States v. Stavroulakis, 
952 F.2d 686 (2d Cir. 1992) 
150, 154 
United States v. Stein, 
456 F.2d 844 (2d Cir. 1972) 
46 
United States v. Stein, 
541 F.3d 130 (2d Cir. 2008) 
99 
United States v. Stokes, 
733 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 2013) 
87, 93, 94 
United States v. Stringer, 
730 F.3d 120 (2d Cir. 2013) 
151, 152, 153 
United States v. Strohm, 
671 F.3d 1173 (10th Cir. 2011) 
120, 127 
United States v. Swanson, 
210 F.3d 788 (7th Cir. 2000) 
115 
United States v. Sweig, 
441 F.2d 114 (2d Cir. 1971) 
139, 141, 145 
United States v. Tanu, 
589 F.2d 82 (2d Cir. 1978) 
53 
United States v. Thai, 
29 F.3d 785 (2d Cir. 1994) 
165 
United States v. Thompson, 
13 Cr. 378 (AJN), 2013 WL 6246489 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 3, 2013) 
182, 189, 192 
United States v. Thompson, 
896 F.3d 155 (2d Cir. 2018) 
156 
United States v. Torres, 
901 F.2d 205 (2d Cir. 1990) 
174, 176, 179 
United States v. Towne, 
870 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1989) 
165 
United States v. Tracy, 
12 F.3d 1186 (2d Cir. 1993) 
191 
xxi 
EFTA00095088

United States v. Tram :::: ti, 
513 F.2d 1087 (2d Cir. 1975) 
150, 154 
United States v. Tranquillo, 
606 F. Supp. 2d 370 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) 
192 
United States v. Trippe, 
171 F. Supp. 2d 230 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) 
175 
United States v. Triumph Capital Group, Inc., 
237 F. App'x 625 (2d Cir. 2007) 
122, 125 
United States v. Turoff, 
853 F.2d 1037 (2d Cir. 1988) 
138 
United States v. Urena, 
989 F. Supp. 2d 253 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) 
23 
United States v. Valentine, 
820 F.2d 565 (2d Cir. 1987) 
107, 108 
United States v. Valona, 
834 F.2d 1334 (7th Cir. 1987) 
45 
United States v. Vickers, 
708 F. App'x 732 (2d Cir. 2017) 
168 
United States v. Vickers, 
No. 13-CR-I28-A, 2014 WL 1838255 (W.D.N.Y. May 8, 2014) 
37, 38, 39, 154 
United States v. Vilar, 
No. 05 Cr. 621 (KMK), 2007 WL 1075041 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 4, 2007) 
114 
United States v. Villegas, 
899 F.2d 1324 (2d Cir. 1990) 
82 
United States v. Walker, 
191 F.3d 326 (2d Cir. 1999) 
48 
United States v. Walsh, 
194 F.3d. 37 (2d Cir. 1999) 
151, 174, 179 
United States v. Walters, 
910 F.3d 11 (2d Cir. 2018) 
105 
United States v. Washington, 
431 U.S. 181 (1977) 
96, 97 
United States v. Watson, 
599 F.2d 1149 (2d Cir. 1979) 
53 
United States v. Weiner, 
479 F.2d 923 (2d Cir. 1973) 
125 
United States v. Werner, 
620 F.2d 922 (2d Cir. 1980) 
138, 139, 140, 149 
United States v. Wey, 
No. 15 Cr. 611 (AJN), 2017 WL 237651 n.8 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 18, 2017) 
58, 151, 152 
United States v. Williams, 
205 F.3d 23 (2d Cir. 2000) 
48 
United States v. Williams, 
No. 10 Cr. 622 (ADS), 2018 WL 4623017 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2018) 
87 
EFTA00095089

United States v. Winter, 
348 F.2d 204 (2d Cir. 1965) 
101 
United States v. Wong, 
431 U.S. 174 (1977) 
101 
United States v. Wright, 
343 F.3d 849 (6th Cir. 2003) 
43 
United States v. Ying Lin, 
No. 15 Cr. 601 (DLI), 2018 WL 5113139 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 2018) 
139 
United States v. Yonkers Contracting Co., Inc., 
682 F. Supp. 757 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) 
199 
United States v. Young, 
08 Cr. 285 (KMK), 2008 WL 4178190 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 4, 2008) 
154, 155 
United States v. Zackson, 
12 F.3d 1178 (2d Cir. 1993) 
165 
United States v. Zodhiates, 
901 F.3d 137 (2d Cir. 2018) 
86, 88, 93 
United States, 
359 F. Supp. 3d 1201 (S.D. Fla. 2019) 
12 
Untied States v. Coffey, 
361 F. Supp. 2d 102 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) 
151 
Untied States v. Post, 
950 F. Supp. 2d 519 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) 
150 
Valentine v. Konteh, 
395 F.3d 626 (6th Cir. 2005) 
155 
Vernon v. Cassadaga Valley Cent. School Dist., 
49 F.3d 886 (2d Cir. 1995) 
32, 33 
Washington v. Giucksberg, 
521 U.S. 702 (1997) 
104 
Weingarten v. United States, 
865 F.3d 48 (2d Cir. 2017) 
passim 
Zafiro v. United States, 
506 U.S. 534 (1993) 
140, 147 
Zicarelli v. Dietz, 
633 F.2d 312 (3d Cir. 1980) 
201 
Zietzke v. United States, 
426 F. Supp. 3d 758 (W.D. Wash. 2019) 
85 
Statutes 
18 U.S.C. §1623(a) 
119 
18 U.S.C. § 371 
2, 152, 156, 169 
18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2) 
120 
18 U.S.C. § 1591 
153 
18 U.S.C. § 1621 
120 
18 U.S.C. § 1623 
3, 116, 120 
EFTA00095090

18 U.S.C. § 3282 
18 U.S.C. § 3283 
18 U.S.C. § 3299 
18 U.S.C. § 3500 
18 U.S.C. § 3500(a) 
18 U.S.C. § 3500(b) 
18 U.S.C. § 3509(a) 
18 U.S.C. § 3509(a)(8) 
18 U.S.C. § 3509(d) 
18 U.S.C. § 3509(k) 
18 U.S.C. § 3771 
24, 35 
passim 
26 
182, 185 
182 
183 
37 
37 
153 
24, 36 
117 
18 U.S.C. §§ 2422 
passim 
18 U.S.C. §§ 2422(b) 
17 
18 U.S.C. §§ 2423 
3 
18 U.S.0 § 2423(a) 
38, 154, 169, 172 
28 U.S.C.§ 112 
193 
28 U.S.C. § 112(b) 
201 
28 U.S.C. § 1861 
194 
28 U.S.C. § 1863(a) 
195 
28 U.S.C. § 1863(b)(6) 
196 
28 U.S.C. § 1865(b) 
195 
28 U.S.C. § 1869(e) 
199, 201 
New York Penal Law § 130.55 
156 
Pub. L. No. 101-647 
24 
Pub. L. No. 103-322 
24 
Pub. L. No. 108-21  
25 
Pub. L. No. 109-162 
25 
Pub. L. No. 109-248 
25 
Rules 
Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6) 
81 
Fed. R. Crim. P. 5(f) 
188 
Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e) 
69 
Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(c)(1) 
150 
Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(d) 
159 
Fed. R. Crim. P. 14(a) 
139 
Fed. R. Crim. P. 21 
203 
Fed. R. Evid. 402 
165 
Fed. R. Evid. 403 
165, 167 
Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(2) 
166 
Fed. R. Evid. 801  
192 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 
135 
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 7 
150 
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 7(f) 
174 
xxiv 
EFTA00095091

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 8(a) 
138 
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16 
182 
N.Y. R.P.C. 3.7(b) 
148 
Rule 14 
139 
Rule 404(b) 
168 
Other Authorities 
H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 108-66 
29 
Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 
71 Harv. L. Rev. 593 (1958) 
130 
Sexual Abuse Prosecutions, 
77 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 1 (1986) 
24 
United States v. Balde, 
20 Cr. 281 
206 
United States v. Cromitie, et aL, 
09 Cr. 558 (CM) 
194 
United States v. Drago, No., 
18 Cr. 0394 
59 
United States v. Guerrier, 
18 Cr. 284 (JSR) 
194 
United States v. Hester, No., 
19 Cr. 324 
141 
United States v. Israel, 
05 Cr. 1039 (CM) 
194 
United States v. Reeves, et aL, 
16 Cr. 372 (VEC) 
194 
United States v. Serrano, No., 
13 Cr. 58 
88 
United States v. Ulbricht, No., 
14 Cr. 68 
83 
United States v. Vickers, 
13 Cr. 128 
154 
United States v. Wedd, 
15 Cr. 616 
179 
xxv 
EFTA00095092

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK 
x 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
S 1 20 Cr. 330 (AJN) 
GHISLAINE MAXWELL, 
Defendant. 
 
x 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
The Government respectfully submits this memorandum in opposition to the defendant's 
twelve pre-trial motions, dated January 25,2021 (the "Defense Motions"). In her pretrial motions, 
the defendant seeks to throw the proverbial kitchen sink at this case. She does so, however, with 
little support in the law or the facts. For the reasons that follow, the motions should be denied in 
their entirety. 
First, the non-prosecution agreement between Jeffrey Epstein and the U.S. Attorney's 
Office for the Southern District of Florida is entirely irrelevant to this case, and the defendant's 
motion fails as a matter of law. Second, the indictment is timely under 18 U.S.C. § 3283, which 
provides an extended statute of limitations for crimes involving the sexual abuse of minors. The 
defendant's statute of limitations arguments run contrary to the text of the statute, the intent of 
Congress, and the weight of authority. Third, the defendant's claim that the Government delayed 
in bringing the indictment fails as a matter of law and fact. Fourth, the defendant's motion to 
suppress evidence obtained through a judicially approved subpoena is meritless, and her 
allegations of Government misconduct are baseless. Fifth, Counts Four and Five—which charge 
the defendant with committing perjury—are properly pleaded, and the defendant's motion to 
1 
EFTA00095093

dismiss those charges improperly asks the Court to adjudicate her guilt. It is for the jury to decide 
whether the defendant committed perjury, and the motion should be denied. Sixth, the crimes in 
the indictment should be tried together, as all six counts of the indictment are logically connected 
and provable by overlapping evidence. The Court should not sever this case, and thereby require 
victims of child sexual abuse to testify at multiple trials. Seventh, the Indictment indisputably 
alleges each element of every offense charged and provides the defendant with ample notice of the 
charges against her. Eighth, the Indictment is properly pled and there is no basis to strike any 
portion of it as surplusage. Ninth, the defense motion to dismiss one of the conspiracy charges as 
multiplicitous is, at best, premature. Tenth, the defendant is not entitled to a bill of particulars or 
any of the other early disclosures she seeks. Finally, the use of a grand jury sitting in White Plains 
to return the Indictment in this case was entirely proper. 
BACKGROUND 
On June 29, 2020, a grand jury sitting in this District returned an indictment charging the 
defendant in six counts. On July 2, 2020, the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBP") arrested the 
defendant. On July 8, 2020, a grand jury sitting in this District returned a superseding indictment 
(the "Indictment") containing the same charges, but with ministerial corrections. (Dkt. No. 17). 
Count One of the Indictment charges the defendant with conspiring with Jeffrey Epstein and others 
to entice minors to travel to engage in illegal sex acts, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371. Count Two 
charges the defendant with enticing a minor to travel to engage in illegal sex acts, and aiding and 
abetting the same, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2422 and 2. Count Three charges the defendant 
with conspiring with Epstein and others to transport minors to participate in illegal sex acts, in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371. Count Four charges the defendant with transporting minors to 
2 
EFTA00095094

participate in illegal sex acts, and aiding and abetting the same, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2423 
and 2. Counts Five and Six charge the defendant with perjury, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1623.1
ARGUMENT 
I. 
Jeffrey Epstein's Non-Prosecution Agreement Is Irrelevant to This Case 
The defendant seeks to dismiss the Indictment based on a 2007 non-prosecution agreement 
("NPA") between Jeffrey Epstein and the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of 
Florida (the "USAO-SDFL"). She does so despite the fact that: (1) she did not negotiate the NPA, 
was not a party to the NPA, and her name is not contained anywhere in the document; and (2) her 
crimes are not identified or named in any way in the NPA. Indeed, the defendant's argument boils 
down to an assertion that she is, in essence, immune from prosecution for any federal crime, during 
any time period, anywhere in the United States, based on the language of a document that does not 
name her and which she did not sign. Moreover, she seeks to enforce the NPA against a U.S. 
Attorney's Office that did not negotiate the NPA and is not bound by it. 
The defendant's arguments are meritless, and the Court should reject them. As a threshold 
matter, under the well-settled law of this Circuit, the NPA is not enforceable in this District, 
because the USAO-SDFL's agreement with Jeffrey Epstein is not binding on the U.S. Attorney's 
Office for the Southern District of New York (the "USAO-SDNY"). Moreover, even if the NPA 
applied to this District—which it does not—the NPA does not immunize the defendant from 
prosecution for the crimes charged in the Indictment. Finally, because the defendant has failed to 
1 As the Government has repeatedly indicated, the investigation into Jeffrey Epstein's co-
conspirators remains ongoing. (See, e.g., Gov't Letter dated Aug. 21, 2020, Dkt. No. 46; Gov't 
Letter dated Oct. 6, 2020, Dkt. No. 60; Gov't Letter dated Oct. 20, 2020, Dkt. No. 65). To the 
extent that investigation results in additional charges against the defendant, the Government 
intends to seek any superseding indictment at least three months in advance of trial. The 
Government does not anticipate that any new charges would require the production of any 
additional discovery. 
3 
EFTA00095095

offer any evidence to support her claim that the NPA applies to this District, to the defendant, or 
to the crimes in the Indictment, the Court should deny the defendant's request for discovery and 
an evidentiary hearing. 
A. 
The NPA Does Not Bind the Southern District of New York 
As an initial matter, the NPA is not enforceable in this District. To the contrary, it is black-
letter law in this Circuit that a plea agreement in one district does not apply elsewhere, in the 
absence of express indications not present here. Indeed, the Second Circuit has considered and 
rejected the exact arguments the defendant advances in her motion. The defendant's motion is 
without any basis in the law and should be denied. 
It is well settled in the Second Circuit that "a plea agreement in one U.S. Attorney's office 
does not, unless otherwise stated, bind another." United States v. Prisco, 391 F. App'x 920, 921 
(2d Cir. 2010) (citing United States v. Annabi, 771 F.2d 670, 672 (2d Cir. 1985) (per curiam) ("A 
plea agreement binds only the office of the United States Attorney for the district in which the plea 
is entered unless it affirmatively appears that the agreement contemplates a broader restriction.")); 
United States v. Salamelz, 152 F.3d 88, 120 (2d Cir. 1998). This Circuit "presumes a narrow 
reading of the boundaries of a plea agreement unless a defendant can affirmatively establish that a 
more expansive interpretation was contemplated." United States v. Laskow, 688 F. Supp. 851, 854 
(E.D.N.Y. 1988) (citing Annabi, 771 F.2d at 672), ard, 867 F.2d 1425 (2d Cir. 1988). To meet 
this burden, a defendant must establish that either the text of the agreement or the "negotiations 
between defendant and prosecutor" indicate a promise to bind other districts. United States v. 
Russo, 801 F.2d 624, 626 (2d Cir. 1986). For the reasons set forth below, the defendant has failed 
to establish that the USAO-SDFL promised Epstein that the NPA would bind other districts. 
4 
EFTA00095096

1. 
The Text of the Agreement Does Not Contain a Promise to Bind Other 
Districts 
Turning first to the text of the NPA, the terms of the agreement do not contain an 
"affirmative appearance" that the parties who signed the NPA intended to bind any other U.S. 
Attorney's Office. To begin with, there can be no dispute that only representatives of the USAO-
SDFL signed the agreement. There is no signature block for, nor specific mention of, any other 
district or component of the Department of Justice. 
In her motion, the defendant argues that the words "United States" in the NPA evince an 
intent to bind the entire United States Government. (Def. Mot. 1 at 18). But the Second Circuit 
has rejected this very argument: "[t]he mere use of the term `government' in the plea agreement 
does not create an affirmative appearance that the agreement contemplated barring districts other 
than the particular district entering into the agreement." Salameh, 152 F.3d at 120 (citations and 
internal quotation marks omitted). This rule also extends to plea agreements that use the term 
"United States." See United States v. Brown, No. 99-1230, 2002 WL 34244994, at *2 (2d Cir. 
Apr. 26, 2002) (summary order) (plea agreement does not bind other districts "even if the plea 
agreement purports to bind `the Government' or the "United States"); United States v. Bruno, 159 
F. Supp. 3d 311, 321 (E.D.N.Y. 2016) ("The Court disagrees with Defendant's argument that the 
phrase `United States' shows an intent to bind all United States Attorney's Offices. Rather, the 
plea agreement covers only Defendant's liability in the SDFL."). 
As the Second Circuit first explained in Annabi, plea agreements apply only in the district 
in which they are executed, absent evidence that the parties agreed to broader restrictions: 
As an original proposition, a plea agreement whereby a federal 
prosecutor agrees that `the Government' will dismiss counts of an 
indictment . . . might be thought to bar the United States from 
reprosecuting the dismissed charges in any judicial district unless 
the agreement expressly limits the scope of the agreement to the 
5 
EFTA00095097

district in which the dismissed charges are initially brought. 
However, the law has evolved to the contrary. A plea agreement 
binds only the office of the United States Attorney for the district in 
which the plea is entered unless it affirmatively appears that the 
agreement contemplates a broader restriction. 
Annabi, 771 F.2d at 672 (citations omitted). Thus, under Annabi and its progeny, a plea agreement 
only binds the U.S. Attorney's Office that executes the agreement, even if, as here, the agreement 
references "the Government" or "the United States" and even if the agreement lacks a provision 
that "expressly limits the scope of the agreement to the district" in which the agreement was 
entered.2
Confronted with this clear and controlling authority, the defendant's motion attempts to 
limit the rule of Annabi by noting that some decisions applying Annabi concerned plea agreements 
that also included express provisions limiting the enforceability of the agreements to the districts 
in which they were entered. (Def. Mot. 1 at 22). Essentially, the defendant argues that without an 
express provision limiting the scope of the agreement, every plea agreement should be interpreted 
to bind the entire federal government. But the law in this Circuit holds the opposite: the 
presumption is that a plea agreement in one district does not bind another, absent an affirmative 
appearance that the agreement extends more broadly. See Laskow, 688 F. Supp. at 854 (E.D.N.Y. 
("Defendant's argument, in effect, is that unless there is an explicit statement to the contrary, it is 
presumed that a non-prosecution agreement binds offices of the United States Attorney that are 
2 The defendant's motion emphasizes that the Second Circuit has held, as a general matter, that 
plea agreements are construed against the Government. (Def. Mot. 1. at 13). That does not carry 
the day here, as Annabi provides a specific mode of analysis for determining whether a plea 
agreement applies to other districts, and the defendant's motion fails under Annabi. More broadly, 
the authorities the defendant cites for this general principle arise from circumstances in which a 
defendant has sought to enforce his own a plea agreement against the Government. (See, e.g., Del 
Mot. 1 at 13 (citing United States v. Feldman, 939 F.3d 182, 189 (2d Cir. 2019) (analyzing claim 
by defendant seeking to enforce promises he claimed prosecutors had made to him)). Notably, the 
defendant has cited no authority for the proposition that plea agreements are to be construed in 
favor of a third party who was not involved in plea negotiations. 
6 
EFTA00095098

not parties to the agreement. This position is at odds with the law in this Circuit, which presumes 
a narrow reading of the boundaries of a plea agreement unless a defendant can affirmatively 
establish that a more expansive interpretation was contemplated.") (citing Annabi, 771 F.2d at 
672), aff'd, 867 F.2d 1425 (2d Cir. 2d Cir. 1988). To hold otherwise would turn Annabi on its 
head. 
The defendant next argues that the following provision of the NPA evinces an intent to bind 
the entire federal government: 
In consideration of Epstein's agreement to plead guilty and to 
provide compensation in the manner described above, if Epstein 
successfully fulfills all of the terms and conditions of this 
agreement, the United States also agrees that it will not institute any 
criminal charges against any potential co-conspirators of Epstein, 
including but not limited to Sarah Kellen, Adriana Ross, Lesley 
Groff, or Nadia Marcinkova. 
NPA at 5; Def. Mot. 1 at 20-21. Aside from the reference to "United States" which, as noted 
above, is insufficient, the defendant does not point to any language in this provision that 
purportedly binds other districts. Instead, she argues that the absence of language specifically 
limiting this provision to the USAO-SDFL demonstrates an intent to bind the entire federal 
government. This argument fails, for at least three reasons. First, the defendant's argument inverts 
the holding of Annabi: in this Circuit, the presumption is that plea agreements bind only the district 
in which they are entered, absent affirmative indications otherwise. Put differently, the absence 
of express limiting language in this provision is not an affirmative indication of a broader 
application. Accordingly, under Second Circuit law, the absence of limiting language in this 
specific provision provides no support for the defendant's motion. 
Second, the defendant's argument acknowledges that the plain terms of the NPA 
immunized Epstein from prosecution in "this District," that is, the Southern District of Florida. 
7 
EFTA00095099

See NPA at 2 ("After timely fulfilling all the terms and conditions of the Agreement, no 
prosecution . . . will be instituted in this District"). In other words, the NPA was expressly limited 
to the USAO-SDFL.3 Given this provision, it would be unnatural to read a broader application to 
other districts—based on no textual indicia—into the provision relating to co-conspirators. What's 
more, the defendant's reading of the NPA would require the Court to adopt the view that, where a 
plea agreement contains limiting terms, they must be repeated in every paragraph in order to have 
their natural and common-sense effects. 
Third, and perhaps most importantly, the defendant's interpretation strains common sense. 
In order to accept the defendant's arguments, the Court would have to reach the counterintuitive 
conclusion that Epstein expressly bargained for broader immunity for his co-conspirators than he 
did for himself. That is, under the defendant's reading of the agreement, Epstein bargained to 
protect co-conspirators nationally for crimes they committed with Epstein, but Epstein only sought 
protection for himself in the Southern District of Florida. The text of the agreement does not 
support such a puzzling interpretation. Instead, the more natural reading of the NPA is that its 
repeated references to the U.S. Attorney's Office and "this District" reflect a universal limitation 
on the NPA: it applies only to the USAO-SDFL. 
Finally, at several points in her motion, the defendant emphasizes that the NPA contains the 
word "global," but she does not appear to argue that this creates an affirmative appearance that the 
NPA binds other districts. (Def. Mot. 1 at 9, 12). Nor could she. The phrase "Epstein seeks to 
resolve globally his state and federal liability," by its terms, refers to Epstein's liability alone. See 
NPA at 2. 
Moreover, this language appears directly after several paragraphs describing 
investigations conducted by the Florida State Attorney's Office and the USAO-SDFL. See id. at 
3 In fact, the NPA states that it was executed "on the authority of R. Alexander Acosta, United 
States Attorney for the Southern District of Florida." NPA at 2. 
8 
EFTA00095100

1-2. Thus, in this context, the terms "global" and "state and federal liability" plainly refer to 
prosecutions by those two offices, and only those two offices.4 Thus, the defendant cannot argue 
that the word "global" in this provision means that the NPA binds the entire federal government. 
In sum, the defendant points to nothing in the text of the NPA that could possibly be 
construed to bind other districts. Accordingly, under Annabi, the NPA is only binding on the 
USAO-SDFL, and the defendant's motion fails as a matter of law. 
2. 
The Defendant Has Offered No Evidence That the NPA Binds Other 
Districts 
Although a defendant may offer evidence that the negotiations between the prosecutor and 
defendant contained a promise to bind other districts, Russo, 801 F.2d at 626, the defendant has 
failed to do so here. The defendant's motion is replete with bare assertions and conclusory 
allegations, but it fails to point to any evidence that the NPA binds the USAO-SDNY. 
The lone document the defendant offers in support of her motion is a privilege log filed by 
USAO-SDFL in connection with a lawsuit filed by Epstein's victims. (Def. Mot. 1 at 22). The 
log reflects that the FBI agents working with the USAO-SDFL interviewed witnesses in other 
states—including New York—during their investigation. That is entirely unremarkable, since 
federal investigations frequently involve gathering evidence in other states. This does not in any 
way establish the substantive involvement of any other districts in the prior investigation, let alone 
that the USAO-SDFL promised Epstein that the U.S. Attorney's offices in those states would be 
bound by the NPA. 
4 Interpreting the term "federal liability" in this provision could not be read to encompass all U.S. 
Attorney's offices without also interpreting its neighboring term, "state . . . liability" to refer to 
every state prosecutor's office in all fifty states. The USAO-SDFL clearly did not—and could 
not—make such a broad promise. 
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The privilege log also does not establish that the USAO-SDFL involved other U.S. 
Attorney's Offices in plea negotiations with Epstein. Grasping at straws, the defendant points to 
an entry in the privilege log, which contains an entry for handwritten notes, reflecting that the 
prosecutor in the USAO-SDFL spoke with an Assistant U.S. Attorney in New York. (Def. Mot. 1 
at 22). The notes referenced in the privilege log are attached hereto as Exhibit 1. As the notes 
reflect, the prosecutor at the USAO-SDFL reached out to an Assistant U.S. Attorney in the 
Southern District of New York to ask about a civil lawsuit relating to Epstein that was handled by 
the Civil Division of this Office in the 1990s. The Government is producing to defense counsel 
today emails that confirm that this was the nature of the contact.5 One of those emails is attached 
hereto as Exhibit 2 for the Court's reference. Put simply, those communications provide no 
indication that the USAO-SDNY was involved in plea negotiations with Epstein. Rather, the 
USAO-SDFL asked about an old civil case involving Epstein that an AUSA at USAO-SDNY 
happened to handle years earlier. In sum, the privilege log in no way establishes that other districts 
were involved in negotiating the NPA, much less that Epstein was promised that the NPA would 
bind other districts. 
The defendant proffers no other documentary evidence beyond the privilege log. Instead, 
without any citation, she broadly alleges that "senior levels of Main Justice were directly involved 
in the negotiation and approval of the NPA." (Def. Mot. 1. at 22). This vague and unswom 
5 In response to the allegations raised by the defense's motion, the Government identified the 
underlying notes referenced in the privilege log. The Government is producing those underlying 
notes, as well as the relevant emails, to defense counsel today. The Government has also been 
informed by a human resources representative that payroll records reflect that the Assistant U.S. 
Attorney referenced in the privilege log left the U.S. Attorney's Office on or about April 29, 2007, 
months before the NPA was executed. Although the Government has been informed that Human 
Resources records do not contain information regarding a division transfer, the Government 
understands from colleagues that the Assistant U.S. Attorney worked in the Civil Division in the 
1990s and worked in the Criminal Division in the 2000s. 
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allegation is not evidence. Moreover, any contacts between the USAO-SDFL and Main Justice 
would not, without more, establish that the USAO-SDFL intended to bind other districts, much 
less that the USAO-SDFL communicated a promise to Epstein that the NPA would extend beyond 
the USAO-SDFL. The defendant's failure to offer any evidence is fatal to her claim. 
Although it is not the Government's burden to address and rebut every innuendo or 
conclusory statement in the defendant's motion, it is significant here that the circumstances of the 
NPA have been extensively litigated in a civil lawsuit, and have also been investigated by the 
Department of Justice's Office of Professional Responsibility ("OPR"). The records of both 
matters provide no support for the defendant's claims. 
The OPR Report notes that the USAO-SDFL periodically consulted with the Chief of the 
Department of Justice Child Exploitation and Obscenity Section ("CEOS"), Andrew Oosterbaan, 
during the investigation and plea discussions, and that the CEOS Chief attended a meeting with 
defense counsel, during which defense counsel made a pitch that Epstein should not be prosecuted. 
November 2020 Report, United States Department of Justice, Office of Professional 
Responsibility, at 61-62.6 However, although the line prosecutor, Maria Villafalia, subsequently 
sent the CEOS Chief a draft of the NPA, the OPR Report reflects that the CEOS Chief reported to 
6 The defendant's motion cites to the executive summary of the OPR Report. However, the entire 
report is publicly available, is attached as Exhibit 3, and has been widely reported on and published 
by the media. See, e.g., "Read the report: Investigation into the U.S. Attorney's Office for the 
Southern District of Florida's Resolution of Its 2006-2008 Federal Criminal Investigation of 
Jeffrey Epstein and Its Interactions with Victims during the Investigation," Washington Post, Nov. 
12, 2020 (https://www.washingtonpost.corn/context/read-the-report-investigation-into-the-u-s-
attomey-s-office-for-the-southern-district-of-florida-s-resolution-of-its-2006-2008-federal-
criminal-investigation-of-jeffrey-epstein-and-its-interactions-with-victims-during-the-
investigation/db9373e8-22f8-4712-b4a7-be844d162de0/). 
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OPR that "he did not recall having read the NPA at this juncture and "had no involvement with 
it." OPR Report at 64 n. 105.7
Beyond this, the OPR Report and the record in the civil case note contacts with Main 
Justice about the NPA, but only after the NPA was negotiated, drafted and signed. In the civil 
case, the district court detailed the history of the plea negotiations—and noted that, after the NPA 
was signed, Epstein's counsel appealed to officials in Washington, D.C., hoping to avoid 
enforcement of the NPA's requirement that Epstein plead guilty to state offenses, as the agreement 
required. Doe I v. United States, 359 F. Supp. 3d 1201, 1212-13 (S.D. Fla. 2019). As the district 
court noted, that appeal was rejected. Id. at 1213. 
In particular, and following the execution of the NPA, the report reflects that the USAO-
SDFL contacted the CEOS Chief in connection with a letter from Epstein's counsel, Kenneth Starr, 
protesting about complying with certain parts of the NPA. OPR Report at 95. According to the 
report: 
At the same time, at [USAO-SDFL supervisor] Lourie's request, 
Villafafta sent the NPA and its addendum to Lourie and Oosterbaan. 
Oosterbaan responded to Lourie that he was "not thrilled" about the 
NPA; described Epstein's conduct as unusually "egregious," 
particularly because of its serial nature; and observed that the NPA 
was "pretty advantageous for the defendant and not all that helpful 
to the victims." He opined, however, that the Assistant Attorney 
General would not and should not consider or address the NPA 
"other than to say that she agrees with it." During her OPR 
interview, [Assistant Attorney General] Fisher did not recall reading 
Starr's letter or discussing it with Oosterbaan, but believed the 
comment about her "agree[ing] with it" referred to a federal 
prosecution of Epstein, which she believed was appropriate. She 
told OPR, however, that she "played no role in" the NPA and did 
not review or approve the agreement either before or after it was 
signed. 
The OPR Report further reflects that, at the time, the line prosecutor's immediate supervisor 
noted the CEOS had "no approval authority." OPR Report at 60. 
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OPR Report at 95. The OPR Report further notes that, thereafter, Epstein sought to avoid 
complying with the NPA entirely, and his attorneys appealed to Main Justice in the hopes of 
voiding the agreement. OPR Report at 94-108. That appeal was not successful. Id. In any event, 
the involvement of Main Justice alone would not begin to establish the very different proposition 
that Main Justice viewed the NPA as binding any district other than USAO-SDFL, let alone 
specifically considered and approved such an outcome, or communicated such a promise to 
Epstein. 
Further still, the record in the civil case makes clear that USAO-SDFL's position was that 
the NPA did not bind other districts. In a July 5, 2013 brief, USAO-SDFL stated: 
[T]he Non-Prosecution agreement simply obligated the government 
not to prosecute Epstein in the Southern District of Florida for the 
offenses set forth in the Non-Prosecution Agreement. The Non-
Prosecution Agreement does not bar the United States from bringing 
federal criminal charges against Epstein for the offenses set forth in 
the Non-Prosecution Agreement in any other district in the 
nation. 
Neither does the Non-Prosecution Agreement bar 
prosecution in any district for offenses not identified in the 
agreement. 
Government Brief, 08 Civ. 80736 (KAM), Dkt. No. 205-2, at 10-11 (S.D. Fla.) (emphasis in 
original). See also OPR Report at 81, n.125 (observing that a supervisor at the USAO-SDFL 
"pointed out that the NPA was not a `global resolution' and other co-conspirators could have been 
prosecuted `by any other [U.S. Attorney's] office in the country."). 
As the USAO-SDFL has explained, the NPA did not bind other districts, and could not. 
That is because the USAO-SDFL lacked the authority to do so under applicable Department of 
Justice guidelines: 
Significantly, under the governing provision of the United States 
Attorney's Manual, the USAO-SDFL did not have the authority to 
unilaterally bar Epstein's prosecution in any other district in the 
country: `No district or division shall make any agreement, 
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including any agreement not to prosecute, which purports to bind 
any other district(s) or division without the express written approval 
of the United States Attomey(s) in each affected district and/or the 
Assistant Attorney General of the Criminal Division.' 
Government Brief, 08 Civ. 80736 (KAM), Dkt. No. 205-2, at 11 n. I I (S.D. Fla.) (quoting United 
States Attorney's Manual, 9-27.641 (Multi-District (Global) Agreement Requests)). Significantly, 
this brief was signed by the same prosecutor who negotiated and signed the NPA. Id. Although 
the defendant makes the sweeping, self-serving, and unsupported allegation that "the government 
had every reason to foresee a potential prosecution of Epstein's co-conspirators in this District 
and, after multiple layers of review within the Department of Justice, intended to agree to preclude 
it," the USAO-SDFL's brief says otherwise. (Def. Mot. 1 at 22). 
Further still, the record 
developed in both civil litigation and OPR's investigation does not support this claim. 
*** 
As the foregoing makes clear, the defendant has failed to produce any evidence that the USAO-
SDFL promised Epstein that other districts would be bound by the NPA. There is no "affirmative 
appearance" that the NPA binds other districts, and the motion should be denied. Under Annabi 
and its progeny, the defendant has failed to establish that the NPA binds other districts. For this 
reason alone, the defendant's motion should be dismissed, in keeping with the well-established 
law in this Circuit.8
8 In her motion, the defendant asks this Court to apply a bizarre and unprecedented choice-of-
federal-law doctrine, under which the defendant asks the Court to apply non-existent rulings from 
the Eleventh Circuit on an issue that Court does not appear to have reached. (Def. Mot. 1 at 23-
25). This argument has no legal foundation, and the defendant offers no authority for the 
proposition that federal plea agreements are governed by the choice of law principles that apply to 
conflicting state laws. Annabi is the binding law of this Circuit, and this Court must apply it. 
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