

EUSSR

The Soviet roots of European integration

**“Our slogan is a world-wide Soviet Union.”
Anthem of the Comintern 1938**

By

Vladimir Bukovsky and Pavel Stroilov

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Contents

Introduction	1
Chapter 1. Fateful decision	3
Chapter 2. Crisis of Socialism	7
Chapter 3. Socialist donkey	17
- Spanish socialists	17
- French socialists	19
- British Labour	21
- German Social Democrats	22
Chapter 4. Other forces from hell	25
Chapter 5. Builders at work	33
Chapter 6. Après le déluge	41

Introduction

For anyone even remotely familiar with the Soviet system, its similarity with the developing structures of the European Union (EU), with its governing philosophy and "Democratic deficit", its endemic corruption and bureaucratic ineptitude is striking. For anyone who lived under the Soviet tyranny or its equivalents across the world - it is frightening. Once again we observe with growing horror the emergence of a Leviathan which we had hoped was dead and buried, a monster which destroyed scores of nations, impoverished millions and devastated several generations before finally collapsing. Is it inevitable? Is the human race bent on self-destruction and doomed to repeat the same mistake time and again until it dies in misery? Or, is the EU, indeed, simply a clone of the USSR imposed upon reluctant nations of Europe by the same political forces which created the first one?

The answer to these questions can be found in the secret archives of the Politburo in Moscow which the authors were lucky to get access to. We refer those who want to see the originals to the archives of the Gorbachev Foundation (Inventories 1-1; 2-2; 2-3 and 3-1).

Vladimir Bukovsky
Pavel Stroylov

December, 2004

1. Fateful decision.

There are some days in history when the destiny of whole continents is pre-determined for many decades to come. One would not find these dates in an encyclopaedia, neither would students spend sleepless nights before exams memorising them. Only the few, the chosen, know and honour those dates.

As for us, the unchosen masses, we go to sleep one night in a familiar environment of our ancient homeland, and the next morning we wake up in a desolation of some union of socialist republics. We are not supposed even to know who has taken that fatal decision and when.

For Europe, one such date was 26th March in the year 1987.

That day, the Soviet Politburo made a decision on the USSR's future policy in Western Europe. Gorbachev formulated the gist of this policy briefly and clearly, like a battle order:

To strangle in embrace.

This concept already had a specific name among the inner circle of the Soviet leadership – "Common European Home". Soon it became known to the whole world.

At that Politburo meeting "Common European Home" was given the highest priority. Gorbachev strictly prohibited the making of any political decisions without taking it into account.

Many things, comrades, are involved here. Obviously, we should not make a decision on any issue without taking Europe into account. We need it even in our internal affairs, for perestroika. But in foreign policy Europe is irreplaceable. It means

the strongest bourgeoisie in the world, not only economically, but politically as well.

Look, it seemed that Japan had outraced the whole world, and suddenly West Germany made such a dash in the sphere of science and technology!

Meanwhile, it was exactly in that sphere where Soviet backwardness had become catastrophic by that time. Indeed, Gorbachev decided to embrace Europe not because of sincere brotherly love. He had no choice.

By the beginning of the 1980s, the Soviet leadership had finally woken up to the fact that their system had entered a period of profound structural crisis. On the one hand, their economic model, unproductive and wasteful by definition like all socialist models, had brought them to the brink of bankruptcy. On the other, their very 'success' in exporting that model to other countries was becoming an unbearable burden to carry on their shoulders. With their troops bogged down in Afghanistan, and with the Polish crisis looming large on their doorstep, the 'cost of Empire' had become virtually unsustainable. Simply put, they had suddenly realised that their economic base was too small for their global ambitions. Added to that a new round of the arms race forced on them by Ronald Reagan, falling oil prices and a growing discontent at home, and one could understand their sudden urge for reforms. A final blow came with Reagan's obsession with the 'Star Wars' project. The Americans might have been bluffing, but the Soviets had to follow suit regardless, trying to compete in the very sphere where they were most behind the West - high-tech.

The only way to modernize the Soviet economy was to use the 'class enemy's' technological potential.

An important task is to use Western Europe's scientific and

technological potential. All the more so since our Eastern European friends have already struck there. Our rapprochement with Western Europe would make their work easier.

Gorbachev's idea was clear enough. On one hand, he feared the growing economic dependence of the Soviet satellites on the West. So, he hoped his friendship with Europe would secure the Western borders of his empire. On the other hand, once the other communist regimes in Europe were already fraternizing with the West, he felt it necessary to strengthen their embraces with the strangling grasp of the Soviet Union. Since these regimes were dealing with the class enemy anyway, they should do so in complete unity.

Besides, the Politburo had to take care not only of the Eastern bloc, but also of the whole world. They came to the conclusion that 'Common European Home' was a key to success of their worldwide plans.

Europe is present everywhere: in Cambodia, in the Middle East, in Africa, and, of course, among our Eastern [bloc] friends, and even in Latin America. Without Europe, we are unable actually to move forward anywhere.

If Western Sovietologists, by some miracle, knew about these "prospective measures of the USSR's foreign policy at the Western European direction", they would call it 'finlandisation'. Indeed, Gorbachev mentioned the Soviet experience of relations with Finland, and with Austria as well, as a good example of "constructing new international relations". Now he planned to expand them to continental scale.

However, Finland and Austria were just small neutral countries, while NATO kept preventing finlandisation of the whole of Europe. Hence, the first particular objective followed:

Not to split Western Europe from the USA, but rather to oust the USA from Europe.

Later, Gorbachev often insisted that the "Common European Home" project never had been intended to cause a split between Europe and the USA. He lied.

But, indeed, there is some difference between splitting and ousting. A split among enemies, good as it is, does not mean the parties become more hostile to each other than to you. The Soviet tactic of gradually ousting the USA by strengthening their own influence is different. This ousting, in turn, created additional opportunities to increase Soviet influence, whose goal was to oust the USA ever further. Thus it goes until final victory, when the Kremlin would be rewarded with an absolutely pro-Soviet, "finlandised" Europe and with the isolation of the United States on their own continent.

Shall we succeed? I don't know. But we cannot shirk from setting this goal. Europe is our problem. Our interests are great there. And we should not fear.

Gorbachev also emphasised two 'realities' to be seen, analysed and used. The first one was the 'diversity' of Europe. The Soviets had to work out the most suitable approaches to every country, to every political party, to various circles of various societies.

The other 'reality' was European integration. It was necessary to analyse, Gorbachev said, which aspects of this integration were good for the Soviets and which were not.

2. Crisis of Socialism.

Before the mid-80s, Soviet leaders and most of the Western Left were hostile towards the European Communities and the Common Market, seeing them as a result of a conspiracy between multinational corporations and liberal politicians.

It was the world-wide crisis of socialism in late 1970s – early 1980s which made them start re-considering this attitude, as well as many other cornerstones of their strategies.

The Italian Communist Party used to be seen by the Soviets as disloyal, if not hostile, because of its ‘euro communist’ direction. Now this had to be re-viewed, too. More than that, Italian communists played quite an important role in working out the new strategy. Its General Secretary of the time Alessandro Natta came to Moscow in January 1986.

A. Natta. [...] Since the late '70s, not only the offensive of capitalism can be seen in the West, but also certain successes of this offensive in economic, political and ideological respects (the ideas of market and competition are getting ever stronger roots) . [...]

The response of the working class, of all the left-wing forces, to imperialism's attack is inadequate. To be frank, the position of the communist parties in the West is at a critical stage. It was not like this 15-20 years ago. There is a retreat, a loss of influence in the masses, and not only at the polls. The splits and deep crises in the parties have influenced the working class's position. And the reasons for this are not only in late reactions to imperialism's attacks, late evaluation of the new situation, but something else, too.

And the communists are not alone in this distressful situation, the Italian continued. Rather, we are facing a common crisis of all the European Left.

We live in Europe, in Western Europe. We were born there, and we are fighting for socialism in Western Europe. German social democrats, British Labourites, French communists have also met big problems, arising from scientific and technological progress, collapse of the 'welfare state' and unemployment. The social democrats have followed their traditional policy, but now they are beginning to ponder, too. However, the problems we've met are not only European. They exist in other parts of the world, as well.

The latest failure of the European Left had been, at that time, Mitterrand's attempt (in coalition with the Communists) to build socialism in France in 1981-1983. This experience became an object of the most intense attention in all discussions about the future of socialism.

The French socialists say something we should take into account. An attempt at democratic reforms in a country like France is very difficult, unless it is accompanied by similar attempts in other countries. Just as the socialists began their reforms in France, the social democrats left the governments in West Germany and Great Britain. This caused a lot of trouble. Any progressive reform needs support from other progressive forces in Europe.

Indeed, by trying to build socialism just in one, 'separately taken', country one would face a very unpleasant choice. If you keep building socialism you lose competitiveness. If you take care of competitiveness, you have no socialism. You cannot combine these two things, even armed cordons along the borders and other kinds of iron curtains do not help. The only solution is to impose

socialism on your competitors as well.

Progressive solutions in the social sphere must fit in the European framework. In one country, even the most interesting solutions would give only partial results.

The new attitude of the Left to European integration was pre-determined by this very consideration. This attitude used to be cold, if not worse, for many decades, but now they realised that integration was about the only way to salvation. Many years of their struggle for power in independent European countries had proved fruitless. The only thing left to do was to try to seize control over the whole of Europe at once.

We have to recognise, that the creation of a Single Market is not just a project, but a reality of Europe's development, Natta said. That is why the workers' movement of Western Europe, represented by its political parties and trade unions, should not ignore this process, but rather get involved in it actively. What does await us in the future? Decrease of unemployment or decrease of employment, alleviation or aggravation of economic problems, increase or decrease of influence of the major financial and industrial forces? Of course, we would be displeased if domination by tycoons like Agnelli would emerge in an united Europe. Let's hope that democracy will prevail, democracy in the sense of widening the social rights of the citizens, increasing their political rights, such as a right to truthful information.

Certainly, speaking of democracy, communists always mean 'social democracy', while 'truthful information' in their parlance has always been an euphemism for communist propaganda. That is what they hoped would prevail in an united Europe.

However, it was not enough to hope, they had to act. Power over Europe would not come to the Communists by itself, they had

to fight for it.

"We assume that the European community is a really existing organisation, i. e. a kind of battlefield on which the leftist forces have to wage their political struggle", Natta said.

As for an united Western Europe, so far conservative and liberal forces still dominate. The leftist forces currently fall behind. Because, first, they failed to gain the support of a wider strata of the population. And, second, they failed to get closer to the centrist forces, representing the interests of new social strata, employed, for example, in the services sphere or in administration. These strata are unreservedly in favour of integration.

Of course, this gap is not fatal yet, as we are willing and able to represent the interests of these new strata. But there is a real possibility that they will remain under the influence of the centrist or, at best, social democratic forces. The new social strata exists and develops independently from our reckonings and forecasts, and we have to work with them.

Therefore, one thing was clear enough. It was necessary to unite all the left: communists, social democrats and anyone else who would support the socialist agenda.

We need new efforts to widen the alliances, not only in Italy, but also in the European framework. And I mean all the leftist forces in a wide sense of this word. Not only communist, socialist and social democratic parties should be involved in these alliances, but also the whole complex of movements, of progressive forces with various aspirations, including the religious movements. In the peace struggle the religious forces outstrip the communists somewhere, in organisation if not in ideas. For example, in the Netherlands. In Italy the situation is variable as well: there are some bishops carrying out reactionary policies and there are some

who are in favour of social justice, of equality.

However, in making these alliances we must preserve the communist identity of the party. The communist identity is a living process, not determined once and forever. I should like to repeat myself: the conditions have become complex, the processes are developing, and their laws are not established once and forever. I can see that you are thinking about this as well. Any transition from one phase of development to another always causes complex problems. They are not fatal problems, pre-determined once and forever. These are new opportunities.

However, Gorbachev warned the Italian comrade they should not go too far. All their manoeuvres, smart as they might be, were to benefit the main goal: socialism.

One thought, he said. In assessing your work, it is important always to keep in mind the attraction of the socialist ideal, of the socialist perspectives. No one except us would think about it. Others have other ideals, even the social democrats, let alone conservatives. You are right, we have no prepared position on the left front, while our task is to enrich the left movement, to get new allies. Perhaps, some intermediate stages will appear on the way. We should go through them, not losing sight of our goals. Some have got lost seeking answers to the questions raised. It is possible to lose all the positions as a result. [...] We should seek points of interface, temporary alliances are possible as well. But the true alternative to the bourgeois parties are the communists.

Of course, this strategy meant inevitable and significant compromises, but that was acceptable. The Communist dogma allows that in an extreme situation. All the more so, as this retreat from Marxist orthodoxy was forced on the Left not only by political needs, but also, and even to a greater extent, by the economic crisis of socialism. This crisis urged them to moderate

their agenda anyway, introducing some elements of free market into the socialist model. But they found it to be a good idea to pretend this was a huge concession not to the reality, but to their political allies.

We have already mentioned, Natta reminded, that the left-wing forces have, to some extent, lost their positions in the countries of Western Europe. One of the causes of this is a certain tardiness in the analysis and perception of the processes of great changes under way in contemporary capitalist society. And not only the communists are late with this, but also the socialists and social democrats. Absolutely insufficient was our analysis, our critical approach to the problems of contemporary capitalism, including the great changes which took place and continue in the sphere of production, in the social structure of the society. In particular, we took too defensive a stance on such issues as the internationalisation of the capitalist economy, development and the crisis of the 'welfare state' and so on.

We must recognise that, for example, the 'welfare state' brought great achievements to the working people – the spheres of services, pensions, social security. But at the same time we, the communists, having either overestimated or underestimated the functions of the 'welfare state', kept defending situations which, as has become clear only now, we should not have defended. As a result, a bureaucratic apparatus, which serves itself, has swelled. It is interesting that a certain similarity with your situation, which you call stagnation, can be seen here.

M. S. Gorbachev. *'Parkinson's law' works everywhere ...*

A. Natta. *Any bureaucratisation encourages the apparatus to protect its own interests and to forget about the citizens' interests. I suppose, that is exactly why the Right's demands of re-privatisation are falling on fertile ground in Western public*

opinion.

Indeed, the decades of 'welfare state' devastated the European economy no less than a military invasion would do. But its architects were not honest enough to recognise they had made basic mistakes in their calculations. They preferred to move to opposition, gloomily leaving the others to clean out the debris of this beautiful construction and lament the ensuing "infringements on the working people's interests". Nevertheless, the picture was clear even to them. The experiment of the century had failed. Now they had to retreat, reshuffle the forces and try again. As Gorbachev said,

let the conservatives take responsibility for the re-organisation of the economy. The communists ought to bring forward more topical slogans.

Indeed, it is more important to keep power for a longer time than to take it quickly. So, the Left decided to step back, uniting and amassing their forces. They did not have to wait for too long.

In 1992 the creation of the European Single Market is planned, Natta remembered. This will mean the erosion of all national frontiers: geographic, fiscal, economic. This will lead to the creation of a single European currency and an European Central Bank. This process will be complex and will inevitably cause collisions of different opinions. The Left has a chance for success.

The same reasons which made Western communists reconsider their policy this way, led their Eastern comrades to the conclusion about the need for 'perestroika'*. The difference was that the socialist experiment in the East had gone further, than in the West. This made the task of healing the economy much more difficult there. In addition, the Communists in the East had to do

this dirty work themselves, as there were no conservatives to pass the buck to. And, of course, the Soviet 'perestroika' was a failure, while the Western 'perestroika' was a success. The Western Left really managed to create this wide alliance, which is still governing Europe.

However, there are amazing similarities and close interdependence in the origins, goals and means of both 'perestroikas'. For that alliance of the European Left was originally supposed to be pro-Soviet. Therefore, it was important to make the pro-Soviet stance respectable first, and that was what Gorbachev's reforms were about. As Natta said:

To maintain relations with the Left in Europe is not an easy task. [...] If the left-wing forces want to be more autonomous, they must have more connections to the Soviet Union, they must carry out policy for development and socialism. That is why our interest in the new stage of your development, which you are talking about, is so great.

However, to Gorbachev this praise was not something unexpected, for his 'perestroika' policy was, first of all, addressed to the Western Left. Judging from these archive documents, it was international problems rather than internal ones which made the Soviet leaders start reforms. Not a big surprise, bearing in mind that the purpose of the Soviet Union's existence was world revolution. The Soviet people lived in an eternal struggle. Never did the Soviet power simply take measures – it always delivered strikes. Even the most peaceful points of the Soviet agenda would always be formulated as a 'declaration of war' ('fighting alcoholism', 'battle for harvest', 'war with bureaucracy' etc.).

Therefore, to understand any of the Bolsheviks' activities, we should, first of all, find out against whom they were directed.

First of all, the new image of socialism undermines the traditional claims of the right-wing circles in the West for dominating influence, which used to be supported by the image of the enemy – socialist 'totalitarian monster'. Openly hostile to socialism the conservative front, which had strengthened in the West in the early '80s, began to erode, –

said Gorbachev in his secret speech to his Warsaw pact allies on 6th July, 1988. It was in that very speech, where he told them the details of the 'Common European Home' project.

Judging from this speech, 'perestroika' was intended to change the political situation in Western countries rather than in the USSR. It was

... to allow socialism to get involved in shaping world politics more actively and more widely, to influence it more effectively and to stimulate positive changes in the surrounding world.

In other words, it was to influence foreign politics by any means, bringing the most "progressive" forces there to power.

Being realists, [we] cannot wait for new partners, for a more democratic alternative to get into governments in the West. But, in substance, we are enabling such an alternative.

The renewal of socialism is also an invitation to evolution of the capitalist world, an encouragement for the forces able to overcome class prejudice and ready for co-operative work in the solution of contemporary burning problems to take centre-stage there. And this can already be seen in the growth of influence of the bourgeoisie's moderate wing.

In communist ideology, by 'bourgeoisie's moderate wing' they usually meant socialists and social democrats. The Soviet

‘perestroika’ created a favourable political climate for them, cutting the ground from under the Right. This policy combined perfectly with the Western Communists' efforts to unite all the Left in a wide pro-Soviet alliance. That is why Gorbachev, after listening to Natta's plan, blessed him:

With great interest did we survey your views of the integration processes, your thoughts and ideas about the alternative to the existing state of affairs in Western Europe. [...]

What should be the face of the future socialist alternative? Here we need a lot of analysis and theoretical work. It is clear, however, that we should not be afraid of alliances in the framework of the integration processes. You have already outlined the circle of your search for unity of the Left. I don't think this will be easy. The Italian experience shows it is not. All the more so since it will be on an European scale. But I see that the Left is quite able to make the integration processes to contribute to democratisation of Western Europe, to solving the social problems.

[...]

What is now going on in Western Europe will pre-determine the course of events for decades, if not for centuries. The Italian Communist Party has recognised the importance of a new approach to this process, in which many forces are involved. But it is hardly possible to protect the interests of the working people without the left-wing forces. Therefore we salute [...] your efforts.

* Perestroika (re-structuring) is a widely used name for the reforms introduced by Gorbachev in the Soviet Union (1985 – 1991).

3. Socialist donkey.

Needless to say, European socialists have enthusiastically welcomed the new partnership. This was their dream coming true. Ever since the social democrats split at the beginning of 20th century into Bolsheviks (communists) and Mensheviks (socialists), the latter were hoping that one day the Bolsheviks will see the light, "mellow down" and return to the fold of Social Democracy. And the former always shamelessly exploited this dream by pretending to see the Menshevik's 'light' each time they found themselves in a tough corner. Hence followed all sorts of Popular Fronts, United Fronts, etc. which all invariably ended in yet another quarrel (as soon as the Bolsheviks were comfortably out of a current trouble). Still, no matter how many times this scenario has repeated itself, the Menshevik's donkey was always happy to be once again seduced by the Bolshevik's carrot. What else could they do? After all, the difference between them was mostly in questions of tactics, their ultimate goal and, to some extent, their ideology was and is the same.

So it happened again, with the launching of Gorbachev's perestroika which was perceived by European socialists as a great historic opportunity.

Spanish socialists:

...The success of perestroika means only one thing – the success of the socialist revolution in contemporary conditions. And that is exactly what the reactionaries don't accept, – said Francisco Fernandez Ordonez, Spanish Foreign Minister, to Gorbachev in Moscow, on 3rd March, 1989. The Soviet leader appreciated such a deep understanding of his idea, so he replied:

Now, addressing you as a socialist, I ask you to tell F.

Gonzalez that all of us should bear in mind one principal point. Today we, the communists, are working to realise the potentials of socialism as fully as possible, through perestroika. This is our model of socialist society. But I am sure that the success of our search would enrich the socialist values, which are common for all of us. All of us would be able to move forward significantly faster. I suppose, the Socialist International should be interested in that no less than ourselves. Eventually, we will manage to sort out which model of society is best to meet the yearnings of working people, their hopes for justice. This is something you and we surely can sort out.

F. Fernandez Ordonez. *What you are talking about is exceptionally important. In the process of perestroika the main bet is the outcome of the ideological battle. The success of the ideas of socialism in the contemporary world community depends on the success of perestroika.*

M. S. Gorbachev. *Through our perestroika, through the new ideas brought forward by the socialists of Western Europe, we are not moving away from each other, we are doing the opposite. From our point of view, now, at the critical stage of the development of human history, there are no reasons why the two factions of the workers' movement should be positioned on different sides of the barricades once again. No, mutual understanding and solidarity, adequate to present realities, should dominate the relations between the two factions of the workers' movement. We are feeling real comradely interest, sympathy and understanding of our problems and difficulties, understanding of the importance of our course by those countries, where socialist or social democratic governments are in power.*

A year and a half later, on 26th October, 1990, Felipe Gonzalez himself would tell Gorbachev in Madrid his complex theory of modern socialism.

The Revolution of 1917, he said, began the split of the world into two antagonistic systems. The emergence of these two alternative models actually opened a way to attempts of creating a third model – social democracy, Nazism, fascism. Today the essence of the revolution, going on in the world, is the movement to the united world community.

I must say that confusing ideological and political analyses as we did for many years – and, to some extent, all of us are responsible for that – made a fetish of the opposition between capitalism and socialism. For many years, to a great extent artificially, we supported that antagonism.

Today I come to one quite strange conclusion. Since we came to power, I had to struggle with my party comrades to make them understand that the market economy is the best instrument to achieve our main goals. Just the best instrument, but not the goal in itself. I feel intellectual disgust when I have to read, for example, passages in the documents of 'G7' where the problems of democracy, freedom of human personality and ideology of market economy are set on the same level. As a socialist, I cannot accept such an equation.

French socialists:

The construction of a 'Common European Home' is a great idea. Anyone who has imagination and intellectual courage, would easily imagine the European continent, all of the countries situated there, as a new entity, connected by relations of a new kind, in the framework of which everyone remains oneself and all of them co-operate in the name of coinciding goals. I, personally, consider the realisation of this idea as my top priority.

Thus spoke French President Mitterrand to Gorbachev on 26th November, 1988, in Moscow. We can only wonder how he could

guess that a 'Common European Home' was something pretty close to his own pan-European ideas.

Europe, united in the EEC framework is just the first step to the true goal, to achieve which we will need very much time – twenty five, fifty years or, perhaps, even the whole century. The true goal is the whole of Europe.

But some aspects of the bright future, concealed behind the monumental facade of the 'Common European Home', were omitted in their public pronouncements. For instance, the common European structures were supposed to be based not only on the European Communities, but also on the economic organisation of the Warsaw Pact – the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance. That is why one of Mitterrand's top priorities was the development of connections between the EC and CMEA.

Since the Soviet Union was the strongest member of the CMEA, it was supposed to become at least one of the landlords of the 'Common European Home'. Naturally, this would mean either socialist 'home', or no 'home' at all.

But Mitterrand was not afraid of that either. He was a socialist, and nothing socialist was alien to him. For the Soviet Union was promising to attach something like a 'human face' to its socialism. If so, why should not the West add a bit of socialism to its 'human face'?

It seems to me, Mitterrand discoursed, that as far as individual rights are concerned, the practice existing in Western countries seems more perfect than the respective practice in the Soviet Union. At the same time, as far as collective rights are concerned, especially in industrially developed countries, the West as a whole will probably have to work a lot in this direction. I mean right to work and so on.

And other social rights, Gorbachev happily provided the term from the Soviet jargon.

F. Mitterrand. In France, by the way, there are a lot of areas where the problem of social rights reflects the inequality between various strata of French society.

So, Mitterrand clarified his intention to solve this 'problem of social rights' in France and in Europe as a whole. This probably meant the elimination of social inequality, of which the 'problem' was only a reflection. Meanwhile, the East would complete their 'perestroika' and little difference would remain between the two socialist empires. They would be ready to converge.

British Labour:

On 23rd August, 1988, Gorbachev's advisor Vadim Zagladin secretly reported to his boss about his meeting with Ken Livingstone MP.

The economic difficulties of Western Europe stimulate, Livingstone said, the process of political delimitation between it and the USA. The process of political unification of Western Europe is going to accelerate. I understand, Livingstone continued, that it is important for the Soviet Union not to allow a politically united Western Europe to turn into an anti-Soviet bloc. But this is not necessary at all. Significant political forces in Western Europe are in favour of other alternatives: Europe's greater independence in political aspect, which might be either neutral or developing good-neighbour relations with the East. [...]

Livingstone's general conclusion (and he claimed that this is, in fact, the opinion of the Labour Party's basic core) is that nowadays there are very wide opportunities to develop mutually

beneficial economic and intensive political contacts between Western Europe and the Soviet Union. Only one thing is important – to use these opportunities effectively. In future these opportunities may change, increase or decrease, but now they are, perhaps, most beneficial in the whole post-war period. Both you and we should make the necessary conclusions from this fact, Livingstone concluded.

German Social Democrats:

Of course, the most enthusiastic supporters of the project were German social democrats who had established ‘special relations’ with Moscow decades before. Even at the high noon of the Cold War, they cultivated (behind the backs of their partners in various coalitions) confidential communications with the Kremlin, often through KGB channels, thus becoming de facto its collective agent of influence. Here, at last, their hour had come! Their Chairman H.-J. Vogel (together with such a veteran Kremlin collaborator as Egon Bahr) hurried to Moscow in May 1988.

Perestroika is a help to us all, to the entire progressive movement in the West. [...] [It] removed many obstacles on the way to cooperation between the forces of the Left, of democratic forces, and at the same time created new prerequisites for their further collaboration.

Speaking of his party's prospects, he said that a ‘decisive moment’ is coming soon, with the creation in 1992 of the ‘single market’, bearing in mind a necessity for Europe to strengthen its independence with regards to the USA, Zagladin reported.

However, the main tool for implementing this project was the Socialist International (SI). Its Chairman Willi Brandt was one of the first Western politicians to visit Gorbachev after the latter was elected General Secretary, and different delegations of the SI were

constantly on the road to Moscow like Muslims to Mecca. Indeed, their relations were somewhat similar to those of Islamic worshippers and their Ayatollah. It came to a point when Gorbachev was simply instructing them what to do on this or that issue, and they would report on the implementation next time they came, seeking his approval like school kids from a teacher.

I would especially like to emphasize your last thought: it is extremely important to make perestroika a success. I would be most grateful to you if you tell us what do you expect from the so-called West, and from us - social democrats [...] - in terms of helping perestroika. There is a lot of talk now about the 'end of socialism', that it has outlived itself. But I believe that from the viewpoint of history we are witnessing a new beginning, a new quality of socialism in a very large part of the world, said Brandt to Gorbachev in October 1989 when the SI delegation once again reported for duty.

The scope of their joint activity was, indeed, huge and all-embracing, from publishing a theoretical magazine and 'trying to overcome the 1914 split' in the socialist movement to practical questions of politics. Some errands run by the SI for Gorbachev were of quite a sensitive nature.

W. Brandt. *I am concerned with the situation in the Baltic republics. I am in touch with our Northern friends ...*

Exploiting his position in the SI, Brandt was using his Scandinavian colleagues as proxies in order to put restraining pressure on the democratic opposition in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.

Our influence in that region is not huge. But I would like to assure you that we will use it only in the interests of pacification. If need be, we will tell certain people: questioning federation with

the USSR is like playing with fire.

Indeed, luckily for us all, his influence was not omnipotent, but he was quite happy to play the role of a prison guard and to help his boss in keeping the captive nations from running away.

How is your health, Mr. Gorbachev? Have you got enough time to sleep?

4. Other forces from hell.

However, all the talk of opposing US influence in Europe, all the pretence at creating a European 'counterbalance' to the remaining superpower sounded more like propaganda than a real goal of the EU. If nothing else, the United States did not oppose it at all, while certain influential forces in America have actively encouraged European integration. Thus, on 18th January, 1989, a delegation of the Trilateral Commission visited Gorbachev - Rockefeller, Kissinger, Nakasone and Giscard d'Estaing. Ostensibly, their purpose was to encourage the Soviets to begin integrating into the world's economic and financial institutions (e.g. GATT, IMF), to convert the rouble etc. Then, suddenly, Giscard took the floor and said:

V. Giscard d'Estaing. Nowadays Western Europe is experiencing a perestroika, changing its structures. It is difficult to say exactly when this will happen: five, ten or twenty years later. But a new modern federal state will emerge in Western Europe. That is where we are going, and the USSR should be prepared to communicate with a large single state of Western Europe. This future state will be open, ready for all forms of co-operation.

But then, perhaps, an issue of accession of some other states, de jure or de facto, will emerge. Most probably, this will include Austria, Switzerland, Scandinavian countries and, also, some East European states. We are not going to 'stir up' East European countries, to shake the basis of their stability. We see the dangers of destabilisation in different states and we are not interested in that. But we would like to know, if some East European countries, while preserving the ties of security with the USSR, wish to become associate members of the EEC, what would be your attitude to that idea?

Kissinger did not object to this either. If nothing else, he was eager for the USA to become a part of the project:

H. Kissinger. [...] Second line of considerations is related to the future of Europe, to inter-relations between its different parts. What do you think of a concept of 'Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals'? What will be the fate of that part of the Soviet Union which is situated to the East of Urals? What kind of relations will there be between the USA and the future Europe?

My colleagues in the Trilateral Commission and I want to contribute in a constructive manner to the building of this Europe, in which both the USSR and the USA would have played a similarly positive role".

Please note that this conversation was taking place in January 1989, when even the Treaty of Maastricht was not drafted yet, let alone the Treaty of Amsterdam, the Treaty of Nice, or the European Constitution, not to mention the fact that no referenda on any of them had yet been held. How did they know, much before we have expressed any consent to these dramatic changes in our homelands, what will definitely happen in 20 years? Who are these people? Why do they have such enormous power over our lives that we all feel irrelevant, our wonted democracy notwithstanding?

In any case, this quotation leaves us with a host of burning questions about the mysterious links between the European superstate project, Giscard d'Estaing and the Trilateral Commission. What is Giscard's role in the construction of the European superstate? And what is the connection between this and his recent authorship of the notorious European Constitution? Above all, what has the Trilateral Commission to do with all of that?

The mystery continued with Georges Berthoin, the European co-chairman of the Trilateral commission, who came to prepare Jacques Delors' visit to Moscow. Here is what Vadim Zagladin, Gorbachev's advisor on European affairs, reported about this secret conversation:

On my meeting with the Co-Chairman of the Trilateral Commission Georges Berthoin.

4th April, 1990.

The meeting with G.Berthoin took place at his request. During it, he expressed a number of ideas connected to the forthcoming visit to Moscow of J. Delors, Chairman of the Commission of the European Communities, and his intentions.

1. G.Berthoin is an old friend of J. Delors. He began the conversation, characterising Delors as a dry, very businesslike person, but, deep in his soul, sincere and loyal to his beliefs. He is able to change his beliefs, but only under the influence of conclusive arguments.

Then my companion noticed that Delors is coming to Moscow this time first of all as the Chairman of the Commission of the European Communities. Meanwhile, we should take into account that nowadays he is the only West European politician, who has certain authority and 'means something' for each of the twelve member-states of the Community.

For example, as for his own country – France – he is one of the possible candidates to become its President. [...]

For Germans, Berthoin continued, Delors is the only West European politician who enjoys practically unreserved trust. In Germany, he has relations with all the political circles, and all of them take him into account to this or that extent.

For Englishmen, Delors is the man who has persuaded the trade unions to support the idea of the Common Market. Naturally, Margaret Thatcher likes Delors little just for this reason. But she takes him into account, too.

Delors is also respected in Spain, Portugal and Greece, because it was he who, during the negotiations on these countries' entrance into the Common Market, pressed for a longer transitional period for them and for more beneficial conditions of entry.

In other words, concluded G. Berthoin, Delors is the man who is able to influence other countries' positions and many things in the future position of the European Communities depend on him.

2. Nowadays, Berthoin said, Delors is most concerned with the following problems: the German question (he is for the unification of the two German states, but he intends to find a solution which would neither damage the European Communities, nor the European idea); the increase of political power of the European Communities, i.e., in fact, their transformation into a kind of federation; the problems of co-operation between the Communities and Eastern Europe. Naturally, he will probably wish to know the opinion of the Soviet leadership on all these issues.

He is going to be particularly interested, my companion continued, in the following aspects of the above problems.

Delors wants to understand our goals concerning Eastern Europe. To be more precise, he is interested what, in our view, our own relations with the countries of Eastern Europe should be and what the West's relations with these countries should be; what we consider to be important, from the point of view of the provision of our own security in a military and a political sense, and economic security of our country as well.

In connection with this, Delors will probably be interested in what we think of [President Mitterrand's] idea of European confederation. Talking to Berthoin himself, as my companion told me, Delors meditated: is, for the Soviet Union, the idea of 'European confederation' identical to the idea of 'Common European Home'? Then he asked a question, whether the Soviet Union considers itself as a whole, from Brest to Vladivostok, belonging to Europe. Or the USSR counts on its Western part's only 'involvement in Europe'. In Delors's opinion, it is difficult to imagine that the whole Soviet Union, including, for example, its Asian republics, can become a member of the Common European Home. He would like to hear the Soviet argument about that.

In fact, Berthoin went on, the further evolution of Delors's own concepts much depends on what these arguments will be. The idea of categorical separation of the whole Soviet Union from Europe is alien to him. He understands that the USSR is a single entity. However, at the same time, if the whole USSR will be a part of the Common European Home, what should we do about the USA?

During his talks with Berthoin, Delors used to ask him a question like that, as well: would it be clever to integrate Japan? Certainly, Japan is not Europe. But, in fact, Europe, USA and Japan is a single complex, to some extent. Is it possible that the European process can, after some time, become a factor, contributing to constructive co-operation of all the countries of the Northern hemisphere?

G. Berthoin added, that in his personal opinion, Delors lacks clarity in all these questions. All his ideas bear elements of realism. But, on the other hand, if we try to base today's policy on the idea of the whole northern hemisphere's co-operation, would it not lead to the destruction of the European idea as such?

However, in Berthoin's opinion, short-term and long-term

strategies of the European Communities will, in many respects, depend on the results of negotiations between Delors and Gorbachev.

3. Berthoin expressed interesting ideas , concerning Delors's views on the general problems of contemporary international relations. In the opinion of the Commission of the European Communities' Chairman, there is currently a kind of struggle being carried on in the world between two kinds of diplomacy. One of them is the traditional diplomacy of defending the national interests of every country, separately. The other kind is diplomacy based on the growing interdependence of nations, which (interdependence) means the necessity of integration both in the economy and in politics.

Probably now, (reasons Delors, according to Berthoin), we can see a kind of compromise between these two approaches. This compromise has a strong influence upon the positions of separate countries and the EEC as a whole about the choice of the way forward, working out the so-called architecture of the future European and world order.

In Delors's opinion (though, in principle, he supports F. Mitterrand's policies and, in turn, enjoys his support), the French president has not made a conclusive choice yet between the old and the new kinds of diplomacy. That is why he is so inconsistent on many issues, including the one of France's role in the world and in Europe, and the German question.

Delors himself believes, that today's compromise approach (which, in his opinion, can be seen everywhere) cannot exist for a long time. Either Europe and the world return to the old approach, which would be very dangerous, reviving the old international conflicts, or the new approach wins, oriented towards a wide integration, and then the world would really get a

new quality.

I don't know, Berthoin said, whether Delors will ask this question directly to Gorbachev or not. Anyway, he will bear it in mind.

[...]

In the end Berthoin said, that he had decided to tell me so frankly about Delors's plans not only by the right of an old friend, but, first of all, because he wants Delors's visit to Moscow to be marked by really serious advances in solving the burning European and world problems. "This is what our common future depends on", he concluded.

Admittedly, we know too little about this secretive Trilateral Commission to draw any far-reaching conclusions, but one thing we can claim for certain: it was unlikely to encourage an anti-American project. Somehow, their ultimate goals must have coincided with those of the European integrationists. Could it be an idea of World Government somewhere in the misty future, for which the EU was perceived by them as a step in the right direction? Such interpretation, often rejected and ridiculed as a 'conspiracy theory', has nonetheless some documentary evidence to support it. Speaking with Argentinean President Carlos Menem on 25th October, 1990, Gorbachev mused:

M. Gorbachev. [...] But we should go further. Further progress will depend on the actions in Europe, in Latin America, in the Asian-Pacific region. After the European home is built, many other homes of cooperation must follow. [...]

C. Menem. [...] speaking of integration, everyone agrees with it. We in Latin America intend to act along the same lines as Europe. In general, humanity has no other choice. And then, after

integration, we will concentrate on conquering the universe.

M.Gorbachev. *One of my aides has written sometime ago that we need to create a world government. People were laughing at him at that time. But now?*

C.Menem. *Some 40 years ago Peron was speaking of continentalism which would enable us to go for a world government.*

M.Gorbachev. *I believe we should think about enhancing the UN role. It could not realise its potential for 40 years and only now did it get such an opportunity. Here is a proto-type of the world government for you.*

However, traditional anti-American orientation of many forces in Europe was routinely exploited in order to get them aboard. Thus, reporting on his talks with the former French Ambassador to the USSR, Henry Froman-Meris, Zagladin notes that his collocater tried to dispel Soviet fears of European military integration as a potential for a new arms race by playing the anti-American card:

My companion assured me that nobody in the West is thinking about a military build-up, rather the opposite. And then, lowering his voice to half-whisper for some reason, he said: "You see, it will not be an American union, it will be an European one, and not in the NATO framework". To my objection that most of the EEC members take part in NATO military organisation, my companion winced and replied: "anyway, Europe wants to have its own defence policy, and we are going to discuss the issues, connected to it, with you".

And offered in conclusion his advice:

that we 'don't over-sell' the idea of a Common European Home, don't 'scare the Europeans away'.

5. Builders at work.

So, the pro-Soviet alliance grew even wider than its initiators had ever hoped. Not only the Left, virtually the whole world idolised Gorbachev. Any of his ideas, including the 'Common European Home' were enthusiastically accepted, though most of his followers hardly understood his goals.

Thus, Jacques Chirac, then Mayor of Paris, was terribly puzzled by the idea of a 'Common European Home' (which did not prevent him from fully supporting the project). Being somewhat naive, he made a wrong conclusion after listening to Gorbachev for a while that the 'Common European Home' would consist of two different parts: socialist East and capitalist West.

If we understand you correctly, the Common European Home you have mentioned will consist of two separate constructions under one roof. As far as we are concerned, we would like to create a more uniform building, with greater intertwining of its parts, based on peace reinforced by the disarmament policy, on growing exchanges, on ever more uniform understanding of human rights, he told Gorbachev in 1989.

M. S. Gorbachev. *I think you understand our approach imprecisely. Perhaps, you don't have full information on what we actually mean.*

Judge for yourself, what may happen if you tell us: transform to what we wish you to be, while we shall wait and see. We, in turn, would address the same request to you. Naturally, nothing good would come out of that. We need different approaches.

There are certain realities: we have two systems, two military and political blocs, two sets of values innate to each of us. Now,

let's try to move the whole process forward on the basis of these realities. And, along with political contacts, let us set connections between military and political blocs, economic communities, cultural centres, capital cities etc. All of this, as we believe, would create a new situation, when the trappings of the Cold War and its alienation would be eliminated step by step.

In a word, there is a positive potential. It is like one family. There might be differences between its members, which does not prevent them from normal coexistence, from bearing responsibility for themselves and for the family. We should proceed from the existing realities rather than from ideological postulates and sympathies. As a result of communication, the exchange of ideas, the whole situation may become different. New opportunities may emerge, which we don't even suspect now, but with which we will have to deal in the future.

Probably, the most difficult question after we build the Common European Home would be that of where the main capital city should be situated...

At this point Gorbachev realised he had already told too much. So, he chuckled and said:

...But, probably, all the capitals should remain as they are.

And Chirac, happy as a lark, went away to work on that construction site. There he spent the next fifteen years, even after the chief architect of the project had to change his profession to that of a pizza seller.

Socialists were more in tune with the fundamentals and less naive.

We believe the builders' team for this home must be European-

wide, Gorbachev was telling the visiting leader of the German social democrats H.-J. Vogel. There are certain realities here, such as NATO and the Warsaw pact.

***H.-J. Vogel.** Every house must have load bearing walls. Those organizations fit the requirement. [...]*

The other two 'walls' of the building, as both of them happily agreed, were supposed to be the CMEA and the EEC.

It is important to make sure that integrational processes in both parts of Europe did not diverge.

[...] I would also like to know your attitude to the current stage of the development towards a new order in Europe, bearing in mind the interests of stability and peace. This corresponds to your ideas of a Common European Home. For we have already built the first floor of that home - West European integration, asked French Foreign Minister Roland Dumas when visiting Moscow in November 1989, eager to be assured that the blueprints are still the same.

***Gorbachev.** This is only an annexe to it.*

***R. Dumas.** Yes, we can call it an annexe. But, building the next floors, we should have a common architectural design and try to have our floors compatible.*

Dumas had every reason to be worried because the Eastern half of their common home was suddenly showing cracks all over its edifice, its rafters were threatening to fall down on the heads of the ill-fated builders. The Berlin Wall had just crumbled down to earth, exposing the weakness of the whole construction. Gorbachev urgently needed a prop-up from the Western side.

It is agreed, that the changes are gathering speed in the countries of Eastern Europe. But is the West changing? – he demanded.

R. Dumas. *This is a good question [...]*

M. S. Gorbachev. *By the way, my conversation with you is lightened by the fact that we represent two tendencies of the socialist, workers' movement. Did you not forget about that?*

R. Dumas. *If you see signs of surprise in my eyes, this is only because I was just going to say the same thing.*

But, worries aside, they continued to dream on regardless. On 19th July, 1990, Delors, properly introduced by Berthoin to Zagladin, came to Moscow. And here is what he told Gorbachev about his architectural views:

I see three floors in the architecture of Europe. The first floor is Europe of 'the twelve'. And to those who are afraid of a united Germany and the dominance of the German Mark, I say: as Germany is among 'the twelve', it will be the ECU, not the German Mark, which dominates. The second floor is Europe as a whole, including the Soviet Union. Here, undoubtedly, the problems of disarmament and measures of trust are important, but we also should think about the coming CSCE [Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe] meeting on measures in the areas of ecology, transport and energy. When the time comes and European countries' economies get close enough to each other, we can turn to what Mitterrand is talking about, to European confederation. And the third floor is the CSCE, including the USA and Canada. We involve them in the collective resolution of great problems. But Europe is growing, expanding and getting ever greater autonomy.

At this stage any more sober-minded bricklayer than our

dream-builders from cloud cuckoo land would have been running for cover, as the collapse was much in progress. Czechoslovakia had just opted out of a socialist future, Poland had already elected its first post-communist government, the Baltic states were pushing for complete independence and in the German elections the social democrats were utterly defeated. The future was bleak for Gorbachev and his Western partners could offer him little help in practical terms.

On 3rd April [1990] I met Jacques Attali, special advisor of the French president [...] reported Zagladin.

Finally, J. Attali told me that currently a plan to establish a new body is being thought over in the European Communities. A Senate of Europe is expected to be created soon, alongside the European Parliament. In the Senate separate regions, rather than countries, will be represented. For example, senators from France will be representatives of Alsace and Lorraine, Brittany, Normandy etc. From Spain there will be representatives of Catalonia, Country of Basques, Andalusia etc. Thus, not only ambitions of countries, but also those of separate regions will be satisfied.

Perhaps, J. Attali asked rhetorically, if in future the USSR is represented in the European Parliament, its separate regions, such as Lithuania, may be represented in the Senate of Europe? I asked whether Attali admitted the USSR might enter the European Community, which is necessary to be represented in the European Parliament. Attali replied: "this is, of course, the question of the future and of the further development of the USSR. But, personally, as a theorist of politics rather than a practitioner, I accept this is possible".

Alas, it was too little too late. The Soviet empire had, in essence, already collapsed, and there were no forces in the world

able to save, or rather resurrect it. But the socialists kept trying until the very end. The donkey was simply unable to face the fact that the carrot it had followed for almost a century was lost forever. And at what a moment! At the very eve of an historic victory, when the Left had finally managed to hijack the European project, and were already preparing to “build the new international order on worldwide scale”. They were beginning to believe in their invincibility.

So, they kept trying.

The Communist Party of the Soviet Union International Department wrote in a secret report, dated June 7th, 1991.

[...] the process of reforms in the countries of Eastern and Central Europe is marked by the dismantling of socialism, by elements of 'wild capitalism' being developed and by the level of the working people's social security falling down. This causes concern among the leading European parties – members of the Socialist International. They are conducting a search for means to oppose these unwanted trends in social development. [...]

Apparently, French socialists were the most vociferous. According to the report, they were worried by the problem of the survival of the socialist idea in the conditions of its crisis in Eastern Europe.

However, most of the ‘means’ the socialists suggested were various forms of chat: meetings, conferences and informal talks on such burning issues as: “*problems of relations between socialists and communists*”, “*new concept of the socialist and social democratic parties' actions in the conditions of a changing Europe*” or “*The European Community and Eastern Europe after the unification of Germany: challenge to the Left*”.

The communists tried to make even these impotent activities helpful by drawing *the attention of international political circles and the public to the unconstructive position of Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia (whom, perhaps, Bulgaria will join soon) on the problem of these countries' new treaties with the Soviet Union.*

The Warsaw Pact was dead, and the Soviets were desperately trying to substitute it with a series of bilateral treaties while the former 'brothers' were striving to wriggle out of them by hook and by crook. Who else could help at this dark hour but the old loyal Menshevik donkey! And he did oblige by putting pressure on the emerging East European democracies not to escape from the Soviet concentration camp.

At the last moment, just a few months before the Soviet collapse, no lesser figure than Pierre Mauroy (former French Prime-Minister and Vice Chairman of the SI) offered to come to Moscow and to work out a salvation strategy. And he did, too! On September 17th, 1991, a SI delegation headed by him was speaking with Gorbachev.

P. Mauroy. *A really tough question - about the future of socialism in your country. [...] You said yourself that the old communist model has disappeared. Of course, socialism in your country will be of a Soviet type, the one which suits your country. However, I am convinced that your democratic society will fit into the framework of the socialist movement developing in Europe, and in the rest of the world. [...] The fact that we are here, standing beside you after the two movements of the workers were separated for 73 years makes me all emotional. We hope that socialism, freedom, democracy will be a common destiny of your country and ours, within the framework of diversity we see today.*

Our donkey had finally got his carrot.

Within three months the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was no more. Half of the European building was lying in ruins.

6. Après le déluge.

One would expect our builders of the brave new world to become disheartened by such a catastrophe. At the very least, they should have re-assessed their project, investigated the causes of this disaster, made some corrections in the design. Or, perhaps, even abandon it altogether: after all, a need to overcome the great European divide thus saving the world from the nuclear holocaust was always cited by them as a main justification of the project. And here we were, looking at the ruins of the Soviet empire which was the only threat to peace in Europe for half a century. No need for any effort or strategy, any complex construction or sophisticated diplomacy. The divide closed on its own. We could have lived happily ever after.

At least there was definitely no need to continue building structures so similar to the Soviet ones. Yet, this is what our builders did, as if nothing happened. From the Maastricht Treaty, to the Amsterdam Treaty, to the Treaty of Nice and finally to the draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, the 'democratic deficit' grew, the layers of bureaucracy multiplied, the lies and coercion became endemic and we, the people of this ancient continent, became more and more irrelevant. Gone is the initial pretence that our nations' sovereignty is not at stake; today we are openly told about a single state of Europe as a goal of the project. Why did not they say it before, if they knew it 20 years ago? Was it in order 'not to scare Europeans away'?

Still, the ultimate truth about it is not revealed yet and is unlikely to be ever admitted by them, namely, that the whole project is nothing but a clever attempt by a bankrupt socialist nomenklatura to salvage their bankrupt utopian dream and their unearned position of power.

When they ask us to vote for their numerous treaties, why don't they simply say: Vote for Socialism!

When they force impoverished nations of Eastern Europe to join their shining city on the hill by false promises of prosperity, why don't they say in plain language: Here is a chance for you to live under socialism again!

When they offer us this monstrous grossbuch (big book) of a Constitution, as unintelligible and as lengthy as Karl Marx's *Das Kapital*, why don't they just say: Here is a roadmap to the European Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics. Vote for it!

But they don't because they know very well that no nation on earth will ever vote voluntarily for this bankrupt idea. Instead, they use every deception possible to conceal the true nature of the beast.

For those of us, however, who have already lived in the belly of that beast, the truth is self-evident. We can even predict what will happen with a good degree of accuracy. In fact, this is not a terribly difficult trick to perform as long as you remember one basic rule: utopians always deliver exactly the opposite to what they promise.

They are telling us now that one of the reasons we need such an European superstate is to avoid war in Europe. At this particular point there is no threat of war here, not at least of any serious war, but at the end of their experiment the countries of Europe will be so much at odds with each other that they will be on the verge of conflict.

We are told that it is necessary for us to suppress our ethnicity, our nationality, our prejudices, our traditions and then we would be living as multi-national communities happily ever after. We can

tell you in advance, the opposite is going to happen. After seventy three years of living in the Soviet Union which was supposed to be a happy family of nations we had so much ethnic conflicts that no other country could produce. Look at former Yugoslavia which also claimed to be one happy family of nations under socialism.

We are told today that the aim of the EU is to become prosperous. Our economy will be capable of competing with the United States thus enabling Europe to stand up for its interests. The opposite will happen. Over-regulated, over-bureaucratic, the over-taxed economy of the European Union will become very weak, the nations of Europe will become poorer and poorer and more and more dependent on the United States.

They are telling us that the peoples of the EU will enjoy unprecedented freedom and human rights. They are lying for they began by depriving us of the most basic right - a right to elect by direct ballot those who govern us. We do not elect those People's Commissars who govern the EU. And this is just the beginning. What about that sinister Europol, or Eurojust with its 'European arrest warrant', its diplomatic immunity and the power to prosecute the ill-defined 'crimes' of 'racism' and 'xenophobia'? One wonders how many former East German Stasi officers, or their colleagues from other East European countries will end up working there. Judging by the example of the latest Commission, which has seven former communist apparatchiks out of 25 Commissioners, we might have up to one-third of them. If we learned anything from the lessons of the last century, it must be the notion that every utopia ends up in a GULAG of its own. And it just remains to be seen what kind of a GULAG will the EU create.

Meanwhile, the EU will continue to expand uncontrollably, unable to stop, until it collapses in exhaustion pretty much like the late Soviet Union. In his parting speech, Romano Prodi had already drawn us a map of that expansion by including in the

sphere of EU interests the whole of the Middle East, North Africa and Turkey. And if they achieve complete integration of the whole globe, they will begin conquering the universe, as we remember. No utopian dreamer can ever stop dreaming of expansion because no utopia has ever worked in a limited space, be it a village, a town, a continent or a planet. But, once it stops expanding, it invariably collapses.

Yes, it will collapse very much like its prototype did. But in doing so it will bury us all under the rubble. And it might take a generation to clear up the mess. Do we really need to go through this?

The Authors

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The booklet

Revealed in this publication are things always suspected by many in the West: the secretive discussions between Western and Soviet Union leaders planning to create a collectivist European Union State.

The records of these discussions are so embarrassing to these various leaders that the archives have now been closed but not before the authors were able to gain access.

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